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Light  and  Truth 

AFTER 

The  World  Tragedy 

A  POLITICAL  AND  ETHICAL  ANALYSIS  OF 

THE  EUROPEAN  WAR  of  1914-1919 


By 
J.  ANTHONY  STARKE 

Author  of  these  Political  Pamphlets 

THE  TRUE  SITUATION  (1896)   Gold  Standard  i-s.  Free  Silver 

NATIONAL    EVOLUTION    (1908)     Electoral,    Immigration    and 

Office-Tenure  Reform 

SHALL  THIS  REPUBLIC  LIVE?   (1912)  The  Three-cornered  Party 

Contest  and  the  Author's 
General  Reform  Program 


New  York,  August  1st,  1921 


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Copyright,    1921 
By  J.  ANTHONY  STARKE,  New  York 

All  Rights  Reserved 

German  and  Spanish  Translations  in  Preparation 
by  the  Author 


LIST  OF  CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION    7 

A.   ANTE-WAR   POLITICAL   CONDITION 
OF    EUROPE. 

I.  1639-1793 15 

II.  1793-1815 19 

III.  1815-1870 24 

IV.  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR,  1870-1871 27 

V.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE 31 

VI.  OTHER  POLITICAL  EVENTS  CONTRIBU- 
TORY TO  THE  WAR  CONDITIONS 
OF  1914   (1854-1914) 35 

A.  The  Russo-Turkish  and  Balkan  Questions        36 

B.  The    Unification    and    Development    of 

Italy 42 

C   Germany's    Phenomenal   R'se    to    World 

Power — Her  Orierital  Expansion  Policy        44 

D.  Austria's       Political       Character       and 

Destiny 55 

E.  The  Ensuing  Combinations  of  the  Pow- 

ers— The  Triple  Alliance — Germany, 
Austria,  Italy.  The  Triple  Entente — 
England,  France,  R2issia 61 

VII.  MORAL  DELINQUENCY  AND  SPIRITUAL 
INERTIA  AS  ESSENTIAL  FACTORS 
OF  THE  WAR 75 


B.  OUTBREAK   AND    COURSE   OF   THE 
WAR. 

VIII.     RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR— The  Great 

Conspiracy — The  British  Propaganda.         79 
IX.     THE  FOOD  BLOCKADE — Its  After-War  Effects       98 

X.  ITALY,  GREECE  AND  ROUMANIA  IN  THE 

WAR — Those  Irredentas 103 

XI.     AMERICA  IN  THE   WAR 110 

A.  American    Neutrality — Sentimental    In- 

fluences.— International  Rights  on  the 
High  Seas — The  U-Boat  Warfare — 
Sinking  of  the  Lusitania — The  Psycho- 
logical  Moment  Neglected 110 

B.  The  American  Anti-German  Propaganda 

— The  German  Anti-American  Propa- 
ganda— Our  Disinterested  Motives — 
Political  Effects  of  the  War  Upon 
America 126 

XII.  THE  INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  THE 
ENEMY  COUNTRIES— The  Belgian 
Atrocities — The    Devastation     Charge 

Against  Germany 151 

XIII.      THE     DEFEAT     OF     GERMANY     AND     HER 

ALLIES 160 

A.  Strain     upon     Germany  —  Democracy's 

Opportunity — The  Wilson  Gospel — 
Military  Puzzles  Explained— America 
Turns  the  Tide  to  Victory — The 
Aftermath 160 

B.  The    Armistice.      Abdication    of    Kaiser 

Wilhelm  II.— The  Reaction  of  Des- 
pair— A  New  Germany  Revealed — 
The  Modern  Drift — A  New  Philosophy 
of  Life  Needed — The  German  State.  .      185 

C.  Austria,    Turkey    and    Bulgaria    in    the 
'  War — Self-Determination    of    Nations 

— Poland — Opportunities  for  Retalia- 
tion        211 


XIV.  PEACE  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS..   224 

A.  The  Peace  and  League  of  Falsehood — 

The  Future  Armies,  and  Disarma- 
ment— The  War  a  Fiasco — Ireland's 
Title  to  Independence  —  America's 
Disappointment  and  Awakening 224 

B.  War  and   Civilization — Misleading  Illu- 

sions— A  "Natural  View"  of  Life  as 
the  Remedy — The  True  Historical  and 
Ethical  View  of  War 236 

XV.  THE  SUMMIT— The  Nineteenth  Century- 
Progress  or  Decay — The  Philosophy 
of  "Rationalism"  vs.  Supernatural  Re- 
ligions— Its  Practical  Application.  .  .  .      247 

XVI.  AFTER-PEACE  CONCLUSIONS— The  League 
of  Nations  and  America — Modification 
of  the  Treaty — Revelations  from  Paris 
— President  Wilson's  Position — Ger- 
man and  other  War  Publications — 
Present  Situation  in  Eui'ope — England 
and  France  Show  their  Hand  at  Last 
— Final  Summary  of  the  Moral  Aspect 
of  the  War — The  Russian  Drama.  .  .  .      267 


NOTE.  The  main  occurrences  of  the  ivar  being  still  vividly 
in  the  public  mind,  a  consecutive  reading  of  this  book 
is  not  strictly  necessary.  With  this  point  in  view,  the 
separate  articles  ivere  each  made  as  complete  as  pos- 
sible. This  plan  accounts  for  the  occasional  repetition 
of  statements  v-hich   may  be  found. 


INDEX  TO  SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES 


The  War  Indemnity  of  1871 30 

Lord  Haldane's  Memoirs 54 

The   Asia    Minor    Question 71 

Succeeding:  Developments 73 

The  Kaiser's  League  of  Nations 74 

The  Serbian    Uultimatum,   etc 94 

The  Final  Ag-ony 95 

Germany's   Relative    Modernity 97 

King    Constantine's    Return 110 

May  7,  1915,  to  February  1,  1917 124 

The  Madcap  of   War 147 

The  Reign  of  Blind  Hate 148 

The  Chancellor   Crisis,   New   Peace   Moves   and   Reichstag 

Resolution  of  July  17,  1917 180 

The  Entente's  Persistence  in  War 184 

The  Kaiser's   Failure 195 

The  Prussian  Electoral  Reform  Measure 196 

World   Conquest   and   German   Jingoism 206 

The  Relative  Responsibility  of  Peoples  and  their  Rulers.  .  207 

Influence  of  the  Russian  Revolution  on  the  Course  of  the 

War  and  on  Germany's  Defeat 219 

After-War  Anti-German  Demonstrations 235 

Excrescence^  of  Religion 246 

The  Reparations  Settlement 272 

Additional  Remarks  on  the  Reparations  Settlement 273 

America's  Unbridled  Language 287 


INTRODUCTION 

The  great  war  was  ended  by  the  armistice  of  November  11, 
1918,  and  final  peace  was  concluded  on  June  28,  1919.  The 
lapse  of  time  since  has  enabled  the  public  mind  gradually  to 
emerge  fi'om  the  oppression  in  which  it  had  been  held  by  the 
awful  cataclysm  and  to  return  to  a  more  normal  state.  But 
sufficient  time  has  not  yet  passed  for  the  American  public  to 
arrive,  unassisted,  at  a  correct  comprehension  of  the  stupendous 
events  of  1914  to  1919.  The  underlying  political  conditions 
and  the  immediate  motives  of  the  great  conflict  still  remain 
indistinct  to  the  large  body  of  the  people;  the  passions  and 
prejudices  which  were  aroused  still  retain  sufficient  hold  upon 
them  to  prevent  a  correct  valuation  of  what  has  taken  place. 
However,  there  is  evidence  now  that  enough  progress  in  re- 
ceptiveness  and  insight  has  been  made  by  the  most  enlightened 
sections  for  the  fruitful  presentation  of  impartial  facts  and 
arguments  to  elucidate  the  subject.  May  truth  and  calm 
reason  now  rapidly  dispel  the  misapprehensions  and  emotional 
delusions  which  still  prevail  in  this  country  and  elsewhere 
in  regard  to  the  war! 

Many  books  have  appeared  on  the  war,  during  the  same 
and  since,  and  an  immense  amount  of  periodical  literature  all 
endeavoring  to  trace  the  causes  of  the  conflict  and  to  explain 
the  objects  of  the  contending  nations,  but  the  arguments  of- 
fered are  mostly  prejudiced,  evolved  under  the  influence  of 
abnormal  psychological  tension,  lacking  in  clearness  of  outlook 
and  adherence  to  facts.  Most  of  the  American,  English  and 
French  early  war  books  and  articles  in  magazines  and  the 
daily  papers  were  distinguished  for  absolute  one-sidedness 
and  studied  malice  of  presentation,  while  the  enemy  countries 
were  almost  entirely  deprived  of  rejoinder  by  the  operation  of 
the  censorship  abroad  and  prescriptive  regulations  in  this 
country.  Now,  however,  the  accumulation  of  enlightening  in- 
formation and  the  important  political  developments  which  have 


taken  place  since  peace  was  signed  enable  us  to  clearly  recog- 
nize and  analyze  the  true  realities  which  precipitated  the  war, 
their  historical  background  and  all  the  attendant  economic  and 
social  factors  which  combined  brought  on  the  terrible  complica- 
tion. In  the  light  of  such  examination  we  begin  to  realize  to 
what  a  distorted  state  of  emotion  and  astonishing  perversion 
of  reasoning  powers  the  entire  world,  almost,  had  been  brought 
during  the  war  by  the  nefarious  methods  which  inaugurated 
and  accompanied  the  upheaval.  Truth  was  dethroned  by  black 
deceit;  all  normal  feeling  and  judgment  became  stifled;  un- 
reasoning passion  was  given  free  run !  Our  examination  will 
also  disclose  those  disturbing  social  and  ethical  tendencies  which 
were  active  in  Europe  for  years  and  contributed  their  share 
to  the  conflict  and  its  strange  ending. 

In  its  turn,,  the  war  has  given  to  these  non-political  questions 
an  increased  importance  which  will  make  them,  perhaps,  its 
greatest  resulting  problems.  In  this  way  we  will  endeavor 
to  establish  the  correct  I'elationship  between  the  war  and  all 
the  facts  of  political  and  social  life  and  the  individual  man. 
No  other,  narrower,  examination  of  this  world  catastrophe  can 
have  any  value  of  true  information  and  furnish  us  with  real 
guiding  lessons  for  the  future.  In  order  to  reach  this  com- 
bined view  on  the  political  and  social  side  of  the  problem 
and  a  well-balanced  estimate  of  the  conflict  as  a  whole,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  present  the  war  to  a  large  extent  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Germany  and  her  allied  powers  in  order 
to  check  our  present  preponderating  impressions  with  the  other 
side  of  the  case.  We  have  been  given  the  Entente  represen- 
tation of  the  war  so  exclusively,  almost,  that  it  becomes  nec- 
essary for  us  also  to  know  the  German  view  and  relations 
of  the  war  in  all  its  factors  if  we  are  to  arrive  at  a  correct 
judgment  on  the  struggle  and  our  own  part  in  it. 

We  must,  therefore,  aim  to  be  impartial,  hide  nothing  and 
spare  no  one,  whether  it  be  on  our  side  or  on  that  of 
the  enemy.  Great  deeds  of  valor,  ability,  devotion  and  sacri- 
fice have  been  done  by  all  the  nations  engaged  in  the  war! 
From  the  merely  physical  and  intellectual  point  of  view  the 
war  is  for  all  concerned  a  testimonial  of  merit!  All  the  same, 
when  we  include  also  the  moral  and  ethical  factors  and  grasp 

8 


the  commotion  as  a  whole  the  war  is  for  all  its  actors  and  the 
world  at  large  a  picture  of  horror,  shame  and  remorse ;  the 
bright  individual  spots  are  extinguished  by  the  revolting  moral 
outrage  of  this  unwarranted  and  monstrous  fratricide!  It 
compels  us  to  denounce  the  political  motives  and  methods  which 
led  to  and  reigned  during  the  war  and  reign  to-day  in  the 
most  scathing  terms  which  language  can  find.  The  war  was 
a  nauseating  mass  of  falsehood  and  low  sordid  cunning — an 
ethical  fraud — and  a  maze  of  incomprehensible  aberration! 
This  Gordian  knot  of  foul  conceits,  calumnies  and  lies  must 
be  cut  asunder  by  fearless  strokes  of  dissecting  criticism  till 
the  truth  shall  stand  revealed  and  the  guilty  be  exposed !  In 
this  iniquitous  war  gigantic,  relentless  and  often  barbarous 
physical  forces  and  methods  were  projected  into  the  arena  and 
sustained  by  equally  unnatural,  corrupt  moral  impulses.  There 
was  an  absence,  on  all  sides,  of  grand  purposes,  of  honest  and 
true  enmities,  of  real  enthusiasm  for  a  just  cause  or  noble 
ideal;  instead  there  were  the  low  designs  of  material  ambitions, 
lust  of  power  for  its  own  sake,  all  covered  by  a  web  of  false 
pretenses.  This  war  lacked  even  the  brutal  nobility  of  openly 
avowed  conquest  or  of  a  fanatical  religious  or  general  senti- 
mental object;  it  was,  from  beginning  to  end,  the  war  of 
meanest  motives  of  all  history — the  war  of  cold,  cruel  political 
and  material  calculation — the  negation  of  all  our  moral  and 
religious  pretensions — a  crushing  accusation  against  all  man- 
kind! It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  this  base  character  of 
the  war  be  revealed  to  all  peoples  at  this  time — now — not  in 
twenty  years  hence —  if  we  wish  to  prevent  an  early  similar 
or  even  more  awful  atrocity.  The  hideous  character  of  the 
war  is  particularly  illustrated  by  the  cynical  cunning  with 
which  its  perversity  was  sought  to  be  hidden  to  the  great 
majority  of  men  in  all  countries  by  an  organized  system  of 
hypocritical  pretense,  on  the  part  of  the  Entente  powers,  of 
being  engaged  in  a  conflict  for  liberty,  justice,  human  rights 
and  civilization  against  a  barbarous  people  and  autocratic 
Kaiser  who  had  risen  to  destroy  these!  What  a  nightmare  of 
an  idea! — mendacious  and  unbelievable  on  its  very  statement. 
With  us  in  America,  alas!  this  cruel  deceit  became  transformed 
into   an   exalted   but  false   illusion   and   inspiration   which  led 


us  into  war  and  in  its  course  cost  us  over  a  hundred-thousand 
lives,  heavy  material  sacrifices  and  deep  suffering,  and  has 
brought  us  mostly  burdens  and  disappointment. 

This  book  is  not  a  history  of  the  war  in  the  ordinary  sense. 
The  reader  is  assumed  to  be  acquainted  with  the  general  course 
of  events,  diplomatic  and  military.  Reference  to  these  is 
made  only  as  appears  necessary  to  illustrate  the  author's  point 
of  view  and  elucidate  his  deductions.  The  general  trend  of 
these  has  been  indicated  in  the  preceding  statements  and  may 
be  formulated  more  specifically,  as  to  the  political  issues  of 
the  war,  as  follows: 

1.  To  show  that  the  official  advanced  war  motives  of 
America  against  Germany  were  founded  on  imperfect 
information  and  skilfully  aroused  prejudices,  and  that 
they  were  colored  and  sustained  by  an  idealism  which, 
while  genuine  as  far  as  the  large  body  of  the  people  was 
concerned,  had  been  artificially  inspired  by  an  interested 
clique  which  wanted  war  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  of 
which  some  were  as  sordid  as  those  of  the  European  En- 
tente powers. 

2.  To  repel  with  all  possible  emphasis  the  charge  that 
Germany  had  plotted  and  started  the  war  for  motives 
of  political  aggrandizement  and  a  general  policy  of 
"world  conquest,"  and  to  roll  back  this  infamous  charge 
of  her  sole  responsibility  upon  its  authors  and  restore  the 
name  of  Germany,  as  to  this  important  issue,  to  the 
estimation   in   which   it   was  held   before   the   war. 

3.  To  disprove  the  charge  of  "systematic  and  official  cruelty" 
and  "wanton  destructiveness"  in  the  conduct  of  the  war 
by  the  Central  powers  beyond  the  general  war  practice 
of  other  nations  in  an  enemy  country,  and  to  expose  and 
denounce  the  unprincipled  exaggeration  with  which  this 
charge  has  been  exploited  for  sentimental  purposes  in 
the  allied  countries,  particularly  in  America. 

4.  To  protest  against  the  annihilating  terms  of  peace  im- 
posed upon  Germany;  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  but 
particularly  upon  Germany,  and  to  ai'ouse  a  sentiment  for 
their  immediate  revision   on   lines  of  what  is  politically 

10 


just  undex'  the  conditions  of  Section  2  and  reasonably  pos- 
sible of  fulfillment.  The  admission  of  the  joint  responsi- 
bility by  all  the  powers  involved  must  become  the  basis 
of  the  peace  revision.  Also  to  insist  that  in  regard  to 
economic  questions  and  territorial  adjustments  a  settle- 
ment be  made  in  agreement  with  natural  geographical 
and  true  racial  boundaries  and  approved  by  a  free  plebis- 
cite of  the  populations  affected. 

5.  To  bring  about  gradually  through  the  realization  of  the 
fact  that  the  world  was  enslaved  by  a  mistaken  concep- 
tion of  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  war,  the  conviction 
that  a  great  wrong  has  been  done  to  Germany  and  her 
allies,  and  that,  in  reparation  of  this  wrong,  not  only 
should  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  be  revised,  as  stated  in 
Section  4,  but  these  stricken  countries  be  rehabilitated 
as  speedily  as  possible  and  their  present  acute  distress 
relieved. 

6.  In  America  to  stimulate  by  word  and  example  a  soften- 
ing of  the  aspersity  and  prejudices  which  were  aroused  by 
the  war  against  our  fellow-citizens  of  German  birth  or 
descent,  and  who  were  compelled  to  suffer  much  un- 
deserved abuse  and  heavy  material  losses.  In  these 
respects  the  war  recollection  should  be  buried  as  speedily 
as  possible.  It  would  be  thoroughly  wrong,  un-American 
and  most  regrettable  if  the  former  relations  of  mutual 
esteem  and  confidence  were  not  promptly  restored  with 
our  German-American  and  other  late  "enemy"  fellow- 
citizens,  in  business  as  well  as  socially. 

We  see  from  the  preceding  that  the  just  determination  of 
these  political  questions  is  not  a  matter  of  mere  interested 
argument  as  to  "who  is  right  and  who  is  wrong"  for  its  own 
sake  but  a  necessary  procedure  for  helping  the  world  out  of 
the  evil  consequences  of  the  war.  We  cannot  expect  to  arrive 
at  this  result  until  a  just  peace  is  determined  on  the  basis  of 
truth;  until  this  is  done  all  settlements  made  will  prove  mere 
makeshifts.  We  may,  naturally,  wish  to  squirm  out  of  our 
own  responsibilities  in  the  premises,  and  also  to  assist  our 
friends  to  do  the  same,  but  it  will  not  avail!     As  a  final  dispo- 

11 


sition  of  the  war  issues  and  results,  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
is  an  international  calumny  and  must  be  wiped  out,  cost  what 
may  in  hurt  feelings  of  national  pride  and  violation  of  opinions 
and  sentiments  with  which  we  have  deceived  ourselves!  There 
can  be  no  real  peace,  no  world  regeneration,  no  new  prosperity 
and  new  comity  among  the  nations  until  this  treaty  is  rewritten 
on  the  basis  of  war  facts  now  established  beyond  all  doubt. 
The  day  for  acknowledgment  has  come! 

The  importance  of  the  social  and  ethical  questions  related 
to  and  focused  by  the  war  conditions  is  now  fully  recognized; 
they  have  become  the  absorbing  intellectual  problem  of  the 
world,  from  philosophers  and  doctrinary  preachers  to  statesmen 
and  the  educated  of  all  nations.  The  author's  views  on  these 
questions  are  presented  in  scattered  instalments  in  connection 
with  the  text  subjects  of  articles  XII  B,  XIII  B,  XIV  and  XV. 
In  regard  to  socialism  of  every  kind  and  degree,  its  further 
spread  on  the  lines  and  aims  now  followed  is  deprecated,  the 
movement  being,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  defective  in 
several  important  respects  in  its  fundamental  theory  and  im- 
practical in  application  on  a  large  scale  through  not  taking 
sufficient  account  of  the  general  laws  of  nature  and  the  limita- 
tions of  human  nature  and  individual  character.  Socialism  will 
require  to  purify  and  strengthen  its  system  in  the  direction 
stated  in  the  text  to  enable  it  to  place  its  promise  to  mankind 
upon  a  firmer  footing.  Above  all,  socialism  and  all  the  other 
present  surging  movements  of  life  reform,  political  reform 
and  industrial  reorganization  should  be  divorced,  as  to  their 
ethical  foundation  and  pui'pose,  from  supernatural  beliefs  and 
be  founded  upon  a  natural  system  of  life  philosophy,  called 
"rationalism"  by  the  author,  and  set  forth  in  the  book  at  the 
various  points  mentioned.  The  opinion  is  expressed  that  super- 
natural religion  and  related  schools  of  thought  should  not  be 
made  the  source  and  guide  of  our  code  of  practical  life  ethics 
for  the  individual  and  society.  The  author  makes  the  attempt, 
in  all  earnestness,  to  show  that  the  false  morality  which  pro- 
ceeds from  these  phantastic  beliefs,  and  which  produced  a  fatal 
inertia  of  spiritual  outlook  as  applied  to  political  relations,  was 
in  reality  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  war.  By  their  power  of 
distorting  man's  conception  of  his  own  nature  they  promote, 

12 


instead  of  restrain  and  suppress,  the  low  selfish  impulses  of 
our  animal  character.  Religion,  as  we  understand  it  in  its 
practical  aim,  has  not  succeeded  to  enthrone  the  vii'tues  which 
it  counsels  and  has  not  brought  the  real  brotherhood  of  man — 
not  after  several  thousand  years  of  work.  Such  progress  as 
has  been  made  towards  these  ideals  is  due  almost  entii-ely  to 
the  advance  of  man's  natural  intelligence — which  carried  the 
advance  in  religious  thought  with  it — and  must  now  carry  us 
out  of  it.  The  fault  is  not  in  the  purpose  but  in  the  mistaken 
fundamental  idea  and  in  the  method  of  teaching.  It  is  these 
which  are  responsible  for  the  lamentable,  barren  results  shown 
to-day  in  the  moral  and  social  chaos  which  pervades  the  world. 
The  reader  should  thoroughly  understand  that  the  author's 
ideas  are  not  the  result  of  any  narrow  antagonism  to  religion 
as  such  but  of  a  deep  conviction  that  our  everyday  morality 
needs  a  less  illusory  foundation,  one  more  convincing  and, 
therefore,  more  authoritative  and  in  better  agreement  with 
the   quality  of   20th   century  intellect. 

The  war  has  been  a  terrible  destroyer,  not  only  of  human 
lives  and  material  possessions  but  of  beliefs,  hopes,  illusions 
and  false  ideals  of  every  kind,  in  regard  to  man's  nature  and 
the  problem  of  existence.  Surely,  our  life  philosophy  must 
be  reconstructed!  The  childish  myths  about  a  "soul"  apart 
from  the  body,  of  a  "conscious  life"  after  death,  of  the  belief 
in  "divine  providence,"  in  "eternal  justice"  and  in  a  "pre- 
determined destiny"  as  to  our  position  and  course  in  life  and 
the  occurrences  in  the  world  in  general  must  be  dismissed  as 
a  nebulous  inheritance  from  the  infancy  of  man  and  incom- 
patible with  this  age.  Nothing,  certainly,  has  been  more 
thoroughly  demonstrated  by  the  war  than  the  utter  untenability 
and  emptiness  of  these  beliefs!  These  propositions  will,  no 
doubt,  seem  very  extreme  to  many  but  they  are  not  out  of 
proportion  to  the  existing  world  malady,  neither  is  there  any- 
thing new  in  them;  doubt  about  the  supernatural  is  as  old  as 
mankind  itself.  What  we  have  stated  is  impartially  deduced 
from  the  facts  of  life  and  is  held  as  incontrovertible  in  ever 
widening  circles;  now  the  war  and  the  ghastly  exhibition  it  has 
made  of  man  has  given  to  these  views  a  glaring  vividness  and 
convincing,  basis    of   truth.      We    seem    to    have    walked    in    a 

13 


wrong  direction;  the  illusoi-y  and  supei'cilious  cliaracter  of 
our  thought  and  feeling — the  whole  false  pretense  of  our  life 
and  living — stand  to-day  exposed  and  must  be  remodeled  if 
civilized  society  is  not  to  succumb! 

In  the  article  entitled  "The  Summit"  the  conclusions  out- 
lined above  are  pursued  further,  and  the  attempt  is  made  to 
focus  not  only  the  war  and  our  immediate  life  interests  but 
the  position  of  our  civilization  as  a  whole  in  the  light  of  larger 
history  and  of  the  great  cosmic  laws  to  which  human  existence 
is  subordinated.  In  this  view  civilization  is  seen  to  come  and 
go  in  ascending  and  retreating  waves  of  achievement,  now 
carried  by  this  people  or  part  of  the  world  and  now  by  an- 
other. It  is  also  revealed  that  stagnation  and  retreat  are 
mainly  caused  by  the  failure  of  the  moral  philosophy  (religion, 
if  you  prefer)  of  a  particular  t;rne,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  by 
the  exhaustion  of  the  physical  and  mental  powers,  by  external 
subjection  or  other  material  agencies.  Applying  this  deduction 
to  our  own  time,  we  are  brought  to  the  conclusion  that  such  a 
failure  and  retreat  of  civilization  is  vividly  indicated  by  the 
actuality  of  the  war's  occurrence  and  the  general  conditions 
of  our  day.  These,  and  certain  parallel  physical  symptoms 
which  are  plainly  in  evidence,  are  a  warning  to  us  that  the 
civilized  western  world  may  have  reached  the  crest  of  such 
a  wave  of  historical  development.  Shall  we  fall  and  fail  utterly 
or,  after  a  period  of  stagnation  and  travail,  rise  again  to  new 
heights  of  achievement? 


14 


RETROSPECT  AND   PROGNOSTICATION 

DEC.  1st,  1922 

Since  the  publication  of  this  book,  important  events  have 
taken  place  which  confirm  the  position  of  the  author  in  every 
particular.  As  to  the  public,  the  four  years  of  reading  and  re- 
flection on  the  war  and  the  events  since  its  close — together  with 
the  stagnant  and  desperate  situation  in  Europe — cannot  have 
passed  without  effecting  a  far-reaching  change  in  the  opinions 
and  sentiments  of  the  American  people  and  opening  the  minds 
of  a  large  part  of  the  reading  public  to  the  truthful  presenta- 
tion of  the  war  motives,  objects  and  conduct  as  given  in  this 
book.  As  time  recedes  and  passions  cool  down,  the  Intelligent 
American  should  revive  his  interest  in  the  war  which  has  now 
become  a  great  historical  occurrence  seen  from  a  distance  and  in 
all  its  reactions.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  author  makes  the 
second  offering  of  his  book,  in  bound  form  and  accompanied  by 
an  explanatory  map.  His  treatise  is  a  historical,  political  and 
ethical  investigation  based  on  the  most  authentic  information. 

Early  in  the  year  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  Conference 
was  called  at  Washigton  by  this  government,  partly  as  a  step 
for  necessary  international  economy  and  partly  as  a  sentimental 
impulse  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  future  wars.  The  latter 
aspect  took  great  hold  upon  the  imagination  of  the  American 
people  and  engendered  many  hopes  that  war  would,  practically, 
be  abolished  by  this  conference.  Women's  clubs  and  church 
circles  were  especially  active  for  this  humanitarian  object.  But 
these  hopes  were  rudely  disappointed.  On  the  subject  of  stand- 
ing armies,  France  positively  refused  to  accede  to  any  reductions 
on  her  part;  and  her  position  effectively  closed  that  question. 
As  to  the  proposed  reduction  of  the  great  navies,  which  was 
finally  adopted  after  much  contention,  the  reduction  is  confined 
to  the  elimination  of  a  number  of  the  "old  bottoms  "  of  the  prin- 
cipal naval  powers,  but  leaves  the  most  effective  battleships, 
and  cruisers,  etc.,  intact,  so  that  the  relative  fighting  strength  and 


the  concrete  power  of  the  different  navies  remains  practically  as 
before.  The  "scrapping"  of  the  eliminated  ships  is  still  to  be 
done,  most  of  it,  both  here  and  abroad,  according  to  the  best 
available  information. 

This  conference  also  reached  a  consultative  offensive  and 
defensive  agreement  in  the  so-called  "four-power  compact" — 
between  England,  France,  the  United  States  and  Japan — to  limit 
the  possibility  of  an  outbreak  of  war  in  that  dangerous  region 
by  submitting  any  threatening  situation  which  may  arise  to  a 
conference  of  these  powers  before  hostile  action  be  taken  by 
any  one  or  more.  This  is  good  in  principle;  but  its  binding 
power  and  real  efficacy  can  only  be  tested  and  proven  by  each 
specific  case.  Yet  another  important  agreement  was  reached  by 
the  conference,  i.  e.  to  suspend  construction  of  new  naval  arma- 
ment for  a  period  of  ten  years  by  the  four  powers  previously 
mentioned  and  also  including  Italy  and  Spain — the  so-called 
"six-power  agreement."  This  is  also  good  in  principle  but  oper- 
ates much  the  same  as  the  measure  for  the  reduction  of  the 
navies  by  elimination,  leaving  their  strength  not  much  impaired. 
The  fact  is  that  there  is  sufficient  left,  all  around,  for  a  right 
royal  world  naval  fight!  Moreover,  the  important  questions  of 
the  employment  of  air-craft  forces,  of  the  sleek  submarine  and 
the  deadly  new  explosives  were  left  untouched — thanks  again  to 
the  position  taken  by  France.  It  is  amusing  to  reflect  how  all  the 
indignant  talk  during  the  war  about  "the  barbarous  Germans" 
Uoing  these  agencies  has  suddenly  been  forgotten.  Without 
doubt,  submarines,  air-craft  and  frightful  explosives  will  be  used 
by  every  nation  in  the  first  new  war  which  will  break  out! 

In  one  other  most  important  matter  the  Washington  conclave 
of  lofty  pronouncements  for  peace  and  humanity  proved  a  re- 
grettable failure  in  that  it  entirely  omitted  to  outlaw  the  employ- 
ment of  the  cruel  hunger  blockade  against  non-combatants  of  an 
enemy  country,  in  spite  of  the  awful  spectacle  enacted  in  the 
late  war  in  this  respect  and  in  spite  of  strong  pressure  brought 
upon  the  conference  from  all  parts  of  America  to  adopt  this 
humane  resolution.  Were  the  conferees  afraid  to  "arraign  the 
British"  by  such  action,  for  their  conduct  in  the  war?  We  see, 
thus,  that  the  results  of  the  Arms  Conference  were  largely  nega- 
tive; it  left  a  wide  gap  between  program  and  actual  accomplish- 


ment;  there  was  an  atmosphere  of  suspicion  and  reticense  about 
it;  the  attendance  of  some  important  nations  whose  mind  was 
made  up  before  they  came  was  merely  complimentary.  One 
nation  at  the  conference  table  preserved,  by  admirable  diplomatic 
skill,  all  its  real  objects  nnd  made  the  minimum  of  concessions, 
while  gayly  participating  in  the  general  game  of  bluff  and  sweet 
pretenses.    That  nation  was — Japan. 

Turning  to  the  situation  in  Europe — which  revolves|around  the 
"reparations"  question  like  a  wheel  around  its  axle — we  find  that 
absolutely  no  progress  has  been  made,  thanks  again  to  France,  in 
the  settlement  of  the  political  and  economic  war  inheritance. 
Conditions  in  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey, 
and  also  in  every  one  of  the  "liberated"  reconstructed  countries — 
Poland,  Szecho-Slovakia  and  Jugo-Slavia — have  gone  from  bad 
to  worse,  all  of  them  merely  "existing"  in  a  floundering  way, 
politically  and  industrially,  their  money  standards  depreciated  to 
a  cypher.  The  condition  of  these  countries,  historical  and  eco- 
nomic, is  fully  analyzed  in  the  text.  One  special  conference  after 
another  of  the  great  allied  powers  has  taken  place.  Prime  minis- 
ters have  met  and  met  again;  the  "Supreme  Council"  of  the 
allies,  the  Reparation  Commission  and  sundry  special  financial 
and  economic  commissions  have  met,  traveled  around  and  investi- 
gated, presented  "ultimati"  and  threatened  exacting  reprisals- 
all  and  all  without  results.  The  whole  of  these  proceedings 
signify  an  attempt  to  do  the  impossible — but  out  of  an  empty  pot 
you  cannot  get  any  milk.  It  comes,  in  fact,  precisely  to  this: 
The  enforcement  of  the  reparations  terms  and  other  Versailles 
peace  conditions  against  the  defeated  countries  without  a  sub- 
slantial  reduction  of  these  terms  is  simply  impossible.  This  fact 
is  now  slowly  becoming  clear  to  even  the  most  obsessed  of  the 
war  victors  and  war  "avengers."  The  story  of  Germany,  her 
struggle  for  political  and  financial  stability,  is  daily  put  before 
the  people  of  this  country  by  the  press  and  can  be  summed  up 
in  a  few  words:  Chancellor  has  succeeded  chancellor,  one  coali- 
tion party  after  another  has  obtained  governmental  control,  but 
all  have  failed  to  pump  the  billions  of  gold  marks  of  the  "repa- 
rations and  general  indemnity  bill"  out  of  a  people  completely 
impoverished,  save  for  a  small  number  of  usurers  and  speculation 
profiteers.     The  masses  are  again— after  a  very  short  period  of 


partial  recovery — next  door  to  starvation  and  complete  despair. 
Food  riots  and  looting  of  stores  are  the  daily  reports;  the 
"mark"  is  ever  falling  and  has  now  reached  the  rate  of  over 
6000  to  the  dollar,  while  before  the  war  it  was  241/^  to  the 
dollar.  Prices  of  all  commodities  are  soaring  to  a  point  which 
puts  them  beyond  the  reach  of  the  average  man,  as  wage  adjust- 
ments cannot  be  made  with  sufficient  rapidity  and  to  a  corres- 
ponding extent.  The  factories  in  Germany  are  said  to  be  "hum- 
ming" and  everybody  is  working  to  the  utmost,  but  it  does  not 
signify  a  legitimate  and  normal  "business"  with  a  profit  and  satis- 
faction for  effort  attached.  It  means  only  a  frantic  struggle  to 
pay  off  at  least  a  part  of  the  reparations  sums  with  merchandise 
to  keep  the  hated  enemy  from  still  further  encroaching  upon  the 
country  and  fastening  his  talons  still  more  upon  its  coveted 
natural  resources — coal,  iron,  other  metals,  nitrates  and  other 
chemicals,  timber,  salt,  etc.  What  an  arraignment  this  recital 
makes,  in  this  year  1922,  the  age  of  claimed  super-civilization! 
Alas  I  these  humans  of  the  most  highly  developed  countries  even 
are  daily  demonstrating  that  they  are  no  more  than  dressed-up 
brutes. 

As  to  the  Austria  of  today — the  small  fragment  of  the 
former  empire  which  now  carries  that  once  illustrious  name — 
it  is  in  a  state  of  hopeless  collapse  and  apathy,  even  worse,  if 
possible,  than  that  of  Germany.  Austria  is  cut  off  from  its 
former  agricultural  resources  and  the  extensive  industrial  activi- 
ties which  were  flourishing  throughout  its  provinces;  she  is 
incapable  of  reviving  without  the  great  powers  taking  complete 
control  of  the  government  and  the  finances  of  the  country  on  the 
basis  of  a  large  long-term  loan  and  a  substantial  reduction  of 
the  war  indemnities.  But  the  only  permanent  and  logical  solu- 
tion for  Austria's  ills  will  be,  as  stated  in  the  book,  her  amal- 
gamation with  Germany  whenever  that  country  will  have  been 
given  the  opportunity  to  regain  its  feet.  Are  the  allies  at  last 
reaching  the  same  conclusion  in  the  case  of  Austria  as  in  that 
of  Germany?  And  how  about  poor,  outraged  and  tattered  Hun- 
gary, robbed  of  her  birthright  and  territory  to  reward  a  calculat- 
ing war  ally?  When  and  how  will  this  awful  injustice  in  Europe 
ever  end?  No  one  can  tell;  but  one  thing  is  absolutely  certain 
about  it:     It  is  a  complete  demonstration  of  the  ruinous  character 


of  the  Versailles  treaty,  of  the  utter  impossibility  of  its  fulfil- 
ment. All  eyes  are  now  turned  upon  the  approaching  Brussels 
conference  of  the  allied  powers  as  the  last  effort  at  a  peaceable 
adjustment;  if  it  fails,  the  French  war  dogs  stand  ready  and 
eager  to  be  unleashed. 

But  from  Turkey  we  have  quite  another  story.  The  complete 
territorial  spoliation  of  that  country,  the  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople by  the  allies,  the  control  of  all  national  activities, 
from  government  to  business — and  to  which  must  be  added  the 
invasion  of  Asia  Minor  ty  Greece — have  raised,  after  a  period  of 
complete  de:ection,  a  powerful  current  of  nationalist  sentiment, 
in  reaction  to  the  unbearable  oppression.  Under  the  leadership 
of  the  undaunted  Kemal  Pacha  and  his  party  of  the  Angora 
government,  this  revoluntary  new  Turkey  succeeded,  after  many 
trials  and  reverses  in  the  field,  to  dislodge  and  defeat  the  usurp- 
ing Greeks  decisively  and  to  drive  them  out  of  the  country  to  the 
last  man.  It  was  a  most  remarkable  achievement,  both  as  a 
military  feat  and  in  its  political  consequences.  It  enabled  the 
new-born  Turkey  to  tear  up  the  Sevres  treaty  and  demand  of 
the  allies  the  reinstatement  of  Turkey  in  Constantinople  and 
in  the  eastern  part  of  the  ancient  province  of  Thrace,  including 
reduction  of  the  fiscal  terms  of  that  treaty.  Refusal  meant 
immediate  advance  upon  Constantinople  by  a  numerous  army  of 
victory-flushed  troops,  fresh  from  the  burning  and  looting  of 
Smyrna.  Under  the  negative  attitude  taken  by  France  and 
Italy  (who  begged  to  be  excused)  and  in,  view  of  the  Russian 
Bolshevists'  support  of  Turkey,  England  was  forced  to  yield,  or  to 
fight — single-handed — a  new  war  in  the  near  East,  a  step  she 
could  not  afford  to  take  under  all  the  domestic  and  foreign 
circumstances  of  the  empire.  This  backing-down  by  England  led 
directly  to  the  fall  of  Premier  David  Lloyd  George  from  power. 
In  Turkey,  therefore,  the  arbitrament  of  arms  has  completely 
uprooted  at  least  one  of  the  four  onerous  and  impractical  peace 
treaties  of  the  allies,  imposed  upon  their  helpless  foes  in  un- 
paralleled cruelty  and  grasping  greed,  born  of  the  blind  exulta- 
tion of  victory.  Will  similar  arbitrament  by  the  force  of  arms 
be  the  only  way,  perhaps,  in  which  Germany,  Austria,  Bulgaria 
and  Hungary  can  obtain  justice?  The  example  has  made  a  deep 
impression   in   those   countries!      When   desperate   men  have   no 


guns  and  swords,  they  will  fight  with  sticks  and  stones,  with  fire 
and  poison.    Let  France  beware! 

In  connection  with  this  reversal  of  the  situation  in  Turkey, 
and  also  with  regard  to  the  continued  paralysis  of  Europe,  may 
we  not  ask  the  question:  "Where  is  the  League  of  Nations  which 
was  to  be  an  agency  of  such  beneficent  political  regulation  for 
justice  and  lasting  peace?  How"  is  it  that  in  so  threatening  a 
situation  as  that  which  developed  in  Asia  Minor,  at  the  gates  of 
Constantinople,  the  League  was  not  assembled  to  solve  the 
problems  presented?  An  illustration  has  now  been  furnished  the 
world  that  the  League  is  merely  a  perfunctory  body,  the  existence 
and  "action"  of  which  depends  on  the  pleasure  of  the  principal 
victorious  powers  to  the  war!  The  situation  on  the  Bosphorus 
was  for  over  a  week  within  an  ace  of*  actual  hostilities  between 
the  British  and  the  Turks — yet  the  League  of  Nations  was  not 
called  in,  And  may  we,  of  the  United  States,  not  congratulate 
ourselves  to  have  been  kept  out  of  this  League,  impotent  of 
quick  and  effective  action  in  a  given  crisis  and,  yet,  capable  of 
drawing  us  int(>  dangerous  entanglements  in  the  course  of  time? 
The  factor  of  America's  participation  or  abstention  has  absolutely 
no  bearing  on  the  intrinsically  faulty  character  and  limited  scope 
of  tl^is  quasi  association  of  nations. 

In  France  there  is  in  power  today,  as  Prime  minister,  the 
man  who  more  than  any  other — or  at  least  fully  as  much  as  his 
Russian  confederate,  Sazanoff,  the  Czar's  Prime  minister  in  1914 
— is  responsible  for  the  inception  and  outbreak  of  the  great  war, 
Poincare — war-President  of  France.  Until  this  man  and  his 
extreme  party  of  "revanchists"  and  "imperial  militarists"  are 
driven  out,  Europe  will  remain  in  chaos!  Nothing  constructive 
and  conciliating  will  come  from  them  to  heal  the  wounds  of 
the  war  and  restore  old  Europe  to  life  and  hope.  We  are  again 
made  painfully  aware  of  this  spirit  from  the  very  first  utterance 
on  American  soil  by  ex-Premier  Clemenceau  of  France,  when  he 
says:  '"In  the  world  at- this  time  there  is  a  crisis  which  has  not 
been  settled."  True;  it  has  not  been  settled;  but  he  fails  entirely 
to  state  that  it  is  France  who  prevents  that  settlement  by  heij 
more  than  unbending  attitude — by  her  aggressive  designs!  M. 
Clemenceau  says,  further,  that  "this  crisis  must  be  settled  right." 
True  again;    but   for   him   and   his   political   school   this   means 


the   annexation    by   France   of  the   entire  left   bank   of  the   Rhine! 

It  is  well  known  that  France  made  the  most  strenuous  efforts  at 
the  Paris  peace  conference  to  have  this  scheme  embodied  in  the 
peace  terms  to  Germany.  When  the  plan  failed  through  the  firm 
opposition  of  England,  Italy  and  the  United  States,  France  fell 
back  u?on  the  imposition  of  such  an  enormous  indemnity  upon 
Germany  as  should  be  wholly  beyond  the  capacity  of  that  country 
to  pay,  and  would,  in  due  time,  and  partly  by  actual  provision  in 
the  treaty — give  to  France  the  opportunity  to  seize  that  territory 
for  annexation. 

The  most  accusing  omission  in  M.  Clemenceau's  argument 
is  his  refusal  to  accept  for  France  one  dot  of  responsibility  for 
the  war.  On  this  subject  he  is  as  silent  as  the  grave — for  good 
reasons!  Yet,  there  is  no  myth  of  the  war  argument  of  the  Allies 
which  has  been  more  thoroughly  destroyed  than  this  one  of 
Germany's  sole  responsibility  for  the  war.  France,  England, 
Austria  and  Russia  were  equally  guilty — each  in  its  own  way — 
and  must  assume  their  share  of  guilt,  of  war  cos';s  and  damages. 
Germany  and  her  allies  must  not  be  made  to  shoulder  the  whole 
of  the  guilt  and  to  pay  the  entire  war  bill.  Until  this  position  is 
reached,  there  will  be  no  real  progress  in  the  European  situation! 

From  press  reports  it  appears  that  ex-Premier  Viviani,  of 
France,  is  to  back  up  the  speech-making  campaign  of  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  with  a  series  of  articles  to  run  in  a  number  of  prominent 
papers  here  in  a  joint  effort  io  recapture  American  sympathy 
and  support  for  France,  preparatory  to  the  launching  of  her 
policy  of  force  against  Germany.  From  all  these  schemes  it  is 
clear  that  France  is  the  real  stumbling-block  in  the  lifting  of 
the  European  deadlock  and  misery.  England,  Italy,  the  United 
States  and  all  the  other  war  powers  have  shown  a  favorable 
disposition  for  the  reopening  of  the  Versailles  peace  terms  on  a 
basis  which  can  be  fulfilled  by  the  defeated  countries,  yet  make 
their  general  revival  possible.  In  these  circumstances  it  can 
fairly  be  prognosticated  that  if  "a  new  temper"  is  not  manifested 
by  France  at  the  forthcoming  Brussels  conference,  and  conditions 
will,  instead,  be  allowed  to  drift  to  their  logical  ending  nothing 
will  be  able  to  save  Europe  from  a  new  war  of  vengeance,  of  the 
(lercest  desperation  and  on  a  scale  of  mutual  annihilation  which 
will  pale  even  the  horrors  of  the  past  w^ar ! 


,What  has  America  to  say  at  the  vision  of  such  a  terrible  and 
imminent  possibility?  We  have,  wisely,  refrained  from  actively 
participating  in  the  political  troubles  of  Europe,  confining  our- 
selves to  their  purely  humanitarian  aspect,  and  we  surely  do  not 
want  to  enter  upon  another  war  based  on  poor  information  and 
unsound  sentiment;  yet  we  cannot  remain  indifferent  to  the 
dangerous  situation  looming  ahead,,  outraging  to  all  our  ideals 
for  peace  and  world  happiness.  Humanity,  civilization,  right 
and  justice  are  at  stake — and  we  must  take  our  part.  Is  M. 
Clemenceau,  who  has  come  here  for  a  bad  purpose,  to  be  given 
the  glad  hand  of  welcome,  approval  and  support  or,  rather,  to  be 
plainly      made      to      understand      that      the      ainis      and      methods 

of  France irreconcilable   and  aggressive are  disapproved  here? 

Let  America  speak  boldly,  and  insist  with  all  her  moral  force 
and  material  pressure — minus  any  war  threat  or  unnecessary 
asperity — that  the  political  and  financial  relations  of  Europe  musi 
be  put  in  order  without  further  delay  on  a  basis  of  plain  justice 
and  practical  common  sense,  that  the  danger  of  a  new  war  may 
be  quickly  removed,  real  peace  made  to  reign  at  last  and  these 
unfortunate  peoples  be  enabled  to  revive,  recuperate  and  live 
again! 

THE      MAP 

The  map  herewith  given  has  been  selected  as  being  a  particularly 
useful  one  to  elucidate  the  political  and  economic  features  of  the 
great  war^the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  and  its  ship  connections  to 
the  orient,  the  political  and  commercial  possibilities  connected  there- 
with and  the  visible  encroachment  carried  by  them  upon  England's 
domination  in  the  East.  The  author  contends  in  the  book  that— aside 
from  France's  "revenge"  dreams  for  1871.  this  was  the  deepest  motive 
which  precipitated  the  great  war  (the  only  one  on  England's  part)  — 
jealousy  of  Germany's  growth  in  political  importance  and  material 
strength.  ,       ^  , 

The  map  also  covers  practically  the  whole  of  the  war  theatre  and 
allows  the  militarv  events,  briefly  related  in  the  te.xt,  to  be  followed 
with  better  understanding,  especially  if  the  reader  will  have  at  hand 
any  one  of  the  numerous  detail  maps  which  appeared  during  the.  war. 

Explanation:  The  plain  red  tint  shows  the  original  boun'.ar.;  ;' 
Germany  in  1914  and  her  important  African  colonies.  Alsace-Lior- 
raine,  at  the  southwest  corner  of  Geimany.  !■  t  nt  '  ■  • 
brownish  tint  shows  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  the  countries  under  the  benevolent  political  influence  of  Ger- 
many in  connection  with  her  B-B  railroad  and  eastern  expansion  ..  - 
icv,  as  explained  in  the  text.  The  pale  pink  tint  shows  Italy,  which 
up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  was  politically  affiliated  with  Germany 
through  the  Triple  Alliance.  I'ale  pink  also  covers  Persia,  to  indicate 
the  probable  extension  of  German  political  influence  over  that  country 
as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  realization  of  her  eastern  expansion 
policy.  The  narrow  horizontal  red  hatching  indicates  the  enemy  ter- 
ritories which  were  conquered  and  occupied  by  Germany  In  tne 
course  of  the  war— in  France,  Poland,  Russia,  Serbia,  Roumania  and 
Italy. 


A.    ANTE-WAR    POLITICAL    CONDITION 

OF  EUROPE 

I.      1639-1793 

These  six  Introductory  Articles  were  written  to  furnish 
the  reader  with  the  historical  outline  indispensably  necessary 
to  enable  him  to  comprehend  the  political  and  general  situation 
in  Europe  as  it  existed  at  the  time  just  previous  to  the  war. 
Without  these  facts  fully  understood,  he  would  not  be  able 
to  gauge  correctly  the  political,  racial  and  economic  factors 
which  entered  into  the  motives  and  objects  of  the  war  on  the 
part  of  the  several  nations  involved.  The  American  reader 
needs  this  information  particularly  because  foreign  history  and 
geography  are  not  taught  to  any  great  extent  in  our  public 
schools,  such  study  being  reserved  for  the  higher  colleges.  We 
also  lack  in  our  public  life  the  animated  intei'course  which 
exists  in  Europe  between  men  for  discussing  history  and 
pending  political  questions  and  which  gives  even  to  the  Eu- 
ropean of  ordinary  education  a  fair  grasp  of  past  and  current 
events.  When  we  join  to  this  deficiency  the  circumstance  that 
the  average  American  is  too  far  removed  in  his  interests  to 
feel  a  very  keen  concern  in  the  political  affairs  of  Europe, 
except  during  some  great  event  like  the  war  just  closed,  it 
becomes  evident  that  we  may  easily  fall  victims  to  false  infor- 
mation spread  before  us  in  times  of  agitation  or  actual  hostili- 
ties by  those  interested  to  suppress  the  truth,  and  who  may 
wish  to  work  upon  our  national  pride,  racial  sympathies  or 
humanitarian  impulses  for  their  own  selfish  purposes. 

The  greatest  event  still  intimately  connected  with  the 
political  history  of  Europe  as  the  shaping  influence  of  modern 
conditions  is  the  French  Revolution  of  1789-1795.  In  its 
tempestuous  course  the  revolution  aroused   the   opposition   of 

15 


the  other  European  states,  trembling  for  the  established  social 
and  political  order  of  the  world,  and  this  brought  on  the 
"wars  of  the  French  Republic."  These,  in  turn,  produced 
General  Napoleon  and  the  defeat  of  the  extei-nal  enemies  of 
France,  yet  ultimately  led  to  the  fall  of  the  French  Republic. 
The  military  savior  turned  dictator  and  the  republic  was  suc- 
ceeded by  the  empire  and  Napoleon  as  emperor,  in  his  astound- 
ing career  of  military  and  political  triumphs.  These  ended 
in  his  own  defeat  and  eclipse  at  Waterloo,  followed  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  and  the  final,  second,  peace  of  Paris  in 
1815.  The  settlement  there  made  in  regai'd  to  the  boundaries 
and  sovereignties  of  the  different  countries  involved  in  the 
long  struggle — France,  Austria,  independently  and  also  as 
nominal  head  of  the  German  Empire,  Russia,  England,  Holland, 
Scandinavia,  Spain,  Sardinia,  and  Prussia  and  a  number  of 
smaller  independent  German  States  forming  the  Germany  of 
that  day — is  the  foundation  and  starting  point  of  modern  po- 
litical Europe. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  dwell 
in  much  detail  upon  the  events  of  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution,  of  those  preceding  it  and  of  the  Napoleonic  era. 
The  reader  who  desires  to  inform  himself  thereon  may  study 
up  on  the  story  of  these  stirring  times  from  any  of  the  standard 
books  of  history.  But  it  is  necessary  for  our  future  argument 
on  the  war  just  closed  to  recite  at  least  the  salient  facts  of 
Germany's  unfortunate  position  and  acute  sufferings  in  these 
many  wars  at  the  hands  of  France.  This  recital  will  trace 
the  origin  of  the  deep-seated  resentment  which  the  Germans 
feel  towards  the  French  in  consequence  of  these  aggressions 
and  depredations.  We  must  go  back  to  the  time  of  Louis  the 
XIV  of  France  and  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia,  in  fact  still 
further  back  to  Louis  the  XIII  and  his  famous  cardinal-minister, 
Richelieu,  to  find  the  record  that  sections  of  Alsace,  a  part  of 
Germany  since  the  Middle  Ages,  were  first  seized  by  the  French, 
in  the  year  1639,  in  the  course  of  the  complications  which  arose 
out  of  the  thirty-years'  war  of  the  Reformation  (Luther  and 
Protestantism — 1618-1648).  About  ten  years  later,  in  the 
peace  of  Westphalia  (1648),  which  terminated  that  historic 
religious  conflict,   these  first  gains  of   France   in   Alsace  were 

16 


confirmed   to  her  and  reluctantly  conceded  by  prostrate   Ger- 
many, exhausted  by  the  long  war. 

Early  in  the  reign  of  Louis  the  XIV,  concurrent  with  the 
time  of  the  Great  Elector  of  Brandenburg  (founder  of  the 
Prussian  dynasty),  the  second  incursion  of  France  into  the 
upper  Alsace  and  into  the  Palatinate,  and  beyond  the  Rhine 
into  the  Prankish  countries,  took  place,  conducted  by  the 
feared  general  Turenne.  He  devastated  these  sections  in  a 
barbarous  manner,  burning  and  pillaging  as  he  went,  and  ex- 
tending his  raids  all  along  the  rivers  Saar  and  Moselle,  in 
Lorraine  (1674-1678).  In  the  peace  of  Nymwegen  (1679)  new 
districts  of  Alsace  were  claimed  by  the  French  and  also  the 
first  tentative  hold  obtained  over  parts  of  Lorraine.  These 
successes,  made  relatively  easy  by  the  weakness  and  lack  of 
unity  of  the  small  German  princes  who  ruled  over  these  coun- 
tries, emboldened  Louis  the  XIV  to  make  additional  demands. 
He  proceeded  to  issue  his  famous  "decrees," — a  sort  of  com- 
pulsory declaration  of  political  adherence-^and  had  them  pro- 
mulgated by  the  bribed  and  overawed  "Reunion  Councils" 
which  he  had  set  up.  In  pursuance  of  these  steps  he  boldly 
seized  a  series  of  additional  towns,  villages  and  country  dis- 
tricts of  Alsace.  In  the  very  midst  of  ostensible  peace  he 
had  his  general  fall  upon  the  free  German  city  of  Strassburg 
with  a  strong  force,  disarm  the  defenders  and  compel  them, 
upon  their  knees  and  under  pain  of  instant  death,  to  swear 
allegiance  to  France  (1680).  All  these  robberies  of  German 
lands  had  to  be  conceded — under  protest — by  the  disconcerted 
and  divided  German  and  Austrian  rulers  of  these  parts,  unable 
to  defend  themselves  against  their  powerful  enemy,  and  were 
assigned  to  the  French  in  the  peace  of  1684. 

But  still  greater  trials  were  in  store  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
and  the  unfortunate  Rhine  countries  which  formed  the  buffer 
states  between  France,  on  the  one  side,  and  Austria  and 
Prussia  beyond.  A  fourth  invasion,  dictated  wholly  by  mon- 
archical ambitions  and  entirely  devoid  of  provocation  on  the 
part  of  Alsace  or  Germany,  occurred  in  the  so-called  "Orleans 
War"  for  the  succession  to  the  rule  of  the  Palatinate  (1690- 
1697),  in  which  dispute  Louis  the  XIV  was  determined  again 
to  have  his  ambition   prevail.      The   German   empire,   Austria, 

17 


the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  Savoya  were  involved  in  this  con- 
tention. In  order  to  prevent  these  enemies  invading  French 
territory,  the  French  war  minister,  Louvois,  ordered  the  sys- 
tematic and  merciless  devastation  of  the  Rhine  countries  and 
Alsace.  The  work  was  done  so  well  that  it  required  fifty  years 
for  the  afflicted  districts  to  recover  from  the  ruin  wrought  by 
the  relentless  French  general  Melac,  who  had  charge  of  the 
operations.  The  famous  fortress-castle  of  Heidelberg  on 
the  right  side  of  the  Rhine,  a  structure  of  immense  strength 
and  ramified  extent,  was  undermined  and  almost  entirely 
blown  up.  To  this  day  the  shattered  round-tower  of  the  castle 
is  a  mute  witness  to  these  outrages.  The  bridge  acros  the 
river  Neckar,  at  Heidelberg,  was  also  blown  up  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  town  laid  in  ashes.  Many  other  isolated  strong- 
holds were  similarly  destroyed.  The  cities  of  Worms  and 
Speier,  in  the  Palatinate,  shared  the  fate  of  Heidelberg;  the 
inhabitants  were  driven  out,  and  the  houses  and  the  venerable 
old  cathedrals  burned  and  all  but  destroyed.  In  the  town 
of  Mannheim  the  citizens  themselves  wei*e  compelled  to  raze 
the  fortification  walls  under  pain  of  death.  In  the  country 
districts,  fields  and  vineyards  were  uprooted,  barns  and  stocks 
of  produce  burned,  cattle  mutilated — all  by  orders  of  the 
wanton  French  government  and  its  generals,  drunk  with  power! 
The  countries  arrayed  against  France  were  unable  to  stem 
the  tide  against  the  mighty  French  monarch  with  his  well- 
equipped  armies,  skilful  commanders,  abundant  supplies;  and 
in  the  peace  of  Ryswick  (1697)  all  previously  acquired  parts 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  Palatinate,  and  many  new  conquests 
made  in  this  latest  raid,  including  several  important  towns 
and  districts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  were  confirmed 
to  France  as  the  prize  of  overwhelming  main  force  overrid'ng 
right  and  tradition  and  the  nationaHty  of  the  populations  af- 
fected. 

This  settlement  of  force  lasted  undisturbed  for  nearly  a 
hundred  years.  The  Alsatians  became  Frenchmen  outwardly, 
but  retained  their  Teutonic  national  character,  language  and 
customs  as  before.  In  1793,  however,  new  disturbances  began 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  when,  at  the  beginning  of  the  wars  of  the 
French   revolution,  as  already   related,   German   and   Austrian 

18 


coalition  troops  crossed  the  Rhine  to  put  down  the  revolution 
and  its  reign  of  blood  horrors.  In  the  course  of  this  invasion 
of  France  and  its  progress  toward  Paris,  the  Germans  held 
these  their  old  native  lands  again  for  about  a  year.  But  the 
able  French  generals  of  the  revolution  soon  turned  the  scales 
.  against  the  Germans  and  Austrians  and  broke  their  hold  in 
Alsace  completely.  In  the  disastrous  peace  of  Basel  (1795) 
France  won  back  all  and  more  than  she  had  ever  held  before 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The  whole  west  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
including  Holland,  had  to  be  abandoned  to  her  and  Germany 
was  compelled  to  accept  the  Rhine  as  "the  natural  frontier" 
between  the  two  countries.  It  was,  once  again,  a  victory  of 
might  over  right;  nothing  could  withstand  the  fierce  spirit  of 
the  French  in  the  years  of  the  revolution !  Soon  thereafter, 
however,  the  cities  of  Heidelberg  and  Mannheim,  which  had 
been  ceded  in  the  above  peace  to  France,  were  retaken  by 
Austrian  troops  after  a  violent  period  of  siege  and  destruction, 
and  rejoined  to  Germany.  All  this  perpetual  warring  and 
taking  of  lands  and  cities  had,  from  the  beginning  (in  1639), 
been  a  mere  game  of  superior  power  and  covetous  conquest  on 
the  part  of  France,  in  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  affected 
districts  had  no  voice  and  could  but  submit  and  suffer.  The 
acceptance  of  this  degrading  peace  of  Basel,  of  1795,  illustrates 
well  how  a  defeated  enemy  may  be  compelled  by  force  of 
political  circumstances  to  submit  to  onerous  terms  of  armistice 
and  peace,  although  not  entirely  crushed.  Austria  and  Prussia 
were  not  exhausted,  but  were  confronted  by  greater  troubles 
brooding  in  Poland  at  this  time  and  to  meet  which  it  was 
necessary  for  them  to  conserve  their  strength  by  a  temporary 
peace  with  France. 


II.      1793-1815 

Nothing  further  occurred  to  affect  the  political  status  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  till  1870.  But  it  is  necessary  for  our  general 
argument  to  present  a  similar  rapid  sketch  of  the  further 
military  visitations  to  which  the  Rhine  countries  and  entire 
Germany  were  subjected  at  the  hands  of  their  imperious  and 
unceasing  enemy,  France.     In  the  years  from  1793   to   1799, 

19 


during  the  wars  of  the  French  Republic  and  following  the  peace 
of  Basel  (as  already  related),  all  southern  Germany,  from  the 
Rhine  to  the  heart  of  Bavaria  and  even  into  the  Tyrol  and 
Upper  Austria,  was  intermittently  overrun  by  the  French, 
accompanied  by  battles,  siege,  fire  and  pillage.  Anyone 
acquainted  with  these  countries  knows  that  to  this  day  there" 
is  scarcely  a  town  or  city  within  them  that  has  not  got  "its 
legends  and  its  ruins"  to  point  to  as  reminders  of  the  passage 
of  the  "French  scourge"  of  those  days! 

With  the  year  1800  and  the  seizure  of  complete  power  by 
Napoleon  as  First  Consul  of  the  Republic,  the  Napoleonic  ei'a 
began.  From  its  commencement,  in  the  military  sense,  by  a 
new  raid  into  Bavaria  by  the  French  general  Moreau,  which 
culminated  in  the  battle  of  Hohenlinden  (1801),  and  thence 
through  the  entire  Napoleonic  gamut — invasion  of  Hanovtr 
(1801) — second  invasion  of  South  Germany,  capitulation  of 
the  fortress  of  Ulm  and  battle  of  Austerlitz  (1805) — formation 
of  the  compulsory  "Rhinebund"  and  dissolution  of  the  German 
empire,  the  frightful  battle  of  Jena,  surrender  of  the  principal 
fortresses  of  Prussia  and  entry  into  Berlin,  all  in  1806 — 
the  "bloodiest"  of  all  battles,  that  of  Eylau  on  the  borders  of 
Poland  (1807) — surrender  of  the  Silesian  fortresses  and  battle 
of  Friedland,  also  in  1807 — Napoleon's  triumphal  conclave  in 
the  city  of  Erfurt  (1808) — territorial  spoliation  of  Sweden 
(1809) — the  battles  of  Aspern  and  Wagram,  also  in  1809 — 
the  campaign  against  Russia,  battle  of  Borodino  and  the 
memorable  "retreat  from  Moskau"  in  flames  (1812)  —  (five 
hundred  thousand  went,  eight  thousand  came  back) — the  com- 
bats of  "the  liberation,"  ending  with  the  world-battle  of 
Leipzig,  the,  dissolution  of  the  forcible  and  hated  "Rhinebund" 
and  of  the  Napoleonic  ci'eation  of  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia 
(1813) — entry  into  Paris  by  the  triumphant  coalition  allies 
(1814)— Elba,  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  and  finally,  WATER- 
LOO (1815) — Germany,  to  its  remotest  parts,  was  the  battle- 
field in  these  tremendous  conflicts,  Germany  had  to  sustain 
and  quarter  the  French  armies  and  give  them  through-passage 
into   Austria,    Italy,    the   Netherlands   and    Russia! 

Let  the  reader  study  the  full  account  in  any  textbook  of 
history  and  fully  picture   all   this  in   his  mind  and   grasp   the 

20 


magnitude  of  the  trials  heaped  upon  the  German  people  for  a 
continuous  period  of  twenty  years  by  the  ambitions  of  this 
overbearing  neighbor-nation,  France,  and  the  unscrupulous  . 
sch(-mes  of  a  military  adventurer,  Napoleon  the  First,  and 
consider  that  all  this  had  occurred  without  any  provocation 
whatever  having  been  given  by  them!  Even  those  who  will 
not  read  the  detailed  history  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  can  form 
an  idea  from  the  above  rapid  recital  of  events — a  succession 
of  wars  and  battles  which  in  number,  magnitude  and  intensity 
had  never  before  been  crowded -together  into  the' space  of 
fifteen  years — what  this  must  have  meant  for  Germany,  who 
had  to  bear  the  physical  brunt  of  it  all,  quite  independent  of 
the  political  humiliation  and  spoliation  which  she  had  to  suffer. 
It  left  her  crushed  and  exhausted  from  every  angle. 

In  the  second  peace  of  Paris  (November,  1815)  France,  at 
last  defeated  by  the  coalition  against  her,  was  retrenched  to 
her  borders  of  1790,  which  included  Alsace  and  parts  of  Lor- 
raine, but  without  the  additional  territories  which  had  been 
ceded  to  her  in  the  peace  of  Basel  of  1795.  Considering 
all  the  historical  facts,  this  magnanimous  settlement  was  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  political  concessions  of  all  times!  Here 
was  plainly  the  opportunity  for  Prussia,  in  her  hour  of  triumph, 
to  take  revenge  for  the  many  wrongs  and  sufferings  inflicted 
upon  her  and  all  Germany,  especially  the  southern  parts 
thereof,  by  France,  and  to  make  the  claim  for  the  return  of  the 
provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  Germany  as  independent 
German  principalities  and  members  of  the  greater  empire. 
England,  Austria  and  Russia  were  willing  to  entertain  this 
proposition — but  Prussia  repelled  the  temptation!  She  hesi- 
tated to  sow  the  seeds  of  a  new  war  over  the  possession  of 
these  countries.  Napoleon,  the  firebrand  and  usurper,  who  had 
victimized  France  almost  as  much  as  he  had  all  the  other 
countries  of  Europe,  being  gone,  Prussia  did  not  desire  that 
P'rance  should  be  too  deeply  humiliated  and  torn.  Regrettable, 
fateful  generosity! — but  in  spite  of  wars  there  existed  at  that 
time  a  close  intellectual  sympathy  between  Germany  and 
France  in  philosophy,  arts  and  letters  which  justly  claimed  its 
expression  by   this  lenient  political   peace. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  establish  in   detail  all   the   political 

21 


interests  connected  with  this  perpetual  strife  between  France 
and  Germany,  from  1639  to  1815,  and  to  determine  the  exact 
responsibility  in  each  case.  France  was  brutally  aggressive, 
without  question;  but  some  blame  also  attaches  to  the  lack 
of  unity,  vaccillation  of  policy  and  bartering  covetousness  of 
the  German  kings  and  princes.  These  were  much  left  to  follow 
their  own  separate  interests,  in  the  absence  of  a  strong  political 
direction  on  the  part  of  the  nominal  German  empire  and 
Kaiser.  The  authority  of  both  was  more  titular  than  real  and 
concertedly  effective.  Austria,  which  held  the  imperial  power, 
and  whose  ruler  was  also,  therefore,  the  emperor  of  all  Gei'- 
many,  was  through  her  territorial  and  dynastic  relations  with 
Italy,  Spain,  the  Netherlands — and  even  with  France — not  in 
a  position  to  carry  on  an  effective  and  strictly  German  imperial 
policy  apart  from  her  own  interests.  The  indisputable  fact 
remains  that  from  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII  to  the  end  of  the 
revolution,  from  1639  to  1797,  the  French  were  always  the 
aggressors  in  these  wars  and  that  their  object  was  the  forcible 
acquisition  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  general  dictation 
over  the  German  countries  immediately  east  thereof.  This  is 
the  verdict  of  impartial  history.  But  under  Napoleon  I  this 
traditional  "objective"  of  France  was  quickly  widened  out  to 
obtaining  political  domination  over  entire  Germany  and  secur- 
ing actual  "administrative  occupation"  of  large  areas  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  notably  of  the  entire  provinces  of 
Westphalia  and  Hanover. 

From  the  above  it  should  be  apparent  to  the  reader  that 
for  a  period  of  175  years,  from  1639  to  1815,  Germany  suf- 
fered with  but  little  intermission  a  continuous  campaign  of 
attack  and  destruction  from  her  turbulent  and  haughty  neigh- 
bor, France.  These  violations  were  dictated  solely  by  lust 
for  increased  power  and  wealth;  there  was  an  entire  absence 
of  active  provocation  on  the  part  of  the  German  princes  of 
these  districts  or  by  the  powers  of  the  empire  or  the  inhabitants 
of  the  territories  in  question.  No  claim  of  race  identity  or 
close  relationship  even,  or  of  political  preferences  of  the  people 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  Bavarian  Palatinate  or  the  western 
Rhine  provinces  were  ever  advanced  by  France  as  a  justifica- 
tion of  her  policy  of  aggression.     All  these  peoples  were  origi- 

22 


nally  pure  German  in  stock,  language  and  customs;  they 
remained  so  in  ovei'whelming  proportion  even  up  to  1870. 
The  ethnological  proof  of  this  is  incontrovertible;  one  needs 
but  to  read  the  family  names,  those  of  the  towns  and  cities, 
rivers,  mountains  and  woods  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  be 
convinced ! 

Will  the  people  of  the  United  States,  after  reading  these 
plain  and  true  statements,  begin  to  understand  the  deep  resent- 
ment felt  by  the  Germans  against  the  French,  their  implacable 
enemy  and  despoiler  for  three  centuries?  The  story  we  have 
given  is  the  one  which  the  German  boy  and  girl  hears  from 
the  lips  of  father  and  mother  when  they  are  gathered  around 
the  fireside  and  are  old  enough  to  understand!  France  has  no 
such  story  of  unprovoked  wrong  from  the  Germans  to  tell  its 
children — not  even  to-day!  It  is  this  stoi'y  which  sinks  into 
the  young  blood  and  heart  of  German  children,  from  the  Rhine 
to  the  Baltic,  and  lurks  and  boils;  this  story  which  we  must 
understand — be  willing  to  understand — to  comprehend  the 
German  frame  of  mind  and  point  of  view  in  regard  to  France 
in  general  and  Alsace-Lorraine  in  particular.  And  at  this 
very  hour  a  new  story  of  unheard-of  rapacity  and  national 
strangulation  of  Germany  by  France  is  being  added  to  the  old! 
The  above  recital  explains  the  action  of  Germany  in  1871, 
of  rejoining  these  provinces  to  the  new  empire ;  it  also  explains 
the  attitude  and  temper  of  her  people  in  the  great  war  just 
ended  and  which,  in  the  light  of  their  experiences,  was  but  a 
deliberate  attempt  to  throw  them  down  once  more,  to  rob  them 
again  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  to  destroy  the  successful  State  which 
they  had  built  up  in  scarce  more  than  forty  years,  that  it  may 
no  longer  be  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  their  jealous  enemies!  It 
is  well  to  keep  all  this  in  mind  to  allow  us  to  correctly  appraise 
the  French  claims  at  the  "peace  table"  not  only  for  the  return 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  but  for  the  annexation  of  the  entire 
German  left  bank  of  the  Rhine!  How  shockingly  these  "out- 
rageous claims"  clashed  with  the  pretended  idealism  for  liberty, 
justice,  humanity  and  nationality  which  was  so  adroitly  put 
forward  as  the  war  motive  of  the  Entente  allies! 

Has  America  forgotten  with  what  execration  the  English- 
man was  regarded  in  this  country  for  the  one  hundred  years 


or  more  following  the  war  of  the  American  revolution?  Yet 
the  history  of  our  contention  against  England  bears  no  com- 
parison in  the  degree  of  aggravation  and  injury  to  that  of 
Germany  against  France!  Except  that  the  superficiality  of 
our  knowledge  of  the  history  of  Europe  excuses  us  somewhat, 
we  should  be  truly  ashamed  of  the  unmerited  villification  dealt 
out  to  Germany  by  America  in  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ai'gument 
with  its  cry  of  "the  crime  of  1871"  and  the  persistent  mis- 
representation of  this  question  during  the  war  and  to  this  day! 


III.      1815-1870 

From  1815  to  1870  no  military  actions  took  place  between 
France  and  Germany.  It  was  a  period  of  reaction  from  the 
political  ideas  of  the  French  Revolution  and  of  internal  political 
commotions  followed  by  monarchical  restorations  in  almost 
every  country  of  Europe.  Between  1840  and  1850  a  new 
period  of  agitation  for  democratic  institutions  set  in,  not 
only  in  France  but  in  Germany  and  other  countries.  In  the 
course  of  these  convulsions  France  became  a  republic  for  the 
second  time,  under  the  presidency  of  Louis  Napoleon,  nephew 
of  the  Great  Napoleon,  who  soon  imitated  his  uncle  by  making 
himself  emperor  of  the  French  (1852),  and  reigned  as  such 
till  1870.  In  all  other  directions,  also,  Napoleon  III  aimed 
to  revive  the  glories  of  the  former  French  empire  in  pomp, 
political  dictation,  wars  of  conquest,  in  general  vainglorious- 
ness  and  opulence  of  life,  and  he  succeeded  very  well.  France 
was  once  more  at  her  height,  Paris  again  the  mistress  of 
elegance,  the  pinnacle  of  ostentatious  civilization.  The  great 
International  World's  Fair  at  Paris,  in  1867,  was  the  triumph 
of  Napoleon's  reign,  the  scene  of  political  fraternization  among 
all  the  peoples  and  of  their  homage  at  the  feet  of  France.  To 
some  simple  minds  it  seemed  as  if  the  millennium  had  come! 

In  Germany,  during  this  period,  a  wonderful  spirit  of 
national  revival  had  arisen,  a  striving  for  concentration,  union 
of  effort  and  progress,  political  and  material.  After  the  re- 
publican movements  of  1848,  in  different  parts  of  the  country, 
and  the  reaction  which  followed  in  favor  of  firmly  governed 
monai'chial  states   on   the   pattern   of   Prussia,   the   several    in- 

24 


dependent  kingdoms  and  principalities  vied  with  each  other 
to  bring  all  their  administrative  institutions,  the  universities, 
colleges  and  art  academies,  public  school  instruction,  the 
physical  training  of  the  young  and  the  military  service  to 
the  highest  development.  All  intellectual  pursuits — literature, 
art  and  music — flourished.  Prussia  gradually  took  the  national 
leadership;  her  predominating  size  of  territory  and  rapid 
material  progress,  the  ability  of  her  kings  and  statesmen,  her 
magnificent  military  organization  on  the  basis  of  universal 
consci'iption  service  pointed  her  out  as  the  leader  to  bring 
about  a  new  united  German  fatherland — the  dream  of  the 
several  peoples  of  the  disjointed  German  nation,  from  poets 
and  scholars  to  princes  and  peasants  ever  since  the  terrible 
Napoleon  I  had  set  his  heavy  foot  upon  them.  Austria 
seemed  disqualified  for  the  task  of  active  national  leadership 
because  of  her  largely  slavic  composition  and  Italian  interests, 
if  for  no  other  reason. 

External  political  events  marched  rapidly  apace  towards 
new  and  favorable  constellations.  In  1864  Prussia  and  Austria 
were  jointly  drawn  into  a  war  with  Denmark  about  the 
succession  to  the  partly  Danish  and  partly  German  provinces 
of  Schleswig  and  Holstein.  After  a  tortuous  course  of  diplo- 
matic negotiations,  followed  by  hostilities,  Denmark  lost  the 
fight  at  both  ends  and  agreed  to  the  surrender  of  these  pro- 
vinces to  the  victors.  This  conflict  ended  with  an  acrimonious 
dispute  between  Austria  and  Prussia  about  the  division  of 
occupation  and  administration  of  the  two  provinces.  This 
laid  the  foundation  for  the  war  of  1866,  although  both  Schles- 
wig and  Holstein  were  ultimately  conceded  to  Prussia  by 
Austria  and  incorporated  into  her  dominions.  The  double 
success  of  Prussia  in  this  war,  in  which  her  new  military 
organization  had  demonstrated  its  superiority  in  actual  war- 
fare for  the  first  time,  and  her  diplomacy,  under  the  leadership 
of  Bismarck,  had  won  the  victory  over  Austria,  established  her 
predominant  position  in  Germany  beyond  question.  Soon  her 
plans  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  North-German  union  or 
"Bund"  upon  a  more  effective  basis,  eliminating  Austria,  led 
to  serious  internal  constitutional  agitations  in  Germany  itself, 
during  1864-66,  and,  together  with  the  Schleswig  issue,  finally 

25 


to  the  war  between  Prussia  and  Austria  and  to  the  fratricidal 
strife  between  the  different  smaller  German  States  and  Prussia, 
in  18G6,  many  of  which  still  vacillated  in  their  "leanings" 
between  Prussia  and  the  hereditary  Austrian  authority.  The 
dangers  and  uncertainties  of  these  times  of  external  conflict 
and  internal  fermentation  towards  a  new  national  life  weighed 
heavily  upon  the  German  patriotic  heart;  all  that  had  been 
hoped  for,  striven  for,  bled  for  in  the  war  with  Denmark 
seemed  to  hang  in  the  balance!  Unfortunately  the  far-seeing 
and  practical  ideas  of  the  king  of  Prussia,  William  I,  of 
Bismarck,  of  von  Moltke,  for  bringing  about  a  strong  and 
united  Germany  wei'e  not  fully  comprehended;  events  came 
too  rapidly  for  the  stolid  mind  of  the  mass  of  the  people; 
their  irresistible  consequences  would  have  to  be  pounded  into 
the  heads  of  princes  and  people  alike  with  cannon  shots  and 
saber  cuts! 

The  military  campaign  of  the  war  of  1866  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  developed  rapidly.  In  the  famous  battle  of 
Koeniggraetz,  or  Sadowa,  in  Bohemia,  the  Austrians  suffered 
a  crushing  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Prussia.  Her  star  now 
flamed  in  the  zenith!  The  victory  resulted  in  the  immediate 
and  complete  elimination,  thenceforth,  of  Austria  from  German 
national  political  affairs.  Those  North-German  and  South- 
German  States  which  had  risen  against  Prussia's  uncompre- 
hended  plans  were  now  quickly  defeated,  in  their  turn,  by 
Prussia.  The  states  of  Hannover,  Nassau  and  Kurhessia  were 
annexed  and  incorporated  into  her  dominions  and  their  rulers 
dethroned,  under  liberal  compensations.  The  kingdom  of 
Saxony  and  most  of  the  central  Saxon  principalities  now  en- 
tered into  the  perfected  political  union,  or  "Bund,"  with  Prussia 
and  came  under  her  complete  leadership.  The  South-German 
states  of  Baden,  Wurttemberg,  Bavaria  and  Hessia  retained 
their  constitutional  independence  but  entered  into  a  close  mili- 
tary convenion  with  Prussia  in  order  to  create  a  uniform  army 
system  for  the  whole  country.  These  political  arrangements 
provided  the  general  foundation  and  paved  the  way  for  the 
one  and  united  Gorman  Empire  which  came  five  years  later. 
As  a  fact,  the  unification  of  the  military  service  and  revenue 
customs,  establishment  of  a  federal  judicial  system  and  con- 

26 


certed  internal  legislative  action  had  resulted,  practically,  in  a 
"united  new  Germany"  even  at  that  time,  1866-1870.  (The 
contemporaneous  war,  in  1866,  between  Austria  and  Italy 
for  the  latter's  final  deliverance  from  foreign  rulers  and  her 
complete  unification  is  described  in  a  later  article  on  Italy.) 


IV.     THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR,  1870-71 

Our  review  has  now  reached  the  great  years  of  1870-71. 
Many  volumes  have  been  written  on  the  political  events  and 
diplomatic  moves  which  culminated  in  this  momentous  war, 
which  was  in  many  respects  the  most  wonderful  military  event 
of  all  history.  It  would  carry  us  too  far  to  trace  all  these 
factors  and  describe  the  course  of  the  war  in  much  detail.  The 
rise  of  the  German  federation,  under  Prussia's  leadership,  and 
the  military  strength  of  Prussia  has  been  related  in  the  preced- 
ing article.  This  was  one  of  the  factors;  another  was  the  new 
spirit  for  German  unity.  Whether  France  purposely  provoked 
the  war  of  1870  or  whether  Prussia  did,  or  whether  the  occa- 
sion was,  perhaps,  equally  welcome  to  both  sides  bears  no 
important  relation  to  the  argument  we  are  interested  in  most. 
After  all  information  available  is  sifted  down,  these  salient 
facts  appear:  That  Napoleon  III  was  deeply  chagrined  by  the 
failure  and  tragic  ending  of  the  French  expedition  to  Mexico 
to  set  up  Prince  Maximilian,  of  Austria,  as  emperor  of  Mexico, 
in  1864,  and  that  he  was  ready  to  embrace  any  opportunity  to 
restore  the  injured  prestige  of  France;  that  he  viewed  with 
apprehension  the  rising  power  of  Prussia  and  the  prospective 
early  erection  of  a  unified  and  strong  Germany  which  might 
challenge  the  pre-eminent  position  of  France  on  the  continent; 
that  he  was  fully  aware  of  the  activities  of  his  many  internal 
enemies — royalists  and  republicans — whom  nothing  could  con- 
ciliate, no  surveilance,  control  or  repression  intimidate,  and 
who  were  bent  upon  his  fall;  that  he  knew  himself  to  be,  like 
his  great  uncle,  an  usurper  of  the  imperial  power  by  force  and 
intrigue  alone  and  artificial  endorsement,  devoid  of  real  devo- 
tion by  the  people;  that  alone  great  deeds  of  glory  by  battle  or 
diplomacy  for  French  honor  and  renown  could  long  hold 
the  glamour  of  his  reign.     His  opponent,  the  astute  Bismarck, 

27 


gauged  the  position  of  Napoleon  accurately  and  felt  that  a 
war  with  France,  under  all  the  circumstances,  was  only  a 
question  of  time  and  opportunity.  He  made  his  preparations, 
military  and  diplomatic,  accordingly,  to  be  ready  when  the 
hour  of  fate  should  strike. 

A  matter  for  serious  dispute  between  France  and  Prussia 
soon  arose — the  succession  to  the  Spanish  throne — but  the 
ostensible  point  of  contention  was  merely  the  hinge  upon 
which  the  deeper  political  motives  at  work  were  balanced  and 
revolved,  until  they  finally  led  to  the  declaration  of  war  by 
France  upon  Prussia,  in  July,  1870.  It  must  be  conceded  that 
Napoleon,  a  man  of  very  high  intelligence  and  good  natural 
instincts,  was  driven  upon  this  fatal  course  by  an  ambitious 
entourage,  headed  by  the  Empress  Eugenie,  and  by  other 
circumstances  beyond  his  control;  moreover,  in  diplomatic  skill 
he  was  like  putty  in  the  master  hand  of  Bismarck!  In  his 
scheming.  Napoleon  made  one  fundamental  miscalculation: 
He  relied  upon  the  ignoble  and  unpatriotic  record  of  South 
Gei'man  princes  of  former  times  in  their  covetous  submission 
to  the  Bourbon  kings  and  to  Napoleon  the  Great,  he  believed 
that  he  could  detach  tHe  South  German  states  of  Baden, 
Wurttemberg,  Bavaria  and  the  Hessias,  which  had  not  yet 
fully  entered  into  the  German  "Bund"  (see  preceding  article) 
from  Prussia  by  adequate  promises  of  compensation.  In  this 
reckoning  Napoleon  plainly  underestimated  the  new  German 
spirit  and  purposes  for  a  united  fatherland.  In  his  moves  to 
realize  his  object  he  soon  proved  himself  no  match  for  the 
forensic  and  persuasive  diplomacy  of  Bismarck.  Napoleon's 
plans  and  hopes  in  this  respect,  and  also  in  respect  to  England, 
Austria,  Russia  and  Italy  in  his  quest  for  allies,  were  fore- 
doomed to  failure!  When  hostilities  broke  out,  France  stood 
alone  and  was  confronted  by  a  militarily  united  Germany, 
commanding  forces  which  in  numbers  exceeded  and  in  equip- 
ment and  leadership  far  outclassed  her  own.  Events  also 
pi'oved  quickly  that  the  regime  of  favoritism  and  corruption 
which  had  eaten  into  French  court  and  official  life  in  the  later 
years  under  Napoleon  III  had  left  behind  a  demoralized  army, 
inefficient  generals  and  empty  ai'senals. 

28 


The  result  is  known:  The  defeat  of  France  was  rapid  and 
complete.  Napoleon  and  General  MacMahon  were  hopelessly 
beaten  at  Sedan  and  surrendered  with  380,000  men  and  2000 
cannon;  General  Bazaine  was  crushed  in  the  series  of  frightful 
battles  around  Metz  (Gravelotte,  Saint  Prieux,  Pont-a-Mous- 
son)  and  pressed  into  the  fortress,  and  later  compelled  to 
surrender  with  180,000  men;  Paris  was  besieged  and  starved 
into  submission  after  heroic  resistance.  Previous  to  these 
events  at  Sedan  and  Metz  the  fortress  of  Strassburg,  and 
many  minor  ones,  had  fallen  or  were  ready  to  surrender.  In 
the  Southwest — along  the  Swiss  border — ^as  well  as  in  the 
West,  about  Orleans,  the  German  armies  met  with  stout  resist- 
ance, but  were  ultimately  victorious.  French  troops  fought 
valiantly  on  all  fields — as  always — and  the  Provisional  Repub- 
lican government,  under  the  genius  and  fire  of  the  great  com- 
moner, Gambetta,  made  heroic  efforts  to  arrest  the  final  dis- 
aster, but  without  avail.  The  military  collapse  of  France  was 
early  followed  by  political  revolution,  civil  war  and  the  terrible 
days  of  the  "Commune,"  marked  by  the  burning  of  Paris  and  a 
reign  of  terror  akin  to  that  of  the  great  revolution  of  1789. 
At  Sedan,  and  with  what  followed,  Napoleon  lost  his  throne 
and  soon  died  in  exile.  In  January,  1871,  six  months  only 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  German  Empire  was  pro- 
claimed and  established  in  Versailles  itself,  with  the  king 
of  Prussia,  William  I,  as  William  I,  emperor.  In  the  final 
peace  a  war  indemnity  of  5,000,000,000  francs  ($1,000,- 
000,000)  was  laid  upon  France  by  the  victors,  and  a  portion 
of  the  country  occupied  temporarily  as  security  for  payment 
of  the  indemnity.  The  territorial  exaction  was  that  the  whole 
of  the  province  of  Alsace  and  the  German  part  of  Lorraine 
were  re-annexed  to  Germany,  partly  as  an  act  of  political 
restitution  and  partly  as  a  measure  of  military  protection. 

The  world  was  consumed  with  astonishment  and  admiration 
at  the  cyclonic  rapidity  and  titanic  grandeur  of  these  military 
and  political  events!  Germany  had  leapt  with  one  bound  to 
the  front  rank  of  nations  and  in  a  short  time  became  the 
dominating  political  power  on  the  continent.  In  eulogy  of 
the  ability  and  force  demonstrated  by  Germany  in  this  war 
we  are  bound  to  add:    Compared  with  the  energy  and  concen- 

29 


tration  of  action,  the  rapid  succession  of  grand  and  decisive 
battles,  the  successful  sieges  of  Paris,  Metz,  Strassburg,  etc., 
the  whole  lightning-like  splendor  of  the  war  of  1870,  the  war 
of  1914-18  was  a  tame  exhibition  in  the  sluggishness  of  its 
immense  masses  of  men,  the  desultory  monotony  of  the  trench 
fighting,  the  total  failure  of  attaining  even  one  really  brilliant 
and  decisive  military  action  on  a  large  scale  by  either  side! 
The  staggering  loss  of  life  in  the  great  war  was  partly  due  to 
intensity  of  actions,  but  mostly  to  the  great  numbers  of  soldiers 
in  the  field,  the  destructiveness  of  the  modern  explosives  and 
machine  guns  and  the  increased  size  and  range  of  modern 
artillery.  In  genius  of  leadership,  the  war  of  1870  far  out- 
shines the  one  just  closed,  but  in  individual  valor  of  troops  on 
both  sides  the  two  wars  compare  very  favorably. 

Defeated  France,  happily,  was  not  all  a  loser  in  the  war  of 
1870-71.  The  fortunate  consequence  of  her  disaster  was — 
after  the  passage  of  a  few  years  of  turbulence  and  uncertainty 
— the  failure  of  all  monarchical  and  Napoleonistic  plots  at 
restoration  and  the  definite  establishment  of  free  government 
under  the  present  republic. 


The  War  Indemnity  of  1871.  It  is  interesting,  at  this  time, 
to  compare  the  money  indemnity  exacted  by  Germany  from 
France  in  1871 — five  billions  of  francs  in  gold — with  the 
money  indemnity  demanded  by  the  leading  Entente  Allies  from 
Germany,  now  settled  at  approximately  134  billions  of  marks 
in  gold,  equivalent  to  about  167^2  billions  of  francs  in  gold! 
(Fr.  167,500,000,000,  or  $34,000,000,000  gold,  approximately). 
In  1871  there  was,  also,  great  destruction  in  France,  and  many 
excesses — atrocities — had  occurred,  but  one  heard  little  about 
these,  either  during  the  war  or  thereafter.  The  French  took 
all  that  as  the  unavoidable  accompaniment  of  war  by  a  military 
force  in  an  enemy  country;  the  British  sentimental  propaganda 
had  not  then  been  invented!  We  will  admit,  certainly,  that 
the  wealth  of  nations  has  greatly  risen  in  the  period  between 
the  two  wars,  also  that  the  scale  of  the  later  war  was  much 
larger  as  to   men,   ships,  guns,   engineering  and   new  devices. 

30 


Yet  one  fails  entirely  to  comprehend  the  figures  demanded  from 
Germany,  except  on  the  assumption  that  something  more  than 
bona  fide  war  damages  is  included  in  and  intended  by  these 
demands ! 


V.     THE  PROBLEM  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Our  prime  interest  in  the  preceding  sketch  of  the  war  of 
1870-71  centers  in  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  which  has 
figured  so  largely  as  a  leading  motive  in  the  late  war  and  was 
one  of  the  great  problems  of  the  peace  conference.  The  his- 
toric background  of  this  question  is  given  in  Articles  I  and  II. 
As  stated,  Germany  re-annexed  these  provinces  in  1871  prima- 
rily as  a  restitution  of  lands  Germanic  in  national  character, 
language  and  traditions,  but  equally  as  a  step  necessary  fi'om 
considerations  of  military  security.  It  was  necessary  to 
protect  the  Rhine  by  a  strip  of  land  on  its  west  bank,  a  river 
generally  being  the  most  vulnerable  boundary  between  two 
hostile  countries,  no  matter  how  well  it  may  be  protected  by 
fortifications.  This  precaution  arose  from  the  certainty  felt 
by  the  German  leaders,  even  in  1871,  that  France  would  seek 
revenge  for  her  unparalleled  defeat  sooner  or  later,  whether 
Alsace-Lorraine  were  taken  from  her  or  not.  Still  more  it 
arose  from  the  voice  of  history,  the  story  of  persistent  French 
attack  and  invasion  in  the  past,  which  we  have  related  in  pre- 
ceding articles.  To  do  otherwise  would  have  been  blindness 
and  weakness  combined  on  the  part  of  Germany  in  the  cir- 
cumstances. Thomas  Carlyle,  the  renowned  English  philoso- 
pher, critic  and  historian,  wrote  as  follows  on  this  subject: 
"No  people  has  had  such  a  bad  neighbor  as  Germany  has 
possessed  during  the  last  four  hundred  years  in  France.  Ger- 
many would  have  been  mad  had  she  not  thought  of  erecting 
such  a  frontier  wall  between  herself  and  such  a  neighbor  when 
opportunity  offered."  These  are  indelible  words  from  an  ab- 
solutely impartial  thinker.  England  conceded  the  perfect  justice 
of  the  re-annexation,  and  made  no  protest  against  it  in  spite 
of  her  warm  friendship  for  France.  That  the  re-annexation 
was  not  only  proper  politically,  but  also  an  act  of  wisdom  is 
proven  by  the  fact  that  it  assisted  largely  to  secure  the  long 

31 


period  of  peace  between  Germany  and  France  which  followed 
— forty-three   years — a  fact  well  worth   remembering  to-day. 

In  order  to  maintain  a  close  connection  with  all"  that  has 
been  stated  on  this  matter  in  the  preceding  Articles,  we  will 
at  once  pursue  this  subject  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  finish. 
Nothing  of  great  moment  had  occurred  to  affect  this  question 
in  the  interval  of  peace,  from  1871  to  1914.  The  Germans 
instituted  the  complete  re-Germanization  of  the  annexed  pro- 
vinces and  spent  immense  sums  in  reconstruction  of  the  cities, 
in  promotion  of  enterprise  and  industry,  in  railroads,  canals, 
and  bridges,  in  betterments  of  every  kind.  These  efforts  to 
benefit  the  country  and  win  the  population  were  not  unac- 
companied with  some  friction,  due  to  the  rigidity  of  German 
official  methods,  but  there  was  at  no  time  any  evidence  of 
real  discontent  on  a  large  scale  with  the  nevr  political  asso- 
ciation. Such  hostile  incidents  as  did  happen  were,  naturally, 
greatly  exaggerated  in  France  and  other  countries  antagonistic 
to  Germany's  rise.  The  recalcitrant  and  irreconcilable  French 
elements  in  Alsace-Lorraine  were  encouraged  to  complain  and 
revolt  against  the  annexation  by  their  sympathizers  in  France, 
but  all  this  did  not  avail  much  as  the  substantial  benefits  of 
German  rule  became  apparent  to  the  people. 

In  France,  also,  the  solidity,  wisdom  and  benefit  of  German 
rule  was  being  recognized.  There  were  even  those  "cooler 
heads"  in  France  who  believed  that  this  national  wound  would 
ultimately  heal  if  it  were  not  being  continually  torn  open 
afresh  at  every  slight  German  provocation  of  France  by  that 
small  band  of  irreconcilables  led  by  Foreign-affairs  Minister 
Delcasse,  and  later  by  the  future  President  Poincare.  This 
agitation  was  seconded  by  articles  in  French  papers  inspired 
by  England  and  Russia,  whose  interests  were  opposed  to  the 
sincere  efforts  of  Germany  and  a  minority  of  enlightened 
Frenchmen  to  bring  about  a  genuine  rapprochement  between 
the  two  countries.  From  about  1908  on,  this  hostile  agitation 
gained  great  impetus  through  the  secret  entente  which  had 
been  effected  between  England,  France  and  Russia  by  Edward 
VII  (in  pursuance  of  deep-laid  and  long-visioned  English  ob- 
jects), and  towards  the  year  1914  had  carried  almost  the  whole 
French  nation  with  it  in  a  delirious  desire  for  revenge. 

32 


President  Wilson,  and  others,  adopting  a  term  coined  by 
the  French  soon  after  the  war  of  1870,  have  called  this  re- 
annexation  "the  crime  of  1871."  This  inflaming  term  is  a 
pointed  example  of  that  vicious  practice  of  exaggerated  lan- 
guage which  has  characterized  the  late  war  and  caused  so 
much  misunderstanding!  How  and  wherein  was  there  a  crime 
in  this  natural  and  legitimate  act  of  re-annexation?  The 
war  of  1870  had  been  honestly  fought  by  Germany;  the  terms 
of  peace  were  agreed  to  and  ratified  by  the  French  Congress; 
it  wao  in  all  respects  a  "reasonable  peace"  which  Germany  had 
exacted,  but  a  just  amount  of  indemnity  and  reparation  and 
guaranties  of  security  could  not  be  dispensed  with.  It  may 
have  been  "unwise"  of  Germany  to  re-annex  the  provinces  and 
thus  sow  the  seeds  of  later  troubles,  but  the  Germans  believed 
differently,  and  were  probably  correct  in  their  estimate  of  the 
stability  of  peace  with  France  whether  Alsace-Lorraine  were 
taken  or  not.  There  was  every  historical  and  ethnological 
reason  for  France  to  accept  the  situation  loyally  and  cultivate 
the  amicable  relations  so  sincerely  desired  by  Germany,  in- 
stead of  keeping  up  a  fateful  friction  by  the  cry  of  revenge! 
It  should  be  thoroughly  understood  by  the  American  reader 
that  it  was  not  territory  originally  French  which  was  taken  in 
1871  but  districts  which  were,  racially,  German  and  had,  in 
spite  of  a  hundred  and  seventy-five  (175)  years  of  French 
rule,  remained  overwhelmingly  German  in  character!  How 
otherwise  than  with  dismay  and  resentment  could  Germany 
view  this  perpetual  agitation  by  France  for  a  new  conflict 
the  purpose  of  which  was  to  rob  her  again  of  these  two  valu- 
able provinces  of  essentially  German  population,  which  she 
had  regained  in  a  costly  war  and  upon  which  she  had  spent 
prodigious  eff'orts  and  billions  of  money  to  bring  up  to  a  high 
level  of  development  and  prosperity? 

That  which  will  be  a  crime  is  the  intended  (now  accomp- 
lished) restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  in  the  light 
of  the  historic  facts  presented  in  these  articles  and  in  the 
face  of  the  principle  "of  nationality  and  self-determination" 
so  eloquently  urged  as  the  "guide-to-be"  in  the  territorial 
adjustments  of  the  Peace  Congress.  This  author  believes  that 
the  only  just  and  durable  solution  of  this  problem  would  be 

33 


the  autonomy  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  a  free  state,  and  its  union 
as    such    with   the  new   German   Federated    Republic,   if — as   the 

writer  believes — the  people  will  so  declare  by  a  plebiscite. 
The  people  themselves  should  be  invited  to  decide  this  (luestion 
of  preferential  allegiance  and  should  for  their  own  content- 
ment and  that  of  the  world  in  general  declare  in  a  free  and 
full  plebiscite  in  which  direction — and  in  what  proportion — 
their  political  sympathies  lie!  Only  in  such  a  settlement  will 
all  the  factors  of  this  problem  find  their  logical  and  just 
satisfaction.  To  those  Americans  and  others  who  lean  to  the 
French  side  in  this  contention  it  is  desirable  to  submit  some 
important  "practical  considerations" — studiously  kept  from 
their  view  but  of  wide  bearing  on  the  subject — in  order  to 
strip  from  this  argument  the  "halo  of  artificial  sentiment"  so 
adroitly  wound  about  it. 

It  should  be  known  that  the  protestations  of  the  French  of 
their  great  love  for  the  Alsacians  and  Lorrainers  have  a  very 
materialistic  sub-stratum :  The  coal  and  iron  fields  of  Longwy 
and  Briey  are  as  valuable  in  the  eyes  of  the  French  as  in 
those  of  the  Germans;  the  sturdy  Germanic  vitality  of  these 
people  has  been  as  a  tonic  to  the  French  nation  in  its  effete 
depopulizing  social  habits  and  has  furnished  them  great  work- 
ers, thinkers,  soldiers,  field-marshals,,  business  men  and  finan- 
ciers; the  productivity  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  agricultural  and 
dairy  lines,  fruit,  poultry,  cattle,  etc.,  is  an  important  asset 
even  for  so  richly  blessed  a  country  as  France.  It  must,  in 
addition,  be  particularly  appreciated  by  the  American  reader 
that  the  Alsace-Lorraine  of  to-day  is  not  that  of  1871.  It 
has  been  magnified  tenfold  in  all  its  activities,  wealth  and 
culture  by  the  beneficence  of  forty  years  of  German  steward- 
ship of  ability  and  honesty! 

When  the  French  rode  into  Strassburg,  Muehlhausen,  Col- 
mar,  Metz,  etc.,  at  the  end  of  the  late  war,  they  rode  into 
splendid,  stately,  clean  cities  which  spoke  of  order,  system, 
sanitation,  prosperity  and  civic  pride.  Great  industrial  estab- 
lishments were  found  throughout  the  country;  agriculture, 
farm  buildings,  cattle  stocks  were  at  the  top  of  development; 
the  smallest  places  were  found  possessed  of  waterworks,  elec- 
tric-light  plants   and    other   installations   for   modern    comfort 

34 


and  convenience;  everywhere  the  French  met  evidences  of 
progress,  prosperity  and  popular  contentment.  Surely  such 
a  country  was  a  desirable  one  to  re-annex  by  France  irre- 
spective of  any  pretensions  of  sentiment!  When  the  Germans 
rode  into  the  same  cities  in  1871  they  found  them  reeking 
with  rats,  mice,  black  roaches  and  similar  vermin  that  thrives 
on  dirt  and  negligence.  The  evidence  of  second-empire  sloth, 
official  laxity  and  public  vice  were  everywhere.  The  trans- 
formation is  significant:  It  cannot  all  be  ascribed  to  the 
general  progress  of  the  times;  it  was  not  necessary  for  the 
Germans  to  do  all  these  things;  they  are  the  result  of  the 
working  of  a  principle!  Strassburg,  to-day,  is  transfigured 
from  a  cramped-up,  dirty,  middle-age  fortress  town  to  one 
of  the  finest  of  the  many  fine  German  cities.  The  Alsatian 
and  Lorraine  people  have  been  raised  100  per  cent  in  efficiency, 
physical  and  moral  character,  general  and  technical  educa- 
tion, happiness  and  well-being.  Is  it  not  reasonable  to  assume 
that  a  people  so  benefitted  should  be  proud  of  its  new  posi- 
tion and  glad  to  remain  united  with  its  German  tyrants?  There 
are  many  among  them  living  to-day  who,  in  1870,  were  any- 
where from  16  to  36  years  of  age  and  who  have  been  wit- 
nesses of  the  transformation.  The  Germans  were  never  afraid 
of  a  popular  vote  in  Alsace-Lori-aine,  provided  it  would  be 
taken  under  proper  safeguards  to  eliminate  unfair  pressure 
by  the  French  army  of  occupation.  Just  now  the  French, 
naturally,  flatter  their  new  wards  and  exert  themselves  to 
win  their  favor;  but  in  course  of  a  little  time  Paris  will 
again  indulge  itself  in  the  witticisms  and  thinly  veiled  asper- 
sions against  the  Alsatians  which  were  so  frequently  heard 
before  the  war  of  1870.  France,  better  than  anyone  else, 
knows  that  she  can  never  convert  this  population  of  German 
race,  traits  and  physiognomy  into  real  French  people — and  the 
inborn  antipathies  will  find  sai'castical  vent  as  of  yore! 

VI.     OTHER  POLITICAL  EVENTS  CONTRIBU- 
TARY  TO  THE  WAR  CONDITIONS  OF  1914. 

(1854-1914) 

Additional  to  the  preceding  subjects  we  must  take  cogni- 
zance of  several  other  important  political  events  and  conditions 

35 


in  Europe,  long  prior  to  1914,  which  became  active' factors  in 
the  making  of  the  great  war.  We  will  describe  them  under 
the  following  divisions:  A.  The  Russo-Turkish  and  Balkan 
Question;  B.  The  Unification  and  Development  of  Italy;  C.  Ger- 
many's Phenomenal  Rise  to  World  Power.  Her  Oriental  Ex- 
pansion Policy;  D.  Austria's  Political  Character  and  Destiny; 
E.  The  Ensuing  Combinations  of  the  Powers.  All  these  events 
and  moves  on  the  European  chessboard  are  so  intricate  and 
extensive  that  it  will  not  be  possible  to  state  more  than  the 
outline  facts  of  each  gi'oup,  but  that  much  we  believe  to  be 
absolutely  necessary  to  enable  the  American  reader  to  form 
a  correct  conception  of  the  exceedingly  complicated  and  ex- 
plosive situation  which  existed  in  Europe  towards  the  fateful 
year  1914. 

A.    THE  RUSSO-TURKISH  AND  BALKAN  QUESTION 

This  problem  enjoys  the  merit  of  having  always  been 
inspired  by  the  same  motives  and  objects  and  conducted  by 
the  same  means — intentional  militant  provocation,  insidious 
diplomatic  intrigue.  Since  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great  it 
has  been  the  unmistakable  pux'pose  of  Russia  to  obtain  sea- 
shore control  and  freedom  of  shipping  from  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Aegean  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean.  A  glance  at  the 
map  is  sufficient  to  explain  this.  Russia's  northern  coast  is 
icebound ;  even  the  sheltered  port  of  Archangel  is  open  only 
for  a  part  of  the  year.  Her  Baltic  coast  is  more  free  in  this 
respect,  but  the  passage  through  the  Danish  straits  is  tortuous 
and  consumes  much  time  before  the  open  North  Sea  is  reached. 
It  is  subject  to  the  hostile  interference  of  Germany,  Denmark, 
Sweden,  and  Norway.  As  for  the  Siberian  seacoast,  it  is  too 
far  removed  from  the  most  important  part  of  Russia,  the 
western  section,  to  make  its  full  value  available  even  at  the 
present  time;  but  before  the  construction  of  the  Trans-Caspian 
railway,  from  Moskau  to  Vladivostok,  it  was  so  far  removed 
as  to  be  useful  only  for  the  fishing  industry  and  local  shipping. 
Thus  Russia,  an  immense  empire  with  a  population  of  close 
to  150  millions,  is  largely  landlocked.  Her  rapid  and  un- 
restricted intercourse  with  the  countries  bounding  on  the  Medi- 
terranean,   with    England,    with    the    Orient    through    he    Suez 

36 


J 


Canal  is  hemmed.  These  conditions,  naturally,  were  and  are 
unfavorable  for  the  legitimate  development  of  Russia's  industry 
and  commerce. 

This  geographical  disability,  and  the  consequent  political 
designs  to  which  it  gave  rise,  linked  with  Russia's  position 
as  the  head  of  the  Greek-catholic  church  and  the  natural  pro- 
tector of  all  Greek-catholic  countries  and  districts  along  the 
Mediterranean  borders,  and  of  such  populations  within  the 
Turkish  dominions,  led  to  frequent  demands  upon  Turkey  for 
redress  of  grievances,  and,  at  times,  to  sharp  protests  over 
troubles  of  violence  arising  out  of  this  general  situation. 
Under  the  great  Czar  Nicholas  (between  1850  and  1854)  serious 
friction  of  this  nature  had  arisen  between  the  Greek  catholics 
and  the  Roman  catholics  in  regard  to  the  jurisdiction  over  the 
Holy  Sepulchre  in  Jerusalem.  This  dispute  brought  on  a 
clash  of  the  "spheres  of  interest"  between  Russia  and  France, 
as  the  latter  had  assumed  to  occupy  the  same  protective  posi- 
tion in  regard  to  Roman  catholics  in  the  Orient  and  near- 
Orient  as  Russia  held  in  regard  to  the  Greek  catholics.  This 
led  to  a  state  of  embitterment  between  the  two  countries, 
between  the  Czar  Nicholas  and  Napoleon  III.  Also,  this 
situation  could  not  help  undermining  the  political  authority  of 
Turkey  over  the  catholic  christians  of  both  confessions  within 
her  own  borders.  Instead  of  yielding  to  proposals  of  com- 
promise, Nicholas,  a  masterful  man,  remained  unbending  in 
his  claims  and  increased  his  demands  for  control  over  the 
Sultan.  Russia,  moreover,  declared  herself  the  champion  of 
the  Slavic  nationalities  within  European  Turkey  at  that  time 
(Bulgars,  Serbs,  Bosnians,  Magyars,  Czechs,  Slovaks,  etc.)  who 
were  beginning  agitation  for  their  political  emancipation. 

This  attitude  soon  made  it  clear  to  the  other  powers  that 
Russia's  object  was  much  more  that  of  her  territorial  ex- 
tension and  seashore  rights  than  of  her  benevolent  interest 
in  the  Greek  catholics  and  the  Slavs.  In  consequence  of  this 
delicate  and  dangerous  political  empasse,  England  and  France 
championed  the  sovereignty  of  Turkey  and  demanded  the  re- 
cession of  Russia  from  her  defiant  attitude  for  control  over 
Turkey.  These  representations  failed  of  any  result,  and  the 
war  of  the  Crimea  broke  out  (1854-55).     In  this  war  France, 

37 


England  and  Turkey,  joined  later  by  Sardinia,  were  arrayed 
against  Russia.  For  its  short  duration,  it  proved  one  of  the 
most  costly,  in  human  life,  of  the  older  types  of  war.  The 
armies  were  exposed  to  unspeakable  sufferings  from  climatic 
hardships  and  disease,  as  during  the  campaign  the  dread 
Asiatic  cholera  broke  out  in  the  ranks.  The  most  famous  action 
of  the  war  was  the  siege  and  fall  of  the  Russian  fortress  of 
Sebastopol,  on  the  Crimean  peninsula  in  the  Black  Sea,  in 
September,  1855.  Famed,  also,  is  "the  charge  of  the  Six 
Hundred"  of  the  British  Light  Brigade,  at  Balaclava,  nobly 
immortalized  in  Tennyson's  stirring  poem.  In  the  midst  of 
these  events  Emperor  Nicholas  died  suddenly.  His  successor, 
Alexander  II,  being  more  peacefully  inclined  than  his  father, 
and  realizing  the  superior  power  of  the  enemy  coalition,  soon 
brought  the  bloody  conflict  to  an  end  by  making  accepta'ble 
concessions.  Military  honors  were  about  evenly  divided  be- 
tween ^-he  belligerents. 

The  peace  concluded  in  the  Congress  of  Paris,  1856, 
guaranteed  the  political  integrity  of  Turkey  as  she  was  before 
the  war;  it  trimmed  down  the  pretensions  of  Russia  as  the 
sole  protector  of  the  christian  slavic  Balkan  inhabitants  and, 
instead,  conferred-  this  function  upon  the  victorious  signatory 
countries,  extending  it  also  to  the  christian  peoples  of  Asiatic 
Turkey.  This  settlement  laid  the  foundation  of  at  least  one 
side  of  that  ever-burning  Balkan  question.  From  that  time 
on,  numerous  atrocious  massacres  and  persecutions  of  Chris- 
tians, and  consequent  insurrections  arising  out  of  these  religi- 
ous and  racial  animosities,  have  taken  place  in  the  Balkan 
countries  and  in  the  christian  sections  of  Asiatic  Turkey,  not- 
ably in  Armenia,  and  have  deeply  stirred  European  feeling 
against  the  Turk.  In  consequence,  a  second  war  occurred 
between  Turkey  and  Russia  on  the  same  issues,  1877-78.  This 
was  followed  by  a  politico-religious  war  between  the  allied 
Balkan  States  and  Turkey,  and,  later,  by  a  political  war 
among  the  Balkan  States  themselves,  and  ending  finally  by  one 
between  the  Balkan  States  and  Greece.  This  succession  of 
wars,  together  with  the  four-years'  war  just  concluded,  have 
made  of  that  south-eastern  corner  of  the  map  of  Europe  a 
veritable    cockpit!      Yet,    in    1914,    the    Balkan    question    was 

38 


still  far  from  being  settled ;  to  the  religious  and  racial  strife 
against  the  Turk  there  was  now  joined  the  keen  contention 
for  individual  nationality  among  these  peoples.  Within  a 
comparatively  small  territory  there  are  thrown  together  in 
that  area  some  seven  or  eight  nationalities,  and  semi-nationali- 
ties: Greece,  Eoumania,  Bulgaria,  Servia,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
Montenegro  and  Albania,  to  which  we  must  add  Hungary, 
Ci'oatia,  Slavonia,  Turkey  and  Italy  .  to  make  this  political 
crazy-quilt  complete.  The  Balkan  and  adjoining  slavic  na- 
tionalities are  largely  intermixed  along  their  real  and  imaginary 
boundary  lines,  and  the  whole  area  is  permeated  by  Greeks, 
Turks,  Italians  and  numerous  Jews,  also  some  Austrians  and 
Germans.  Each  country  claims  parts  of  the  others  on  ethno- 
logical and  historical  grounds;  each  has  proud  traditions  of 
former  independence ;  they  all  claim  the  glories  of  ancient 
Greece  and  Rome  as  their  heritage.  In  reality  they  are  a 
collection  of  "wreckage  peoples,"  evolved  from  the  transition 
periods  of  ancient  civilizations,  mixed  with  nomadic  settlers 
from  the  east  and,  hence,  of  most  indefinite  lineage.  In 
character  they  are  turbulent,  hot-blooded,  ignorant,  vengeful, 
treacherous  and  cruel  and,  therefore,  of  the  worst  possible 
political  reputation.  They  have  been  the  trouble-makers  in 
Europe  for  75  years;  if,  figuratively  speaking,  the  whole  of 
them  could  be  made  to  disappear  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea, 
it  would  be  a  benefit  for  the  peace  of  the  world ! 

England  is  directly  responsible  for  this  exasperating  and 
baffling  state  of  affairs.  By  nourishing  in  these  peoples, 
under  the  impulse  of  Gladstone's  humanitarian  eloquence,  an 
inordinate  sense  of  importance  quite  beyond  their  deserts  and 
the  nationalistic  possibilities  of  the  situation  as  it  stood  at 
that  time,  she  directly  encouraged  their  restlessness  and  vi- 
olence, increased  the  racial  jealousies  between  them  and  inter- 
fered with  the  natural  evolution  of  these  related  countries  to 
a  strong  and  united  slavic  state  under  Austrian  guidance — the 
fertile  scheme  of  the  murdered  prince  Francis  Ferdinand! 

The  Balkan  question  is  important  to  our  argument  in  that 
it  furnished  one  of  the  causes  of  the  great  war.  The  peace 
of  Paris  (1856)  by  no  means  succeeded  to  make  Russia  give 
up  her  ambitions  along  the  southern  waters;  this  ambition  is 

39 


her  natural,  her  necessary  national  policy.  She  now  turned 
further  east,  to  Asia,  to  find  a  way.  By  the  gradual  conquest 
of  Turkestan  and  the  Caucasus  district,  by  the  instigation  of 
a  revolt  in  Afghanistan  against  England  in  India,  and  by  the 
occupation  of  parts  of  Persia  she  sought  a  position  of  political 
influence  in  these  countries  to  enable  her  to  reach  her  object 
at  least  partly  at  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Arabian  Sea.  But 
these  steps  were  blocked  by  England  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Afghan  insurrection,  1880.  In  the  Balkans,  having  been  check- 
mated by  the  great  powers  in  her  direct  line  of  action,  she 
resorted  to  intrigue  and  cabal  to  further  her  designs  and  used 
these  states  as  "a  club"  towards  her  most  direct  antagonists, 
Austria  and  England,  as  the  Balkan  states  carried  an  in- 
herent and  constant  threat  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  Russia 
now  urged  with  increasing  insistence  her  "slavic-race  protec- 
torate" argument,  her  racial  and  dynastic  relationship  with 
Serbia  in  particular,  and  by  both  these  agencies  woi'ked 
through  the  Balkan  states  for  the  achievement  of  her  own 
political  purposes:  The  elimination  of  Turkey  from  Europe; 
possession  of  or  dictation  over  Constantinople;  acquisition  of 
Aegean  and  Adriatic  sea  ports;  complete  freedom  of  navigation 
through  the  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles  for  her  commercial  ships 
and  navy.  For  the  realization  of  this  program  in  p]urope, 
Russia  would  probably  have  been  willing  to  renounce  definitely 
any  further  designs  to  reach  the  Persian  gulf  and  Arabian 
Sea.  This  aspect  of  the  matter  is  important  as  it  carried 
within  itself  the  possibility  of  that  later  rapprochement  with 
England  which  atually  took  place  and  was  such  an  important 
factor  for  the  war  of  1914.  The  connection  is  plain:  England 
could  afford  to  look  with  much  less  concern  upon  Russia 
obtaining  her  southern-sea  outlet  policy  in  European  than  in 
Asiatic  waters  because  of  the  lesser  danger  therefrom  to 
Ind^a.  For,  holding  the  Suez  Canal  and  Gibraltar,  she  had  it 
in  her  power,  with  her  superior  fleet,  to  block  any  sea  aggres- 
sion from  the  Mediterranean  from  any  or  all  the  countries 
bounding  thereon. 

All  the  same,  these  schemes  of  Russia  were  opposed  to 
the  interests  of  England  on  general  political  principles  as 
well    as    on    account    of   India,   and    were    opposed    to    the    in- 

40 


terests  of  Austria  because  of  the  latter's  long  historical  and 
necessary  economic  association  with  the  Balkan  states  and 
Adriatic  countries,  and  because  of  her  established  position 
on  the  east  coast  of  the  Adriatic,  from  Trieste  to  Antivari. 
This  was  Austria's  only  sea  coast,  and  her  commercial  and 
naval  ports  were  located  there;  she  could  not  entertain  their 
{lossession  being  questioned  from  any  quarter.  And,  in  more 
recent  years,  a  new  antagonist  to  Russia's  Balkan  policy  arose 
— Germany — by  her  plans,  also  from  economic  necessity,  to 
extend  her  supply  sources  and  markets  eastward  through 
Austria,  the  Balkans,  the  Black  Sea  and  Turkey  into  Mesopo- 
tamia, to  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  gulf  in  order  to  reach  the 
Orient  by  a  quicker  and  safer  route  than  that  by  the  sea  past 
England,  France,  Spain,  Gibraltar,  the  Mediterranean,  past 
Malta  and  through  the  Suez  Canal!  This  grand  and  bold 
German  scheme  necessarily  carried  with  it  the  making  of 
confidential  and  financial  conventions  with  the  countries 
through  which  this  line  of  communication — the  Berlin-Bagdad 
railroad — -was  to  pass,  to  guarantee  the  physical  necessities 
and  safety  of  the  line.  Russia's  fear  of  Germany  in  this 
enterprise  was  not  so  much  due  per  se  to  the  latter's  plans 
of  commercial  extension  than  to  the  interference  she  was  sure 
would  flow  from  the  accompanying  alliances  with  her  own 
policy  of  securing  freedom  of  shipping  ports  and  political 
position  along  the  Aegean  and  Adriatic.  It  must  be  acknowl- 
edged that  Russia  was  honest  enough  to  disclaim  any  suspicion 
that  Germany's  proposition  carried  with  it  any  deeper  political 
plot  of  permanent  annexations,  or  that  silly  bugaboo  of 
"world  dominion"  ascribed  to  her  by  the  Entente  enemy.  Yet, 
these  great  plans  of  Germany  not  only  threatened  to  thwart 
Russia  but  were  also  a  formidable  challenge  to  England;  they 
would  strengthen  Germany's  commercial  position,  extend  her 
sphere  of  political  influence  and  bring  her  dangerously  near  to 
Persia  and  to  India  itself.  Thus  this  near-oriental  compli- 
cation with  its  irreconcilable  interests  was  the  most  important 
factor — the  Russo-English  factor — that  brought  on  the  war  of 
1914.  Its  acute  development  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the 
succeeding  articles. 

41 


B.     THE  UNIFICATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  ITALY 

This  historical  event  engages  our  interest  more  in  its 
accomplishment  than  in  the  processes  of  its  evolution,  but  the 
latter  are  one  of  the  most  fascinating  studies  of  modern  his- 
tory. Italy  as  "a  country"  has,  like  Germany,  been  more  a 
political  term  than  national  identity.  There  were  independent 
kingdoms  and  principalities  of  great  number,  and  many  of  them 
dominated  by  foreign  ruling  dynasties.  Of  such,  Austria  had 
held  a  strong  hold  in  central  and  upper  Italy  for  several 
hundred  years.  The  struggle  for  Italian  unity  is  comparatively 
a  recent  event,  1858-1866,  disregarding  the  earlier  movements. 
After  the  war  between  France  and  Austria,  1858-60,  in  which 
Napoleon  III  had  championed  the  cause  of  Italian  unity  and 
independence  from  foreign  yoke,  and  which  defeated  and  dis- 
solved several  of  the  Bourbon  and  Austrian  kingdoms  and 
smaller  principalities,  there  followed  a  series  of  revolutions  in 
lower  Italy  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Kingdom  of  Naples 
(founded  by  Napoleon  I).  This  movement  was  led  by  the 
famous  patriot  Garibaldi.  Soon  thereafter  a  number  of  minor 
dynastic  conflicts  occui'red  in  Lombardy,  undertaken  by  the 
strong  and  patriotic  king  of  Sardinia,  Victor  Emanuel,  for 
the  final  clean-up  of  these  small  sovereignties,  native  as  well 
as  foreign.  These  conflicts  and  revolutions,  which  extended 
from  the  Sicilies  to  northern  Italy,  resulted  in  a  few  years' 
struggle  in  a  united  country,  but  not  as  a  republic,  as  so 
many  had  hoped,  but  as  a  kingdom  under  Victor  Emanuel  of 
Sardinia,  a  man  who  had  not  only  proved  his  ability  and 
leadership  in  this  struggle  for  nationality,  but  had  won  the 
confidence  and  regard  of  the  entire  people.  The  province 
of  Venice  and  the  Papal  State,  the  latter  under  strong  French, 
Spanish  and  Austrian  protection,  alone  were  left  out  of  the 
fold.  Seldom  before  in  the  history  of  mankind  have  the 
united  and  inspiring  eff'orts  of  but  a  few  able,  high-minded 
and  patriotic  men  succeeded  to  fire  a  people  to  such  a  pitch 
of  national  enthusiasm — Cavour,  Garibaldi,  Mazzini  and  Victor 
Emanuel — and  attained  in  so  short  a  period  so  complete  and 
magnificent  a  political  success  for  their  ideals.  To  emperor 
Napoleon   III,  his  liberal  mind,  political  intelligence  and  well- 

42 


meaning  interest   United   Italy  also   owes   an   eternal   debt   of 
gratitude. 

In  186G,  when  the  war  clouds  began  to  rise  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  for  the  final  trial  of  strength  for  German  leader- 
ship, king  Victor  Emanuel,  morally  supported  by  Napoleon  III, 
saw  the  opportunity — and  did  not  hesitate  to  seize  it — for 
rlefiniteiy  expellingr  the  remaining  hated  rule  of  Austria  from 
the  province  of  Venice,  the  last  of  the  true  Italian  provinces 
still  in  foreign  possession.  (The  Papal  State  was  always 
regarded  in  a  light  not  purely  political  and  was,  also,  an 
absolutely  native  state  within  Italy.)  Austria  was,  however, 
in  spite  of  her  pressing  difficulties  with  Prussia,  unwilling  to 
cede  Venice  without  a  struggle,  to  satisfy  her  prestige  at 
least,  and  thus  war  resulted  between  the  two  countries.  After 
a  few  engagements  between  the  opposing  armies,  running  paral- 
lel with  Austria's  disastrous  campaign  in  Bohemia  against 
Prussia,  and  likewise  unfavorable,  she  was  compelled  to  yield. 
As  a  result,  Venice  had  to  be  ceded,  and  was  united  with  Italy. 
Thus  the  watchword  of  the  Italian  wars  of  the  liberation 
"Free  to  the  Adria,"  was  at  last  made  a  reality. 

This  happy  unification  of  Italy  ran  about  parallel  in  point 
of  time  with  that  of  Germany  which  had,  practically,  begun  in 
the  same  year,  1866,  with  the  reconstructed  North-German 
"Bund."  In  the  course  of  their  subsequent  development, 
after  1871,  many  reciprocal  political  and  economic  interests 
and  cultural  sympathies  sprang  up  between  these  two  coun- 
tries. Germany,  by  its  new  political  position,  greater  size 
and  industrial  activity  the  leader,  invited  Italy  to  join  her — 
with  Austria — to  form  the  historic  "Dreibund,"  or  Triple  Al- 
liance, one  of  Bismarck's  great  diplomatic  designs  and 
triumphs.  Nothing  speaks  more  for  his  skill  and  broad- 
minded  outlook  than  this  success  to  conciliate  Austria  with 
Germany  and  also  with  Italy  only  a  few  years  after 
wars  of  the  most  bitter  enmity  had  been  fought  between  them. 
In  return  for  the  security  which  this  political  alliance  guaran- 
teed to  Germany,  Bismarck  was  able  to  extend  Germany's 
fostering  and  protecting  hand  over  Italy  in  the  years  of 
her  development  to  a  first-class  power.  More  than  once  the 
gathering  clouds  of  jealousy  and  enmity  that  rose  from  other 

43 


countries,  particularly  France  and  England,  and  foreboded 
danger  to  Italy's  adventures  of  foreign  acquisition  in  Tunis, 
Tripoli  and  Abyssinia  were  thus  held  aloof  and  dissipated  by- 
Germany's  powerful  arm.  In  the  industrial  and  economic  sense, 
also,  this  same  combination  of  helpful  and  stimulating  effects 
which  flowed  from  the  Triple  Alliance  can  be  said  to  have 
been  "the  making  of  modern  Italy,"  the  upbuilding  of  her 
material   progress. 

This  propitious  relationship  was  violently  torn  asunder  by 
Italy's  perfidious  course  of  selfishness  in  aligning  herself  with 
the  Entente  allies  in  the  war  and  against  Germany  in  the  face 
of  her  binding  treaty  obligations.  While  Italy's  action  was 
not  a  direct  contributary  cause  of  the  war,  it  had  an  important 
effect  on  its  course  and  final  outcome.  One  can  venture  the 
statement  without  much  uncertainty  that,  with  Italy  remaining 
neutral,  Germany  and  her  allies  would  have  won  the  war.  The 
details  of  Italy's  faithlessness  and  ingratitude  for  the  benefits 
received  from  Germany's  friendship  and  protection  form  one 
of  the  most  drepressing  chapters  of  the  war.  This  topic  will 
be  further  pursued  in  its  proper  connection  in  a  later  article. 

C.      GERMANY'S  PHENOMENAL  RISE  TO  WORLD  POWER 

Her  Oriental   Expansion   Policy 

The  rise  of  the  German  Empire  after  the  war  of  1870-71 
was  like  that  of  a  phoenix;  at  her  height,  in  the  years  just 
preceding  1914,  Germany  was  the  cynosure  of  all  eyes!  This 
astounding  success  was  due  to  the  wise  and  solid  foundation 
from  which  the  German  State  had  been  developed — unification 
not  merely  physical  and  external  but  organic  and  internal.  In 
nothing  else  has  the  versatile  genius  of  her  great  statesman — 
Otto  von  Bismarck — shown  more  brilliantly  than  in  this  work 
of  organizing  the  country  for  attaining  a  solid  future.  The 
dominating  ability  of  his  external  diplomatic  policy  was  even 
surpassed  by  the  penetrating  intelligence  of  his  internal  policy: 
In  the  amalgamation  of  the  many  differing  elements  of  ad- 
ministration and  public  life  of  what  had  formerly  been  some 
thirty  or  more  separate  German  States  into  one  harmonious 
whole;   in  the  conversion  of  the  thirty  diffei'ent  standards  of 

44 


money,  weights  and  measures,  judicial  procedui'e,  police  laws, 
post-office  service,  railroads  and  other  public  ti-ansportation 
factors,  etc.,  into  one  national  standard  in  each  class.  With 
all  this  went  the  complete  unification  of  the  military  service, 
financial  and  banking  laws,  public  and  higher  education.  Hav- 
ing the  common  language,  the  addition  of  this  standardizing 
and  unifying  of  all  the  elements  of  public  administration,  in- 
tercourse and  business  agencies  made  the  people  and  the 
country  a  homogeneous  whole.  The  task  of  accommodation 
required  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  take  up  all  these  changes 
was  a  tremendous  one,  but  the  intelligence  and  patience  of 
the  Germans  were  equal  to  the  demand! 

In  the  economic  field  Bismarck's  policy  was  built  upon  the 
basis  of  a  stimulating  protective  tariff  and  favorable  com- 
mercial treaties;  by  fostering  and  protecting  ship-building, 
mining,  forestry  and  agriculture  by  state  subsidies;  by  creating 
facilities  for  obtaining  working  capital  through  establishing 
of  banks  and  co-operative  loan  societies ;  by  a  well-balanced 
system  of  taxation,  etc.,  all  of  which  combined  started  the 
wheels  of  industry  a-humming  in  Germany  at  undreamed-of 
speed.  Two  agencies  were  the  special  fertilizers  of  this  pro- 
gram: The  first,  the  five  billions  of  francs  of  French  war- 
indemnity  gold  which  poured  into  the  c(^ntry  in  a  steady 
stream  like  a  blessing  from  heaven;  the  second,  the  establish- 
ment of  a  chain  of  the  most  highly  organized  commercial,  in- 
dustrial and  higher  technical  schools  spread  throughout  the 
country,  and  also  of  such  for  agriculture,  mining  and  forestry, 
thus  harnessing  every  phase  of  science,  investigation  and  prac- 
tical experience  to  the  chariot  of  industry.  Under  this  com- 
bination opportunity,  the  golden,  was  laid  at  the  feet  of  the 
German  people  in  boundless  profusion  and  was  seized  by  them 
with  an  energy,  intelligence,  systematic  application  and  solidity 
of  business  methods  which  achieved  a  success  to  astonish  the 
world ! 

In  its  train  immense  manufacturing  establishments  arose 
in  all  parts  of  the  country;  steamships  and  sailing  vessels, 
counting  thousands  of  the  finest  ships  afloat,  plied  from  the 
North  Sea  and  Baltic  poi'ts  to  every  part  of  the  world ;  a  net 
of  railroad  lines  of  the  highest  class  of  construction  and  equip- 

45 


ment  was  spread  over  the  empire ;  macadamized  highways 
linked  together  the  cities  and  towns,  and  canal  systems  hetween 
the  rivers  made  cheap  transportation  to  tide  water  possible. 
As  a  result  production,  exports  and  imports  increased  from 
year  to  year  to  prodigious  figures  comparable  only  to  those  of 
England  or  the  United  States.  All  energies  were  strained  to 
the  utmost  and  brought  prosperity  to  all  and  untold  national 
wealth. 

The  entire  internal  life  of  the  nation  shared  in  this  progress. 
Magnificent  cities  arose,  adorned  by  grand  public  buildings, 
monuments,  parks  and  boulevards;  the  medium-sized  and 
smaller  towns  shared  proportionately  in  this  wave  of  improve- 
ment and  enjoyed,  down  to  the  smallest  villages,  the  triumphs 
of  modern  science  as  applied  in  sanitary  drainage,  waterworks, 
electric  lighting  systems,  telegraph  and  telephone  service, 
public-health  regulations  and  hospitals,  fire  departments,  etc. 
The  educational  system  of  Germany  and  her  universities,  famed 
since  the  Middle  Ages,  were  brought  to  that  highest  degree  of 
theoretical  and  practical  instruction  which  made  them  the  pin- 
nacles of  learning  and  the  Mecca  to  which  students  came  by 
the  tens  of  thousands  annually  from  every  part  of  the  globe. 
German  research  in  history,  archeology,  natural  sciences,  bi- 
ology, chemistry,  electricity,  abstract  and  applied  philosophy 
achieved  a  position  of  world  renown  and  musters  the  names 
of  many  of  the  most  famous  men  in  these  studies.  In  litera- 
ture, music  and  the  drama,  art  and  architecture  works  of 
great  force  and  originality  were  prdduccd  that  excited  universal 
admiration.  And  not  least  was  the  practical  sociological  de- 
velopment which  took  place  in  the  new  Germany.  The  physical 
and  moral  well-being  of  the  working  population  was  safe- 
guarded by  wise  and  just  laws  which  recognized  its  importance 
to  the  State,  and  the  standard  of  living  of  the  entire  people 
was  raised  from  one  of  severe  frugality  to  one  of  greater 
variety  and  plenty. 

This  sociological  side  of  the  modern  State  received  in  no 
other  country — monarchy  or  republic — such  wide  recognition 
and  effect  as  in  Germany;  nor  were  these  progressive  measures 
of  social  justice  entirely  the  result  of  socialistic  agitation,  but 
largely  the  voluntary  acts  of  an  enlightened  administration  and 

46 


public  opinion.  The  institutions  for  the  sick,  the  needy, 
the  criminal,  the  imbecile  and  entirely  demented  were  raised 
to  the  highest  grade  of  efficient  and  economical  service.  By 
the  introduction  of  wise  factory  and  labor-protective  laws, 
of  the  woi'kmen's  compensation  act,  compulsory  life  insurance 
of  the  employee  by  the  employer  and  a  system  of  old-age 
pensioning  of  the  workers  that  great  scourge  of  humanity, 
breeder  of  sickness,  vice  and  crime — POVERTY — was  practi- 
cally abolished  in  Germany!  All-in-all  and  everything  was  done 
with  the  well-known  German  qualities  of  thoroughness,  atten- 
tion to  detail,  honesty  and  faithfulness  to  duty! 

It  fairly  baffles  the  imagination  to  form  a  complete  mental 
picture  of  this  highly  educated  German  people  throbbing  and 
seething  with  life-activities  of  every  kind — 65  millions 
crowded  together  in  a  territory  only  a  little  larger  than  the 
State  of  Texas — when  we  consider  their  many-sided  and  in- 
tensely social,  emotional  and  sentimental  character;  their  deep 
interest  in  all  the  arts  and  sciences;  in  music,  literature  and 
advanced  philosophy,  all  deployed  and  enjoyed  in  the  self- 
consciousness  of  complete  political  and  material  success!  Such 
a  mental  picture  would  be  that  of  the  much  named,  little  un- 
derstood and  foolishly  derided  "German  Kultur"!  And  this  is 
the  country  which  had  to  be  destroyed  by  envious  greed  and 
stupid  hatreds  born  of  pride  and  lust  of  power;  this  the  country 
which  is  accused  to  have  plotted  the  destruction  of  civilization! 

Politically,  the  growth  of  Germany's  position  and  influence 
was  developed  by  her  ruler  and  statesmen  apace  with  her 
internal  and  commercial  progress.  Her  political  position  was 
to  be  not  merely  a  part  of  the  great  work  but,  in  fact,  its 
i)asis,  its  necessary  basis  of  peace.  Only  upon  a  basis  of 
secure  and  long-continued  peace  could  Germany  grow  and 
prosper  to  her  ligitimate  national  greatness.  But  within  that 
seething  caldron — Europe — it  was  possible  only  by  the  crea- 
tion of  a  strong  army  and  navy,  ready  to  strike  at  a  day's 
notice — and  a  resolute  foreign  policy  to  indicate  that  this 
force  would  be  used  without  hesitation  when  necessary  to 
guard  her  security — to  attain  the  desired  condition,  the  con- 
tinued peace  of  Europe!  The  military  readiness  of  Germany 
was,  thus,  a  blessing  to  all  nations;  it  was  not  at  all  a  matter 

47 


of  free  choice  by  Germany  but  imposed  upon  her  by  her  vul- 
nerable geographical  position  in  the  center  of  Europe,  sur- 
rounded by  hereditary  foes.  A  country  so  located  cannot  begin 
to  prepare  for  war  when  war  from  without  is  actually  upon 
her,  and  one  or  more  enemies  are  ready  to  invade  her  terri- 
tory from  land  or  sea,  or  both.  Thus  this  Germany,  in  all 
its  desire  for  and  necessity  of  peace,  was  secretly  ever  trem- 
bling beneath  its  success  and  outward  serenity  in  the  certain 
expectation  of  war,  sooner  or  later,  of  war  of  revenge,  envy 
and  hate ;  she  knew  at  all  times  that  her  enemies  were  but 
waiting-  for  their  opportunity!  Yet,  any  such  war  in  which 
Germany  might  have  at  any  time  become  involved  could,  on 
her  part,  only  have  been  a  defensive  war.  The  self-evident 
truth  of  this  statement  is  proven  by  the  forty-three  years  of 
uninterrupted  European  peace,  1871-1914,  during  which  time 
difficult  political  situations  had  arisen  on  several  occasions 
which  brought  war  perilously  near,  but  the  outbreak  of  which 
was  prevented,  each  time,  by  Germany's  resolute  attitude  and 
military  preparedness,  based  on  her  determined  policy  to  pre- 
serve the  peace  in  her  own   interest  and  in  that  of  all  Europe! 

This  great  and  splendid  German  Empire  was  in  very  large 
measure  the  woi'k  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  who  followed  upon 
the  foundation  builders — Bismarck  and  the  aged  emperor  Wil- 
helm I- — and  the  galaxy  of  able  and  devoted  men  who  worked 
with  them.  He  succeeded  his  father,  the  ill-starred  and  beloved 
Frederick  III,  who  at  the  death  of  William  I  was  in  the 
grip  of  a  fatal  illness  and  died  after  but  a  few  months  of 
reign.  The  success  of  William  II  was  not  due  to  any  striking 
qualities  of  statesmanship  akin  to  genius,  but  to  his  broad 
general  purpose  and  liberal  progressive  attitude  on  all  questions 
concerning  the  welfare  and  reunion  of  the  country  and  its 
people;  to  his  confident,  Joyous,  exuberant  enthusiasm  for 
the  empire!  When  the  present  wave  of  abuse  will  have  dis- 
appeared, history  will  undoubtedly  give  him  much  credit;  ra- 
tional Germany  does  it  ungrudgingly  even  to-day.  In  judging 
Wilhelm  II  it  may  be  overlooked  that  in  a  monarchy  of  the 
semi-autocratic  constitution  of  Germany  the  head,  king  or 
emperor,  is  the  source  from  which  must  flow  a  large  share 
of  the  initiative  and   directing   inspiration,  and   which  may — 

48 


as  such — prove  either  the  life-giving  impetus  or  the  death- 
dealing  blight  for  the  national  destiny.  Emperor  William 
proved  himself,  in  this  sense,  a  true  leader  of  his  State  and 
Country,  and  in  all  situations  a  man  of  very  high  intelligence 
and  political  insight,  of  firmness  of  purpose  and  noble  patriotic 
ambition.  And  he  fully  realized,  up  to  the  very  outbreak  of 
the  war,  the  spiritual  and  material  object  of  his  reign:  To 
achieve  by  a  policy  of  uninterrupted  peace  and  ready  strong 
defense  the  upbuilding  of  the  German  nation  to  a  foremost 
position  in  the  world!  A  man  of  high  moral  character  and 
true  Prups'an  unbending  righteousness,  of  profound  religious 
feeling,  possessed  of  fine  judgment  and  enthusiastic  instincts 
for  the  arts  and  sciences  and  all  the  beautifying  and  stimu- 
lating influences  of  life  Kaiser  Wilhelm — leaving  aside  a  few 
minor  vagaries  and  weaknesses  of  character — was  a  man  and 
emperor  of  whom  the  German  nation  has  reason  to  be  proud, 
to  whom  the  German  nation  should  be  deeply  grateful  even 
in  the  hour  of  his  fall!  The  unmerited  abuse,  the  infamy  of 
every  species  which  has  been  heaped  upon  his  head  by  the 
enemy  nations  and  many  neutrals  and — saddest  of  all — by  the 
blind  and  vulgar  of  his  own  people  are  an  arraignment  of 
the  fairness,  moral  decency  and  sense  of  justice  of  our  time. 
He  is  accused  of  heinous,  impossible  crimes;  but  impartial 
history  will  say  that  his  crime  consisted  merely  in  his  audacity 
to  stand  up  in  defiance,  backed  by  his  people,  against  the  En- 
tente plot  to  subdue  and  humiliate  and,  if  necessary,  crush  and 
break  up  the  German  empire! 

The  fame  of  Germany's  internal  institutions,  like  that  of 
her  manufactures  and  business  methods,  went  abroad  every- 
where and,  in  return,  attracted  visitors  to  the  country  from 
all  parts.  And  while  that  which  they  saw  elicited  unstinted 
praise,  these  evidences  of  the  working  of  a  truly  "mutualized 
State" — mutualized  between  the  citizen  and  his  government, 
between  his  obligations  and  the  returns  received  in  practical 
benefits — these  evidences  of  an  elevated  national  consciousness 
nevertheless  excited  envy  and  jealousy  in  many.  Here  was 
a  country  in  which  public  administration  was  not  only  capable 
and  economical  but  also  strictly  honest;  the  taxpayer's  dollar 
went  further  than  anywhere  else;  the  whole  "reciprocal  con- 

49 


ception  of  "the  State"  as  an  entity  was  on  a  higher  plane. 
Americans,  particularly,  who  went  to  Germany  in  thousands 
"to  see"  were  disagreeably  touched  In  their  political  prejudices 
to  find  that  so  ideal  a  State,  so  efficient  an  administration 
had  been  attained  under  a  monarchy,  a  semi-autocracy  in  fact, 
while  at  home  in  their  own  country,  under  democratic  insti- 
tutions and  the  aegis  of  "liberty"  they  beheld  everywhere 
the  curse  of  incapacity,  extravagance,  graft  and  open  bribery 
undermining  the  public  service,  all  of  which — while  fully 
recognized  and  aired  in  the  public  press — is  condoned  by  a 
humdrum,  self  satisfied  political  attitude  by  and  on  behalf  of 
the  citizen.  The  French  Republic,  likewise,  in  the  looseness 
and  corruption  of  its  internal  administration,  had  its  ire  aroused 
by  the  precision,  smoothness  and  completeness  of  the  German 
public  service.  Political  scholars  who  had  asserted  the  superi- 
ority of  democratic  institutions  over  monarchical  ones  saw  in 
Germany  an  irksome  contradiction  of  their  arguments,  in  many 
respects.  All  the  same,  many  of  the  practical  administrative 
methods  and  humanitarian  socialistic  innovations  of  Germany 
for  the  greater  efficiency,  protection  and  contentment  of  the 
great  body  of  the  people  were  diligently  copied  in  England, 
America    and    other    countries. 


(~\F  the  details  of  the  formation  of  Germany's  famous 
^^  political  association — the  Triple  Alliance — in  support  of 
the  empire's  consolidation  and  development,  we  shall  speak 
later.  This  alliance,  and  its  later  extensions,  was  the  founda- 
tion of  her  Oriental  Expansion  Policy  which  was  one  of  the 
foremost  causes  of  the  war.  The  industrial  and  shipping 
competition  of  Germany  was  felt  and  resented  more  keenly  by 
England  than  any  other  country.  Germany's  leading  produc- 
tions interfered  less  with  the  trade  of  France,  Belgium  and 
the  United  States  than  with  that  of  Great  Britain  and,  as 
to  shipping,  the  bulk  of  the  freight  and  passenger  service  of 
the  world  was  in  the  hands  of  Germany  and  England.  This 
threat  to  the  supremacy  of  the  latter  in  manufacturing,  com- 
merce and  shipping,  or  at  least  the  serious  encroachment  upon 
these,  challenged  England  to  the  depths  of  her  national  pride. 

50 


Never  before  had  she  countenanced  a  rival,  nor  would  she  do 
so  now!  She  had  defeated  the  rivalry  of  Spain,  of  Holland 
and  of  France,  one  by  one,  and  would  likewise  crush  the 
rivalry  of  Germany,  cost  what  may!  This  was  the  feeling  in 
England — as  attested  by  the  utterances  in  the  press,  in  books, 
in  parliamentary  debates — even  before  the  Berlin-Bagdad  Rail- 
road Scheme  was  launched  by  Germany;  but  when  that  project 
came  into  the  open  and,  in  spite  of  England's  and  France's 
stubborn  opposition  during  a  tortuous  course  of  negotiation, 
left  no  further  doubt  of  its  being  executed,  together  with  all 
the  attendant  changes  of  "political  balance"  in  the  near-Orient, 
the   die  w^as  cast ! 

The  general  idea  of  the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  was  simple 
enough.  The  increasing  industrial  production  of  Germany 
made  the  question  of  raw  materials,  new  markets  and  security 
from  interference  acute.  The  near  East  and  further  Orient — 
Mesopotamia,  Persia,  India,  China,  Japan,  the  Dutch  and 
British  possessions  and  the  east  coast  of  Africa,  where  Ger- 
many had  an  important  colony — offered  sources  of  supply  and 
markets  as  well.  If  a  railroad  line  could  be  arranged  through 
Austria,  Bulgaria,  Turkey  and  Mesopotamia  to  Bagdad  and 
the  Persian  gulf,  with  a  water-link  through  the  Black  Sea 
and  one  down  the  Tigris  river,  together  with  all  the  necessary 
economic  and  fiscal  conventions  with  the  countries  along  the 
route,    the    problem    would    be    solved! 

This  plan  promised  not  only  to  meet  the  direct  economic 
need  from  which  it  sprang  but  would  have  opened  to  Germany 
a  shorter  and  safer  route  to  the  Orient  than  that  from  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  through  the  English  Channel,  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar,  the  Mediterranean  and  Suez  Canal — or  that  around 
the  Continent  of  Africa — with  all  the  possibilities  of  sudden 
interruption  by  the  ever-present  danger  of  a  European  war. 
In  brilliancy  and  boldness  of  conception  this  Berlin-Bagdad 
railroad  plan  far  exceeded  the  Cape-to-Cairo  plan  of  Cecil 
Rhodes,  the  British  South-African  Premier,  or  the  Panama- 
Canal  Scheme.  In  revolutionary  consequences  to  commerce 
and  the  political  and  industrial  alignment  of  the  world  there 
is  no  comparison  possible  with  any  other  similar  enterprise 
excepting    that   of    the    Suez    Canal.      The    map    and    a    little 

51 


imagination  will  show  the  reader  what  all  this  would  have 
meant  for  Germany  and  against  England,  and  in  a  lesser  degree 
also  against  Russia,  France,  America  and  every  country  having 
Oriental  commercial  interests.  It  was  easy,  also,  to  foresee  that 
this  scheme  would  lead  to  political  influence  of  Germany  in 
Persia.  The  railroad,  once  opened  to  Bagdad,  would  soon 
be  extended  to  the  open  Arabian  Sea  and  by  its  connections 
through  Asia  Minor  would  reach  the  Mediterranean  ports  of 
Smyrna,  Beirut,  Jaffa,  and  future  ports  to  be  established  on 
the  Arabian  side  of  the  Red  Sea!  A  train  from  any  of  these 
ports  could  have  reached  Vienna,  Berlin,  Bremen  and  Hamburg 
before   the  fastest  ship  would  have  passed   Gibraltar. 

This  Berlin-Bagdad  route  and  its  branches  would  have 
increased  Germany's  commercial  opportunities  ten-fold  in  a 
few  years'  time;  from  the  Ai'abian  Gulf  and  the  Persian  Sea 
shipping  lines  would  have  been  established  to  every  point  of 
Asia,  Africa  and  the  rich  islands  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  to 
Australia  and  New  Zealand.  A  truly  gigantic  superman  con- 
ception and  ambition !  Such  a  consummation  in  the  hands  of 
an  unscrupulous  power  desiring  world-power  and  dominion 
would  have  been  capable  of  upsetting  the  political  balance  and 
all  the  geographies;  it  would  have  to  be  stifled,  killed!  Was 
Germany  such  a  power?  The  answer  to  this  question  it  was 
scarcely  necessary  to  determine  accurately;  it  was  only  nec- 
essary, under  the  influence  of  jealousy,  to  spread  the  suspicion 
thereof — and  that  and  the  positive  commercial  advantages  laid 
into  her  hands  by  that  scheme  were  sufficient  to  unite  all 
the  natural  antagonists  of  this  proposition — some  of  them 
already  filled  with  other  grievances — to  a  combination  for 
thwarting  these  ambitious  plans  of  this  presumptuous  new- 
comer among  the  nations! 

Looking  at  this  matter  dispassionately  we  may  well  ask 
this  question :  "Wherein  was  the  moral  or  political  wrong  in 
Germany's  plans  in  as  much  as  her  enterprise  was  merely 
commercial  and  economic  and  did  not  emanate  from  any 
design  of  conquest  and  annexation?  Have  not  other  nations 
carried  out  similar  schemes  of  commercial  extension  or  im- 
proved transit  facilities:  Suez  Canal,  Panama  Canal,  Cape-to- 
Cairo  railroad  plan,  and  others,  all  of  which  carried  with  them 

52 


political  measures  and  re-ai'rangements?  Why  is  that  which 
is  approved  and  accepted  when  done  by  England,  France  or 
America  wrong  when  done  by  Germany?  Why  should  a 
nation  so  fit  not  aspire  to  its  fullest  development,  to  an 
equal  position  and  facilities  with  the  others?  She  had  of- 
fered financial  participation  in  the  Bagdad  scheme  to  all  the 
world;  she  had  agreed  to  allow  England  to  establish  her  own 
port  on  the  Arabian  Sea  and  use  of  the  railroad  on  equal 
terms,  a  candid  offer  which  was  frustrated  only  by  England's 
•vident  design  to  obtain  control  of  the  road  for  herself  by 
insisting  upon  political  rights  for  France  and  Russia  as  well. 
(See  Lord  Haldane's  Memoirs.)  Germany  had  even  agreed 
to  concede  to  England  exclusive  shipping  rights  upon  the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris  rivers  and  the  establishment  of  irriga- 
tion works. 

The  plain  truth  behind  all  the  political  charges  and  man- 
oeuvres of  England,  France  and  Russia  in  connection  with 
Germany's  undertaking  is  that  they — and  particularly  England 
— were  envious  of  the  material  gain  and  incidental  political 
prestige  which  would  flow  to  her  from  it,  and  were  determined 
to  break  it  up — somehow,  as  opportunity  would  present — 
rather  than  share  in  the  enterprise  under  Germany's  control! 
Theirs  was  a  simple  rule-or-ruin  policy! 

Thus  what  Germany  had  achieved  and  wanted  to  continue 
in  legitimate  ways  opened  the  evil  eye  of  jealousy  and  greed 
in  other  nations!  Malicious  insinuations  as  to  her  real  pur- 
poses and  policy,  once  she  should  be  big  enough  to  throw 
off  the  mask  of  peaceful  objects,  were  invented  and  spread 
about.  This  false  pretense  of  apprehension  as  to  the  future 
received,  unfortunately  for  Germany,  some  countenance  from 
the  imprudent  utterances  of  a  small  band  of  impulsive  so- 
called  pan-German  or  all-German  writers  and  speakers  who 
talked  in  a  boastful  and  presumptive  way  about  "Germany's 
greatness,"  the  "Imperial  power,"  "the  invincible  army,"  of 
"wanting  a  place  in  the  sun,"  of  "extending  German  culture 
over  the  World,"  and  made  other  similar  aggressive-sounding 
declarations  which  all  were  more  in  the  nature  of  super- 
patriotic  ebulitions  by  a  small  minority  than  the  expression 
of  a  definite  national  purpose.     These  vaporings  were   never 

53 


the  voice  of  the  Kaiser,  the  Government  or  the  serious  part 
of  the  German  people,  and  were  denounced  in  all  responsible 
circles.  Nevertheless,  they  were  skilfully  exploited  by  the 
enemy,  and  during  the  war  made  much  of  by  the  propaganda 
and  magnified  beyond  recognition.  Similarly  the  occasional 
outbreaks  of  patriotic  fervor  by  the  Emperor  or  the  Govern- 
ment— unnecessary  attitudes  of  provocation,  shaking  of  the 
mailed  fist  and  a  certain  brusqueness  of  language — a  tempera- 
mental failing  of  the  Germans  more  in  the  nature  of  noise 
than  real  menace — were  elaborated  and  published  everywhere 
as  evidences  of  Germany's  designs  of  domination  and  world 
conquest!  Nothing  even  remotely  setting  forth  proof  or  even 
reasonable  probability  of  any  such  designs  has  ever  been  pro- 
duced— for  good  and  sufficient  reasons! 

But  with  all  this  false  pretense  of  alarm,  these  manufac- 
tured motives,  these  slanderous  insinuations  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  countries,  the  real  nature  and  intent  of  the  policy 
of  England,  France  and  Russia  was  never  for  a  moment  obscure 
or  left  in  doubt.  The  solid  facts  underlying  their  design  were 
too  plainly  in  view  to  be  disguised  except  for  the  most  ignorant. 
The  effect  upon  Germany  was  exasperating  and  depressing 
at  the  same  time,  as  well  as  eloquently  informing.  It  brought 
the  realization  to  the  rulers  and  the  people  that  they  were 
not  to  be  left  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  their  efforts  and  that  their 
further  normal  progress  on  the  lines  of  the  past  and  of  the 
proposed  near-east  extension  project  were  to  be  blocked — by 
diplomacy  if  possible,  by  force  if  necessary! 


Lord  Haldane's  Memoirs.  As  minister  of  war  of  Great 
Britain,  Lord  Haldane  had  conversations  with  the  Kaiser  at 
Berlin,  in  1906,  and  at  Windsor  Castle,  in  1907,  relative  to 
the  Kaiser's  desire  to  find  a  common  ground  on  which  England 
could  corroborate  with  Germany  in  a  peaceable  execution  of 
Germany's  Bagdad  plans.  There  was  good  prospect  of  these 
negotiations  ending  successfully,  till  England,  through  her 
foreign  minister.  Earl  Grey,  raised  the  question  of  the  political 
rights  of  France  and  Russia  to  participate  in  the  contemplated 
arrangements.  This  immediately  aroused  the  suspicions  of 
Germany  and  indicated  to  her,  even  at  that  time,  the  existence 
of  the  Triple  Entente  "in  embryo"  as  a  coming  active  combina- 

54 


tion  against  the  Triple  Alliance  and  its  specific  near-east 
policy.  Why  did  England  not  conclude  this  "Separate  Under- 
standing" with  Germany?  It  is  plain;  she  was  even  then  plan- 
ning to  bring  in  these  two  countries,  with  their  distinct  in- 
dividual animosities  and  ambitions  against  Germany,  to  work 
up  a  bellicose  situation  on  the  continent  and  a  threat  to  Ger- 
many— conveniently  hinged  on  the  real  and  artificial  opposition 
to  the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  scheme — from  which  she — 
England — would  profit  by  the  thwarting  of  Germany's  near- 
oriental  scheme  and  the  substitution  of  her  own  ambition  in 
the  same  premises.  As  Germany  became  more  and  more  con- 
vinced that  the  inclusion  of  France  and  Russia  into  the  nego- 
tiations with  England  would  produce  dangerous  complications 
against  her,  she  declined  to  proceed  with  England  along  these 
lines  and  ended  the  solicitations.  They  were  resumed  later, 
however,  and  practically  concluded  to  a  favorable  finish  by 
the  early  spring  of  1914.  (See  also  the  later  explanatory 
paragraph  "The  Asia-Minor  Question.") 


D.     AUSTRIA'S  POLITICAL  CHARACTER  AND  DESTINY 

The  beginning  of  Austria's  modern  history  has  been  in- 
dicated in  the  description  of  the  war  with  Prussia,  in  1866, 
in  consequence  of  which  she  was  pushed  outside  the  German 
Confederation,  and  by  her  contemporaneous  war  with  Italy 
by  which  Venice  was  separated  from  her  rule.  By  these 
events  Austria  was  left  composed  of  the  following  parts  of 
originally  and  preponderatingly  German  population:  Upper 
and  Lower  Austria,  the  Tyrol,  Styria,  Carinthia  and  Moravia. 
In  the  North  the  province  of  Bohemia  was  inhabited  to  a  pre- 
ponderating percentage  by  Czechs  (a  branch  of  the  Slavic 
family  of  nations)  ;  the  semi-independent  kingdom  of  Hungary 
was  partly  Magyar  (Slavic)  and  partly  German;  the  southern 
provinces  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
(Dalmatia)  were  preponderatingly  Slavic,  with  a  small  ad- 
mixture of  Italians  along  the  seacoast;  Galicia,  north  of 
Hungary,  was  of  mixed  stock,  about  one-half  Slavic  and  one- 
half  Polish.  In  the  southeastern  part  of  Galicia,  the  Buckovina, 
and  in  Transylvania  the  native  Slavic  and  Hungarian  popu- 
lations, respectively,  had  admixtures  of  Roumanians  and 
Ruthenians.  (All  these  peoples  are  "fragmentary  wreckage" 
from   by-gone   civilizations   or  from   Nomadic   tribes,   like   the 

55 


Huns,  similar  to  those  of  the  Balkan  States  proper  and  of 
Albania  and  Greece,  as  we  have  defined  it  in  a  previous 
Article.)  These  several  non-Gei'nianic  sections  of  Austria 
had,  however,  a  very  large  proportion  of  German  population 
who  were  the  ruling  class  in  government  and  business.  Many 
almost  entirely  German  cities  and  districts  were  scattered 
throughout  this  heterogeneous  empire,  as  indicated  by  their 
names  as  given  on  any  good  map  of  Austria-Hungary.  Mixed 
in  with  this  strangely  conglomerate  population  there  were 
several  millions  of  Jews,  distributed  throughout  the  country 
but  prevalent  particularly  in  the  eastern  parts.  Of  religious 
creeds  and  sects  there  were  about  as  many  as  there  were 
languages  and  dialects,  but  the  catholic  faith  predominated 
largely. 

The  kingdom  of  Hungary  had,  after  a  nationalistic  revo- 
lution and  war  for  independence,  under  Kossuth,  been  ac- 
corded a  separate  Constitution  and  parliament  and  limited 
internal  self-government.  All  the  other  states,  or  rather 
provinces,  were  governed  directly  from  Vienna  by  the  na- 
tional imperial  government  and  parliament,  the  Reichsrath. 
The  official  government  language,  and  of  public  instruction, 
was  German,  but  no  restrictions  were  imposed  upon  the  use 
of  the  Slavic  languages  in  speech,  publications,  political  debate 
or  religious  worship.  The  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina wei;e  formerly  independent  Balkan  principalities,  but 
had,  in  consequence  of  continual  agitations  and  disorders,  been 
made  semi-autonomous  states  by  the  Peace  of  Berlin,  1878 
(after  the  Russo-Turkish  war),  and  placed  under  the  ad- 
ministration of  Austria  under  a  secret  understanding  that 
after  the  lapse  of  a  reasonable  number  of  yeai's  of  gradual 
amalgamation  she  might,  if  found  necessary,  take  complete 
possession  of  these  countries.  This  plan  was  carried  out  by 
Austria  in  1909,  as  the  autonomous  arrangement  had  not 
brought  the  hoped-for  contentment  of  the  population.  The 
signatory  powers  of  the  Peace  of  Bei'lin  acquiesced  reluc- 
tantly in  the  "accomplished  fact,"  instituted  by  Austria  by 
the  military  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  being  dis- 
inclined to  face  the  risk  of  precipitating  a  dispute  and 
renewal  of  war  over  the  question.     Austria  agreed  to  certain 


political  guarantees  and  qualifications,  and  Germany  supported 
her  policy  firmly  as  being  a  move  for  orderly  conditions  and 
progress   under  a   state  of  peace. 

Such,  in  rapid  outline,  was  the  political  constitution  of 
Austria-Hungary  in  the  decade  preceding  1914.  We  have 
thought  it  desirable  to  state  them  because  of  their  important 
connection  with  the  beginning  and  also  with  the  ending  of 
the  great  war.  It  must  be  evident  to  the  reader  that  a 
country  composed  of  so  many  different  nationalities  and 
with  so  many  different  languages  and  traditions  was  not  an 
easy  one  to  govern  successfully  and  lead  in  the  ways  of 
peace,  progress  and  prosperity,  and  so  as  to  realize  some  sort 
of  a  united  sovereignty,  a  national  identity.  There  were 
perpetual  rivalries  between  the  different  nationalistic  "Parties" 
of  Austria  in  the  Reichsrath,  and  continued  aspirations  for 
independence  by  the  Hungarians  and  the  Czechs  of  Bohemia. 
Austria  was,  in  a  large  measure,  held  together  by  a  genuine, 
almost  reverential  loyalty  for  the  ancient  dynasty  of  the 
Hapsburgs  and  particularly  for  the  old  emperor,  Francis  Joseph. 
This  influence,  reinforced  by  a  firm  military  police  administra- 
tion and  joined  to  a  liberal  attitude  towards  the  different 
racial  and  tribal  customs  and  languages  enabled  Austria  to 
succeed  fairly  well  as  an  imperial  government.  Yet  it  was  a 
current  prediction  in  the  political  world  that  this  conglomerate 
and  polyglot  empire  would  break  up  into  its  separate  parts 
at   the   death   of  Francis  Joseph. 

By  entering  the  Triple  Alliance  with  Germany  and  Italy, 
the  political  position  of  Austria-Hungary  was  strengthened 
greatly,  internally  and  externally,  and  by  her  trade  and 
financial  relations  with  Germany  the  country  prospered  ex- 
ceedingly. Industry,  commerce  and  wealth  grew  rapidly.  Her 
military  organization  and  navy  were  brought  to  considerable 
strength  and  efficiency  under  Germany's  influence.  A-s  to 
the  difficult  matter  of  the  racial  diversity  in  the  monarchy, 
the  historic  policy  of  Austria  up  to  about  1908  had  ever, 
except  as  to  Hungary,  been  one  of  "benevolent  absorption," 
of  amalgamation  with  the  dominant  race,  the  German  people 
of  Austria  proper.  She  did  not  countenance  a  permanent 
continuation   and  fostering  of  Slavic  culture  and  separatism; 

57 


she  looked  upon  these  sturdy  but  undeveloped  races  (except 
for  a  small  minority)  mostly  as  excellent  physical  and  cultural 
"fertilizing  stock"  but  never  as  being  entitled  to  become  a 
leading  influence  in  the  empire's  affairs,  except  as  to  individuals 
of  ability  in  important  positions.  German  methods  and  cul- 
ture were  to  be  the  directing  forces  of  the  country;  and  for 
this  reason  those  all-German  cities  and  districts  had  been 
placed  throughout  the  provinces  as  outposts  of  amalgamation 
and   leavening   dough  among   the   Slavic  people. 

When  the  semi-autonomy  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was 
abolished,  1909,  Austria  at  first  encountered  much  difficulty 
in  the  pacification  of  cei'tain  political  elements  which  stood 
under  hostile  foreign  influence.  Bosnia  particularly  was 
closely  related  in  race  and  traditions  to  Serbia,  adjoining. 
But  Serbia  was  Russia's  secret  seat  of  action;  it  was  easy 
from  there  to  foment  demonstrations  of  racial  kinship,  of 
political  union,  of  independence  from  Austria;  but  these  agi- 
tations were  not  for  their  own  intrinsic  sake  but  for  much 
larger  purposes,  primarily  for  keeping  up  the  general  tur- 
bulence, to  prevent  Bosnia  settling  down  and  following  the 
lines  of  development  and  adaptation  mapped  out  for  her. 
The  main  purpose  was  to  keep  friction  alive  between  Austria 
and  the  Balkan  States  and  Russia,  and  to  maintain  the  latter's 
influence  in  these  countries  till  the  propitious  hour  for  in- 
augurating the  larger  aims  and  policy  should  strike!  For  the 
termination  of  this  intolerable  state  of  cabal  and  intrigue, 
Austria  began  to  plan  a  policy  of  "union  of  interests"  towards 
Serbia  whose  ultimate  result  should  be  the  elimination  of 
the  latter  as  an  hostile  State  continually  agitating  on  her 
borders  and  interfering  with  her  rule  in  Bosnia.  This  was 
the  situation  and  "policy"  up  to  1910. 

At  this  time  a  man  of  distinguished  character  and  political 
ability  came  to  the  front — Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  of 
Austria — nephew  of  the  emperor  and  heir  to  the  throne.  He 
had  written  books  and  delivered  addresses  of  importance  in 
which  he  still  further  advanced  the  new  ideas  for  the  solution 
of  the  problem  of  the  Slavic  peoples  of  Austria,  Serbia  and 
adjoining  Balkan  districts.  Seeing  the  difficulties  of  the  old 
policy  of  "benevolent  assimilation"  in  its  uphill  work  against 

58 


the  tenacity  of  national,  or  rather  tribal,  characteristics  and 
aspirations,  and  their  jealousies  and  enmities  as  long  as  they 
were  in  political  opposition  to  each  other,  he  advocated  making 
of  the  several  slavic  peoples  a  united  and  autonomous  country, 
similar  to  Hungary,  thereby  giving  them  racial  recognition  and 
virtual  independence  in  their  domestic  affairs,  yet  tying  them 
to  Austria  with  the  stronger  bonds  of  a  loyalty  based  on 
practical  freedom  than  on  the  old  principle  of  submissive 
amalgamation.  Above  all  it  was  advanced  that  such  an  auto- 
nomous and  united  Slavic  State  would  exclude  the  continuation 
of  the  insidiously  patronizing  "interest"  of  Russia  and  all  her 
self-seeking  machinations.  The  comparative  question  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  consideration  of  Austrian  statesmen  and  the 
leaders  of  all  the  various  peoples;  "Why  should  it  not  be 
possible  to  unite  these  separate  Slavic  peoples,  who  were  not 
radically  different  races  at  all  but  only  different  branches 
or  groups  of  the  same  general  stock,  into  a  united  whole?" 
The  differences  between  them  were  not  greater  than  those  which 
had  formerly  existed,  or  were  still  existing,  between  the  dif- 
ferent race-groups  of  Germans:  Bavarians,  Wurttembergers, 
Badeners,  Prussians,  Hanoverians,  Hessians,  Saxons. 

And  also,  considered  in  a  larger  view,  was  there  not  at 
bottom  something  incongruous  and  contrary  to  the  modern 
spirit  of  business  organization  in  these  "separatist"  and  "na- 
tionalistic" political  tendencies  in  Austria?  Everywhere  we 
find  concentration  of  related  factors  to  united  effort — combi- 
nation in  short — to  be  the  keynote  of  modern  political  success 
as  well  as  of  business  success.  Was  not  the  German  empire, 
the  British  empire,  Italy,  the  United  States  of  America  evi- 
dence of  the  value  of  this  principle?  Was  it  not  better  to  be 
an  active  and  appreciated  part  of  a  successful  whole  than  an 
unknown  nonentity  of  independence,  incapable  to  achieve  any- 
thing noteworthy?  Was  it  not  a  fact  that  the  agencies  of 
modern  political  action  and  existence,  as  of  business  life, 
are  so  manifold  and  extensive  in  scope  that  a  small  inde- 
pendent state  has  no  chance  whatever  to  accomplish  anything 
in  competition  with  the  larger  powers,  to  cut  any  figure  in 
the  life  of  the  world?  These  "practical  considerations"  as  to 
independent    political    success    are    such    as    should    not    only 

59 


have  been  preached  in  Austria  but  written  in  letters  of  flame 
on  the  walls  of  the  peace-conference  room  at  Paris!  These 
ideas  seem  to  have  been  overlooked  during  the  late  war  when 
impulsive  sentimentalists  raised  visions  of  "liberty  and  inde- 
pendence" in  every  handful  of  people  whose  mustachios  hung 
a  little  different  from  those  of  their  neighbors!  This  "self- 
determination  of  nations"  idea — meaning  so-called  political 
freedom  and  independence  from  others — will  turn  out,  as 
applied  to  Austria,  a  fatal  delusion  that  will  make  for  war 
and  not  for  peace.  There  is  more  required  to  make  a  nation, 
one  able  to  stand  up  and  live,  than  the  semblance  of  an 
ethnographical  pedigree!  To  the  one  people  which  has  every 
factor  of  nationality  and  independence — physical,  racial,  ethno- 
graphical— Ireland — this   principle   is  to   be   denied! 

These  views  of  Prince  Ferdinand  and  the  associates  who 
thought  with  him  attracted  wide  attention  because  of  their 
drift  and  because  they  were  expressed  by  the  future  ruler 
of  Austria.  They  were  received  with  distrust  by  the  people 
of  the  states  concerned  through  general  ignorance  and  lack 
of  sufficient  political  insight  to  absorb  so  broad  a  conception — 
much  in  the  same  way  as  Bismarck's  first  North-German  con- 
federation was  distrusted  by  the  South-German  states.  Fer- 
dinand's propositions  were,  in  fact,  by  many  regarded  as  a 
hidden  scheme  for  complete  annexation  to  Austria  of  the 
Slavic  southeastern  peoples,  a  view  derived  from  Austria's 
political  spirit  in  these  respects  up  to  1910.  These  fears 
were  busily  spread  among  the  people  by  agents  of  outside 
hostile  powers.  To  Russia,  the  chief  agitator  in  this  work, 
the  advent  of  this  man  and  his  policy  meant  the  opening  of 
a  new  perspective  full  of  apprehensions.  Russia  had  watched 
with  glee  all  the  signs  of  an  early  dissolution  of  the  Austrian 
monarchy;  she,  also,  had  a  scheme  of  combination  of  the 
Slavic  Austrian  and  Balkan  states,  when  the  breakup  should 
come,  but  it  was  to  be  under  her  domination  and  for  the 
realization  of  her  national  ambitions  on  the  Aegean  and 
Adriatic  coasts.  If  this  Prince  Ferdinand's  idea  should  take 
root  and  he  should  soon  become  emperor  of  Austria,  that 
state's  expected  dissolution  might,  instead  of  becoming  the 
long-awaited    opportunity    for    Russia,    be    transformed    into    a 

60 


reorganization  to  new  life  of  the  Austrian  empire.  That,  to- 
gether with  Germany's  powerful  support,  from  her  new  eastern 
interests,  would  mean  the  permanent  defeat  of  Russia's  aspira- 
tions— her  flag  would  never  float  from  Constantinople's  min- 
arets ! ! 


E.     THE    ENSUING    COMBINATIONS    OF    THE    POWERS 

The     Triple     Alliance — Germany,     Austria,     Italy 
The     Triple     Entente — England,     France,     Russia 

The  various  motives  from  which  Germany  had  become  the 
object  of  the  intense  jealousy,  envy  and  hate  of  the  three 
other  leading  nations  of  Europe — England,  France  and  Russia 
— should  now  be  clear  to  the  American  reader.  In  order  to 
safeguard  her  power  and  secure  the  peace  she  needed  for 
her  development,  Bismarck  had  formed  the  Triple  Alliance, 
previously  mentioned,  a  strong  central-European  wedge, — 
Germany,  Austria,  Italy.  The  offensive  and  defensive  compact 
between  Germany  and  Austria  was  general  and  mutually  bind- 
ing in  all  emergencies.  It  included  intimate  trade  and  fiscal 
arrangements,  also  agreements  for  the  remodeling  of  the  mili- 
tary system  of  Austria  in  some  important  respects  on  the 
Prussian  plan.  The  agreement  with  Italy  was  somewhat  more 
limited  and  conditional,  especially  as  between  Austria  and 
Italy;  but  it  was  also  at  least  a  defensive  alliance  in  case  of 
attack  of  Germany  or  Austria  by  more  than  one  power,  and 
an  offensive  alliance,  as  regarded  Italy,  in  any  circumstances; 
and,  as  with  the  other  two  powers,  it  carried  important  re- 
ciprocal trade  and  fiscal  provisions,  preponderatingly  in.  favor 
of  Italy.  Italy  received  immeasurably  more  than  she  gave 
during  the  many  years  of  this  arrangement;  she  basked  and 
grew  in  the  protection  and  stimulation  that  came  to  her  from 
the  Triple  Alliance.  When  the  test  came,  in  1914,  instead 
of  remaining  staunch,  she  listened  to  the  seducer  and  briber 
and  stabbed  her  partners  in  the  back  in  true  blackhand  style. 
The  Triple  Alliance  was  a  secret  pact,  and  its  exact  terms 
were  known  only  to  few,  but  the  general  trend  of  the  agree- 

61 


ments  was  public  knowledge.  It  is  generally  believed  that  a 
similar  secret  defensive  "understanding" — if  not  full  alliance 
— was  concluded  at  about  the  same  time  (1895)  with  the 
kingdom  of  Roumania. 

As  the  years  rolled  on  and  the  German  near-east  aims 
began  to  develop,  negotiations  were  taken  up  by  her  with 
the  countries  whose  assent  and  facilities  were  required  for 
the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  plans — Turkey  and  Bulgaria 
directly,  Roumania  and  Greece  indirectly — and  intimate  con- 
ventions were  concluded  to  secure  their  authorization,  co- 
operation and  the  rights-of-way  and  fiscal  measures  necessary 
for  the  undertaking.  The  exchange  consisted  of  liberal  money 
considerations,  valuable  trade  concessions,  floating  of  national 
loans  for  internal  improvements,  and  included,  also,  political 
alliance  and  offensive  and  defensive  military  obligations  on 
a  mutual  basis.  When  we  join  these  new  eastern  arrange- 
ments which  Germany  negotiated  to  those  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance already  existing,  we  can  see  what  a  formidable  combina- 
tion it  made!  For  and  by  Germany  and  her  associates  it 
was  a  combination  for  and  of  peace;  but  in  the  view  of 
the  three  enemy  powers  it  was  a  challenge  to  war  for  the 
reason  that  the  commercial  objects  sought  and  the  increased 
political  influence  gained  by  Germany  were  regarded  as  ag- 
gressively competitive  to  their  own  material  interests  and 
political  spheres  of  influence.  And,  equally,  the  wonderful 
brilliancy  and  promising  grand  success  of  the  scheme  had 
excited  their  deep  nationalistic  envy  and  resentment!  It  was 
intolerable  to  them  to  see  Germany  gain  all  these  material 
advantages  and  this  additional  prestige  and  power,  no  matter 
what  explanations  and  guaranties  she  might  vouchsafe.  To 
them  it  had,  therefore,  become  necessary  to  oppose  this  Triple 
Alliance  and  eastern  combination  with  a  counter  alliance  and 
plot — the  Triple  Entente  and  the  design  to  thwart  Germany's 
plans  at  any  cost — after  it  should  have  become  apparent  that 
she   could   not   be   diverted   from   her   purposes. 

It  is  credibly  reported  that  King  Edward  VII,  who  was 
not  only  a  most  gracious  hon-vivaiit  but  a  very  sagacious  dip- 
lomat and  king,  seeing  the  dangerous  drift  of  things,  made  a 
final  eff'ort  early  in  his  reign  at  a  personal  meeting  between 

G2 


himself  and  Emperor  William  of  Germany,  said  to  have  taken 
place  in  Buckingham  palace  gardens,  to  influence  the  latter 
to  modify  the  German  aims  and  policy  in  the  near  East,  her 
naval  program  of  construction,  etc.,  in  appeasement  of  Eng- 
land's opposition  and  apprehensions,  national  prejudices  and 
assumed  prerogatives  in  connection.  The  interview  was  with- 
out result  and  the  two  monarchs  parted  in  anger.  This  clean- 
cut  mutual  avowal  of  the  opposing  purposes  of  England  and 
Germany  became  the  starting  point  for  the  formation  of  the 
Triple-Entente — England,  France,  Russia — to  check  the  Triple 
Alliance.  But  previous  to  this  final  consolidation  of  opposition 
to  Germany,  important  political  events  had  taken  place.  In 
1890,  soon  after  the  retirement  of  Bismarck,  the  former  good 
relations  between  Germany  and  Russia  had  become  loosened, 
and  the  existing  "mutual  protective  convention"  between  the 
two  countries  was  not  renewed.  Immediately  a  close  approach- 
ment  between  France  and  Russia  was  solicited  by  France  and 
received  enthusiastic  response  from  Russia,  resulting  in  an 
intimate  political  alliance  which,  even  in  the  nineties,  con- 
stituted a  two-power  coalition  danger  against  Germany.  Eng- 
land still  kept  quietly  in  the  background,  suspicious  of  Russia, 
and  because  of  the  irritation  then  existing  in  France  against 
England  on  account  of  Fashoda  (1898).  But  soon  a  new 
political  atmosphere  arose.  Queen  Victoria  had  died  and 
was  succeeded,  in  1901,  by  Edward  VII,  and  about  at  the 
same  time  the  irritating  African  Colonial  questions  arose,  par- 
ticularly that  of  Morocco,  which  were  managed  with  exceed- 
ing skill  and  tact  by  Delcasse  in  the  interest  of  inaugurating 
a  close  approachment  with  England  for  the  purpose  of  isolating 
Germany. 

The  determined  protest  of  the  latter  and  her  insistence 
on  a  mutual  and  joint  settlement  of  these  ascending  colonial 
questions  and  on  the  recognition,  by  the  other  powers,  of 
Germany's  legitimate  interests  in  Africa  led  to  the  Algeciras 
conference  and  to  the  victory  of  Germany  on  these  points.. 
But  this  success,  or  concession,  only  served  to  draw  England 
closer  to  France  and  to  open  the  door  for  the  gradual  recon- 
ciliation between  England  and  Russia  and  the  formation  of 
the    complete    Triple   Alliance.      From   all   sides    the    opposing 

63 


interests,  the  joint  interests  as  well  as  the  separate  interests, 
of  the  three  powers  against  Germany  and  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  become  consolidated  and  clarified  for  a  definite  policy 
and  plan  of  action.  England's  interest  lay  chiefly  in  the 
curtailing  of  Germany's  commercial  competition,  of  her  naval 
growth  and  of  her  Turkey- Persia  scheme;  in  France  the  per- 
petual irritation  between  the  two  countries  on  account  of 
the  Morocco  question,  which  had  spread  over  a  period  of  ten 
years,  culminated  in  the  violent  outbreak  of  the  Delcasse 
Alsace-Lorraine  fever  of  revenge  and  raised  plans  for  the 
crushing  of  Germany;  in  Russia,  which  had  seen  her  Constantin- 
ople ambitions,  to  which  Turkey  and  Austria  were  the  natural 
obstacles,  permanently  jeopardized  by  Germany's  political  and 
military  support  of  these  countries,  new  visions  arose  of  ulti- 
mate success. 

She,  Russia,  was  furthermore,  bound  to  France  by  the 
financial  debt  she  had  contracted,  to  the  amount  of  some 
twenty  billions  of  Francs,  for  assistance  in  floating  national 
loans,  for  railroad  construction,  including  strategical  railroads 
throughout  Poland  and  the  building  of  a  line  of  fortresses 
along  Poland's  eastern  frontier,  all  in  preparation  for  war, 
also  for  industrial  plants,  etc.,  France  thus  virtually  had 
become  a  partner  in  Russia's  own  southern  policy;  and  in  order 
to  thoroughly  disarm  Russia's  traditional  opposition  to  England, 
and  vice-versa  in  regard  to  these  objects,  it  was  agreed 
between  the  three  powei's  that,  in  case  of  success  in  the  war 
to  come,  Russia  was  to  be  free  to  take  Constantinople,  the 
navigation  of  the  Dardanelles  was  to  be  open  to  the  world, 
and  all  other  measures  necessary  were  to  be  taken  to  secure 
to  Russia  the  coveted  southern-seas  outlet.  To  this  general 
ground  plan  of  opposition  to  Germany  there  were  now  added 
diplomatic  efforts  to  undermine  the  relations  between  Germany 
and  her  allies  by  estranging  Austria,  by  drawing  away  Italy, 
by  shaking  the  faith  of  the  others.  In  Austria,  especially,  the 
various  nationalities  were  encouraged  to  strike  out  for  in- 
dependence and  "republican  freedom"  so  as  to  accelerate  the 
breakup  of  the  old  monarchy  and  rob  Germany  of  her  chief 
ally.  As  early  as  1918  a  French  book  was  circulated  in 
Bohemia,  Hungary  and  other  disaff"ected  parts  of  Austria  con- 
taining a  map  of  the  central  empires  showing  "how  they  would 

64 


be  after  the  next  war"  and  representing  Austria  dismembered 
into  separate  sections  and  Germany   shorn  of   Alsace-Lorraine! 

From  the  above  recital  we  see  that  Russia  quickly  became 
the  most  active  and  most  dangerous  member  of  the  Entente 
because,  from  her  geogi'aphical  position  and  the  nature  of  her 
objects,  she  would  prove  the  most  readily  provocative  and 
aggressive.  It  was  in  the  East,  without  question,  where  the 
conflagration  would  begin!  In  addition  to  what  we  have  said, 
there  were  other  considerations  which  had  great  weight  with 
Russia  in  becoming  an  active  member  of  the  Entente.  She 
had  come  out  of  the  war  with  Japan  defeated,  her  military 
and  naval  reputation  discredited.  It  was  necessary  to  re- 
habilitate these  for  the  Czar's  regime  to  be  able  to  retain  its 
hold  upon  the  country;  for,  internally,  Russia  had  arrived  at 
a  condition  of  supreme  discontent  by  the  toiling  masses — to 
the  point  of  revolution.  The  government  of  oppression,  cor- 
ruption and  licentiousness  was  exasperating  to  the  people,  the 
revelations  of  life  at  Court  and  in  the  higher  circles  of  Russian 
society  were  humiliating  to  their  sense  of  decency  and  relig- 
ious feeling.  But  above  all,  the  country  had  for  years  been 
saturated  with  socialistic  and  anarchistic  doctrines  of  reform, 
of  liberty,  equality  and  "natural  rights"  for  the  plain  man. 
The  ruling  classes  well  knew  the  country  to  be  seething  with 
the  revolutionary  spirit  (at  least  in  the  large  centers)  and 
ready  to  start  an  outbreak  at  the  first  provocation.  It  was 
imperative  to  forestall  this:  A  successful  war  of  conquest,  in 
combination  with  the  Triple  Entente,  for  attaining  Russia's 
southern  policy,  and  directed  against  Turkey  or  the  obstreper- 
ous Balkan  States,  or  directly  against  Austria  and  Germany, 
would  reestablish  Russia's  military  prestige,  be  popular  with 
the  people  and  lull  them  back  to  loyalty  to  the  Czar 
and  dynasty  and  away  from  their  dangerous  democratic  and 
socialistic  dreams.  Hence,  the  policy  of  irritation  against 
Austria  was  at  work  all  the  time  and  intensified ;  the  diabolical 
intrigues  carried  on  in  Serbia,  Bosnia  and  Montenegro  could 
not  do  other  than  lead  to  some  terrible  plot  of  violence  before 
long  which  would  precipitate  a  war!  Who,  then,  can  fail  to  see 
that  it  was  not  Germany  who  was  the  plotter  for  the  war  but  the 
Triple  Entente  in  the  intensity  and  complexity  of  its  three- 
cornered  designs  against  her  and  her  allies! 

65 


Additional  strength  accrued  to  the  Entente  by  the  secret 
accession  to  it  of  Japan  through  her  alliance  with  England.' 
Japan  had  emerged  from  her  war  with  Russia,  and  the  previous  ' 
one  with  China,  with  great  distinction  and  success;  she  had 
come  to  the  front  rank  as  the  dictating  mistress  of  China  and 
the  Orient.  England,  with  her  wide-open  eye,  hastened  to 
make  an  offensive  and  defensive  treaty  with  Japan,  after  her 
successful  wars,  before  any  other  power  should  have  the  fore- 
sight and  opportunity  to  do  so.  The  idea  was  simple  and 
reciprocal.  The  revolution  in  China  and,  in  consequence,  the 
jeopardized  "vested  interests"  of  the  leading  commercial  na- 
tions in  that  country,  had  brought  the  whole  European 
Concert  into  the  Chinese  internal  conflict  and  had  set  up 
that  "open-door  policy"  to  prevent  the  powers  being  drawn 
into  a  war  among  themselves  over  their  respective  political 
and  trade  rights  in  China.  But  Japan,  ambitious  to  control 
China  altogether  in  order  to  bind  her  to  herself  as  a  source 
of  raw  materials  and  food  stuffs  and  a  ready  great  market 
for  her  manufactures,  seeing  that  she  could  not  possibly  rule 
alone  in  this  matter  without  a  contest  at  arms,  shrewdly  allied 
herself  with  England,  as  the  strongest  of  her  competitors  in 
this  game,  in  a  policy  of  gradually  foi'cing  out  the  other 
nations! 

Hence,  Japan  was  quite  ready  to  secretly  pledge  her  sup- 
port to  England  in  any  European  complications  which  might 
arise,  as  this  would  open  up  an  opportunity  of  ousting  from 
Asiatic  influence  and  Asiatic  possessions  such  of  the  European 
nations  (enemies  of  England)  as  might  become  involved  in 
such  a  complication — and  might  be  defeated  in  consequence. 
Furthermore,  Japan  unquestionably  realized  that  an  alliance 
with  England  would  be  a  valuable  support  to  her  against  the 
United  States  of  America  in  the  latter's  policy  of  racial  dis- 
crimination and  exclusion  of  her  people,  which  policy  had 
already  produced  a  serious  state  of  friction  between  the  two 
countries.  As  for  England,  her  alliance  with  Japan  was  a 
master  stroke  of  political  foresight;  it  cleared  the  Asiatic 
situation  by  creating  a  definite  political  status,  backed  by 
strong  forces,  in  place  of  a  chaotic  "free-foi'-all"  scramble 
full  of  danger.     It  secured  Japan  as  an  ally  in  Europe;  finally, 

66 


nothing  could  have  so  neatly  taken  the  edge  off  America's 
policy  against  Japan  as  the  knowledge  of  this  alliance  in 
Washington;  it  could  have  no  other  effect  than  to  protect 
Japan  against  America  and  thus  secure  amicable  relations  all 
around  and  particularly  in  England's  interest!  Her  professed 
friendship  for  the  United  States  had,  for  the  time,  laid  the 
spectre   of  the  Japanese  danger. 

This  favorable  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  at  the  oppor- 
tune time  deftly  employed  by  England  in  her  European  war 
policy  to  find  an  additional  support  for  the  Triple  Entente 
in  the  United  States  of  America.  There  was  this  wonderful 
and  aspiring  young  giant  of  the  western  hemisphere — the 
United  States — big,  alert,  generous,  whole-souled,  and  pos- 
sessed of  boundless  resources  in  food  and  materials  and  men! 
And,  while  it  was  realized  that  our  country  could  not  be  so 
readily  drawn  into  a  definite  entangling  alliance  with  a  Eu- 
ropean power  at  that  time,  England,  even  then,  began  her 
subtle  plans  of  molding  public  opinion  here  in  favor  of  her 
policies,  to  arouse  jealousy  of  Germany  commercially,  and 
prejudice  politically;  to  misrepresent  to  this  people — an  easy 
task — what  was  happening  in  European  political  developments 
and  thus  to  lay  the  foundation  for  future  help  and  common 
action.  With  this  preparation  made  by  careful  propaganda, 
assisted  by  oflftcious  adulation,  flattery,  social  ties,  it  needed — 
when  the  time  of  action  had  come — but  the  careful  handling 
of  episodes  and  details,  as  they  might  present  themselves,  to 
win  this  country  for  the  Entente. 

What  the  purpose  of  the  Triple  Entente  was,  individually 
and  collectively,  we  know  beyond  doubt,  but  what  its  plan 
of  execution  was,  we  can  but  surmise.  With  two  such  gigantic 
combinations  facing  each  other,  with  the  ever-changing  political 
chessboard  of  Europe  before  them  subject  to  sudden  disturb- 
ances, it  is  most  presumable  that  there  was  no  definite  plan, 
that  no  very  definite  plan  could  have  been  made.  There 
can  only  have  been  the  general  plan  to  shape  policy,  mold 
events,  design  intrigues — and  watch  for  the  opportunity  and 
seize  it  when  it  should  present  itself  with  a  promise  of  success. 
The  manner  of  action,  in  detail,  would  have  to  depend  on 
the   circumstances   of   the    ostensible   casus   belli.      Herein   lay 

67 


the  great  risk,  the  hidden  danger,  the  perplexing  uncertainty 
of  the  calculation!  For,  that  a  war  such  as  actually  happened, 
a  world-war  of  unprecedented  proportions  and  bi'utality,  w.is 
designedly  foreseen  or  foreplanned  we  cannot,  we  dare  not 
assume!  It  would  be  too  monstrous,  too  diabolical  for  human 
beings  to  evolve  and  countenance  such  a  design!  Mankind 
would  have  to  creep  under  the  crust  of  the  earth  and  forever 
disappear  in  shame  and  remorse  if  it  were  capable  of  evolving 
and  harboring  such  a  conception!  Let  us  take  refuge  in  the 
historical  fact  that  nations  often  drift  on  gropingly  under 
the  spell  of  evil  desires  and  without  clearly  knowing  their 
way  and  end,  much  like  individuals. 

And  yet!  so  thoroughly  depraved  did  the  human  conscience 
become  in  this  war  that  the  Gei'mans  were  openly  and  without 
scx'uples  charged  by  the  Entente  allies  with  this  very  crime 
of  having  purposely  provoked  this  war  from  motives  of  world 
conquest,  and  that  upon  this  monstrous  charge  the  peace  terms 
of  diabolical  cynicism  were  based  which  are  crushing  Europe 
to  atoms!  The  author  believes  it  rather  to  be  reasonable  to 
assume  that  the  Entente,  instead  of  planning  deliberately  to 
let  loose  this  awful  war,  counted  to  prevail  over  their  adver- 
sary by  the  sheer  weight  of  their  preponderating  strength  and 
the  agency  of  skilful  diplomacy,  or,  at  the  worst,  by  a  con- 
tinental war  of  limited  proportions,  the  combined  effect  of 
such  action  to  bring  about  the  defeat  and  political  humiliation 
of  Germany  and  the  abandonment  of  her  program  of  ambition! 
How  this  calculation  was  upset,  and  the  position  England 
occupied  in  connection  therewith,  will  be  related  in  the  fol- 
lowing article. 

How  strong  the  German  Triple  Alliance  would  pi'ove  in 
the  crucible  of  war  no  one  was  able  to  predict,  nor  was  there 
anything  certain  about  the  dui-ability  and  extent  of  the  alli- 
ance with  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  or  the  friendly  pledges  of  the 
kings  of  Greece  and  Roumania.  The  military  assistance  which 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria  would  be  able  to  render  to  Germany 
was  not  to  be  despised,  and  its  certainty  or  uncertainty  was  a 
matter  of  moment.  The  three  doubtful  countries — Italy,  Greece 
and  Roumania — were  well  known  to  be  ambitious  for  possess- 
ing   sundry    neighboring    territories.      Under    cover    of    their 

68 


"irredenta  agitations"  they  were  planning  to  reach  out  for 
valuable  lands  and  peoples,  ports,  fortresses  and  other  strategic 
factors.  Might  they,  perhaps,  be  induced  by  guaranties  in 
these  directions  to  violate  their  honor  and  break  their  definite 
agreements  and  implied  promises  with  Germany  and  the  Triple 
Alliance?  These  disquieting  questions  would  only  be  answered 
under  the  stress  and  temptations  of  actual  war! 

Before  proceeding  to  the  detailed  summary  of  the  "war 
conditions"  in  the  spring  of  1914,  it  becomes  interesting  and 
useful  to  state  certain  facts,  political  relations  and  opinions 
which  were  not  heard  or  thought  of  as  war  motives  at  its 
outbreak  but  were  fabricated  into  such  some  months  later 
only,  after  and  because  the  war  had  developed  contrary  to 
calculations.      They   are : 

1.  England  was  not  opposed  to  Germany  because  of  her  form 
of  semi-autocratic  government  or  because  of  the  personality 
of  the  Kaiser;  she  is  a  monarchy  also,  although  of  a  more 
liberal  character;  King  Edward  VII  was  the  Kaiser's  uncle, 
the  Kaiser's  mother  was  the  Princess  Royal  of  England, 
daughter  of  Queen  Victoria  and  Prince  Albert;  every 
branch  of  the  English  Royal  family  is  intimately  related 
with  the  German  reigning  houses  and  nobility,  especially 
of  Hannover,  Brunswick  and  Hessia. 

2.  France,  although  a  republic,  had  no  animosity  towards 
Germany  because  of  her  monarchical  form  of  government 
or  because  of  the  Kaiser  personally,  and  neither  of  these 
conditions  were  in  any  way  linked  with  the  question  of 
"revanche"  and  Alsace-Lorraine.  Culturally  there  existed 
the  most  intimate  and  sympathetic  intercourse  between 
France,  Germany  and  Austria  before  the  war,  more  so 
than  Vvith  any  othqr  countries. 

3.  Russia  was  more  autocratic  in  political  form  than  Germany 
and    governed    by    a    Czar;    Italy,    Greece,    Roumania    and 

Serbia  were  kingdoms,  also,  and  therefore  none  of  these 
had  any  objections  to  Germany  and  Austria  because  of 
being  empires  with  a  Kaiser  for  a  nominal  ruler,  nor  did 
this  prevent  England,  France  and  the  United  States  to 
work  with  them  in  war  alliance. 

69 


4.  All  these  countries  were  on  a  basis  of  so-called  "militarism," 
i.e.,  had  standing  armies  and  compulsory  military  con- 
scription. None  of  them  ever  objected  to  Germany's  mili- 
tarism on  principle,  at  most  only  to  its  numbers  and  effi- 
ciency. The  political  conditions  in  Europe  had  made  stand- 
ing armies  and  service  by  conscription  "a  necessity"  for 
over  a   century,  especially  for  Germany  and  Austria. 

5.  The  peace  footing  of  the  French  army,  in  1914,  W^as  larger 
than  that  of  the  German  army,  not  only  relatively  but 
absolutely  by  nearly  100,000  men  of  all  arms,  although 
the  population  of  Germany  exceeded  that  of  France  by 
nearly  twenty  millions.  These  additional  French  soldiers 
were  drafted  from  her  African  and  Asiatic  colonies. 

6.  Kaiser  Wilhelm  was,  in  the  last  decade  of  his  reign,  the 
most  prominent  political  personage  in  Europe,  perhaps  in 
the  world,  acclaimed  as  a  wise  and  just  ruler  and  a  man 
of  great  intelligence  and  ability  and  of  the  highest  charac- 
ter, liberal  in  thought,  progressive,  intensely  occupied  with 
every  need  and  legitimate  aspiration  of  the  German  people, 
and  working  only  for  their  welfare  and  for  peace  and 
contentment  among  all  the  nations.  He  was  worthy,  con- 
scientious, honest,  no  plotter;  but,  unfortunately  he  was 
not  possessed  of  the  superlative  political  genius  required 
to  guide  the  German  ship  of  State  safely  through  the 
"Cillis  and  Charibdis"  of  European  politics  and  the  great 
crisis  of  the  war.  He  neither  made  nor  wanted  the  war. 
No  man  in  history  has  ever  been  more  coarsely  and  shock- 
ingly slandered  and  abused  than  the  German  emperor, 
especially  in  America — in  America  afflicted  with  deplorable 
ignorance  of  European  history  and  conditions — be  it  said 
to  our  great  shame!  The  fact  that  Germany  has,  since, 
deposed  the  Kaiser  and  established  a  republic  has,  of  itself, 
no  connection  with  either  the  rule  or  the  character  of 
William    II. 

7.  Not  until  some  months  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and 
in  some  respects  not  until  the  entry  of  America,  were  the 
subjects  of  autocracy,  democracy,  liberty,  humanity,  kais- 
erism,  militarism.  Junker  tyranny,  self-determination  of 
nations,  etc.,  advanced  anywhere  as  directly  connected  with 

70 


the  motives  and  objects  of  the  war.  All  of  these  have 
been  subjects  of  international  discussion  for  years,  but 
had  absolutely  no  direct  bearing  on  the  causes  of  the  war; 
as  "war  motives"  they  were  the  artificial  product  of  a 
deceiving,  conniving,  slanderous  and  corrupting  war  propa- 
ganda inaugurated  by  England  and  blindly  outdone  by 
America! 

The  author  has  made  the  above  grouping  with  the  par- 
ticular purpose  of  impressing  the  American  reader  with  the 
totally  erroneous  ground  of  seven-tenths  of  the  motives  upon 
which  the  war  is  popularly  assumed  to  rest  and  upon  which 
we  finally  went  to  war  with  Germany;  also  with  the  realization 
of  the  political  ignorance,  gullibility,  blind  passion  and  bad 
taste  which  we  exhibited  to  the  world.  It  seems  desirable  that 
these  impressions  in  regard  to  ourselves  be  made  ahead  of  the 
material  and  drift  of  the  following  articles  of  this  book.  The 
opinion  here  expressed  of  our  unsound  war  atmosphere  and 
attitude  is  that  held  not  only  by  the  intelligent  part  of  the 
world  outside  of  America  but  by  the  best  informed,  most 
sane,  just-minded  and   truly  patriotic  of  our  own  people. 


The  Asia  Minor  Question.  In  view  of  its  important  bearing 
on  the  war  it  may  be  well  to  add  more  specific  details  on 
some  points.  The  country  in  question  is  Turkish  territory, 
and  stretches  from  the  Agean  Sea  to  the  Arabian  gulf.  Persia 
is  its  eastern  border,  and  along  that  is  situated  the  ancient 
district  of  Mesopotamia,  watered  by  the  great  rivers  Euphrates 
and  Tigris.  They  join  some  fifty  to  sixty  miles  north  of  the 
end  of  the  Arabian  gulf,  and  discharge  into  that  through 
several  branches,  similarly  to  the  Danube,  Nile,  etc.  This 
country  is  famous  since  Biblical  times  for  its  general  fertility, 
and  is  also  rich  in  petroleum,  wells.  For  this  reason  it  had  for 
some  years  even  before  1900  attracted  the  attention  of  Eng- 
land and  France,  and  later  of  Germany,  for  railroad  projects, 
river  steamboat  traffic  and  water-irrigation  schemes  to  develop 
its  natural  riches  and  bring  them  to  Europe.  All  these  schemes, 
naturally,  had  to  be  planned  under  "concessions"  from  Turkey 
and  compensatory  fiscal  arrangements  with  that  power.  The 
rights  obtained  in  this  way  and  the  projects  launched  by  the 
above  nations,  including  also  Russia  and  Italy  in  a  lesser 
degree,    badly   criss-crossed    each    other. 

71 


To  Germany  the  great  point  of  attraction  lay  less  in  the 
local  economic  opportunities  than  in  the  possibilities  of  secur- 
ing by  a  great  railroad  scheme — the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad — 
quick  and  secure  communication  with  the  Orient,  Asia,  etc., 
and  with  her  own  African  colonies.  She  nursed  her  plans  very 
carefully  and  secretly,  secured  liberal  concessions  from  Turkey 
and  made  liberal  financial  arrangements  in  return;  and  when 
the  project  could  not  longer  be  hidden  and  its  real  purpose 
became  apparent,  was  already  in  a  position  of  controlling 
advantage  as  compared  with  England  and  France.  From  that 
moment  there  was  open  opposition  from  those  countries  to 
her  plans.  (See  also  a  preceding  explanatory  paragraph  en- 
titled: Lord  Haldane's  Memoirs.)  She  tried  to  placate  them 
in  every  way  and  made  many  concessions  of  rights  in 
order  to  attain  at  least  her  main  purpose — as  stated  above, 
under  absolutely  secure  political  conditions.  The  negotiations 
with  France  proceeded  favoraTjly  and  reached  an  amicable 
understanding  towards  1912.  Even  with  England,  her  most 
stubborn  opponent,  a  point  was  finally  reached  where  a  peace- 
ful agreement  seemed  possible. 

Germany  had  agreed  to  give  to  both  England  and  France 
important  participation  in  the  capitalization  of  the  German 
company  and  seats  in  its  directorate ;  she  agreed  that  Bagdad, 
on  the  Tigris  river,  should  be  the  end  of  the  German  railroad, 
and  thus  relinquished  her  original  plans  and  rights  to  continue 
the  raih'oad  to  the  deep-water  port  of  Basra,  on  the  lower 
Tigris,  close  to  the  head  of  the  gulf;  she  conceded  the  naviga- 
tion rights  on  the  Tigris  from  Basra  to  Bagdad  to  the  British, 
also  navigation  rights  on  the  Euphrates  river,  irrigation  water- 
works rights,  etc. ;  she  agreed  to  build  the  port  works, 
docks,  etc.,  at  Basra  and  Bagdad  with  her  own  capital, 
as  owner,  but  conceded  to  England  a  40  per  cent  privi- 
lege of  participation  in  the  investments.  Finally,  there 
was  a  general  agreement  that  all  the  interested  countries 
should  have  equal  rights  and  rates  of  shipment  on  all  the 
Asia-Minor  railroads  and  the  Berlin-Bagdad  line  and  on  all 
the   river  transportation   lines. 

On  these  terms  England,  at  last,  agreed  to  offer  no  further 
opposition  to  the  construction  of  the  railroad  by  Germany 
and  to  the  latter's  preponderating  rights  of  ownership  and 
direction  of  the  enterprise.  It  seemed  thus  as  if  the  laborious 
and  difficult  negotiations  of  many  years  (in  which  Germany 
had  shown  persistent  good  will  under  most  galling  aggra- 
vation) were  to  be  crowned  with  success.  But  this  f avoidable 
prospect  had  scarcely  opened  when  the  ominous  shot  at  Sera- 
jevo  rang  out  and  threw  the  gloom  of  doubt  over  all  these 
propositions. 


72 


Succeeding  Developments.  It  is  peculiarly  illustrative  of 
England's  intense  jealousy  of  her  commercial  and  shipping 
supremacy  in  the  world  that  she  should  have  thrown  all  this 
opposition  in  Germany's  path — which,  she  knew  very  well,  had 
no  side  issues  of  political  influence  or  territorial  aggression, 
while  she  herself — England — was  in  possession  of  numerous 
similar  trade  routes  and  special  privileges  in  every  part  of 
the  world,  the  most  of  them  acquired  by  forceful  conquest 
or  arbitx'ary  political  measures  and  not  by  peaceful  diplomacy 
and  equitable  agreements  as  in  the  case  of  Germany  in  hef 
Asia-Minor  project.  In  view  of  all  the  facts,  a  serious  doubt 
arises  as  to  whether  England's  final  apparent  acquiescence  in 
the  German  Berlin-Bagdad  scheme  was  sincere  and  actuated 
by  genuine  desire  to  secure  world  peace  by  removal  of  the 
acute  friction  over  that  question?  As  to  Germany,  her  sin- 
cerity cannot  be  doubted;  her  objects  were  clear  and  plainly 
stated;  the  detailed  history  of  the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  nego- 
tiations as  given  by  Carl  Helfferich,  ex-German  imperial  vice- 
chancellor,  in  the  first  volume  of  his  famous  work  "Der  Welt- 
krieg"  (The  World  War),  and  whose  character  for  honesty 
and  veracity  cannot  be  impugned,  proves  the  assertion.  But 
as  to  England  and  France  the  case  is  different!  Even  while 
England  was  officiously  pretending  to  give  Germany  the  right 
of  way  in  her  enterprise,  Earl  Grey  was  busy  with  his  letters 
to  M.  Cambon,  French  Foreign  Minister,  on  the  provisional 
military  convention  pledges  betw^een  England  and  France,  and 
soon  thereafter  entered,  together  with  France,  into  definite 
marine-policy  agreements  with  Russia,  for  the  case  of  a  Euro- 
pean  w^ar. 

These  negotiations  were  carried  on  in  the  early  spring  of 
1914 — and  were,  therefore,  eloquent  of  coming  events!  In 
order  to  deceive  Germany  as  to  the  real  strength  of  these 
Triple-Entente  military  and  naval  understandings,  no  real  con- 
ventions were  concluded;  the  agreements  were  verbal,  in 
secret  notes  and  memoranda — the  word  was  to  be  represented 
by  the  spirit.  It  appears  from  this  that,  no  matter  with  what 
pretended  sincerity  England's  negotiations  with  Germany  as 
to  peace  in  Asia  Minor  had  been  carried  on,  her  greater 
political  object — the  crippling  of  Germany's  further  growth — 
which  she  had  cautiously  nursed  since  the  Algeciras  confer- 
ence, was  not  to  be  relinquished!  Germany  was  deceived  for 
a  short  time;  but  from  the  day  of  the  visit  of  King  Edward  VII 
to  President  Poincare  of  France,  in  Paris,  on  April  21st,  1914 
(accompanied  by  Earl  Grey),  the  real  situation  became 
quickly  revealed — the  cards  were  on  the  table — and  the  French, 
Belgian  and  Russian  press  could  no  longer  restrain  its  open 
exultation  and  demand  for  an  early  war  with  Germany. 

It  was  thus  for  her  own  purposes  entirely  that  England 
encouraged  an  early  military  embroilment  between  France  and 

73 


Russia,  on  one  side,  and  Germany  and  Austi'ia,  on  the  othei', 
to  bring  to  a  settlement  the  many  questions  of  political  an- 
tagonism, jealousy,  hate  and  revenge  pending  between  them; 
she  counted  that  Germany  would  emerge  humiliated  out  of 
such  a  conflict  and  ready  to  submit  to  England's  dictation 
when  the  latter  would  declare  her  solidarity  with  these  powers. 
This  policy  of  England  resulted  less  from  the  designs  of 
the  British  statesmen  of  the  hour,  or  from  any  specific  political 
or  economic  necessities,  than  from  her  traditional  policy  of 
centuries  which  had  made  England  great  and  which  greatness 
and  supremacy  were  to  be  maintained!  Her  power  was  now 
to  be  turned  against  Germany,  as  her  present  greatest  political, 
industrial,  naval  and  shipping  competitor.  The  astute  Bis- 
marck expressed  the  situation  tersely,  as  early  as  1887,  when 
he  said,  in  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag:  "The  only  way  for  us 
to  guarantee  good  relations  with  England  would  be  to  restrict 
our  economic  and  national  development,  and  that,  of  course, 
we  cannot  do." 


The  Kaiser's  League  of  Nations.  To  many  readers  the 
preceding  articles  may  furnish  ground  for  the  belief  that 
Germany  was  the  main  obstacle  to  the  introduction  of  freer 
political  methods  and  relations  into  world  politics  because  of 
being  the  most  pronounced  "militarist"  power  and  because  of 
having  refused  to  join  in  the  Hague  arbitration  and  reduction- 
of-armament  proposals.  To  disprove  such  conclusions,  we 
must  understand  that  the  Morocco  disputes  and  the  near- 
Oriental  question  thoroughly  convinced  Germany  that  the 
Triple  Entente  meant  war  sooner  or  later,  and  that  all  these 
Hague  proposals  were  insincere  and  nothing  less  than  traps 
set  to  beguile  her.  They  wanted  to  "down"  Germany  well 
enough  but  would  have  preferred  to  accomplish  this  without 
the  uncertain  means  of  an  appeal  to  arms.  The  great  Bismarck 
said,  soon  after  the  war  of  1870-71,  that  "Germany  would 
have  to  fight  for  what  she  had  achieved  within  one  or  two 
generations,  as  the  envy  of  her  neighbors  would  never  allow 
her  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  her  victory  and  her  new  prosperity 
without    challenge." 

We  have  shown  in  our  articles  that  Germany's  necessity 
and  aim  was  peace  and  that  it  was  because  of  that  aim  that 
she  had  to  be  armed  to  the  teeth.  A  corroboration  of  the 
Kaiser's  constant  peace  policy  has  recently  come  to  light 
through  the  memoirs  of  Count  Witte,  the  prominent  Russian 
statesman.  It  appears  that  in  1905,  while  on  a  visit  to  the  Czar, 
the  Kaiser  proposed  a  "League  of  Nations"  offensive  and  defens- 
ive, between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  Russia  and  France  to  secure 
peace  on  the  Continent,  and  that  France  was  to  be  prevailed 
upon  by  Russia  to  join  in  this  league.  This  entire  proposition 
was   arranged    secretly   between   the    Kaiser  and    Czar  and   at 

74 


first  even  kept  from  the  knowledge  of  the  Russian  Prime 
Minister  of  the  day,  Count  Lamsdorff,  presumably  to  facilitate 
confidential  pourparlers  being-  begun  with  France.  When  the 
two  Russian  statesmen  named  above  became  aware  of  these 
private  plans  of  the  two  mon'archs,  they  announced  at  once 
that  "this  proposition  was  an  affront  to  France  and  would 
upset  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance" — 
already  formed  at  that  time — against  Germany's  African  and 
near-Oriental  policy,  and  for  nearer-home  reasons.  This  prop-  - 
osition  then  quickly  died  of  inanition  due  to  the  lack  of 
energetic  power  on  the  part  of  Czar  Nicholas  and  the  deter- 
mined opposition  of  the  pro-French  war  party  at  his  Court. 
From  all  the  circumstances  of  the  situation  it  is  evident  that 
Russia  was  to  be  the  moving  spirit  in  this  plan  because  of  her 
intimate  relation  with  France;  she  failing,  Germany  could  go 
no  further.  Emperor  William  was  deeply  disappointed  by  the 
fiasco  of  his  well-intentioned  detrmrche. 


VII.      MORAL   DELINQUENCY   AND   SPIRITUAL 

INERTIA  AS  ESSENTIAL  FACTORS  OF 

THE  WAR 

In  the  Introduction  the  author  indicates  the  breakup  of 
the  moral  and  ethical  systems  of  our  times,  due  to  their 
irrational  foundation,  as  essential  causes  of  the  war.  These 
views  are  elaborated  in  the  articles  mentioned,  and  it  would 
not  be  amiss  to  read  them  in  connection  with  the  present 
article.  To  these  causes  we  must  add  one  closely  related  to 
them  and  no  less  important:  It  is  the  unfortunate  spiritual 
inertia  in  which  mankind  has  been  held  within  its  stupendous 
technical  and  material  progress  and  which  prevented  a  political 
organization  of  the  world  in  harmony  therewith,  and  the  timely 
removal  of  causes  of  war.  We  refer  here  to  the  brilliant 
ideas  of  Dr.  Alfred  E.  Fx-ied,  a  holder  of  the  Nobel  peace  prize, 
as  expressed  in  his  magazine  articles  on  the  war  and  the 
League  of  Nations.  Among  the  voluminous  literary  material 
which  the  author  has  read  in  his  studies  on  the  war,  nothing 
more  able,  broad  and  fundamentally  true  has  been  presented, 
especially  as  applicable  to  the  possibility  of  a  successful 
League  of  Nations  in  the  present  conditions  of  the  world.    The 

75 


author's  own  views  singularly  cover,  include  and  indorse  those 
of  Dr.  Fried,  although  presented  in  a  different  form.  It  is 
highly  desirable  that  the  philosophical  foundations  of  the 
war  be  submitted  to  the  reader  at  this  stage  of  this  book's 
argument  in  order  that  he  may  become  imbued  with  a  clear 
impression  that  below  historical  and  political  developments, 
as  given  in  the  succeeding  chapters,  there  are  deeper  causes — 
the  ethical  and  spii-itual  conditions  of  the  great  tragedy. 

In  the  article  "The  Summit"  the  author  has  drawn  a  picture 
of  the  phenomenal  progress  of  mankind  in  scientific,  technical 
— purely  material — directions  during  the  nineteenth  century 
and  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  In  the  course  of  this 
progress — particularly  in  the  means  of  inter-communication 
for  business,  research,  pleasure — the  world  has  figuratively 
become  smaller,  as  pointed  out  by  Fried  and  by  the  author 
in  his  "National  Evolution,"  published  in  1908;  peoples  and 
countries  have  been  drawn  closely  together,  intercourse  has 
been  extended,  differences  have  been  leveled  and  prejudices 
softened,  dark  continents  and  semi-savage  races  have  been 
brought  into  the  fold  of  civilization.  As  a  result,  a  con- 
tiguity of  interest  and  aspiration  began  to  embrace  the  entire 
world;  the  events  and  trend  in  each  individual  country  im- 
mediately became  the  common  knowledge  and  property  of 
all  others,  the  world  was  approaching  the  status  of  an  inter- 
national  community.  But  such  a  condition  plainly  demanded 
a  corresponding  widening  of  sentiment  and  method  in  the 
regulation  of  political  matters — an  internationalized  type  of 
political    view,    diplomacy    and    action. 

While  this  was  recognized  by  leaders  of  thought  and  a  senti- 
ment in  this  direction  was  developing  and  the  first  tentative 
steps  were  actually  being  taken  (Hague  Peace  conferences  and 
Tribunal,  the  Kaiser's  League  of  Nations  of  1905,  International 
rules  on  the  High  seas,  belligerency  regulations,  etc.),  not 
sufficient  progress  and  harmony  of  purpose  had  been  attained 
by  1914  to  make  it  possible  to  resolve  the  elements  of  a  threat- 
ening world  conflagration  into  a  judicial  argument  at  the 
Hague  Peace  Palace.  Philosophy,  which  in  the  wider  sense  in- 
cludes religion,  had  remained  stagnant;  man  continued  in  this 
respect,  in  the  confining  swaddling  clothes  of  his  infancy,  which 

76 


left  his  spiritual  horizon  far  behind  his  material  plane.  The 
political  leaders  of  the  time  had  one  foot  upon  the  bridge  of 
progress  but  the  other  was  restrained  by  the  evil  memories 
and  practices  of  the  past;  in  other  words:  Spiritual  progress 
had  lagged  behind,  had  been  outrun  by  the  different  factors 
of  material  progress,  had  not  been  able  to  change  its  feeling 
and  perspective  and  obtain  intellectual  control  over  the  new 
conditions  in  the  world.  In  final  analysis  this  must  be  recog- 
nized as  one  of  the  most  important  indirect  causes  of  the 
war  through  its  failure  to  substitute  counsel  for  force.  The 
new  conditions  of  intercourse,  assimilation,  and  material  ad- 
vance of  every  kind  had  come  too  rapidly  for  man  himself  to 
comprehend  fully  the  process  of  change  which  was  overtaking 
him  and  to  devise  the  ajustments  required  by  it. 

This  dangerous  conflict  between  material  achievement 
and  lack  of  philosophical  outlook  was  bound,  sooner  or  later, 
to  bring  the  world  to  a  crash.  For,  the  new  conditions  while 
increasing  contact  and  domains  of  mutual  interest  between 
all  the  nations  of  the  world,  leveling  inequalities  and  pre- 
judices, also  increased  opposition  of  interests  and  general  fric- 
tion, leading  to  jealousy  and  envy  between  them.  Conflicting 
spheres  of  interests  of  the  different  nations  crossed  each  other 
in  every  corner  of  the  world,  and  instead  of  leading  the 
statesmen  to  the  road  of  "intelligent  understandings,"  the 
old  policies  of  secret  diplomacy,  combinations  and  appeal  to 
force  were  left  to  deal  with  the  questions.  Instead  of  "regu- 
lation" becoming  the  means  of  adjustment,  force,  imperialism 
and  militarism  retained  their  sway.  Thus,  instead  of  man's 
material  advance  leading  to  his  continued  progress  and  ever 
greater  happiness,  all  was  pulled  down  by  the  very  breadth 
and  depth  of  his  achievements  in  scientific  and  general  progress 
when  these  became  applied  to  the  gruesome  tasks  of  war! 

The  war  has  now  fully  taught  us  that  the  new  "intimacy" 
of  all  parts  of  the  world,  the  internationality  of  sentiment  and 
feeling  which  exists  in  many  directions,  demands  a  new  order 
of  political  philosophy  and  world  organization  for  regulating 
the  intercourse  among  the  nations.  This  conviction  has  found 
expression  in  the  "League  of  Nations."  But  those  very  con- 
ditions of  intimacy  and   unity  which   existed   before   the  war 

77 


and  made  the  ground  so  favorable  for  the  forming  of  such  a 
league  and  new  system  of  arriving  at  political  adjustments 
have  been  destroyed  by  the  war  and  are  now  missing.  In- 
stead of  free  intercourse,  confidence,  friendship,  we  now  have 
repression,  distrust,  hate  and  wilful  crippling  of  the  defeated 
nations.  The  borders  are  closed,  travel  is  impeded,  famine 
and  political  ferment  hold  hundreds  of  millions  by  the  throat, 
business  is  depressed  to  the  minimum  of  absolute  necessity, 
enterprise  is  dead,  every  country  is  bankrupt  and  its  money 
almost  without  value.  (The  author  is  speaking  of  Central 
Europe,  particularly.)  Hunger,  dismay  and  hopelessness  have 
paralyzed  all  energies  and  cast  a  pall  over  Continental  Europe. 
How  can  such  conditions  be  favorable  for  the  erection  of  a 
successful  League  of  Nations  at  this  time?  The  very  elements 
required — broad  international  sympathy  and  unity  of  interest 
and  outlook — are  missing.  We  now  realize  with  pain  and 
remorse  what  it  was  that  we  possessed  before  the  war,  what 
we  failed  to  see  and  do,  the  great  opportunity  we  lost!  As  Dr. 
Fried  says:  "The  structure  of  a  real  league  of  nations  can- 
not be  erected  ere  these  lost  foundations  are  regained."  We 
must  first  win  back  the  pre-war  conditions  of  international 
freedom,  opportunity  and  prosperity,  and  the  spiritual  buoy- 
ancy which  comes  of  peace  before  we  can  hope  to  apply  to 
politics  the  new  thought  of  counsel,  compromise  and  co- 
operation in  place  of  sinister  selfishness  and,  the  use  of 
material  force! 

We  have  called  the  defect  under  consideration  "spiritual 
inertia,"  but  what,  at  bottom,  was  its  nature?  The  great 
achievements  of  our  age  certainly  do  not  indicate  any  in- 
tellectual disability  or  decay  in  man;  never  did  intelligence, 
the  power  of  thought,  ingenuity,  imagination  shine  forth 
brighter  than  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Why,  then,  did  this 
"intellectual  strength"  not  assert  itself  in  the  domain  of 
political  philosophy?  Why  did  vision  remain  unclear?  What 
was  it  that  put  "the  spirit"  in  chains?  Here  we  have  to  leave 
Dr.  Fried  and  take  up  the  author's  mox'e  objective  and  fun- 
damental explanation  of  the  whole  phenomenon.  Where,  we 
ask,  is  the  distinct  line  between  spirit,  morals  and  ethics? 
The   author  asserts  that  human    nature   is   one   and   undivided 

78 


and  cannot  be  precisely  separated  into  its  constituent  factors. 
There  is  but  one  system  or  function  of  thought,  and  it  in- 
cludes feeling,  spirit,  morals  and  ethics;  and  the  conclusion 
is  inevitable  that  this  "spiritual  inertia"  which  held  the  woi'ld 
in  bondage  was  but  the  applied  expression  of  the  philosophical 
inertia  and  delinquency  of  our  day,  as  analyzed  in  the  parts 
of  this  book  mentioned.  It  was  the  lack  of  strong  moral 
convictions,  of  full  confidence  in  the  basis  of  our  moral  and 
ethical  system  that  delivered  man  over  to  the  rule  of  coarse 
selfishness,  greed  for  power  and  possessions,  jealousy  and  envy 
of  the  brother-man  and,  brother-nation ;  that  filled  his  mind 
with  the  oppression  of  these  dark  impulses  to  the  exclusion 
of  a  free  and  liberal  perception  of  the  new  world  conditions 
and  of  the  new  political  atmosphere  required  for  their  peace- 
able solution!  Thus,  whichever  way  we  argue  the  point,  we 
are  brought  to  the  author's  declaration  that  a  new  philosophy 
of  life  is  needed  in  the  world  freed  from  the  cobwebs  brought 
over  from  the  infancy  of  man  in  order  to  bring  real  truth, 
candor,  seriousness  and  sympathy  into  men's  character,  their 
motives  and  actions  in  all  the  avenues  of  human  demonstration. 


B.  OUTBREAK  AND  COURSE  OF  THE  WAR 

VIII.     RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

The   Great   Conspiracy.     The    British    Propaganda 

As  stated  in  the  "Introduction"  this  book  is  not  a  history 
of  the  events  of  the  war  in  the  usual  sense  but  an  examination, 
rather,  of  the  inner  forces — political,  social,  moral — that  made 
the  war.  Our  object  is  to  free  the  colossal  occurrence  from 
the  atmosphere  of  ignorance,  deceit  and  calumny  in  which  it 
has  been  enveloped  and  to  reveal  the  great  wrongs  of  motive, 
errors  of  calculation  and  judgment  which  precipitated  the 
war  and  maintained  it  during  four  long  years  of  terror. 

With  the  view  to  focus  the  individual  and  joint  responsi- 
bility of  the  powers  for  the  war  we  will  briefly  restate  the 
objects   of  each   thus: 

79 


1.  Germany    had    no    schemes    of    vengeance    or    conquest 

against  any  of  the  opposing  powers,  and  there  were  no  acute 
political  disputes  arising  from  active  aggression  or  direct 
threat  pending  with  any  one  of  them  in  the  spring  of  1914. 
The  Morocco  question  had  practically  been  disposed  of  through 
the  final  agreements  with  France  made  in  1911-12,  except  that 
a  state  of  mutual  irritation  was  left  behind.  This  question 
unfortunately  had,  in  its  long  course  of  friction,  greatly 
stimulated  the  French  agitation  for  revenge  for  1870  and  for 
regaining  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The  efffect  of  this  open 
determination  of  an  influential  section  in  France  to  bring 
these  questions  to  a  military  decision  at  the  first  favorable 
opportunity  was,  naturally,  very  disquieting  and  exasperating 
to  Germany  and  caused  deep  political  apprehension  in  that 
country.  As  to  other  "war"  subjects,  Germany  had  determined 
on  the  immediate  execution  of  her  eastern  commercial  ex- 
pansion policy  and  the  Bagdad  railroad  single-handed,  prac- 
tically, as  participation  by  other  nations,  mainly  England  and 
France,  did  not  appear  possible  without  surrendering  her 
supreme  rights  in  the  undertaking.  She  was  also  carrying 
out  a  gradual  increase  of  her  naval  strength  in  proportion  to 
the  increase  of  her  mercantile  shipping  and  colonial  possessions 
and  in  line  with  England's  policy  in  this  respect.  For  the 
success  of  her  internal  and  external  policy  Germany  needed 
evidently  nothing  so  much  as  peace;  she  was  fully  aware  of 
the  growing  enmity  of  England  and  the  United  States  because 
of  jealousy  of  her  steadily  expanding  trade  and  shipping,  but 
she  claimed  the  right  to  look  upon  the  world  as  an  open 
market  and  free-for-all  field  of  competition  in  which  merit 
and  price  of  wares  and  efficiency  of  service  should  be  the 
only  privileges   of  competition. 

2.  France,  always  enmious  to  Germany  in  her  subconscious 
self,  had  been  defeated  in  her  plan  (with  England)  to  humiliate 
Germany  in  the  Morocco  question — by  ignoring  hei*  rights  as 
a  member  of  the  Madrid  Colonial  conference — and  had,  in- 
stead, been  compelled  by  Germany  to  come  into  the  Algericas 
conference  and,  later,  settle  the  Morocco  and  related  colonial 
disputes  by  agreements  with  her,  recognizing  Germany's  rights 
and  sphere  of  interest  in  Africa.      This  result  had  left  a   sharp 

80 


sting  of  resentment  in  the  breast  of  France,  which  found  its 
vent  in  the  renewed  and  virulent  revenge  and  Alsace-Lorraine 
agitation  under  Delcasse's  lead,  purposely  calculated  to  irritate 
Germany  to  some  open  act  of  hostile  rejoinder  leading  to  war. 
Knowing  England's  fear  of  Germany's  growth,  and  Russia's 
precarious  internal  situation  and  Constantinople  ambitions, 
France  found  it  easy  to  approach  them  both  with  suggestions 
for  a  combination.  This  insidious  work  culminated  in  the 
Triple  Entente  to  block  Germany's  plans,  bring  on  her  sub- 
mission— defeat  in  war,  if  necessary — and  compel  the  resti- 
tution  of   Alsace-Lorraine. 

3.  Russia  was  determined,  from  the  variety  of  motives 
previously  explained,  to  provoke  war  with  Turkey,  the  Balkan 
States,  Austria  and  even  Germany — one  or  more  or  all  of 
them — to  set  the  ball  a-rolling  to  win  Constantinople  and 
the  freedom  of  the  southern  seas,  already  pledged  to  her  by 
England   and   France   as  the   prize   for  entering   the   Entente. 

4.  Austria  was  resolved  to  put  down  the  plotting  of  Russia 
and  Serbia  against  her  rule  in  Bosnia  and  Dalmatia,  and  the 
plotting  of  Russia  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro  against  her  tra- 
ditional political  consolidation  policy  towards  these  countries. 

5.  England  was  determined  to  check  Germany's  further 
encroachment  upon  her  industrial,  commercial-shipping  and 
naval  supremacy  and  to  definitely  prevent  the  execution  of 
her  eastern-extension  program  unless  she  could  obtain  a  con- 
trolling hand  therein.     Such  was  the  relative  situation. 

We  see  from  this  summary  that  the  three  Entente  nations 
and  Austria  were  the  bellicose  factors;  they  each  had  definite 
"grievances  and  objects"  involving  aggression.  Germany,  on 
the  contrary,  had  none  such;  there  were  no  plans  of  territorial 
aggression  against  either  France,  Belgium  or  Holland,  nor 
against  any  eastern  country;  if  there  had  been  anything  of 
this  kind  in  secret  preparation  it  would  surely  have  come  to 
light  by  this  time  through  the  war  "revelations"  in  the  different 
countries.  The  irritation  of  Germany  against  France  was  a 
"reflex"  irritation;  the  protective  position  she  had  to  assume 
towards  Austria  was  obligatory  under  the  Triple-Alliance  treaty 
and  a  matter  of  honor  with  her,  but  it  was  "indirect"  as  far 
as  she  herself  was  concerned.    The  above  statement  is  funda- 

81 


mental  for  the  correct  understanding  of  the  war  development; 
it  is  incontrovertible;  it  leaves  it  impossible  for  anyone  to 
continue  to  believe  the  infamous  manufactured  propaganda 
charge  "that  Germany  purposely  plotted  the  war  from  motives 
of  conquest."  It  was  the  result  of  the  determined  aggressive 
Entente  designs  against  the  stubborn  defensive  Alliance  designs! 
The  responsibility  is  well  divided  between  them  and  must  be 
shared  by  all  of  the  five  original  war  powers;  if  anything — 
Germany  was  the  least  responsible  of  all!!  It  defies  all 
understanding  that  the  people  of  the  United  States,  so  able 
and  intelligent  in  business  matters,  could  not  see  through  this 
entanglement  and  fell  an  easy  victim  to  English  wiles  and 
French  ebullitions  and  plunged  pell  mell  into  this  hotbed  of 
hate  and  intrigue — European  politics! 

The  nations  of  the  Triple  Entente — France,  England  and 
Russia — knew  very  well  that  neither  of  them  could  fight  for 
their  objects  single-handed  against  the  Triple-Alliance — 
Germany,  Austria,  Italy — ^with  any  chance  of  success,  hence 
the  combination;  and  the  motive  of  this  combination  rested 
in  first  line  upon  their  respective  particular  objects  and  in- 
terests, in  lesser  degree  upon  their  common  jealousy  of 
Germany's  political  and  industrial  position  and  in  the  least 
degree  of  all  upon  natural  sympathy  for  each  other.  As  be- 
tween England  and  Russia,  there  was  no  natural  sympathy  at 
all — quite  the  contrary;  as  between  England  and  France  there 
had  been  a  sympathetic  understanding  about  their  colonial 
policies  since  the  beginning  of  the  Morocco  contention,  but 
even  in  this  the  common  tie  was  a  material  one — the  exclusion 
of  Germany  from  further  colonial  extension  in  Africa  and  the 
checking  of  any  plans  on  her  part  for  acquiring  new  colonies 
in  other  parts  of  the  world.  England  would  never  have  gone 
to  war  with  Germany  merely  for  the  sentimental  object  of 
helping  France  win  back  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  surely  not  to 
help  Russia  win  Constantinople,  and  the  same  reasoning  applies 
to  the  other  two  powers  in  regard  to  each  other. 

We  see  from  the  above  that  the  separate  self-interests 
of  the  three  powers  were  beyond  doubt  the  main  impelling 
force  of  the  Entente;  the  other  factors  were  of  greatly  inferior 
moment.     Had  America  ever  comprehended   this — that  sordid 

82 


selfish     aims — jealousy,     greed,     and     vainglorious     revenge — 

were  at  the  bottom  of  the  combination  against  Germany,  she 
would  never  have  reached  the  point  of  entering  the  war,  she 
would  have  remained  strictly  neutral  and  would  have  taken 
her  unavoidable  shipping  losses  and  restrictions  philosophically 
like  the  other  neutrals  did — as  inevitable  incidents  of  war — 
and  would  have  prevented  all  avoidable  losses  by  proper  ship- 
ping regulations.  We  have  already  said  that  the  war  came 
as  the  joint  result  of  the  entire  situation,  and  that  no  war 
of  the  fierce  character  and  unprecedented  extent  of  the  past 
conflict  was  consciously  planned  by  the  Entente.  The  cal- 
culation was  that  whenever  by  any  acute  political  provocation 
a  dangerous  crisis  should  arise  which  would  furnish  a  plausible 
pretext  for  aggressive  threats  against  the  Triple  Alliance  or 
any  individual  member  thereof,  the  Entente  combination  should 
quickly  reveal  itself  as  of  such  strength  and  determination 
that  Germany  would  not  dare  take  up  the  sword  in  defence^ 
that  she  would  be  overawed  and  compelled  to  submit  to  her 
political  humiliation  and  the  retrenchment  of  her  ambitions  to 
save  herself  from  annihilation.  Failing  this  immediate  out- 
come by  political  pressure,  the  most  that  was  contemplated 
and  expected  was  a  limited  war  with  the  same  final  effect. 
THIS   ENTIRE  CALCULATION  MISCARRIED! 

On  the  afternoon  of  June  28th,  1914,  Europe  was  thrown 
into  consternation  by  the  catastrophe  at  Serajevo,  Bosnia. 
Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  of  Austria,  and  his  morganatic 
wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  while  on  an  official  visit  and 
representing  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  were  assassinated  while 
riding  in  a  carriage  through  the  streets  of  that  city.  The 
terrible  event  had  come  without  an  inkling  of  the  plot  having 
penetrated  to  the  authorities  or  the  public  ear.  Suddenly, 
without  warning,  the  electric  spark  had  been  flashed  into  the 
European  powder  magazine.  The  public  was  stunned,  fearful 
of  the  dread  consequences  which  were  sure  to  follow. 
Immediately  there  occurred  that  rapid  exchange  of  diplomatic 
"notes"  between  the  powers,  accusations,  explanations,  frantic 
efforts  to  preserve  the  peace,  during  which  the  world  lived  in 
suspense.  All  was  in  vain;  it  ended  in  little  more  than  a  month 
with  the  outbreak  of  the  war.     A  few  days'  investigation  had 

83 


established  the  fact  that,  although  the  deed  had  been  committed 
in  Bosnia,  the  murder  was,  on  its  surface  appearance,  a 
Serbian  plot,  the  work  of  a  wide-spread  Serbian  secret  con- 
spiracy! Austria,  the  injured  and  attacked  country,  demanded 
at  once  not  only  the  admission  of  guilt  from  Serbia  but  full 
information  about  the  conspiracy,  also  the  adequate  .punish- 
ment of  the  assassins  and  all  concerned  in  the  devilish  act, 
and  such  guaranties  and  control  over  Serbian  affairs  as  would 
almost  have  annulled  that  country's  sovereign  independence. 
The  Serbian  government  met  these  demands  as  fully  as  it 
could  possibly  do  without  abdicating  its  sovereignty.  But 
Austria,  in  her  exasperation,  was  unbending;  the  moment 
and  opportunity  had  now  arrived,  in  a  manner  quite  unex- 
pected, for  eradicating  once  for  all  that  hotbed  of  native  and 
foreign  intrigue  which  had  been  gnawing  at  her  flanks  for 
twenty  years,  and  of  instituting  that  regime  of  closer  asso- 
ciation and  control  of  which  we  have  previously  spoken.  She 
demanded  the  right  herself  to  examine  all  the  secret  police 
records  on  the  plot,  and  in  future  to  exercise  control  over  the 
Serbian  police  department;  she  insisted  on  the  severe  physical 
punishment  of  Serbia  by  military  occupation  and  practical 
subjection  of  the  country  for  a  stipulated  dui*ation.  This 
was  the  famous  "Ultimatum"  to  Serbia,  most  ominous  demand 
of  political  coevcion  of  modern  history.  All  attempts  at  com- 
promise failed ;  Germany's  pleas  with  her  ally  for  moderation 
were  unavailing  until  later,  when  the,  favorable  time  for  its 
exercise  had  passed.  Austria  finally  ended  the  tension  by 
declaring  war  on  Serbia  and  preparing  to  invade  that  country, 
July  28th,  1914,  one  month  after  the  Serajevo  crime.  This 
was  the  first  great  error  committed  that  precipitated  the  gen- 
eral war,  an  error  of  over-haste  and  passion  for  revenge,  by 
Austria. 

Meanwhile  Russia  had  secretly  begun  to  mobilize  her  army, 
ostensibly  in  protection  of  her  semi-ward  Serbia,  but  in 
reality  to  bring  on  a  conflict  with  Austria,  for  reasons  which 
we  have  amply  set  forth.  She  answered  Austria's  declai'ation 
of  war  on  Serbia  by  a  partial  mobilization  of  reservists,  July 
29th,  1914,  and  by  a  genei'al  mobilization  order,  July  30th, 
1914.      Germany,    on    her   part,    having   done    all    she   possibly 

84 


could  to  influence  Austria  to  moderation,  gave  the  powers  to 
undex'stand  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  a  binding  compact 
none  the  less,  made  op  the  honor  of  her  sword,  and  that  she 
would  stand  by  Austria  to  the  end,  as  the  assaulted  country, 
even  though  her  demands  for  retribution  might  be  excessive. 
Germany  demanded  the  immediate  cessation  of  mobilization 
by  Russia  as  the  sine  qua  non  condition  of  avoiding  a  greater 
wa.r  complication,  and  called  upon  England  and  France  to 
use  their  influence  and  all  necessary  pressure  upon  Russia  to 
effect  this.  Diplomatic  notes  passed  between  the  powers 
hourly  for  three  to  four  days  on  this  main  bone  of  contention 
and  crux  of  the  dangerous  situation — Russia's  mobilization. 
Personal  letters,  telegrams  and  telephone  communications  were 
exchanged  between  the  Kaiser  and  the  Czar  and  King  George 
of  England  with  the  object  of  avoiding  the  catastrophe  that 
drew  visibly  near.  Helas!  nothing  availed;  the  terrible  pas- 
sions of  distrust,  hate  and  strife  were  fully  aroused !  France, 
lying  low  like  a  tiger  ready  to  spring,  secretly  assured  Russia 
of  her  unflinching  support  as  her  Entente  ally,  no  matter 
what  might  develop.  England,  in  the  background,  scheming, 
conniving — now  pushing,  now  halting — played  a  double-faced 
game  of  vacillating  "note  writing,"  of  impossible  proposi- 
tions for  a  "conference,"  and  of  ostensible  working  for  delay 
and  peace  but,  meantime,  hoping  secretly  that  the  continental 
powers  would  become  irretrievably  embroiled  and  all  but  com- 
mitted to  war.  This  would  leave  her  free  to  step  in  at  the 
last  critical  moment  to  reveal  and  impress  upon  Germany 
and  Austria  the  crushing  fact  that  the  Entente  was  a  full 
off"ensive  and  defensive  alliance  and  that  she,  England,  was 
committed  to  stand  by  France  and  Russia  in  the  case  of  war. 
Then  should  come  her  supreme  hour  of  diplomatic  ti'iumph 
by  the  unconditiona-1  backdown  of  Germany!  Never  was  there 
a  more  cunning  and  unscrupulous  fox  in  control  of  the 
diplomatic  moves  of  a  great  country  in  a  dangerous  crisis 
than  Earl  Grey,  England's  Foreign  Minister  in  those  fatal 
days,  proved  himself  to  be! 

In  that  hard-headed,  country — Germany — however,  neither 
the  Kaiser  and  his  advisers  nor  the  people  were  for  a  moment 
given  to  any  delusions  as  to  all  this  "public  play  of  pretenses"; 

85 


they  knew,  they  felt  that  that  which  had  long  been  prepared 
against  them  was  now  about  to  come:  they  knew  that  if 
England  were  sincere,  she  would  but  need  to  speak  to  Russia 
the  one  plain  bold  word:  "DEMOBILIZE!  or  we  will  be  against 
you,  and  that  the  air  would  in  a  moment  have  been  cleared 
of  danger.  THAT  WORD  WAS  NEVER  SPOKEN!  Well 
may  the  reader  imagine  the  feelings  of  outraged  national  dig- 
nity, of  unspeakable  wrath  against  their  enemies  that  pei*- 
vaded  the  German  people  when  they  thus  saw  themselves 
face  to  face  with  being  torn  from  their  path  of  peace  and 
plunged  into  a  desperate  war  in  defense  of  their  existence 
against  an  overwhelming  enemy,  into  a  struggle  behind  which 
there  stood  no  honorable  justifiable  cause,  nothing  but  the 
lowest  motives  of  greed,  jealousy,  revenge  and  the  purpose 
to  dominate  over  them!  When  Germany's  patience  was  ex- 
hausted with  the  whole  disgusting  play  of  falsehood  and 
chicanery  among  the  powers  to  the  point  that  her  self-respect 
and  courage  demanded  action  and  she  was  convinced  that 
war  had  become  inevitable,  she  took  the  bit  in  her  grim 
mouth  and  ran  away  with  it:  On  August  first,  1914,  Germany 
formally    declared    war    upon    Russia. 

For  days  during  the  passage  of  these  events  the  world 
dared  scarcely  breathe,  in  mortal  anxiety  over  the  outcome ; 
when  that  declaration  of  Germany  fell,  the  heart  of  the  world 
stood  still!  Something  awful,  something  immeasurably  terrible 
had  happened!  Civilization  was  now  to  be  torn  asunder  and 
the  nations  of  Europe  were  to  fly  at  each  other's  throats 
like  wild  beasts!  The  blood  of  the  brothers  of  men  was  to 
flow  in  rivers  and  soak  into  the  ground  to  make  the  mother- 
earth  shudder  in  horror!  The  fruits  of  dfccades  bf  up- 
building and  vaunted  progress  were  to  be  dissipated  like  sands 
before  a  windblast!  Death,  mutilation,  destruction,  desecra- 
tion, suffering  and  want  were  to  displace  peace  and  happiness 
on  earth! 

The  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  had  opened  the  eyes  of 
the  Entente  to  the  ominous  reality  that  they  had  miscalculated 
the  temper  and  resolution  of  Germany.  The  latter,  now  fully 
aroused  to  her  perilous  position,  immediately  called  upon 
France  for  definite  assurances  as  to  her  intentions  in  regard 

86 


to  Russia.  The  answer  was  a  defiant  and  curt  reply,  followed 
by  an  order  for  partial  mobilization.  Evidently,  there  was  no 
desire  to  maintain  peace  with  Germany  and  to  restrict  the 
conflict;  evidently  the  obligations  of  the  Entente  powers  to 
eacti  other  were  as  strong  as  those  which  compelled  Germany 
to  fight  for  Austria.  Seeing  herself  open  to  immediate  attack 
from  two  sides,  Germany  could  not  hesitate  long,  but  resolving 
to  be  first  in  the  field,  declared  war  on  France,  August  2d, 
1914.  Meanwhile  Russia  had  not  received  that  word,  or 
demand,  from  England  which  alone  could  have  saved  the  situa- 
tion at  the  eleventh  hour.  She  continued  her  mobilization 
at  top  speed  and  began  to  move  troops  upon  the  Austrian  and 
German  frontiers.  Thereupon  Austria  ordered  full  mobiliza- 
tion against  Russia,  in  agreement  with  Germany;  and  after 
England  had  made  her  all-deciding  move,  on  August  4th, 
Austria  formally  declared  war  upon  Russia,  August  6th,  1914. 
Thus  the  dial  of  war  moved  forward  with  the  relentless  preci- 
sion of  fate!  Mankind  stood  aghast,  trembling,  at  the  thought 
of  the  events  to  come ! 

Upon  England  the  declarations  of  war  by  Germany  had 
fallen  like  a  thunderbolt!  The  nation  was  stunned  at  first — 
then  awoke  to  the  terrible  realization  that  her  design  had 
failed.  Instead  of  a  backdown,  Germany,  girded  to  the 
loins  and  ready,  was  resolved  to  face  the  world!  No  cringeing 
there,  abject  submission  before  the  superior  power  of  her 
enemies!  The  structure  of  Anglo-Saxon  cunning  was  brought 
to  collapse  by  the  blunt  honesty  and  self-reliance  of  German 
character!  England  now  saw  herself  drawn  into  the  maelstrom 
against  her  will,  into  a  war  which  she  had  hoped  others  would 
fight  for  her  and  for  which  she  was  not  prepared.  She  was 
thus  brought  face  to  face  with  two  alternatives:  To  fight, 
or  to  go  down  in  dishonor,  relinquishing  all  the  objects  for 
which  she  had  planned  for  years.  There  could  be  no  doubt 
about  the  decision :  England  could  neither  abandon  her  allies 
nor  her  own  purposes.  Further  attempts  at  temporizing  and 
dissimulating  on  her  part  had  now  become  useless  and  would 
have  looked  cowardly  in  face  of  the  resolute  stand  which  the 
continental  powers  had  taken.  The  drama  was  ready  to  be 
unrolled!  On  August  4,  1914,  England  declared  war  on  Ger- 
many. 

87 


From  the  foregoing  it  is  evident  that  each  of  the  six 
nations — Germany,  Austria,  Serbia,  Russia,  France  and  Eng- 
land— has  its  share  in  the  responsibility  for  the  war,  but  there 
must  certainly  be  one  to  whom  attaches  the  chief  responsibility 
for  its  actual  consummation.  That  nation  is  England,  un- 
questionably. Austria  created  a  belligerent  condition  by 
exacting  almost  impossible  terms  of  satisfaction  from  Serbia 
— which  is  only  another  name  for  Russia — and  the  latter  was 
only  too  ready  to  seize  the  carefully  prepared  opportunity 
to  come  to  an  immediate  contest  >vith  Austria  for  supremacy 
in  the  Balkans.  Germany  was  drawn  in  on  the  one  side  by 
her  obligations  to  Austria,  on  the  other  by  the  expressed 
revenge  attitude  of  France,  allied  with  Russia,  and  on  general 
grounds  by  the  plain  purpose  of  the  combined  Entente  to 
thwart  her  further  political  and  industrial  progress.  But 
England  held  the  balance  of  power  and  the  deciding  word. 
Without  her,  the  Triple  Entente  was  incomplete  in  action  and 
scarcely  sufficiently  preponderating  in  strength  against  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  When  England  saw  the  political  drama 
develop  quite  contrary  to  her  intentions  and  calculations,  and 
was  fully  aware  of  the  coming  of  the  titanic  world  war  she 
should  have  wielded  the  controlling  power  and  position  w^hich 
she  held  to  arrest  the  catastrophe,  or  at  least  to  reduce  its 
proportions.  A  bold  and  open  stand  for  peace  on  her  part 
from  the  beginning,  instead  of  an  attitude  of  connivance  and 
hesitation,  a  decisive  word  to  Russia  and  France  instead  of 
the  ambiguous  one  given,  could  have  prevented  war  even 
after  the  German  war  declarations  had  been  made,  or  at 
least  confined  it  to  a  limited  continental  conflict.  To  England, 
therefore,  belongs  the  ultimate  greatest  responsibility  for  the 
w^orld  war's  character  and  proportions  and  least  of  all  to 
Germany  who,  without  intent,  became  the  center  of  the 
tornado  whose  forces  had  gathered  outside  of  her! 

It  is  the  prevalent  opinion  that  Germany  erred  in  her 
haste  of  declaring  war  on  Russia  and  France  while  proposi- 
tions for  a  conference  of  the  powers  were  being  considered. 
She  may,  however,  have  been  in  possession  of  information,  in 
addition  to  the  impression  of  years  of  a  settled  design  against 
her,   which   deprecated   all    hope   of   favorable   results   from   a 

88 


conference.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  know  to-day — and  Ger- 
many knows  it — that  the  whole  of  the  diplomatic  moves  of 
those  days  were  a  clever  trap  to  manoeuvre  her  into  a  position 
where  she  could  do  no  other  than  make  the  first  war  declaration 
and  thus  lay  herself  open  to  the  charge  of  provoking  and 
"wanting"  the  war.  As  to  what  might  have  been  the  effect 
of  her  waiting  a  week  more  before  declaring  war  is,  of  course, 
pure  speculation;  it  might  have  revealed  more  clearly  to  all 
the  powers  the  abyss  towards  which  they  were  trending.  Ac- 
cording to  our  best  information  today,  war  would  have  come 
in  any  case;  but  by  greater  self-restraint  on  Germany's  part, 
England  and,  perhaps,  Italy — later — might  -have  been  kept 
out  of  the  contest  and  consequently  no  food  blockade  been 
instituted.  Germany  and  Austria  would,  in  these  circum- 
stances, probably  have  defeated  Russia  and  France.  In  such 
a  case  would  England  have  been  content  to  let  them  carry 
o£f  the  victory  without  action  on  her  part?  Scarcely!  This 
reflection  reveals  the  intricate  difficulties  of  the  situation.  The 
war  sp.rit  was  up;  for  fifteen  years  previous,  Europe  had  been 
at  the  "breaking  point".;  only  the  most  insistent  and  persistent 
efforts  had  been  able  to  preserve  the  peace ;  \he  pent-up  feelings 
had  now  been  aroused  to  fever  heat  and  cried  for  action,  not 
for  conferences.  Germany,  having  lost  all  confidence  in  the 
possibility  of  avoiding  war,  rushed  ahead  to  gain  the  military 
advantage  of  being  first  in  the  field  and  enabled  thereby  to 
throw  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country.  She  won  this  ad- 
vantage (except  in  East  Prussia  and  a  small  section  of  Alsace) 
and  was  able  to  maintain  it  to  the  last,  but  she  may  have  paid 
an  incalculable  penalty  for  her  precipitate  action  made  pos- 
sible by  her  preparedness.  Who  could  venture  to  say  how 
matters  would  have  gone  if  Germany  had  waited?  But  as 
we  can  hardly  assume  that  a  short  delay  would  have  greatly 
jeopardized  her  military  advantage,  yet  might  have  minimized 
the  war  and  given  it  a  different  character,  we  cannot  escape 
the  conclusion  that  ,  Germany's  haste  was  a  great  error,  the 
second   committed   that   launched   the   war  into  action. 

Immediately  following  upon  her  declaration  of  war,  Ger- 
many opened  the  campaign  against  France  by  invading  Bel- 
gium   to    gain    a    short    through-route    for    her    northern    armies 

89 


into  France.  This  unprovoked  and  to  all  outward  appearance 
unwarranted  invasion  of  Belgium  was  probably  Germany's 
greatest  mistake  and  wrong  in  the  war,  politically,  militarily 
and  morally.  Of  this  important  event  and  all  its  sad  con- 
sequences we  shall  speak  in  detail  in  a  special  article.  It 
was  the  third  great  error  committed  in  the  war  and  is  largely 
chargeable  to  Germany  alone.  These  events — the  hasty  decla- 
rations of  war  on  Russia  and  France  and  the  invasion  of 
Belgium — have  been  the  mainstays  of  the  charge  that  Germany 
purposely  plotted  to  bring  on  the  war  to  realize  aims  of 
aggression  against  other  nations,  even  world  conquest!  After 
all  the  arguments  we  have  made  in  previous  references  to 
this  subject,  it  should  not  be  necessary  to  point  out  the  total 
absence  of  relevance  or  connection  between  this  charge  and 
the  occurrences  in  question.  As  to  her  "preparedness,"  Ger- 
many was  ready  for  defensive  action  at  a  few  days'  notice 
ever  since  1871;  it  was  an  outcome  of  her  political  and  geo- 
graphical situation — a  .  necessity — as  acknowledged  by  Lloyd 
George  himself  in  a  famous  Guild-Hall  speech.  We  have 
shown  that  Germany's  prime  need  was  PEACE  for  her  internal 
consolidation  and  industrial  development.  As  for  the  inva- 
sion of  Belgium,  it  was  not  political  or  with  the  definite  first 
object  of  conquest,  but  purely  military — to  afford  a  through- 
passage  into  France — and,  beyond  that,  at  most  to  keep 
England  and  France  out  of  that  country  by  her  presence  there. 
Germany  was  reasonably  sure  of  Holland's  neutrality  in  the 
war  but  not  of  that  of  Belgium,  for  reasons  which  we  shall 
argue  in  detail  later.  The  clashing  difference  between  Ger- 
many's real  objects  in  the  steps  she  took  and  the  wild  charges 
thrown  at  her  in  blind  hate  and  cunning  self-defense  by  her 
enemies  should  now   be  apparent  to  the  reader. 


Tj^NGLAND,   having  taken   her  decision,  turned  with   savage 

rage  upon  her  enemy,  that  enemy  who  had  already,  in  a 

sense,  defeated   her  by  upsetting  her  entire   chessboard.      Not 

only  upon  the  battlefield  was  this  enemy  to  be  beaten  by  shot 

and  sword,  but  even  more  so   in   the  subtler  fields   of   diplomacy 
and    publicity    by    a    propaganda    of    "inuendo    and    suggestion" 


90 


to   fasten   upon   him   the   odium  and   responsibility  for   the  war! 

The  real  causes  and  issues  of  the  war  were  to  be  buried  under 
an  avalanche  of  misrepresentation,  deliberate  lies — artful  or 
coarse,  and  inflaming  accusations:  "Not  for  the  supremacy 
of  her  political  position,  industry,  shipping  trade,  commerce- 
and  navy,  not  for  the  defeat  of  Gei'many's  eastern  policy  and 
the  Berlin-Bagdad  railroad  had  England  formed  the  Entente 
alliance  and  stimulated  France  and  Russia  to  bring  their  own 
individual  ambitions  to  realization,  but  to  eradicate  this  en- 
slaving curse  of  "Prussian  militarism,"  this  odious  government 
of-  "German  autocracy"  that  was  an  eyesore  to  the  other 
nations  and  an  offense  to  their  superior  sense  of  rights;  to 
unmask  this  arrogant  braggart  Kaiser-tyrant,  with  his  audacity 
to  defy  England,  France  and  Russia  together;  to  defeat  these 
preposterous  designs  of  "world  conquest"  which  were  to  sub- 
ject all  the  nations  and  about  which  these  Germans  had  been 
writing  and  talking  since  years  with  their  "Deutschland  Ueber 
Alles,"  and  to  execute  which  they  had  purposely  planned  and 
precipitated  the  war!  This  hated  rival  was  not  only  to  be. 
beaten  in  the 'war  but  discredited  before  the  world  forever, 
his  culture  and  achievements  derided,  his  character  defamed; 
the  whole  German  nation  was  to  be  struck  upon  the  cross  of 
infamy  and  left  to  die  the  death  of  a  moral  criminal  against 
mankind ! 

Such  was  the  program  of  English  revenge  against  Germany 
— the  most  colossal  scheme  of  blacki;nail  ever  floated  upon 
the  world — such  the  diabolical  conspiracy  for  the  deliberate 
murder  of  a  great  nation!  France  and  Russia  were  impressed 
into  this  scheme;  all  other  allied  peoples  were  to  be  inveigled 
into»this  network  of  lies,  bef  ogment  and  abuse.  It  was  launched 
in  the  early  period  of  the  war  and  was  in  full  dissemination 
by  the  spring  of  1915.  (The  reader  should  glance  again  at  the 
concluding  resume  of  the  preceding  article  and  the  one  at 
the  opening  of  this  arfcle.)  Especially  those  "far-away" 
nations  whose  general  unacquaintance  with  European  politics 
would  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  properly  distinguish 
between  truth  and  falsehood  in  the  statements  made  were  to 
be  enlisted  in  this  "campaign  in  the  service  of  humanity." 
The  constant  iteration   of  these  charges,  to  which  soon  those 

91 


of  "atrocities"  in  Belgium  were  added,  and  the  continuous 
hypnotic  influence  of  this  appeal  to  "high  ideals  of  government, 
morals  and  human  sympathy"  were  trusted  to  obliterate  in 
the  minds  of  the  people  of  all  nations  the  original  impressions 
as  to  the  causes  and  objects  of  the  war.  The  English  laid 
their  plans  with  that  unmatched  skill  in  diplomacy,  Machia- 
vellan  cold-blooded  cunning  and  marvelous  depth  of  design 
which  belong  to  them  above  all  other  peoples.  With  their 
consummate  knowledge  of  human  nature  and  of  the  particular 
leanings,  foibles  and  general  characteristics  of  other  races, 
they  spread  this  new  view  of  the  war  over  Europe,  the  British 
possessions  and  the  United  States  with  an  assurance  and 
infallibility  of  method  that  brought  immediate  and  complete 
success.  No  means  that  could  contribute  to  the  planned  result 
were  neglected,  from  speeches  of  Prime  Ministers  to  editorials 
in  country  papers.  The  leading  foreign-nations  daily  press  and 
magazines  were  bought  or  subsidized  for  this  propaganda,  and 
in  England  itself  special  publications  were  selected  "to  give 
the  key  note"  in  this  campaign.  Over  all  these  activities  was 
spread  the  control  of  a  scrupulous  censorship.  Books,  pamph- 
lets, public  addresses  by  paid  speakers,  posters  with  harrow- 
ing pictorial  appeals  to  the  emotions,  inspired  indignation 
meetings,  anything  and  everything  possible  was  employed  to 
maintain  the  pressure  of  this  phantom  upon  the  public  mind. 
Unlimited  funds  were  available.  Nothing  more  thorough  in 
method  in  the  "publicity"  line  has  ever  been  organized  and 
carried  out.  Such  was  the  English  propaganda  to  fasten  the 
war-guilt  exclusively  on  Germany,  such  the  campaign  for 
"saving  civilization  from  the  Hun"! 

The  result  was  inevitable :  The  victory  was  easy,  the  effect 
prodigious.  The  stoppage  of  mail  service  to  and  from  Ger- 
many to  all  countries  of  the  Entente  and  to  all  overseas 
countries  made  eff'ective  reply  in  protest  and  explanation 
almost  impossible;  the  proscription  as  "disloyal  and  traitorous" 
of  any  utterances  in  speech  or  print  in  opposition  to  the 
"official  fabricated  diagnosis  of  the  war"  which  had  been 
attained  by  this  propaganda  in  most  countries,  particularly 
in  the  United  States  of  America,  silenced  even  the  spasmodic 
protests  of  just-minded  and  truth-loving  men.     By  skilful  and 

92 


unscrupulous  interpretation  and  elaboration  of  every  circum- 
stance, occurrence,  parliamentary  declaration,  speech  by  Prime 
Ministers  or  the  Kaiser,  that  came  from  Germany — ^even  of 
the  several  tentative  German  peace  offers — all  such  were 
twisted  into  evidence  in  support  of  that  dastardly  accusation. 
Every  contumely  that  could  be  manufactured  was  heaped  upon 
the  head  of  that  country  and  the  Kaiser  until  the  public  mind 
reached  a  state  of  insane  frenzy,  intensified  to  the  danger 
point  by  ever  more  weird  and  horrifying  reports  of  "barbarities 
and  devastation"  in  Belgium,  France  and  elsewhere.  In  Amer- 
ica there  was  added  to  all  this  the  inflaming  recital  of  the 
anti-American  official  propaganda  by  Germany  and  of  that 
by  Germany-born  citizens.  This  combination  swept  public 
reason  off  its  feet  in  this  country,  and  produced  a  state  of 
hysterical  morbid  fury  that  vented  itself  in  deplorable  exhibi- 
tions of  hate  and  violence.  (This  particular  subject  will  be 
discussed  in  detail  in  a  later  article.)  Germany,  in  short, 
was  painted  as  a  decadent,  inhuman  people  of  perverted 
feeling,  of  a  peculiar  and  irrational  psychology,  of  untrust- 
worthy character  and  unfit  for  association  with  other  nations; 
she  was  loudly  called  to  confession,  contrition  and  repentance 
of  her  crime,  before  she  could  again  be  considered  a  member 
of  the  family  of  civilized  peoples!  The  extravagance  of 
language  used,  of  malicious  insinuation  and  accusation,  of 
disdainful  attitude  passed  the  bounds  of  common  decency.  By 
continued  repetition  and  elaboration  of  this  whole  disgusting 
fabric  of  slander  and  unreasoning  hate  it  grew  to  an  im- 
penetrable maze  of  iniquity  of  which  even  its  authors  lost 
the  tracks  and  which  defied  every  attempt  at  unraveling.  Yet, 
gradually  the  time  came  around  for  the  truth  to  be  revealed 
and  recognized  even  by  the  most  obdurate.  As  the  peace  con- 
ference at  Paris  drew  along  its  tortuous  course,  the  real 
motives  of  the  war  reappeared;  as  the  fruits  of  victory  were 
sought  to  be  gathered  in,  the  selfish  objects  of  the  different 
nations  and  the  indescribable  meanness  and  bestiality  of  the 
Entente's  spirit  towards  their  adversary  stood  forth  in  glaring 
nakedness.  The  low  conspiracy  of  the  British  propaganda 
was  unmasked  and  stands  revealed! 

To  fully  assay  the  moral  decrepity  of  this  British  propa- 

93 


ganda  of  false  charges  and  defamation  of  every  species  we 
must  never  lose  sight  of  this  illuminating  fact,  already  stated 
or  intimated:  That  neither  England,  nor  the  Entente  as  a 
whole,  expected  Germany  to  stay  long  in  the  conflict,  once 
she  had  become  fully  conscious  of  the  overwhelming  array 
of  force  against  her.  It  was,  therefore,  through  Germany's 
heroic  persistence  in  the  war  that  the  Entente  powers  were, 
likewise,  compelled  to  continue  in  a  struggle  such  as  they 
never  had  anticipated  and  which  taxed  and  wrecked  them 
almost  as  much  as  it  did  their  foe.  It  was  this  condition  which 
raised  their  hate  to  a  state  of  malicious  rage  and  projected 
forth  this  ignoble  propaganda  of  calumny  as  an  actyof  savage 
revenge.  They  conspired  to  roll  off  their  own  share  of  war 
responsibility  upon  their  enemy  and  to  heap  upon  him  all 
the  fault  and  all  the  ignominy! 


The  Serbian  Ultimatum,  etc.  The  Serbian  government 
took  no  active  steps  to  disclose  the  Serajevo  murder  conspiracy 
until  it  realized  Austria's  determination  to  take  stern  meas- 
ures. From  the  first  it  was  evident  that  all  would  depend  on 
Russia's  attitude — whether  she  would  stand  aside,  or  come 
forward  in  her  old  role  of  champion  of  plan-slavism  and  the 
Greater  Serbia  movement.  She  took  the  latter  course — her 
historic  course — as  given  in  previous  explanations.  It  is 
revealed  now  that  Serbia  received  assurances  of  positive  sup- 
port from  Russia  as  early  as  July  24th,  1914,  soon  after  the 
presentation  of  the  Ultimatum  from  Austria.  Germany  hoped 
for  a  peaceable  outcome  and  worked  towards  that  end  to 
the  last;  her  pressure  upon  Austria  for  moderating  her  terms 
to  Serbia  went  to  the  limit  of  what  was  possible  between  two 
allied  powers.  She  finally  succeeded  to  induce  Austria  and 
Russia  to  take  up  direct  negotiations  between  themselves  as 
to  all  the  questions  of  the  dangerous  entanglement.  All  this 
was  frustrated  and  all  promises  of  "direct  conversations"  in 
St.  Petersburg  and  of  rescinding  mobilization  orders  were 
broken  by  the  trickery  of  Russian  diplomacy— even  to  counter- 
manding the  Czar's  own  orders.  This  Russian  diplomacy  was 
under  the  direction  of  M.  Sazonoff,  Foreign  Minister,  who 
was  in  close  relations  with  the  French  chauvinistic  party,  led 
by  President  Poincare  himself. 

Simultaneously  France,  conspii'ing  with  Russia  instead  of 
helping  to  work  for  peace  by  pressure  upon  her,  was  busily 
engaged  in  soliciting  positive  pledges  of  support  from  England. 
In   the   latter  the  war  spirit  had   meantime   risen   perceptibly; 

94 


the  war  party  came  out  in  the  open;  the  Bank  of  England 
raised  its  discount  rate  to  8  per  cent — an  infallible  barometer 
on  the  general  trend!  England,  by  her  marine  strength,  wealth 
and  resources,  held  the  balance  of  power — and  the  decision 
for  peace  or  war  lay  in  her  hands.  By  her  failure  to  restrain 
Russia  and  France,  she  incurred  the  chief  responsibility  for 
the  war!  (The  oft-repeated  story  of  a  "Kronrath"  (Crown 
Council)  in  Potsdam,  by  the  Kaiser,  his  ministers  and  generals 
purported  to  have  been  held  as  early  as  July  5th,  1914,  and 
in  which  the  attitude  of  Austria  towards  Serbia,  the  terms 
of  the  ultimatum,  and  all  military  measures  were  asserted 
to  have  been  discussed  on  the  basis  of  a  full  determination  for 
war,  has  long  been  disproven  a  pure  myth.) 


The  Final  Agony.  It  was  proven  later,  in  the  Szukomlinoff 
trial,  that  those  circles  who  were  in  control  in  Russia  at  the 
time  were  absolutely  determined  for  war  and  acted  to  destroy 
all  bridges  which  could  possibly  have  led  to  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion. This  attitude  was  due  not  only  to  the  support  of  France 
but  to  the  fact  that  England  made  no  representations  to  Russia 
and  that  the  latter  felt  herself  absolutely  sure  of  England's 
acquiescence  in  war  and  probable  active  support,  all  as  ex- 
pressed by  Earl  Grey  to  M.  Cambon,  Ambassador  of  France 
on  July  29th,  1914.  The  situation  as  here  presented  was  estab- 
lished at  the  time  by  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
Ambasador  of  Belgium  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  has  since  been 
corroborated  by  all  the  accumulated  war,  revelations  and 
publications  of  the  several  countries.  When  the  entanglement 
between  Germany,  Austria,  France  and  Russia  had  become 
acute.  Earl  Grey  adroitly  brought  up  the  subject  of  "Belgian 
neutrality"  to  gain  a  good  pretext  for  England's  participation 
in  the  coming  events — one  which  would  placate  the  British 
public.  The  Serbian  plot  of  assassination  was  too  far  re- 
moved for  this  purpose — and  it  is  doubtful  whether  England 
would  have  entered  a  conflict  confined  to  Germany,  Austria 
and  Russia.  It  required  the  addition  of  France  and  the 
raising  of  the  question  of  "the  balance  of  power"  on  the 
Continent,  together  with  that  of  Belgian  neutrality,  to  furnish 
England  with  her  desired  "casus  belli."  Accordingly,  all  the 
diplomatic  moves  of  the  Entente  were  planned  so  as  to  entrap 
Germany  into  a  position  from  which  she  would  not  be  able 
to  escape  without  either  declaring  war  or  submitting  in  humili- 
ation. 

From  this  ti-ap  Germany,  contrary  to  calculation,  declared 
war  on  Russia  and  France;  and  when  this  terrible  consum- 
mation had  been  reached,  England,  seeing  no  escape  from 
her    participation    and    seeking    for    a    plausible    war    pretext, 

,95 


raised  the  question  of  Belgian  neutrality!  This  opened  Ger- 
many's eyes  as  to  England's  position  and  intentions,  and 
thenceforth  Germany  made  frantic  efforts  to  obtain  England's 
pledge  of  neutrality.  It  was  all  futile,  however.  Germany 
offered  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality;  she  offered  to  guarantee 
the  integrity  of  France  and  of  her  colonies  in  case  she  should 
win  the  war;  she  offered  to  abstain  from  all  action  by  her  fleet 
against  the  coast  of  France  and  against  French  commercial 
shipping — all  in  vain :  England's  purpose  was  plainly  revealed 
by  her  failure  to  state  conditions  to  Germany  on  which  she 
would  remain  neutral  and  by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  final  avowal 
that  "England  desires  to  keep  her  hands  free." 

This  ultra-tense  situation  had  been  reached  by  forenoon 
of  August  1st.  Meanwhile,  the  time  limit  to  Russia  had  ex- 
pired without  an  answer  having  been  received  in  Berlin.  Then 
followed  the  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  by  Germany  and 
the  request  to  France  "to  declare  her  attitude."  At  this 
moment  a  ray  of  hope  seemed  to  break  through  the  gathering 
storm  in  the  inquiry  by  Earl  Grey  "whether  Germany  would 
guarantee  not  to  attack  France  if  the  latter  remained  neutral." 
This  inquiry,  however,  proved  quickly  to  have  been  entirely 
insincere  and  was  smothered  in  a  maze  of  contradictions  and 
denials.  Instead,  France  answered  Germany's  "inquiry"  by 
an  order  of  mobilization.  August  2nd,  Germany  answered  this 
by  her  declaration  of  war  on  France,  and  began  moving  troops 
towards  the  Belgian  border.  On  the  following  day  England 
sent  the  sly  inquiry  to  Germany  "whether,  or  on  what  con- 
ditions, she  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium" — know- 
ing well  that  German  troops  were  already  crossing  the  Belgian 
line.  This  gave  to  England  her  hypocritical  excuse  for  war, 
which  she  followed  with  her  declaration  of  August  4th,  1914. 
We  see  plainly  from  the  foregoing  that  instead  of  restraining 
Russia  and  France,  England's  diplomacy  was  solely  occupied 
with  manoeuvering  Germany  into  a  position  from  which  there 
would  be  no  escape  but  humble  submission.  Instead,  Germany 
decided  to  defend  her  honor  and  security  with  her  blood  and 
treasure,  as  any  self-respecting  nation  would  do  in  like  cir- 
cumstances— and  refused  to  submit  to  such  brutal  and  un- 
paralleled coercion! 

That  England  would  have  entered  the  war  just  the  same 
if  there  had  been  no  false-pretense  case  of  Belgian  neutrality 
has  since  been  fully  made  clear.  She  was,  practically,  the 
bounden  ally  of  France  and  Russia  (for  the  complicated  pur- 
poses we  have  explained)  ever  since  the  first  definite  pro- 
posals for  forming  the  Triple  Entente  were  made,  in  1911. 
Her  guarantee  to  France,  of  August  2nd,  1914,  "to  protect 
the  French  coast  and  shipping  against  attack  by  Germany,  in 
case   of   hostilities   breaking   out,"  antedates   her  Belgian   neu- 

96 


trality  anxieties  by  two  days!!  Strange,  indeed  is  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  character  in  its  mixture  of  honesty  and  mental  sturdi- 
ness  with  a  studied  hypocrisy  of  motives  and  the  moral  cow- 
ardice to  avow  its  real  purposes. 


Germany's  Relative  Modernity.  The  golden  age  of  Ger- 
many, politically  and  before  1871,  was  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
up  to  the  Reformation.  That  religious  turmoil,  which  brought 
on  the  terrible  thirty-years'  war  of  1618-1648,  also  divided 
Germany  more  sharply  than  ever  into  a  number  of  politically 
separate  "states"  under  the  leadership  of  Austria,  a  leadership 
more  a  traditional  compliment  than  an  effective  actuality.  It 
was  strictly  confined  to  matters  of  external  politics,  the  term 
"Germany"  being  really  comprised  in  the  identity  of  language, 
race  traits  and  customs,  territorial  and  ethnological  rather  than 
political.  As  times  advanced,  these  independent  German 
States  became  more  numerous  and  more  clearly  defined  in 
their  separate  territories  and  other  interests  towai'ds  each 
other;  and  after  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  and  the  peace  con- 
gress of  Vienna,  some  thirty-seven  large  and  small  States 
were  recognized  as  independent  "countries,"  the  total  making 
up  the  limited  political  entity  of  "Germany"  as  it  still 
lingered  from  the  Middle  Ages.  The  largest  separate  State 
was  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  followed  by  German  Austria, 
the  Kingdoms  of  Hannover,  Saxonia,  Bavaria  and  Wurttem- 
berg;  the  Grandduchies  of  Baden,  Hesse,  Mecklenburg  and 
Oldenburg,  and  a  number  of  smaller  Duchies  and  Principali- 
ties. Out  of  this  indefinite  and  conglomerate  national  exist- 
ence the  sentiment  for  a  "unitel  fatherland,"  as  of  old,  grad- 
ually revived  and  became  the  poetic  dream  of  the  German 
people.  How  all  this  developed  slowly — through  the  tortuous 
paths  of  revolution,  reaction,  and  internal  antagonisms — up 
to  the  time  of  the  great  test-war  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  (1866)  and  the  Franco-German  war  of  1870-71,  and 
establishment  of  the  new  German  empire,  has  been  related 
in   some    detail. 

We  see,  therefoi-e,  that  from  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 
century  to  the  year  1871  Germany  was  an  insignificant  country 
politically,  compared  with  France,  England,  Russia,  Turkey, 
Spain,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Scandinavian  States;  she  was 
devoid  of  any  large-scale  manufacturing  industries,  foreign 
commerce,  a  navy  or  colonies.  The  army  establishments  of 
the  different  German  States  were  distinctly  separate  and  with- 
out any  "national"  basis.  Thus,  in  the  historical  view,  the 
modern  German  empire  was  an  innovation,  regarded  by  the 
older  countries  with  surprise,  at  first,  later  with  apprehension 
— as  an  usurper,  a  pretender  without  legitimacy.    This  feeling 

97 


accounts  for  much  of  the  jealousy  which  was  at  the  bottom 
of  the  war,  independently  of  the  specific  factors  of  power 
and  numbers,  commercial  and  naval  competition,  etc.  But 
going  back,  again,  to  our  historical  thread,  we  must  note  the 
fact  that  this  condition  of  national  German  disruption — up 
to  18G4 — and  the  constant  fear  of  aggression  from  their 
powerful  neighbors  produced  that  character  of  craintiveness, 
submissiveness,  timidity  and  racial  dejection  for  which  the 
German  people  were  known  for  two-hundred  years. 

That  year  of  1864  was  the  turning  point,  not  only  in  the  poli- 
tical life  of  Germany  but  also  in  the  people's  character;  it 
had  come  with  the  success  of  Prussia  in  the  war  with  Denmark 
and  the  new  inspiration  which  flowed  from  it.  Thence,  it  was 
a  steady  march  forward  to  1871 — and  with  the  new  united 
empire  came  Germany's  second  golden  age.  There  were  43 
years  of  brilliant  national  life  which  brought  great  transfor- 
mations, material  and  psychological.  But  while  the  German 
character  became  changed  with  this  new  atmosphei*e — became 
bolder,  more  self-i'eliant^  and  aggressive — the  old  attributes 
were  not  fully  eradicated;  it  would  require  a  hundred  years 
of  five  generations  to  accomplish  that,  in  any  people.  And 
when  the  disaster  of  the  great  war  broke  over  them,  much 
the  ol'd  traits  of  fear,  lack  of  confidence,  ready  submissiveness 
and  tribal  antagonisms  reappeared!  No  people  fully  possessed 
by  a  strong  sense  of  national  identity,  national  pride,  self- 
esteem  and  determination — France,  England,  the  United 
States,  Japan,  and  others — would  in  similar  circumstances  have 
submitted  to  the  terms  of  a  peace  like  that  of  Versailles;  they 
would  have  defied  the  enemy  to  do  his  worst,  to  invade  and 
occupy  the  whole  country,  rather  than  selling  themselves  into 
virtual  slavery  for  three  generations  voluntarily!  By  their 
lack  of  internal  unity,  and  by  moral  cowardice  at  the  end,  the 
German  people  have  not  only  lost  the  war  but  all  the  prestige 
of  character  which  they  had  acquired  from  1864  to  1914! 
These  reflections  are  in  line  with  similar  opinions  arrived  at 
from  other  viewpoints,  as  expressed  in  different  parts  of 
this  book,  and  are  a  condemnation  of  the  "fatalistic"  lean- 
ings of  German  thought,  of  the  many  strange  weaknesses  which 
accompany   the    many    excellent   traits    of    German    character. 


IX.     THE  FOOD  BLOCKADE 

Its   After-War   Effects 

I 

Of  the  military  measures  taken  by  England  to  win  the 
A'ar  and  crush  Germany,  the  blockade  of  the  German  North- 
sea  coast,  intended  to  operate  particularly  against  importation 

98 


of    food    materials,    must    be    given    a    position    of    prime    im- 
portance.    With  a  thorough  understanding  of  Germany's  eco- 
nomic  situation   as  created   by  the   war,   England  was   certain 
from  the  beginning  that  a  rigid   food  blockade   might  be   the 
means    of    Jbringing    Germany    to    her    knees    ultimately    by 
producing  exhaustion   and   starvation   of   the   entire   people,   a 
condition  against  which  no  nation  could  fight  indefinitely.    The 
Entente  expected  to  win  the  war  by  that  means  if  a  military 
victory  should  not  be  achieved  at  an  earlier  time.     If  England 
could  but  succeed  by  her  policy  of  alternate  persuasion  and 
cajolence    to    bring   all   the   great   food-producing   countries — ■ 
America,   Argentina,    Brazil,   etc.,   to   the   support   of   the   En- 
tente countries  for  food  and  war  matei'ials,  and,  at  the  same 
time,   practically  prevent  all  food   importation   into   Germany 
the  war  was  won  from  the  start  providing,  always,  that  Ger- 
many and  her  allies  could  be  kept  from  achieving  a  decisive 
military  victory  before  reaching  the  fatal  stage  of  their  ma- 
terial exhaustion.     Why  this  military  victory  was  not  attained 
in    time,    after    Germany's    brilliant    deeds    of    arms,    will    be 
argued   in   a  later  article,   but  the   final   outcome   of  the  war 
proved    that    the    food    blockade    was    without    question    the; 
greatest    single    factor    that    defeated    Germany.       When    the 
breakdown  came  she  still  had  a  formidable  army  and  navy,  but 
food    supplies    were    nearly   exhausted;    the    people   had   reached 
the     lowest    endurable     point     of     physical     deprivation!        The 
blockade  also  brought  on  deficiency  in  metals,  leather,  rubber, 
woolen    and   cotton    cloth,    silk,   paper,    chemicals    required    in 
metallurgy  and  for  explosives,  etc. — and  the   collapse  had  to 
come.    This  silent  and  relentless  pressure  of  the  blockade  was 
comparable  to  the  steady  closing  of  the  jaws  of  a  giant  steam 
vise    operated    by   an    infallible    mechanism.      It   took   English 
cold-blooded    perseverance    to    see    it    through    to    the   end — to 
watch  and  wait  with  set  teeth  for  four  long  years  and  observe 
it  slowly  fulfilling  its  ghastly  purpose:  -THE  STARVING  OF 
AN    ENTIRE    PEOPLE    as    a    military    measure.      No    other 
nation  we  know  would  have  been  able  to  stand  the  strain  of 
such  an  act   of   deliberate,   calculated,   cynical   cruelty  so   long! 
This  blockade  was  carried  on  in  violation  of  international 
law  as  established  by  the  Hague  conference,  and  of  recognized 

99 


international    rights    of    neutral    shipping    upon    the    High    Seas, 

but  its  moral  wrong  overshadows  every  other  consideration. 
Was  there,  perhaps,  a  special  significance  in  the  fact  that  so 
little  information  about  the  working  of  the  blockade,  so  few 
references  to  it  appeared  in  the  public  press  during  the  war? 
Was  England,  with  her  constant  declaration  about  "humani- 
tarian warfare"  and  "inviolability  of  non-combatants"  per- 
haps conscious  of  the  incompatibility  of  her  blockade  action 
with  these  declarations;  was  she,  perhaps,  inwardly  ashamed 
of  this  incomparable  war  crime  of  starving  the  civilian  popula- 
tion of  Germany,  of  inflicting  upon  millions  of  aged  and  infirm 
men,  upon  women  and  tender  children  the  tortures  of  hunger, 
slow  decline,  general  want  of  physical  comforts,  clothing,  fuel, 
linen,  etc. — ending  in  sickness,  physical  collapse — death?! 
This  most  cruel,  contemptible  and  cowardly  measure  was  only 
indirectly  a  war  measure ;  England  knew  well  enough,  from  the 
exigencies  of  war,  that  neither  the  German  armies  nor  the 
navy  would  suffer  for  want  of  food  through  the  blockade, 
that  the  fighting  men  would  be  kept  in  ti-im  above  all  other 
considerations.  The  purpose  was  more  insidious  in  its  nature; 
it  was  to  exert  a  "strong  moral  pressure"  upon  the  govern- 
ment through  the  sufferings  of  the  people,  and  to  break  down 
the  latter's  resolution  to  fight  the  war  through  to  the  end! 
And  even  while  this  horror  was  proceeding  and  detailed  news 
of  its  deadly  effect  was  being  carefully  kept  from  the  Entente 
peoples  and  America,  the  world  was  filled  with  strenuous  ap- 
peals for  pity  and  help  for  peoples  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 
suffering — no  doubt— but  in  a  much  lesser  degree.  "Help! 
help!  lest  they  starve  and  die!" — but  the  German  non-com- 
batants might  starve  and  suffer  and  die  without  so  much  as 
a  thought  being  given  to  their  undeserved  fate — because  they 
were  of  the  ENEMY!  Oh!  shame  and  execration  not  only 
upon  the  British  food  blockade  but  upon  this  sickening  "mock- 
humanitarianism"  which  was  being  paraded  with  so  much 
blatant  ostentation  in  this  war — conduct  which  justifies  fully 
the  arraignment  made  and  conclusions  drawn  by  the  author 
in  the  article,  "The  Summit." 

The  awful  effects  of  the   blockade  upon  Germany  became 
fully  known  only  after  the  armistice;  and  the  latter  did  not 

100 


abrogate,  it  till   many  months   later,  after  the   signing  of   the 
peace  treaty,  and  then   only  partly,  so  that  its  operation  and 
consequences  are  felt  even  today,  two  years  after  the  armistice. 
Its  effect  during  the  war  was  that  all  stocks  of  food  in  gran- 
aries, warehouses,  farms  and  mills,  hotels,  public  institutions 
and  large  private  estates  gradually  became  exhausted  and  the 
entire  public,  rich  and  poor  alike,  were  brought  to  a  hand-to- 
mouth    existence    of   meagre    "government   rations"    doled    out 
from  the  national   depots.  These  rations  of  the  absolute  nec- 
essaries for  life  became  smaller  and  smaller  as  the  war  con- 
tinued, and  only  the  young  and  vigorous  were  able  to  support 
life   adequately  upon   them.      Coarse,   indigestible   bread,   only 
partly  made  of  grain,  a  minimum  of  potatoes,  beans  and  peas 
were   the   monotonous  staples   upon   which   the  great  body   of 
the  people  were  forced  to  live — and  even  that  in  very  small 
quantities  only — with  a  meat  allowance  of  a  few  ounces  only 
per  week  during  the  last  year  of  the   war!     Coffee,   tea  and 
sugar,    eggs    and    butter    and    other    fats    were    inprocurable 
except  by  the   rich;  babies  and   young  children   dropped   into 
early  graves  by  tens  of  thousands  above  the  normal  rate  from 
lack  of  mother's  milk  and   cow's  milk,   both,  and   the  women 
bore  dead  or  puny  children.    Cows,  chickens  and  goats  found 
no  fodder  on  the  untilled  fields. 

Since  the  close  of  the  war,  the  meagre  harvests  of  1919 
and  1920  and  the  restriction  on  food  importation,  which  con- 
tinued for  a  year  after  the  armistice,  have  made  it  impossible 
to  accumulate  stocks  of  food  sufficient  for  the  normal  feeding 
of  the  population  of  Germany  and  Austria.  Poland,  Russia, 
Hungary  all  shared  proportionately  in  the  awful  conditions 
of  misery  which  flowed  from  the  British  food  blockade  because,^ 
of  their  economic  interrelation  with  Germany.  And  these 
conditions  continue  to  exist  today  as  far  as  the  great  masses  of 
the  people  are  concerned;  only  the  very  rich  are  able  to  buy 
a  sufficiency,  because  of  the  high  prices.  Speculation  and 
profiteering  have  added  their  share  to  the  general  conse- 
quences of  the  blockade,  and  over  all  is  cast  the  gloom  of 
political  and  social  demoralization  and  hopelessness.  In 
Vienna,  former  capital  of  music,  mirth  and  humor,  the  con- 
ditions  are   the   most   pathetic — a   real   tragedy,   the    poor   and 

101 


middle  classes  starving  and  dying,  the  children  being  sent 
away  to  Switzerland,  Italy,  Holland,  Sweden  to  save  their 
young  lives  for  the  nation. 

What  a  spectacle  for  mankind  to  reflect  upon,  to  shudder 
at, — to  be  ashamed  of!  What  a  horrible  aftermath  of  this 
horrible  war!  The  reproach  and  ignominy  of  this  is  England's 
for  the  ages  to  come!  Let  her  bow  her  head  to  the  earth 
in  shame  and  remorse!  Let  France  and  the  United  States 
hide  their  faces  in  disgrace  as  accomplices  in  this  crime  against 
the  species!  What  must  not  be  the  dream  visions  of  that  man 
in  Washington,  one  corner  of  his  mouth  still  filled  with  abuse 
of  "Germany  and  the  other  with  "humanity"  talk;  who  had  the 
war  decision  in  his  hands  through  the  irresistible  power  of  this 
nation  and  who  failed  to  demand  the  abrogation  or  ameliora- 
tion of  the  food  blockade  from  England  in  return  *f or  Ger- 
many's offer  to  stop  the  U-boat  war,  and  in  return  for  our 
assistance  to  the  Entente  Allies.  May  the  haggard  faces  of 
the  starving  people  of  Europe  rise  up  before  him  out  of  the 
dark  with  the  accusing  stare  of:  'Thou!  thou!  thou!'  Let  the 
world  now  swear  solemnly  that  never  again  in  any  future 
war  shall  a  food  blockade  be  enacted  against  the  civil  popula- 
tion   of    an    enemy! 

Germany's  answer  to  England's  measure  was  the  inaugu- 
ration of  the  U-boat  war  and  the  Zeppelin  raids.  Thus  one 
act  of  brutality  begets  another  till  reason  and  moral  feeling 
are  lost  in  the  reign  of  revengeful  violence!  Where  do  they — 
reason  and  sense  of  right — flee  to  and  hide  themselves  in  the 
terrible  times  of  war  passion  when  man  abandons  all  his 
graces  and  returns  to  the  status  of  a  mad  beast  infuriated  by 
a  red  rag?  Have  "religion"  and  "civilization"  achieved  a  real 
and  durable  advance  and  refinement  of  the  species  "man"? 
These  questions  will  be  seriously  discussed  in  the  later  articles 
on  the  ethical  aspect  of  the  war. 


102 


X.     ITALY,   GREECE  AND  ROUMANIA  IN  THE 

WAR 

Those   Irredentas 

In  Article  VI  we  described  the  relations  which  existed 
between  Italy,  Germany  and  Austria  through  the  compact  of 
the  Triple  Alliance.  While  there  is  some  ambiguity  as  to 
the  exact  extent  in  which  Italy  was  bound  to  the  other  two 
powers,  offensively  and  defensively  in  the  case  of  a  European 
war,  there  is  no  doubt  that  she  was  bound  in  any  circumstances 
which  might  occur  at  least  to  the  extent  of  maintaining  a 
position  of  benevolent  neutrality.  After  the  declarations  of 
war  had  been  made,  Germany  and  Austria  hastened  to  assure 
themselves  of  Italy's  attitude  and  to  exact  her  cooperation 
to  the  fullest  degree  possible  under  the  existing  agreements. 
Italy,  in  reply,  immediately  advanced  a  treaty  interpretation 
which  relieved  her  of  giving  her  active  assistance  to  the 
other  two  powers.  The  Entente  allies  approached  Italy  at 
the  same  time  with  the  same  object  of  ascertaining  her  position 
and,  if  possible,  severing  her  from  the  Triple  Alliance.  Much 
preliminary  work  had  already  been  done  in  this  direction,  as 
indicated  in  preceding  Articles.  In  this  endeavor,  therefore, 
they  knew  themselves  not  only  possessed  of  excellent  chances 
of  success,  but  that  the  advantages  they  would  derive  there- 
from for  themselves  warranted  the  utmost  efforts.  Prince  von 
Buelow,  ex-Chancellor  of  Germany,  and  credited  with  being 
her  foremost  diplomatist,  was  entrusted  with  the  mission  of 
guarding  Germany's  and  Austria's  interests  at  Rome.  Between 
him  and  the  ablest  diplomats  of  the  Entente  a  battle  royal 
was  fought  for  about  eighteen  months  at  the  court  of  Rome 
with  the  king  and  ministers  of  Italy  in  the  effort  to  retain 
their  adherence  to  the  Triple  Alliance  compact.  Von  Buelow 
succumbed  at  the  end,  due  to  the  ascendency  of  the  "greater 
Italy"  party  in  the  parliament  and  the  King's  council — and 
Italy  joined  the  Entente  allies  in  the  war  from  pure  motive* 
of  gain. 

These  are  the  bare  outward  facts.     Behind  them  lies  the 
tragedy   of    Italy's   broken   word  and   sullied   honor.      While   she 

103 


may  have  had  the  right  to  wriggle  out  of  "offensive  and  defen- 
sive obligations"  towards  the  Triple  Alliance  by  a  literal  in- 
terpretation of  the  agreements,  she  was  bound  to  them  by 
stronger  ties — moral  obligations — and  should  at  least  have 
remained  benevolently  neutral.  But  the  advent  of  the  world 
war  had  stirred  up  powerful  forces  of  national  ambition  in 
Italy  which,  under  cover  of  the  "irredentist  agitation" 
conceived  the  execution  of  designs  of  territorial  annexation, 
along  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  which  had  long  been 
entertained.  The  old  enmity  against  Austria,  the  former 
dictator  of  Italy,  was  fanned  to  new  flame  by  this  advanced 
"patriotic"  party.  It  was  not  so  much  the  racial  animosity 
against  these  Austrian  "tedescos"  (Teutons)  that  worked  as 
the  incentive,  but  they,  Austi'ia,  were  in  possession  of  the 
Trentino  and  Trieste  districts  and  the  entire  upper  end  of  the 
eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic  Sea,  as  far  down  as  Montenegro. 
These  were  the  very  sections  which  Italy  had  coveted  since 
decades  and  set  her  heart  upon  to  acquii-e.  In  these  border 
districts  and  seacoast  strips,  of  preponderatingly  Slavic  and 
German-Austrian  population,  there  lived  also  some  75,000 
to  80,000  Italians,  or  half-Italians,  partly  disseminated  and 
partly  in  scattered  concentrated  settlements,  the  remainder 
of  the  "Italia  Irredenta"  which  had  not  been  "redeemed"  or 
joined  to  Italy  when  Venice  was  won  from  Austria  and  the 
last  peace  settlement  and  border  delineations  made  between 
the  two  countries,  in  1866.  This  cry  of  "Italia  Irredenta" 
had  been  smothered  during  the  years  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
from  which  Italy  enjoyed  so  many  advantages  while  engaged 
with  her  work  of  internal  consolidation  and  Afi'ican  adven- 
tures of  colonial  conquest.  In  those  days  the  friendship  and 
protection  of  Austria  and  Germany  far  outweighed  to  her  the 
possession  of  these  few  hundred  square  miles  of  Adriatic  terri- 
tory and  the  accession  of  this  comparatively  small  number 
of  semi-nationalists.  That  slogan  was,  indeed,  a  "fake"  cry: 
It  was  not  these  few  people  and  these  small  strips  of  land — 
as  such — which  animated  Italy's  ambition;  for  these  alone  she 
would  never  have  violated  her  honor  and  undertaken  the 
sacrifices  of  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente.  The  real  "Italia 
Irredenta"   upon  which  patriotic  and  ambitious   Italy  had  set 

104 


its  mind  since  years,  awaiting  only  the  favorable  opportunity, 
was  the  possession  of  the  Austrian  ports  and  cities  on  the 
Adriatic — Trieste,  Pola,  Fiume,  Zara  and  all  the  minor  ones 
down  to  and  including  Cattaro — and,  with  it,  the  control  of  that 
entire    sea. 

A  study  of  the  map  will  elucidate  the  geogi*aphical  ele- 
ments of  the  question  and  explain  this  perfectly  natural  objegt 
of  Italy.  The  Adriatic  Sea  is  a  long-stretched  bay,  some  525 
miles  in  length  by  an  average  width  of  a  little  over  a  hundred 
miles,  but  narrowing  at  the  southern  entrance  into  it  from 
the  Mediterranean  to  a  width  of  only  about  fifty  miles  between 
Otranto  in  Italy  and  the  harbor  of  Avlona  in  Albania  opposite, 
and  to  about  sixty-five  miles  between  the  important  Italian 
port  of  Brindisi  (situated  less  than  fifty  miles  north  of 
Otranto)  and  the  above-named  port  of  Avlona.  From  Brindisi 
northward  the  entire  west  coast  of  the  Adriatic  is  more  or 
less  shallow  and  barren  of  first-class  harbors  for  deep-draught 
naval  or  mercantile  vessels,  whereas  the  east  coast  is  a  rocky 
and  deep-harbor  coast,  with  the  fine  Austrian  harbors  already 
mentioned.  Additional  ones,  not  to  be  overlooked  in  the 
calculation,  are  those  of  Antivari  and  Scutari  in  Montenegro, 
and  of  Durazzo,  in  Albania,  including  the  afore-mentioned 
one  of  Avlona  at  the  mouth  of  the  bay.  It  is  apparent  that 
with  modern  far-carrying  artillery,  and  Italy  in  possession 
or  control  of  Avlona,  she  could  easily  and  entirely  dominate 
the  entrance  to  the  Adriatic  from  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  The 
value  of  this  bay  to  Italy  for  naval  stations  and  commercial 
shipping  is,  therefore,  beyond  measure  and  was  well  worth 
securing  by  a  country  looking  forward  to  political  and  in- 
dustrial expansion.  And,  as  we  said  above,  as  long  as  peace 
reigned  in  Europe  and  the  Triple  Alliance  remained  un- 
challenged, these  aspirations  of  Italy  had  to  remain  sub  rosa; 
they  were,  then,  represented  as  the  "dreams"  of  an  extreme 
nationalistic  faction  only;  but  as  soon  as  the  great  war  had 
opened  there  arose  a  new  political  perspective  w^hich  brought 
them  within  the  range  of  practical  realization  and  made  them 
the  debatable  objects  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  The  Entente 
fully  understood  this;  and  by  exploiting  the  situation  and 
pledging  the   satisfaction   of  Italy's   Adriatic   aims,   as   far  as 

105 


compatible  with  other  interests  in  that  sphere  which  they 
were  bound  to  consider,  they  slowly  turned  Italy  in  their 
favor  against  the  voice  of  right  and  conscience.  When,  in 
addition,  they  promised  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  with 
Turkey  over  the  "Dodekanese"  (the  twelve  Ionian  islands 
situated  along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  and  which  Italy  claimed 
as  a  promised  "compensatory  concession"  by  Turkey  ai'ising 
out  of  the  war  with  Tunis)  in  Italy's  favor,  the  latter's  na- 
tionalistic frenzy  turned  her  head  and  threw  her  into  the  arms 
of  the  Entente  as  an  ally,  forgetful  of  her  obligations  to  the 
Triple  Alliance. 

Previous  to  this  final  outcome  there  had  been  protracted 
negotiations,  conducted  by  Prince  von  Buelow  from  Rome, 
between  Italy  and  Austria  in  an  endeavor  to  prevent  this 
result  through  the  agency  of  Austrian  concessions  to  Italy; 
but  with  every  offer  made  by  Austria,  Italy's  demands  ex- 
panded until  it  became  clear  that  she  was  only  playing  for 
time  and  the  ultimate  of  pledges  obtainable  from  the  Entente 
before  avowing  her  long-determined  course.  Austria  had  of- 
fered the  limit  of  concessions  which  she  could  make  in  due 
justice  to  the  Slavonic  and  German  peoples  of  the  districts 
involved.  The  rights  of  these,  Italy  did  not  consider  in  the 
least  in  her  ambitious  course.  Low  and  sordid  motives  won  the 
victory  over  honor,  decency  and  moral  obligations!  This  "win- 
ning-over of  Italy"  was  a  great  triumph  for  the  Entente  powers 
and  helped  much  to  decide  the  war  in  their  favor;  but  whether 
Italy,  after  all,  made  a  good  bargain  is  very  doubtful  from 
the  present  situation  of  the  question.  Had  she  remained 
faithful  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  re- 
maining neutral,  it  is  probable  that  she  would  have  obtained 
as  much  compensation,  even  under  the  defeat  of  the  Central 
powers,  as  she  is  to  obtain  now  under  the  treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles and  the  private  "London  pact'"  after  having  made  all 
her  sacrifices  in  blood  and  treasure  and  borne  the  sufferings 
of  her  population  through  the  war.  The  adjustment  of  Italy's 
Adriatic  and  other  claims  was  one  of  the  most  difficult  prob- 
lems for  the  Paris  peace  conference,  and  the  final  disposition 
has  only  recently  been  arrived  at  after  d'Annuncio's  spectacular 
exit  from  his  Fiume  dictatorship,  nearly  two  years  after  the 

106 


signing  of  peace,  and  is  likely  to  be  a  source  of  further 
trbuble  in  the  future.  The  creation  of  the  new  State  of 
Jugo-Slavia  introduced  an  element  into  this  problem  which 
had  not  been  foreiseen  when  the  Entente  made  its  liberal 
pledges  to  Italy  in  the  secret  pact  of  London!  Whatever  Italy 
may  achieve  in  the  future,  politically  or  otherwise,  it  will 
never  be  forgotten  that  she  sullied  her  honor  in  this  war  and 
proved  herself  a  low  calculating  bargainer  and  a  traitor  to 
the  two  nations  under  whose  protecting  wing  she  grew  to 
power  and  prosperity!  This  verdict  will  be  Italy's  just  punish- 
ment for  her  perfidy!  Her  defection  is  the  fourth  great  error 
committed  in  the  war;  it  complicated  the  issues  and  extended 
its  duration,  and  is  solely  chargeable  to  Italy! 


THE  story  of  Greece  and  Roumai^ia  is  much  like  that  of 
Italy.  While  neither  of  these  two  countries  was  openly 
known  as  an  active  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  there  is 
authentic  reason  to  believe  that  treaties  of  "material  and  moral 
obligation"  existed  to  cover  possible  political  emergencies,  and 
which  bound  them  to  the  Alliance  and  to  Germany  particularly 
as  a  necessity  of  her  near-east  extension  plans.  In  both  cases 
there  were  also  personal  relationships  which  were  expected 
to  prove  helpful  to  the  joint  political  interests.  The  former 
Queen  of  Greece  is  a  sister  of  Emperor  William,  and  the  King 
of  Roumania  was  originally  a  Prince  of  a  branch  of  the  house 
of  Hohenzollern.  Greece  and  Roumania  also  had  "irredentist 
movements"  for  the  acquisition  of  adjoining  territories  popu- 
lated in  part  by  their  respective  "nationalists"  or  by  related 
stock.  In  Greece  there  had  been  going  on  for  some  years  a 
strong  agitation  for  establishing  a  republic  and  abrogating 
the    monarchy. 

The  position  and  purpose  of  the  Entente  towards  both 
these  countries  were,  therefore,  the  same  as  in  the  case  of 
Italy:  To  tempt  them  to  break  their  engagements  by  pledging 
to  them  the  realization  of  their  nationalistic  ambitions  in  ex- 
change for  their  support  in  the  war  against  the  Triple  Alliance. 
As  in  Italy,  these  advances,  naturally,  had  to  be  made  through 
the  political  party  representing  these  policies  and  against  the 

107 


conservative  elements  who  placed  honor  above  mere  gain  and 
political  feeling.  King  George  of  Greece  made  a  noble  fight 
for  the  principles  for  which  he  stood  and  the  policies  to 
which  he  had  committed  Greece  and  himself  personally — 
adherence  to  Germany  by  observing  strict  neutrality  in  the 
war.  But,  largely  through  the  internal  strife  and  disorgani- 
zation produced  by  the  "republican"  movement,  the  King 
succumbed  ultimately  and  was  compelled  to  resign  the  throne 
for  himself  and  his  direct  heir,  the  crown  prince.  After  a 
short  regime  by  the  second  son  of  King  George,  the  provisional 
Greek  Republic  was  definitely  established,  under  President 
Venizelos,  and  recognized  by  the  allies,  and  quickly  joined 
the  Entente  side  in  the  war.  The  shameful  cajoling  of  Greece 
by  the  Entente,  the  hounding  of  the  king,  the  high-handed 
duress  exercised  over  the  country,  its  partial  occupation  by 
Entente  troops,  seizure  of  arms,  blockade  of  ports  and  other 
acts  of  brutal  coercion  and  dictation  is  one  of  the  darkest 
pages  of  the  Entente's  record  and  makes  up  an  international 
crime    of    usurpation    seldom    exceeded! 

As  to  Roumania,  her  action,  from  the  moral  point  of  view, 
is  probably  the  meanest  deed  of  the  entire  war,  exceeding  in 
wanton  faithlessness  that  of  Italy.  There  had  been  absolutely 
no  friction  between  Germany  and  Roumania;  there  was  no 
strong  movement  in  that  country  for  a  republican  form  of 
government  and  overthrow  of  the  monarchy  to  complicate 
the  difficulties  of  a  consistent  and  honorable  policy  towards 
Germany  and  Austria.  There  was  but  the  reign  of  wild  and 
unprincipled  lust  for  advantage  and  power — from  the  highest 
bidder — using  the  feeble  slogan  of  "Transylvanian  irredentism" 
as  the  club  upon  Austria  for  concessions  and  guaranties,  coupled 
with  the  scarcely  veiled  threat  to  join  her  enemies  in  the  war. 
How  could  Austria  be  expected  to  pledge  the  turning-over  of 
peoples  and  districts  which  had  belonged  to  her  empire  since 
ages  simply  because  there  was  a  certain  small  proportion  of 
Roumanians — semi-Roumanians — living  in  these  parts?  Above 
all,  how  could  this  have  been  done  in  the  midst  of  war  and 
without  being  able  to  ascertain  the  preferences  of  this  popula- 
tion by  popular  vote  or  majority  sentiment  of  their  represen- 
tatives?     All    offei-s   of   concessions   and    conditional   promises 

108 


on  the  part  of  Austria  were  futile  in  the  face  of  the  set 
design  of  pelf  by  Roumania.  The  Entente's  promises  and 
guaranties  again  carried  the  day!  Roumania  joined  the  allies 
and  declared  war  on  Austria,  and  by  implication  on  Germany. 
She  opened  hostilities  by  the  invasion  of  Transylvania. 

But  the  hand  of  swift  and  terrible  retribution  overtook  her 
in  the  campaign  of  Field  Marshal  Mackensen  and  his  Austro- 
German  armies.  He  quickly  crumpled  up  the  Roumanian  troops 
of  invasion,  forced  them  back  through  tbe  Carpathian  moun- 
tain passes,  after  stubborn  fighting,  entered  their  own  terri- 
tory, won  battle  after  battle,  took  city  after  city  and  con- 
quered the  whole  country,  as  in  triumphal  march,  in  a  period 
of  less  than  three  weeks,  all  excepting  a  small  section  in  the 
north-eastern  mountain  district.  This  Austro-German  cam- 
paign to  repel  the  Roumanian  invasion  of  Hungary — in  the 
total  absence  of  any  hostile  provocation — this  campaign  of 
self-defense  and  just  punishment  of  a  treacherous  govern- 
ment, was  later  heralded  to  the  world  by  the  British  propa- 
ganda as  the  unprovoked  invasion  by  the  Central  powers  of 
heroic   Roumania   fighting    for   liberty  and   civilization! 

In  the  cases  of  Greece  and  Roumania  we  may  freely  con- 
tinue the  parallel  with  Italy  as  regards  the  ultimate  permanent 
fruitfulness  and  success  of  the  course  of  these  countries  in 
listening  to  the  seductive  pleas  of  the  Entente  powers.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  their  expectations  will  ultimately  be  realized 
more  than,  or  as  fully  as,  the  Triple  Alliance  would  have  been 
able  to  realize  them,  even  if  only  partly  victorious.  Hungary 
has  made  a  strenuous  protest  that  must  be,  will  be  heard, 
against  being  robbed  of  her  choicest  eastern  section,  parts  of 
her  territory  since  centuries  and  popula;ted  to  70  per  cent  by 
Hungarians.  Russia,  when  she  reaches  settled  conditions,  will 
want  to  know  who  had  the  right  to  take  Bessarabia  from  her 
and  turn  it  over  to  Roumania  without  asking  so  much  as  a 
question  about  it.  By  these  outrageous  "allotments"  of  the 
Paris  peace  conference,  without  ethnological  investigation, 
plebiscites,  mutual  agreement  and  compensations  the  seeds  for 
more  wars  have   been   sown ! 

The  details  of  the  course  of  war  between  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance  and   the    "three   perfidious   nation^"   are   matters   of   the 

109 


regular  history  of  the  war,  and  will  not  be  pursued  here  further. 
We  are  chiefly  interested  in  the  moral  delinquencies  exhibited 
in  these  cases,  in  connection  with  the  views  expressed  in  the 
later  articles   of  the   book   on   the   ethical   aspect   of   the   war. 


King  Constantine's  Return.    The  return  of  the  Greek  King 
to    his    throne    recently,    following    an    overwhelming    popular 

demand,  brings  the  fullest  corroboration  of  the  above  presen- 
tation of  Greece  as  an  "Entente  ally."  Next  to  the  Kaiser, 
King  Constantine  was  the  most  outrageously  maligned  ruler 
in  Europe.  The  complete  reversal  of  minister  Venizelos's 
"entente-financed"  republic  by  the  Greek  people  is  an  eloquent 
testimony  of  the  nefarious  work  done  in  Greece  by  France  and 
England!  But  nothing  was  able  to  wipe  out  the  impression 
of  capability,  honesty,  fairness  to  all  political  parties  and  en- 
lightened patriotism  which  the  King  had  secured  among  the 
Greek  people  of  all  classes;  and  when  the  Entente,  at  Paris, 
proved  the  utter  hollowness  of  the  extravagant  promises  made 
to  Greece,  the  reaction  of  justice  and  repentance  came  quickly. 
It  is  peculiarly  interesting  that  in  this  country  the  reversal 
of  Greek  political  sentiment  and  policy  was  given  only  the 
slightest  possible  notice  in  the  public  press,  with  studied  avoid- 
ance of  all  critical  comment.  This  transformation  and  avowal 
of  error,  naturally,  did  not  "fit  in"  with  America's  artificial 
and  nebulous  conception  of  the  European  war  and  the  noisy 
"liberty  and  democracy"  doctrines  of  universal  salvation  in- 
jected into  it — backed  up  with  guns  and  sabres! 


XL     AMERICA   IN   THE   WAR 

A.     AMERICAN    NEUTRALITY.      SENTIMENTAL    INFLU- 
ENCES.     INTERNATIONAL    RIGHTS    ON    THE    HIGH 
SEAS.      THE   U-BOAT   WARFARE.      SINKING   OF 
THE    LUSITATMIA.      THE    PSYCHOLOGICAJ. 
MOMENT  NEGLECTED 

The  active  entrance  of  the  United  States  of  America  into 
the  war  was  the  startling  sensation  of  the  European  conflicti 
so  unexpected,  so  entirely  opposed  to  the  traditions  of  American 
foreign  policy.     How  ^Ymerica  came  to  be  drawn  into  the  war, 

110 


the  tremendous  and  successful  preparations  made,  the  patriotic 
fervor  aroused,  and  the  details  of  our  participation  and  victory- 
are  familiar  to  all  in  their  outward  course.  But  below  that 
there  lie  hidden  the  secret  and  complicated  motives,  the 
powerful  extraneous  influences  and  the  artificial  emotional 
appeals  made  which  are  not  so  readily  discernible.  It  is  these 
which  are  the  burden  of  inquiry  in  this  article. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  America  declared  that  its 
policy  was  to  be  one  of  strict  neutrality.  It  required  but  a 
little  time,  however,  for  conditions  and  influences  to  become 
operative  which  affected  that  resolution  of  principle  and  trans- 
formed our  attitude  to  one  of  benevolent  neutrality  towards 
the  Entente  powers.  As  the  war  in  Europe  progressed  on  its 
terrible  course  of  violence,  American  sympathies  and  interests 
experienced  a  gradual  transformation  to  an  attitude  of  out- 
spoken enmity  towards  Germany  and  Austria,  ultimately  cul- 
minating in  the  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  by  the 
American  Congress,  on  April  6th,  1917.  The  factors  which 
brought  about  this  change  of  sentiment  were  both  political 
and  material,  but  also  Sentimental  and  of  such  intricate  inter- 
relation as  to  make  it  difficult  for  the  plain  patriotic  American, 
standing  within  this  turmoil  of  forces  as  a  spectator  and  par- 
ticipant at  the  same  time,  to  form  a  clear  and  correct  estimate 
of  the  great  drama  which  was  taking  place. 

The  first  direct  friction  with  Germany  arose  over  the  inter- 
ference with  American  merchant  shipping.  Germany,  in 
answer  to  the  British  blockade  of  her  coast,  had  established  a 
freight  and  passenger-boat  prescribed  zone  against  enemy  ship- 
ping, covering  strips  along  the  Bx'itish,  Dutch,  Belgian  and 
French  coasts  and  along  the  Mediterranean  enemy  coasts. 
Within  these  prescribed  "zones"  such  enemy  vessels  became 
subject  to  immediate  destruction  by  German  regular  warships 
or  her  submarine  boats,  without  previous  warning,  as  seizure 
was  not  practicable  for  German  warships  to  make  under  the 
British  blockade,  and  entirely  out  of  the  question  for  sub- 
marines. At  once  the  question  arose  of  Germany's  right, 
under  the  recognized  code  of  International  Law  on  the  High 
Seas  to  establish  such  prescribed  zones  and  use  of  the  new 
submarine  power  as  announced.     Germany's  assumptions  were 

111 


denounced  by  the  enemy  powers  as  illegal  under  their  inter- 
pretation of  the  said  code.  These  new  regulations  held  great 
dangers  for  all  neutral  merchant  shipping,  as  mistakes  in 
identification — through  bad  light,  change  in  rigging,  etc. — 
were  sure  to  follow.  The  United  States,  as  well  as  the  Euro- 
pean neutrals,  suffered  such  accidental  depi*edations  repeatedly, 
each  individual  case  leading  to  diplomatic  remonstrances,  claims 
for  indemnities,  demands  for  apologies.  Naturally  there  were 
contradictory  accounts  and  contentions  in  each  case,  exaggera- 
tion by  the  injured  party,  belittlement  by  the  offenders;  but 
each  case  ended  with  an  increase  of  acrimony  and  resentment 
in   the   United   States  against  Germany. 

On  her  part  the  latter  set  up  the  plausible  defence  that  the 
British  blockade  was  the  original  offender  in  the  matter  and 
cause  of  these  extraordinary  measures;  that  she  had  the  right 
to  protect  herself  with  all  means  at  her  disposal,  having  been 
challenged  (according  to  her  conception)  to  a  war  in  defense 
of  her  existence,  for  which  she  had  given  no  hostile  cause, 
and  that  the  new  weapon  of  the  submarine  was  as  legal  as 
any  other  agent  of  destruction  in  such  an  unjustified  and 
unequal  contest;  furthermore,  that  she  had  the  right  to  estab- 
lish such  new  rules  of  sea-warfare  as  the  peculiar  character  of 
the  submarine  torpedo  boat — its  vulnerability  and  other  limi- 
tations— together  with  the  British  blockade  of  her  coast,  de- 
manded. Pursuant  to  these  arguments,  Germany  asserted  that 
neutrals  should  realize  and  acknowledge  by  their  attitude  that 
a  new-  kind  of  war  on  the  High  seas  had  come,  different  from 
those  of  former  wars,  and  that  it  was  their  duty  and  their 
interest  to  submit  to  these  new  conditions  by  willingly  ob- 
serving the  established  zones  in  order  to  avoid  accidents.  She 
held  herself  ready  and  accountable  for  damages  and  indemnities 
in  cases  of  accidents,  damage  and  loss  of  life  occurring 
through  mistakes  of  officers,  illegibility  of  signs  and  code  signals 
or  any  other  uncontrollable  causes.  All  the  European  truly 
neutral  countries  accepted  the  reasonableness  of  Germany's 
explanations  and  guaranties  in  view  of  her  geographical  posi- 
tion, the  unwarranted  blockade  of  her  coast,  and  her  naval 
inferiority  which  made  the  raising  of  this  blockade  by  force 
almost    impossible.      Hence,    the    European    neutrals,    holding, 

112 


also,  a  local  and  rational  view  of  the  real  war  motives  and 
objects  and  of  the  unequal  contest  forced  upon  Germany  by 
the  Entente,  were  prepared  to  acquiesce  to  her  rulings,  con- 
fining themselves  to  protests  and  presentation  of  claims  arising 
out  of  individual  cases  of  accidental  violation,  but  conceding 
Germany's  title  to  her  sea  policy. 

Not   so   the   United    States   of   America.      In   this   country, 
unfortunately,    the    original    official    intention    of    observing   a 
strict  neutrality  in  the  war,  and  of  judging  all  political  and 
technical   questions  which  might  arise  with   absolute   imparti- 
ality and  reasonableness,  came  to  grief  in  the  first  few  months 
of  the  war  and  was  transformed,,  as  we  have  said  before,  into 
a    state    of    benevolent    neutrality    towards    the    Triple    Entente. 
This  change  had  not  come  from  any  act  of  enmity  by  Germany 
or  Austria  but  from  the  steady  and  subtle  process  of  social  and 
sentimental  amalgamation  with  England  which  had  been  going 
on  for  forty  years  and  which  might  well  be  designated  as  "the 
bloodless   re-conquest   of   the   United   States    by  Great    Britain." 
There  is  nothing  reprehensible  per  se  in  this  drawing-together 
of  mother  country  and  daughter.     Our  culture-civilization,  if 
you    prefer — is    essentially    English    in    character,    language, 
political     ideas,     law     structure,     social     customs,     etc.,     in 
spite  of  the  strong  admixture  of  German,  Scandinavian,  Italian 
and  other  races  of  different  language  in  the  present  makeup 
of  the  American  people.     Time  had  softened  the  once  bitter 
feeling  against  England  dating  from  the  war  of  the  revolu- 
tion,  the   war  of   1812,   and   from   England's   attitude   in   our 
Civil    War.      The    hundreds    of   marriages    concluded    between 
the  scions  of  importan:  English  and  American  families  have 
drawn  the  two  countries  together,  ractally  and  socially.     Im- 
portant  busines   and    financial   associations    sprang   up    in    the 
course   of  time.      In   this  way  English   tact   and   patience   ac- 
complished  a  remarkable  transformation  in  the  relations   be- 
tween the  two  countries;  it  built  up  an  international  Anglo- 
American    exclusive    social    caste    and    created    a    pro-English 
party — for  peace   or  for  war — in   the   United   States   long  be- 
fore  the    great   European   war   was    thought   of   as   an    acute 
possibility.      In    consequence    of    this    intimate    relationship,    a 
strong  pro-English  war  feeling  asserted  itself  in  this  country 

113 


immediately  after  tiie  war  had  broken  out,  and,  inferentially, 
a  feeling  of  distrust  and  enmity  towards  Germany. 

This  favorable  sentiment  here  was  skilfully  worked  up  tp 
full  activity  and  expression  by  the  British  war  propaganda,  as 
described  in  all  its  aims  and  methods  in  Article  VIII,  which 
utilized  every  means  possible  to  disseminate  false  impressions 
in  the  United  States  about  the  events  transpiring  in  Europe — • 
the  causes  of  the  war,  the  motives  of  Germany,  the  invasions 
of  Belgium  and  France,  the  reported  atrocities,  the  excesses 
of  the  U-boats — and  to  exasperate  this  country  by  similar  exag- 
gerated "inventions"  about  the  diabolical  schemes  of  German 
propaganda  in  America.  The  object  was  plainly  to  work  in 
every  way  possible  upon  the  racial  sympathy  of  this  country 
with  England,  upon  its  political  predilections,  its  humanitarian 
instincts  and,  proportionately,  to  feed  its  irritation  and  ani- 
mosity against  Germany  and  Austria,  whose  every  act  and 
motive  were  distorted  and  painted  in  the  blackest  colors.  The 
English  censorship  and  the  isolated,  defenseless  position  of 
Germany  made  this  scheme  of  attack  and  conquest  a  com- 
plete success! 

To  this  American  pro-English  sentiment  there  became 
adroitly  joined  a  parallel  pro-French  sentiment  by  a  propaganda 
of  re-awakening  and  strengthening  of  the  sympathetic  ties 
long  existent  between  America  and  France  in  a  latent  state, 
and  of  now  vitalizing  them  to  a  keen  reality  by  the  recalling  of 
Lafayette's  and  Rochambeau's  heroic  devotion  to  the  cause  of 
American  liberty,  and  of  France's  generous  diplomatic  and 
financial  aid  and  inspiring  Sympathy  in  the  years  of  the  bitter 
struggle  for  our  independence  from  England  and  the  founding 
of  this  republic.  There  was  nothing  pe?'  se  reprehensible  in 
this  agitation  either;  the  sentiment  in  both  was  good,  but 
the  motives  of  the  leaders  who  aroused  them  were  thoroughly 
bad  because  intended  for  a  purpose  of  hate  and  war!  Once 
started  on  their  insincere  and  enmious  course,  the  entire  press 
of  the  country,  practically,  was  impressed  into  the  service  of 
nourishing  these  sentimental  predispositions.  Additional  sup- 
port accrued  to  this  campaign  of  creating  anti-German  feeling 
— the  British  propaganda  of  hate  and  defamation  working  all 
the  time  meanwhile — by  the  awakening  of  the  American  manu- 

114 


I 


facturer,  speculator  and  financier  to  the  "business  aspect"  of 
the  European  war,  the  commercial  possibilities  of  a  liberal 
application  of  "benevolent  neutrality"  towards  the  Entente 
allies  in  the  enormous  struggle  which  was  developing  abroad.  / 
And,  still  more,  the  American  army  and  navy  organizations 
began  to  see  in  a  possible  participation  of  America  in  the  war 
a  grand  opportunity  for  honors  in  the  service,  promotion  and 
emoluments  which  made  an  enticing  vision.  All  these  factors 
combined  worked  to  transform  the  British  propaganda  in 
America  into  a  genuine  native  American  propaganda  with  new 
features  and  objects  added,  and  with  the  distinct  purpose  of 
familiarizing  the  public  mind  with  the  thought  of  war. 

The  author,  at  this  point,  emphatically  disclaims  any  idea 
of  wishing  to  imply  that  America  had  no  genuine  war  motives, 
that  Germany  committed  no  acts  of  hostile  provocation;  but  he 
does  believe  that  under  the  combined  stimulus  of  the 
two  propagandas — the  false  information  spread,  the  .  senti- 
mental factors  brought  into  play — the  aggressions  of  Germany 
looked  to  us  in  the  superheated  state  of  our  feelings  out  of 
all  proportion  to  what  they  really  were  and  appear  to  us 
to-day.  Except  for  a  small  but  influential  war  clique  of  the 
most  varied  composition,  the  war  motives  of  the  American 
people  were  absolutely  honest;  we  believed  what  we  were  told 
— and  went  ahead!  In  the  feverish  circumstances  which  we 
have  analyzed  above  it  needed,  at  the  height  of  tension,  but 
the  injection  of  some  grand  motive,  some  inspiring  unselfish 
thought  to  lift  the  growing  war  feeling  out  of  its  false  and 
restricted  foundation  into  a  higher  plane  of  disinterested  ideal- 
ism from  which  war  might  be  contemplated  without  a  shudder! 
A  commanding  war  cry  had  to  be  found,  though  it  be  invented, 
to  which  would  fit  those  terrifying  words:  Enlistment,  con- 
scription, the  blood  sacrifice  of  thousands,  agonies  of  soul 
for  loved  ones,  suffering  untold  on  beds  of  mutilation,  enor- 
mous loans  and  the  depletion  of  the  public  wealth,  complete 
disorganization  of  the  country's  normal  life  of  peace! 

But  the  master  minds  at  Washington  were  equal  to  the 
occasion.  Our  great  mesmeric  war  President  issued  the  call: 
"To  Arms!  for  Liberty  and  Democracy;  To  Arms!  for  Universal 
Justice    and    the    Freedom    of    the    World!     To    Arms!    to    crush 

115 


German  Autocracy,  Kaiserdom,  Militarism  and  World  Con- 
quest!" And  behold,  the  miracle  was  done;  as  simple  as  all 
miracles:  Ye  must  believe,  if  ye  would  be  saved;  ye  must 
have  a  faith  if  ye  would  go  to  war  with  a  good  conscience! 
The  country  now  had  its  "crusader"  war  cry;  but  alas!  the 
noblest  of  all  sentirnents — patriotism  and  love  of  liberty — 
had  been  invoked  and  violated  to  the  service  of  a  false  and 
ephemeral  issue!  The  public  did  not  know  this,  and  the  en- 
thusiasm was  now  unbounded;  the  inspiring  war  slogan  was 
flung  to  all  the  breezes  and  trumpeted  from  all  the  house  tops; 
the  conscience  of  millions  of  the  more  sober  and  peaceable 
was  lulled  or  cajoled  to  silence — but  truth  lay  strangled  on 
the  ground!!  It  was  not  true,  as  then  represented,  that  Ger- 
many or  the  Kaiser  had  wanted  and  plotted  the  war  for  world 
conquest  or  any  other  motive;  that  her  government  had  been 
oppressive  under  a  tyrant  autocrat;  that  the  German  people 
were  thirsting  for  the  blessings  of  a  republic;  that  unusual 
atrocities  and  destruction  had  been  committed  by  Germany 
in  the  war. 

The  practical  effect  of  this  evolution  of  our  war  attitude 
was  that  every  accident  which  happened  to  any  of  our  vessels 
in  consequence  of  the  German  zone  regulation  was  enlarged 
to  an  acute  "casus  belli"  which  no  explanations  from  the 
German  side  was  allowed  to  appease.  America  refused  to 
accede  to  the  German  contention  that  the  old  International 
Code  had  become  obsolete,  and  broadly  claimed  the  right  for 
her  citizens  to  travel  unmolested,  zone  or  no  zone,  anywhere 
they  pleased  on  regular  passenger  ships  of  neutral  or  enemy 
nationality.  Meanwhile  the  export  of  American  war  materials 
of  every  kind  and  of  food  to  the  Entente  countries,  which  had 
begun  as  soon  as  the  war  had  started,  assumed  larger  and 
larger  proportions  and  had  taken  place  in  ships  of  all  nationali- 
ties. It  led  to  energetic  protests  from  Germany  as  being  in 
violation  of  our  neutrality,  especially  when  taking  place  in 
passenger  vessels,  in  which  cases  the  presence,  on  board,  of 
American  passengers  was  intended  to  form  a  "protection" 
to  such  vessels  against  challenge  and  search  in  passing  through 
the  zones.  The  question  was  argued  at  length  in  the  American 
press  and   in  the   Congress.     The  view  finally  taken  was  that 

116 


such  exportation  of  arms,  etc.,  was  not  against  American 
rights  as  a  neutral  as  long  as  it  was  done  without  discrimina- 
tion against  German  purchasers  in  our  market,  and  that  it 
was  not  the  fault  of  America  if  Germany  could  not  purchase 
and  import  our  arms  and  food  because  of  the  British  blockade 
of  her  coast. 

As  to  this  traffic  taking  place  in  passenger  vessels,  this 
country  denied  knowledge  of  such  practice  and  threw  the 
burden  of  proof  upon  Germany.  In  answer,  the  latter  claimed 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  this  government  and  of  the  different 
shipping  and  harbor  authorities  to  see  to  it  that  passenger 
ships  observe  the  international  rules  on  cargo  and  that  none 
carrying  "contraband-of-war"  be  given  port  clearances,  be 
they  freight  or  passenger  vessels.  As  to  the  great  volume  of 
this  traffic  carried  on  in  enemy  bottoms  and  neutral  ships, 
Germany  contended  that  exportation  of  food  and  war  materials 
by  a  neutral  country  to  an  enemy  of  another  country  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  practically  constitute  that  enemy's  ability  to 
carry  on  his  side  of  the  respective  war  and  also  supply  many  of 
his  general  necessities,  while  the  opposing  enemy  was  pre- 
vented receiving  similar  support — particularly  food — by  an 
illegal  blockade  of  his  coast,  was  an  action  by  a  neutral  so 
overwhelmingly  prejudicial  to  one  side  of  a  conflict  as  to  con- 
stitute a  flagrant  breach  of  neutrality,  being  a  measure  of 
assistance  so  decisive  as  never  to  have  been  contemplated  by 
international  law  as  permissible- — and  that  there  was  no  record 
of  any  such  practice  in  any  previous  war. 


TN  course  of  time  the  German  government  claimed  to  have 
received  positive  information  from  its  agents  in  America 
that  the  large  and  swift  passenger  vessels  of  the  English 
Cunard  and  White  Star  lines — the  Adriatic,  Celtic,  Mauritania, 
Lusitania — were  engaged  regularly  in  this  illegal  traffic  and 
that  these  vessels  vrere  being  armed  with  six-inch  afore  and  aft 
guns  for  attack  against  U-boats,  in  case  of  pursuit.  The  Ger- 
man government  made  an  insistent  protest  against  this  prac- 
tice and  threatened  measures  of  a  serious  kind  in  self-defense 
and  reprisal.    For  several  weeks  spirited    "notes"   were   being 

117 


exchanged  between  the  two  governments  on  this  dangerous 
controversy.  The  German  position  was  very  clear,  much  more 
so  than  the  American :  "The  vessels  used  in  this  way  and 
particularly  complained  against  were  enemy  bottoms — British 
chartered  and  owned ;  they  were  regular  passenger  boats,  not 
freighters;  they  solicited  to  carry  American-citizen  passengers 
— for  their  protection  in  the  illegal  ti'affic  of  conveying  arms 
and  ammunition  to  the  enemies  of  Germany.  The  American 
government  was  asked  tersely  to  use  its  power  over  the  English 
companies  and  its  own  citizens  to  eliminate  the  illegal  and 
intolerable  features  of  this  traffic  which,  in  the  German  view, 
were  acts  of  open  hostility  in  'which  the  American  government 
was   participating,    failing    repressive   action. 

Nothing  came  of  these  diplomatic  exchanges  except  more 
distrust  and  irritation  on  both  sides;  our  government  took 
no  steps  to  prevent  a  catastrophe.  Finally  the  German  govern- 
ment, seeing  the  futility  of  its  endeavors,  and  being  advised 
that  the  steamship  Lusitania  was  being  thus  illegally  prepared 
and  loaded  to  sail  from  the  port  of  New  York  with  a  con- 
siderable cargo  of  small  arms  and  shells,  and  a  large  passenger 
list  of  distinguished  Americans,  losing  all  self-control  in  the 
face  of  this  exasperating  and  open  defiance  by  the  United 
States,  issued  public  warnings  for  two  weeks  before  the  sail- 
ing date  that  the  safe  passage  of  the  Lusitania  through  the  war 
zone  could  not  be  guaranteed  by  the  German  government 
under  the  new  instructions  recently  issued  to  U-boat  com- 
manders in  regard  to  this  hostile  passenger-steamer  traffic. 
These  notices  wei'e  posted  up  in  all  steamship  agencies  and 
railroad  offices  and  were  published  conspicuously  in  a  large 
number  of  the  leading  newspapers  of  the  country,  at  an  outlay, 
it  was  said,  of  over  $30,000.  There  is  absolutely  no  question 
of  the  warning  having  been  given  in  an  explicit  and  extensive 
manner.  Still  our  government  took  no  steps  to  avert  a  cata- 
strophe; no  warnings  to  the  public  were  issued;  the  British 
line  was  not  called  upon  to  halt  their  plan;  the  port  authorities 
received  no  orders  to  refuse  clearance  papers.  There  were 
misgivings  in  many  quarters,  as  revealed  by  letters  to  the 
papers  and  other  evidences  of  anxiety,  but  on  the  whole  thei*e 
was   a    disposition    "to   call    Germany's    bluff" — and    take    the 

118 


risk!  On  the  morning  of  her  sailing  the  passengers  of  the 
ship  were  made  fully  aware  of  all  the  circumstances;  a  very 
few  canceled  passage;  the  majority  indulged  themselves  in 
unseemly  hilarious  gibes  and  tirades  against  German  "boasts 
and  frightfulness."  The  witty  and  famous  "Fra  Elbertus" 
(Elbert  Hubbard  of  Aurora)  was  a  passenger  and  was  reported 
to  have  exclaimed :  "I  will  sail  on  this  ship  to  interview  the 
Kaiser  if  I  will  have  to  go  to  hell  to  do  it."  Whether  he  went 
to  hell  the  author  cannot  say — probably  not,  but  he  went  to 
the  bottom  of  the  sea — the  Lusitania  was  sunk!! 

A  shriek  of  horror  rang  through  the  world;  America  was 
struck  dumb  in  rage  and  grief!  It  had  not  been  thought  pos- 
sible! We,  in  America,  were  too  far  removed  from  the  pres- 
sure of  the  war  in  Europe  to  understand  the  grim  earnestness 
of  Germany  to  stop  these  ships,  each  one  of  which  carried 
enough  ammunition  on  each  trip  to  kill  fifty  thousand  German 
soldiers!  And,  while  it  is  true  that  more  stringent  U-boat 
instructions  had  been  issued,  and  had  to  be  issued  ahead  of 
time,  it  was  confidently  expected  in  Berlin  that  the  final  re- 
monstrances made  in  Washington  and  the  issuing  of  the  "warn- 
ing" notice  would  have  their  effect  and  cancel  the  Lusitania's 
sailing  and  stop  the  nefarious  traffic.  This  awful  catastrophe, 
which  occurred  on  May  7th,  1915,  preceded  our  declaration 
of  war  by  almost  two  years,  yet  it  wrought  up  public  feeling 
to  such  a  pitch  and  reacted  so  irresistibly  upon  Congress  and 
the  President  that  it  undoubtedly  made  one  of  the  final  decid- 
ing factors  for  our  participation  in  the  war — although  we 
clearly  felt  our  share  of  responsibility  in  the  awful  occurrence. 
In  saying  this,  the  writer  has  not  the  slightest  intention  to 
excuse  or  belittle  this  wanton  act  by  Germany  of  sinking 
the  Lusitania ;  we  condemn  it  unreservedly.  But  whether  this 
act  was  a  deliberate  one,  done  under  definite  instructions,  or 
an  accident,  or  due  io  misinterpretation  of  orders  by  the  U-boat 
commander  is  not  fully  established  even  to-day.  Th<i  most 
reasonable  explanation  is  that  the  German  representatives  here 
waited  till  the  last  moment,  hoping  that  this  government  would 
take  expected  repressive  action,  and  that  when  this  hope  was 
disappearing  it  was  too  late  under  the  difficulties  of  war  com- 

119 


munication  in  Europe,  to  arrest  previously  given  orders  to  the 
U-boats. 

The  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  with  its  appalling  loss  of  life 
and  scenes  of  terror,  caused  as  profound  an  impresion  of  sorrow 
in  Germany  as  in  this  country;  it  was  deeply  regretted  in 
German  official  circles  and  sincerely  deplored  by  all  sections  of 
the  German  people  despite  their  well-grounded  wrath  against 
the  United  States  in  this  matter!  The  guilt  of  Germany  for 
this  disaster  is  great,  possibly  the  greatest  as  between  the 
three  countries  concerned,  but  we  cannot  escape  the  conclusion 
that  America  and  England  must  share  heavily  in  the  respon- 
sibility. It  was  the  consciousness  of  this  in  the  popular  mind 
of  this  country  which  accounted  for  the  absence  of  violent 
outbreaks  of  feeling,  at  the  time,  in  proportion  to  the  im- 
mensity of  the  horrible  occurrence — we  knew  that  we  were 
guilty  in  part.  It  was  the  consciousness  of  this  which  also 
accounted  for  the  lame-footed  "investigation"  into  the  disaster 
by  the  English  Admiralty  Court  and  the  silence  of  the  British 
people — they  also  knew  that  they  vfere  gu'Ity  in  part.  The  fol- 
lowing conclusions  are  incontrovertible:  Either  England  should 
have  ordered  the  canceling  of  the  passenger  list  of  the  Lusi- 
tania, in  face  of  Germany's  incontrovertible  declaration,  or 
America  should  have  publicly  prohibited  the  booking  of  Ameri- 
can passengers  and,  failing  compliance,  have  refused  issuance 
of  the  necessary  port-clearance  papers.  We  had  no  right  to 
send  out  that  ship;  she  was  illegal,  internationally  and  morally. 
These  acts  of  callous  indifference  and  defiance  in  a  situafon 
of  so  much  risk  make  England  and  America  Jointly  guilty 
with  Germany  for  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  There  is  no 
question  that  this  is  the  sentiment  today  both  in  England  and 
in  this  country.  This  crime  is  the  fifth  great  error  committed 
in  the  war  and  is  jointly  chargeable  to  the  three  powers  in- 
volved   in    the    case. 


'T^HE  diplomatic  representations  which  followed,  demanding 

-■■     on  the  part  of  the  United   States  admission   of  guilt  and 

disavowal  by  Germany  (at  that  time  there  was  no  open  thought 

of  guilt   on   our   part)    and    reparation   resulted   after  various 


120 


minor  concessions,  at  the  end  of  about  a  year,  in  the  offer 
by  Germany  to  modify  her  U-boat  warfare  in  deference  to 
our  rem.onstrance  and  the  President's  clear  and  positive  warn- 
ing to  restrict  it  to  the  cruiser-type  of  "conditional  attack" 
after  previous  warning.  With  her  offer  Germany  coupled  the 
implied  expectation  that  America  shall,  in  return,  use  her 
good  offices  and,  if  necessary,  pressure  with  England  to  have 
the  food  blockade  raised  or  at  least  favorably  modified  in  the 
interest  of  her  civilian  population.  This  offer  and  return  action 
might  have  proven  the  happy  turning  point  in  the  war  towards 
its  restriction  to  more  reasonable  and  humane  lines  than  those 
into  which  it  had  fallen.  In  expectation  of  responsive  action 
by  our  President,  Germany  left  the  U-boat  war  in  practical 
abeyance  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1916.  Germany's 
contention  had  always  been  that  her  U-boat  warfare  against 
merchant  vessels  of  every  kind  and  nationality  was  her  answer 
to  England's  indefensible  blockade  of  her  coast,  her  object 
being  to  cripple  England's  commerce  and  to  prevent  her 
receiving  supplies  of  food  and  other  materials — it  was  a 
stra'ght  policy  of  retaliation.  England  had  been  the  challenger 
in  these  unnatural  and  inhuman  measures  used  by  both  sides! 

Was  the  gra'^rd  opportunity  for  turning  events  into  a  better 
channel  seized,  was  there  a  "humanitarian  response"  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  the  American  people  or  England  to  Germany's 
offer  after  all  their  loud  protests  against  the  cruel  innovations 
of  the  war — poison-gas,  dum-dum  balls,  submarine  torpedo 
boats,  air-craft,  etc.?  No!  there  was  no  prompt  response; 
the  precious  opportunity  was  allowed  to  pass  the  door  un- 
called! President  Wilson  took  no  notice  of  the  implied  re- 
ciprocity which  the  Germans  had  asked  for,  or  claimed,  in 
their  truly  conciliatory  note  except  to  say,  very  formally,  that 
"his  protestations  on  the  U-boat  warfare,  if  met  by  Germany, 
carried  no  return  obligations  by  the  United  States;  that 
compliance  was  a  matter  of  abstract  justice  on  Germany's 
part!"  There  was  no  sense,  as  yet,  of  divided  guilt  and  re- 
sponsibility for  the  coming  of  the  war,  no  recognition  of  the 
illegality  of  the  food  blockade  and  North  Sea  war-zone  order 
by  England,  all  and  everything  connected  with  the  war  was 
Germany's    fault    exclusively!      The    attitude    of    the    President 

121 


was  one  of  negation  and  inaction  which  he  must  have  difficulty 
today  to  reconcile  with  his  conscience,  and  which  impartial 
history  w^ll  set  down  as  a  proof  of  his  insincerity  and  commit- 
ment to  the  cause  of  the  Entente.  The  indifference  by  the 
public  will,  likewise,  be  set  down  against  the  honor  and  good 
faith  of  the  American  people,  except  that  we  may  urge  that  the 
people  were  at  the  time  too  much  in  the  throes  of  a  wild  war 
passion  to  be  able  to  comprehend  the  deep  import  of  each 
passing  event.  The  whole  matter  of  Germany's  offer  was 
smothered  in  silence  in  press  and  speech  by  order  and  example 
of  our  government!  A  prompt  and  energetic  responsive  action 
at  that  psychological  moment  might  have  turned  the  whole 
history  of  the  war;  the  frightful  spirit  of  hate,  revenge  and 
savage  violence  which  had  settled  upon  the  world  might  have 
been  turned  back! 

This  inaction  was  the  sixth  great  error  of  the  war,  second 
in  importance  to  none,  and  is  wholly  chargeable  to  the  United 

States.  Not  until  December  22,  1916,  after  the  German  peace 
offer  and  its  rejection  by  the  Entente,  did  the  President  come 
forward  with  a  proposal  for  a  "conference  of  neutrals"  with 
the  object  of  securing  bases  for  peace.  In  midst  of  the  terrible 
turmoil  and  stress  in  which  Europe  was  trembling,  it  took 
the  President  from  September,  1915,  to  November,  1916,  to 
decide  to  make   this  peace   move.      (See   below.) 

It  may  be  urged,  as  a  matter  of  argument,  that  this  country 
had  no  power  to  dictate  the  policy  of  England  in  the  premises, 
and  might  have  been  unsuccessful  in  the  attempt.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  energetic  intercession  of 
the  President  in  London  would  have  carried  the  day.  The 
war  had  already  lasted  about  two  years;  its  exhausting  drain 
upon  the  nations,  its  disrupting  effect  upon  civilization,  its 
total  uncertainty  of  outcome  were  being  felt  by  all.  England 
was  at  that  time — fall  of  1915  to  end  of  summer  1916 — not 
yet  on  her  full  industrial  war  footing  and  largely  dependent 
on   this  country   for  arms,  ammunition  and   food,  and   COUld   not 

have  repelled  our  solicitations.  But  in  the  absence  of  pres- 
sure being  put  upon  her  by  America,  she  determined  to  pursue 
other  plans  than  those  of  compromise  and  reconciliation ;  for 
the    achievement    of    her    purposes    she    had    already,    by    the 

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agency  of  her  aggressive  propaganda  and  other  influences  we 
have  described,  fastened  her  claws  upon  this  government  and 
country  in  an  unshakable  grip!  We  were  in  her  power — 
committed  to  be  the  tool  of  her  international  crime!  Nothing 
proves  this  so  fully  as  the  dead  silence  and  submission  with 
which  the  President  took  the  curt  rebuff  by  the  Entente  allies 
of  his  belated  peace  offer.  To  rebel,  we  had  already  gone 
too  far,  we  should  have  had  to  stultify  ourselves — admit  that 
we  had  allowed  ourselves  to  be  deceived  and  imposed  upon 
on  the  war  issues!  This  was  not  possible  to  do  at  that  time; 
only  few  saw  it;  we  were  not  even  in  the  war  as  yet  but 
were  running  around  like  a  mad  bull  smelling  blood,  and 
furious  for  a  fight! 

After  this  unequivocal  revelation  of  mind  and  shackled 
position  on  the  part  of  America  there  followed  in  Germany  the 
coldness  of  disillusionment  as  to  the  real  value  and  meaning 
of  President  Wilson's  generous  phrases  on  political  morality, 
disinterestedness  and  international  justice.  It  was  seen  plainly 
that  he  either  lacked  the  will  or  the  power  to  influence  the 
policy  of  England  and  that  nothing  that  Germany  might  offer 
short  of  complete  submission  would  be  considered  by  America 
and  the  Entente.  Thus,  thrown  back  upon  herself  and  into 
a  struggle  of  desperation  for  her  life,  Germany,  on  January 
29,  1917,  gave  notice  that  the  U-boat  campaign  would  be 
resumed  at  the  end  of  that  month.  In  this  second,  unrestricted, 
phase  of  this  sinister  warfare,  a  still  greater  zone  restriction 
was  instituted,  accompanied  by  the  assignment  to  the  United 
States  of  a  definite  sea  lane  to  a  port  in  Wales,  w^ith  a  one-boat 
schedule  per  week,  to  and   fro. 

This  extreme  step  of  resentment  and  retaliation  on  the 
part  of  Germany  was  equivalent  to  "throwing  down  the  gaunt- 
let"— and  the  gauntlet  was  taken  up — gladly  in  fact!  For, 
in  America  also  there  had  been  a  recoil  effect  from  Germany's 
expectation  of  reciprocity — an  inverse  effect  of  disillusionment 
which  crystalized  the  issue.  Had  we  acted  favorably  on 
Germany's  peace  offers,  it  might  have  meant  the  avoidance 
of  our  entering  the  war — a  result  not  at  all  desired  by  the 
political  war  conspirators,  the  profiteers,  the  army  of  officials, 
the  sentimentalists  and   an  increasing   section   of  the   general 

123 


public  in  America,  aroused  to  a  high  degree  of  unthinking 
patriotism.  Thus  it  was  felt  that  we  were  at  last  committed! 
Our  failure  to  act  for  improved  understanding  at  the  oppor- 
tune moment  had  revealed  our  cards,  and  thei'e  was  no  further 
dissembling  possible  of  our  real  purpose.  Diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  were  severed  on  February  3,  1917,  on  the 
ground  that  the  new  U-boat  war  was  in  violation  of  the  pledge 
of  May  4,  1916,  "not  to  sink  merchant  vessels  without  warn- 
ing." With  the  new  U-boat  war  additional  cases  of  depredation 
upon  our  shipping  by  Germany  now  occurred;  then  came  the 
revelation  of  the  Mex'co  plot  of  conditional  alliance  against  us 
— and  our  cup  was  now  full  with  many  imaginary  and  a  few 
real  aggressions  by  Germany  and  her  allies.  On  April  6,  1917, 
this  country  declared  war  on  Germany!  It  was  the  seventh 
great  error  committed  in  the  war  and  the  second  by  the 
United  States,  one  which  cooler  judgment  could  easily  have 
avoided ! 

Germany  took  no  official  notice  of  our  declaration  of  war, 
made  no  reply  whatever!  Nothing  could  have  intensified  the 
war  feeling  in  this  country  more  than  this  contemptuous 
silence  and  defiance  of  America!  Our  pride  and  vanity  were 
stung  to  the  quick!  It  made  us  feel  that  we  must  win  against 
her  at  all  costs!  There  had  been  those  who  up  to  the  last 
moment  had  hoped  that  Germany  would  recede  before  us; 
now  all  this  hesitation  was  swept  away  and  we  stood  united 
for  victory! 


May  7,  1915,  to  February  1,  1917.  Following  the  Lusitania 
sinking  and  the  exchange  of  a  number  of  "Notes"  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany  on  the  U-boat  warfare,  an 
acceptable  basis  of  concessions  by  Germany  and  acquiescence 
by  America  had  finally  been  reached  by  the  summer  of  1916. 
From  this  time  on  Germany  looked  forward  anxiously  to  the 
reciprocal  steps  expected  to  be  taken  by  President  Wilson  in 
respect  to  the  English  blockade  of  her  coast.  Under  the 
terriffic  stress  of  the  war  and  the  belief  by  many  of  her  ablest 
leaders  that  the  U-boat  weapon  was  her  only  way  to  a  quick 
and  sure  victory,  Germany's  patience  had  already  been  sorely 
tried  by  President  Wilson's  dilatorious  course  in  the  "note" 
exchanges  and  by  his  general  studied  "doctrinariness"  and 
evasiveness  in  a  question  entirely  practical  and  requiring  quick 

124 


action.  (We  must,  perforce,  put  ourselves  in  the  place  of 
Germany  to  be  able  to  understand  her  attitude  and  action.) 
When,  therefore,  after  the  above  juncture  had  been  reached, 
no  better  progress  was  made  by  America  in  putting  pressure 
upon  England,  Germany  became  not  only  exasperated  but 
greatly  alarmed  by  the  military  setback  which  the  practical 
stoppage  of  the  U-boat  warfare  had  entailed  upon  her.  It 
began  to  look  to  her  now  that  the  whole  of  the  dilatorious  pro- 
ceedings by  the  President  were  merely  a  play  to  gain  time 
for  the  allies  and  to  curtail  the  submarine  damages  she  might 
have  been  able  to  inflict  upon  England.  This  explains  the 
renewed  pi'essure  upon  the  German  government  by  the  U-boat 
partisans  and  many  sections  of  the  people  for  the  resumption 
of  the  U-boat  war — in  June,  1916,  and  thenceforth.  Reference 
to  this  is  made  in  Count  Bernstorff's  book  on  the  war  "My 
Three  Years  in  America."  He  advised  his  government  that 
such  resumption  would  mean  war  with  this  country,  and  worked 
strenuously  for  peace;  but  his  attitude  and  opinion  plainly 
show  that  he  failed  to  realize  the  pressing  military  necessity 
of  Germany  and  allowed  himself  to  be  influenced  too  much 
by  that  mysterious  advisor  to   the   President,   Colonel   House. 

As  time  advanced  and  no  action  came  from  America,  Ger- 
many lost  all  hope  and  confidence  and  finally,  in  the  beginning 
of  December,  launched  her  first  peace  move,  of  her  own  initia- 
tive, and  addressed  directly  to  the  war  powers.  This  move 
failed  completely  of  any  sympathetic  response.  Germany's 
independent  peace  action  had  stung  the  President's  ego-centric 
nature  to  the  quick  as  he  saw  its  threat  to  defeat  his  great 
ambition  of  acting  as  "the  savior  of  the  world"  in  a  "peace 
without  victory"!  Thereupon  he  launched  his  tardy  peace 
move,  of  December  18th  to  22nd,  addressed  to  the  neutrals 
to  "discuss  disarmament  and  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and 
finding  bases  for  peace  between  the  belligerents."  We  need 
not  be  astonished,  from  the  frame  of  mind  into  which  the  Ger- 
man government  and  people  had  drifted  through  the  depress- 
ing course  of  events  from  September  to  the  end  of  the  year 
1916,  that  this  late  peace  move  of  our  President  found  no  con- 
fidence in  that  country  and  that  Foreign  Secretary  Zimmermann 
could  cable  to  Von  Bernstoff,  on  January  7,  1917,  that  "Ameri- 
can intervention  for  definite  peace  negotiations  is  entirely  un- 
desirable to  us  owing  to  public  opinion  here."  On  January 
9th,  the  Entente's  crushing  rejection  of  President  Wilson's 
peace  move  was  published,  together  with  their  own  irreconcil- 
able terms  to  Germany  which  plainly  proclaimed  war  to  the 
finish!  The  increasing  eff'ect  of  the  British  blockade  had, 
meantime,  made  the  resumption  of  aggressive  and  "unre- 
stricted" submarine  war  against  England  absolutely  necessary 
to  Germany,  now  that  hope  of  peace  by  any  move  was  gone. 
This  resumption  was  decided  upon  on  January  10,  1917,  after 

125 


the  receipt  of  the  Entente's  answer  to  the  President's  note, 
but  for  obvious  I'easons  it  was  only  published  on  January  29th, 
and   set   in   action    on   February   1st. 


B.     THE  AMERICAN  ANTI-GERMAN  PROPAGANDA.    THE 

GERMAN  ANTI-AMERICAN  PROPAGANDA.    OUR 

DISINTERESTED      MOTIVES.       POLITICAL 

EFFECTS  OF  THE  WAR  UPON  AMERICA 

The  hostile  developments  and  exasperated  state  of  feeling 
just  related  were  followed  immediately  by  a  virulent  campaign 
of  American  propaganda  against  Germany,  German  residents 
in  this  country  and  German-born  citizens,  which  exceeded 
anything  previously  done  in  this  direction  by  the  British  pro- 
paganda. In  order  to  inflame  the  public  mind  to  the  utmost 
and  win  the  people's  full  support  for  the  war,  three  American 
themes  of  attack  were  marshalled  to  the  front  by  the  adminis- 
tration leaders  of  this  propaganda,  in  addition  to  the  British 
propaganda's  European  stock  of  themes.  They  were,  first, 
the  assertion  that  it  was  Germany  who  wanted  and  forced 
war  with  the  United  States;  second,  the  so-called  German 
propaganda  of  disaffection  and  terrorism  in  this  country; 
third,  the  alleged  German  plans  of  "world  conquest"  as  applied 
to  America.  These  charges  must  be  examined  in  detail  to 
show  that  our  violence  of  feeling  and  apprehension  were 
without  foundation  of  facts  of  sufticient  importance  to  warrant 
the  rabid  enmity  we  had  assumed.  Regarding  the  first  charge, 
it  is  almost  too  silly  to  be  seriously  discussed  but  for  the 
fact  that  in  the  existing  state  of  public  prejudice  there  were 
many  here  ready  to  believe  anything  said  against  Germany 
without  further  question  or  reasoning!  But  why  should  Ger- 
many have  wanted  war  with  the  United  States?  Her  every 
interest  commanded  her  to  remain  at  peace  with  this  country, 
the  great  source  of  supply  of  food  and  other  materials  neces- 
saiy  in  war  and  of  which  she  still  was  receiving  at  least  a 
small  share  via  the  northern  neutrals;  the  country  where  she 
might  float  war  loans;  where  millions  of  Germans  were  living 

126 


and  many  millions  more  of  German  descendants  whose  natural 
sympathies  with  "the  fatherland"  in  its  hour  of  distress  would 
be  a  welcome  moral  and  financial  support;  the  country  in 
which  German  business  interests  directly  and  indirectly  reached 
into  the  thousands  of  millions  of  dollars  and  the  protection 
of  which  demanded  a  condition  of  peace.  To  reverse  the 
question:  "How,  in  what  direct  and  indirect  way  could  Ger- 
many have  profited  by  a  war  with  the  United  States"?  The 
question  is  unanswerable  except  for  those  who  firmly  believed 
in  the  "world  conquest"  scare.  There  were  no  pending  diplo- 
matic matters  of  irritation  or  dispute  between  this  country 
and  Germany  when  the  war  broke  out  in  1914;  the  relations 
were  noi'mal  and  peaceful. 

As  to  those  which  arose  during  the  war  up  to  the  time 
of  our  entry,  Germany  had,  at  all  times,  scouted  the  idea  of 
war  with  America  as  something  quite  impossible;  she  may  have 
been  flippant  in  regard  to  the  dangers  of  our  attitude,  believing 
that  the  distance  aci'oss  the  ocean,  the  lack  of  our  military 
preparedness,  the  traditional  policy  of  this  country  not  to 
be  drawn  into  European  quarrels,  the  long  and  cordial  friend- 
ship existing  between  the  two  peoples  would  make  all  subjects 
of  irritation,  which  might  be  unavoidably  produced  by  her  war 
of  self-defense  against  numerous  enemies,  amenable  to  diplo- 
matic adjustment  without  doubt.  The  German  "notes"  in 
connection  with  the  vai'ious  incidents  with  American  vessels, 
which  had  started  the  "acute"  friction  in  this  country — even 
to  the  Lusitania  sinking — claimed  (and  proved  in  most  in- 
stances) that  her  dire  war  necessity  alone  had  occasioned  these 
violations.  Some  of  them  had  been  mere  unavoidable  acci- 
dents. In  each  case  she  expressed  her  sincere  regret  and 
declared  herself  ready  to  make  liberal  adjustment  for  damage 
and  loss  of  life.  Many  more  such  "incidents"  had  occurred 
with  the  vessels  of  other  neutrals — Holland,  Sweden,  Norway, 
Denmark,  Spain,  etc. — without  having  produced  more  than 
temporary  irritation.  As  stated  before,  these  countries  were 
disposed  to  recognize  the  stern  necessities  of  Germany's  ter- 
rible situation  and  to  meet  them  in  a  spirit  of  true  neutrality. 
America,  on  the  contraiy,  was  unbending  in  her  demand  for 
unabridged    rights    for    her    citizen-passengers    and,    in    some 

127 


cases,  advanced  unwarranted  insinuations  that  her  vessels  were 
being  singled  out  specially  by  Germany  for  attack  by  her 
U-boats. 

The  second  theme  of  attack  was  the  charge  of  "German 
propaganda"  in  America  to  spread  disloyalty  and  terror  through 
the  country.  Resting  upon  a  minimum  of  facts  and  the  policy 
to  stamp  as  "propaganda"  every  legitimate  act  and  inquiry 
of  self-protection  on  the  part  of  the  German  government,  this 
subject  was  inflated  to  enormous  proportions  to  hide  from 
view  the  multifarious  workings  of  the  American  and  British 
propagandas  of  deceiving  the  public  on  the  real  issues  of  the 
war.  The  people  were  to  be  whipped  into  a  state  of  war 
fury  by  being  filled  with  the  idea  of  a  Germany  bent  upon 
defying  and  humiliating  us,  of  the  Germans  as  a  people  base, 
cruel,  irresponsible  and  undesirable  for  association  with  us. 
The  tales  of  the  German  plotting,  disloyalty  and  "frightful- 
ness"  were  to  be  constantly  droned  into  the  people's  ear  to 
fire  and  sustain  their  idea  that  we  were  disinterestedly  fighting 
for  a  righteous  and  justified  cause  and  for  those  high  ideals 
which  had  been  so  adroitly  put  forward  to  cover  up  the  morbid 
and  materialistic  motives  of  the  American  war  party.  This 
German  propaganda  was  charged  with  maintaining  an  elabo- 
rate system  of  espionage  on  American  political  and  industrial 
doings,  of  attempting  to  bribe  officials  to  divulge  war  secrets, 
of  buying  or  controlling  newspapers  to  influence  public  opinion 
in  favor  of  the  German  view  of  the  war,  of  maintaing  a 
campaign  by  paid  agents  (like  Dernburg)  in  the  same  interest, 
of  plotting  and  executing  terrorizing  demonstrations  of  violence 
by  blowing-up  of  munition  factories,  warehouses,  vessels  load- 
ing cargoes  for  the  allies,  public  buildings  and  bridges. 

We  will  concede  without  question  that  Germany  main- 
tained in  this  country  (as  every  country  does  even  in  times 
of  peace  in  foreign  lands)  a  secret  information  service  to 
report  to  her  on  the  state  of  public  opinion  on  pending  political 
o.uestions,  on  industrial  and  commercial  activities  of  special 
significance,  etc.,  and  that  these  agencies  were  probably  under 
the  general  direction  of  the  embassy  in  Washington.  When 
the  "special  situation"  due  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
war  arose,  it  became  necessary  for  the   German   government, 

128 


in  its  desire  to  secure  the  full  neutrality  of  this  country,  to 
increase  this  information  service  and  to  employ  it  in  all  legiti- 
mate ways  to  influence  American  public  opinion  in  favor  of 
Germany's  interpretation  of  the  war.  There  was  nothing  wrong 
about  this;  it  was  perfectly  proper  self-interest  and  self- 
defense;  the  same  was  done  by  every  country  in  every  other 
country,  belligerent  or  neutral.  This  activity  was,  in  fact, 
made  imperative  upon  Germany  because  England  had  on 
the  very  first  day  of  the  war  cut  the  German  transatlantic 
cables  and  begun  the  censoring  of  all  news  items  from  Germany 
for  transmission  to  America — and  vice-versa.  Thus  America 
received  all  German  news,  and  Germany  all  American  news 
(excepting  direct  government  cipher  communications),  only 
as  arranged  and  interpreted  for  each  by  the  British  propaganda 
for    its    war   purposes. 

A  little  later,  when  American  neutrality  had  assumed  a 
very  ambiguous  character  in  favor  of  England  and  France, 
making  it  necessary  for  the  German  government  to  take  official 
notice  thereof,  when  munition  factories  on  a  large  scale  began 
to  spring  up  all  over  this  country  to  furnish  war  materials 
to  the  enemies  of  Germany,  it  was  surely  not  anything  out 
of  the  way  that  so-called  "German  spies"  should  be  found 
prowling  around  these  factories  and  around  docks  where  ships 
were  loading  up  with  these  supplies,  in  order  to  gather  exact 
information  about  what  was  going  on  for  their  government. 
This  "spying"  was  absolutely  legitimate,  we  must  admit,  in 
a  country  pretendedly  neutral.  It  took  much  German  money 
to  carry  on  this  service,  considering  the  extent  of  the  United 
States;  and,  consequently,  the  German  government  had  to 
send  over  those  large  sums  of  money  of  which  so  much  was 
made  in  the  investigation  of  these  so-called  spy  activities. 
There  was  absolutely  no  "criminal  espionage  and  conspiracy" 
in  these  German  inquiries  into  what  we  were  doing,  as  was 
daily  being  charged  in  the  newspapers  to  keep  the  public  mind 
a-boiling.  This  German  propaganda  work,  naturally,  became 
more  extensive  and  determined  after  our  declaration  of  war 
and,  in  consequence,  the  U.  S.  Secret  Service  charged  with 
its  investigation  and  the  running-down  of  actual  and  threat- 
ened plots  of  violence,  presently  unearthed  a  perfect  crop  of 

129 


such  "plots  and  conspiracies"  of  violence  in  all  parts  of  the 
country.  Some  few  of  these  proved  to  be  genuine;  the  majority 
were  revealed  as  spurious  rumors.  Every  explosion  in  a 
manufacturing  plant  or  on  a  ship,  every  unexplained  outbreak 
of  fire  in  such  localities,  every  wreck  of  a  freight  train  carry- 
ing munitions  or  food  for  the  allies,  evei'y  "strike"  of  munition- 
factory  workers  anywhere  were  promptly  charged  to  the 
"German  propaganda"  without  waiting  for  an  investigation 
of  the  facts.  Numbers  of  men  were  arrested  all  over  the 
country  and  imprisoned,  of  whom  only  a  few  were  convicted 
of  any  offense.  Offices  were  raided  and  papers  seized  on  the 
most  trivial  suspicions,  newspapers  suppressed,  the  secrecy  of 
the  U.  S.  mail  invaded,  and  a  general  hubbub  kept  up  to  hold 
the  public  in  a  state  of  frenzy  against  everything  German. 

All  this  activity  was  out  of  proportion  with  the  revelations 
of  fact  which  followed.  The  majority  of  the  "cases"  were 
made  up  of  gross  exaggeration,  absolute  fabrications,  false 
swearing  and  but  a  modicum  of  actual  deeds  or  intentions  of 
a  "criminal"  character.  There  was,  undeniably,  some  hot-headed 
plotting;  there  were  a  number  of  cases  of  positive  and  serious 
crime;  but  these  deeds  were  committed  by  super-patriotic  in- 
dividuals or  small  bands  of  German  nationality  and  not  trace- 
able to  the  German  government's  agents  here.  It  was  but 
natural  that  in  the  heated  atmosphere  which  prevailed  at  the 
time  such  "outbursts"  should  occur;  observance  of  the  law 
is  but  a  step  removed  from  crime  when  passions  run  high! 
In  our  own  domestic  disturbances  of  the  peace  by  strikes  in 
the  mines,  building  trades,  printing  trade,  on  railroads,  etc., 
we  have  had  bomb  plots,  incendiarism,  assassination,  open  rifle 
battles  between  State  police  and  troops  and  strikers.  On  the 
whole  we  must  admit  today,  under  the  calmer  view  now  pre- 
vailing, that  the  total  amount  of  proven  criminal  German  pro- 
paganda, by  private  persons  or  government  instigation,  was  in 
ludicrous  disproportion  to  the  public  fear  and  sweeping 
charges  made,  to  the  flaming  headlines  in  the  newspapers,  to 
the  general  attitude  of  enmity,  abuse  and  insult  dealt  out  to 
Germans  and  German-American  citizens  in  every  part  of 
the  country. 

130 


The  third  theme  of  the  American  propaganda  against 
Germany  was  the  charge  of  that  country's  alleged  plans  of 
"world  conquest  and  dominion,"  as  spread  about  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  by  the  British  propaganda.  We  have 
before  intimated  that  this  is  about  the  most  absurd  of  all 
the  charges  made  against  Germany.  Many  books  have  been 
written — English,  American,  French,  Italian — with  wonderful 
maps  attached,  in  which  this  Caesarian  course  of  the  terrible 
Germans  is  described  as  completely  as  if  it  were  a  finished 
piece  of  history!  The  foundation  of  much  of  this  charge  is 
undoubtedly  to  be  found  in  those  sadly  misinterpreted  pan- 
German  writings  and  demonstrations  to  which  we  have  previ- 
ously referred — a  kind  of  super-patriotic  university-professors' 
conquest  of  the  world — on  paper!  Doubtless,  also,  the  Berlin- 
Bagdad  railroad  scheme,  the  large  increase  of  Germany's 
commercial  fleet  and  navy,  the  acquisition  of  colonies,  the 
rapid  growth  of  her  wealth  and  population  were  factors  from 
which  such  a  suspicion  might  be  evolved  by  those  interested 
to  do  so.  But  if  there  ever  was  a  "bogyman"  of  the  nations 
invented,  here  he  surely  was  in  the  character  of  the  "German 
conquest  of  the  world"!  In  some  inexplicable  manner,  Ger- 
many had  evidently  succeeded  to  thoroughly  scare  the  whole 
world!  But  did  not,  perhaps,  that  famous  English  art  of 
hypnotic  suggestion  have  something  to  do  with  the  spread  of 
this  artificial  apprehension?  In  the  book  by  a  Mr.  Wellman 
on  the  world  war  it  is  plainly  stated  "that  the  German  rulers 
promised  the  German  people  the  conquest  of  the  world."  Sim- 
ilar statements  are  made  in  the  book  by  a  Mr.  Smith,  entitled 
"What  Germany  Thinks";  many  other  books  and  many  speakers 
indulged  in  these  irresponsible  assertions.  This  representa- 
tion of  Germany's  policy  was  not  due  to  a  sincere  conviction; 
it  was  a  false  pretense  only,  made  in  the  interest  of  the 
general  policy  of  the  two  propagandas  of  creating  distrust 
of  Germany's  diplomacy  and  declared   aims. 

Why  should  Germany  have  wanted  to  harbor  such  designs; 
what  did  she  actually  do  to  give  color  to  these  charges?  The 
plan  to  reach  the  Persian  gulf  for  legitimate  trade  extensions; 
to  try  to  acquire  more  colonies;  to  increase  her  shipping  fleet 
in  proportion  with  her  rapidly  expanding  industries  and  com- 

131 


merce;  to  extend  her  intercourse  and  intellectual  relations  with 
all  the  world  for  mutual  benefit  were  steps  far  removed  from 
designs  of  territorial  aggression  or  political  domination  over 
other  peoples.  Have  not  England,  Holland,  France,  Spain 
done  these  same  things;  and  why  is  that  which  is  accepted 
in  their  case  as  "legitimate  extension"  turned  into  charges  of 
usurpation  and  conquest  when  done  by  Germany?  The  charge 
is  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  malicious  suggestion  under  the 
spell  of  which  England  hoped  to  hide  her  plan  of  crushing 
Germany's  political  rise  and  trade  competition  and  with  which 
she  attempted  to  fasten  upon  that  country  alone  the  guilt  of 
provoking  the  great  war!  It  has  always  seemed  incomprehen- 
sible that  this  intelligent  American  people  should  have  taken 
"this  play  of  England"  as  seriously  as  they  did,  unless,  in 
fact,  they  shared  in  England's  deeper  motives!  But  it  is  a 
fact  gathered  from  the  newspaper  expressions  of  that  time 
that  the  ordinary  public  in  its  imagination  actually  saw  the 
Kaiser  march  up  Broadway  in  New  York  at  the  head  of  his 
army ! 

This  state  of  mind  was  at  its  height  at  the  time  of  the 
arrival  of  the  first  German  merchant  submarine,  and  the 
wonderful  escape  of  that  boat,  under  command  of  her  famous 
captain  Koenig,  from  Chesapeake  bay,  with  a  dozen  British 
and  French  warships  at  the  three-mile  limit  line  watching  to 
take  or  sink  her!  But  America  has  proven  in  many  other 
ways — slavery  and  emancipation  question,  Cuban  independence 
movement,  woman  suffrage,  temperance  movement  ending  in 
compulsory  prohibition,  in  our  Presidential-elections  excesses 
of  lies  and  slander — that  we  are  a  highly  emotional  and  im- 
pressionable people,  given  to  sudden  lurches  all  in  one  direction, 
with  temporary  loss  of  balanced  judgment.  The  directors  of 
the  American  propaganda  seized  upon  this  German-conquest 
scare,  these  startling  incidents  and  this  national  disposition 
as  welcome  fuel  with  which  to  feed  the  fires  of  patriotism 
and  war  enthusiasm.  They  represented  the  German  propa- 
ganda as  undermining  the  security  of  our  democratic  insti- 
tutions by  its  preaching  of  monarchical  doctrines  and  by 
exposing  the  weaknesses  of  our  political  system  and  methods. 
They  accused  the  German  government  of  fostering  the  existing 

132 


enmity  of  Mexico,  Argentina  and  othei-  South-American  states 
against  us;  and  when,  soon  after  the  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations,  political  correspondence  between  Germany  and 
Mexico  was  intercepted  which  indicated  a  tentative  proposition 
for  a  defensive  alliance  with  that  country  in  case  of  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  not  only  did  feeling 
run  in  the  highest  key  but  the  intrigue  was  represented  as 
giving    direct    proof    of   Germany's   world-conquest    plans. 

To  these  three  themes  of  American  propaganda  were 
added  the  specifically  British  ones  of  Germany's  exclusive  war 
guilt,  of  the  cruelties  committed  in  Belgium  and  Serbia  and 
of  the  devastation  wrought  in  Belgium  and  France.  To  the 
latter  two  subjects  we  have  devoted  a  special  article  because 
of  the  large  place  they  occupy  in  the  public  mind  of  America 
to  this  day  and  the  strong  obligation  the  author  feels  in  the 
service  of  absolute  justice  to  remove  as  much  as  possible  the 
accusing  but  largely  exaggerated  and  erroneous  impressions 
which  they  have  created.  These  two  subjects,  which  touched 
so  deeply  the  springs  of  human  sympathy  in  the  heart  of 
America — a  heart  ever  responsive  to  suffering  and  misfortune 
—contributed  almost  more  than  any  others — rightfully  or 
wrongly — to  fill  the  measure  of  American  wrath  against  Ger- 
many! 


'T^HE  combined  effect  of  the  two  propagandas  was  to  pro- 
-^  duce  an  abnormal  mental  and  moral  condition  of  the 
American  public  mind,  approaching  a  state  of  acute  hysteria. 
All  classes  were  seized  by  the  war  spirit;  all  opposition  was 
shouted  down!  A  majestic  wave  of  patriotism  swept  over  the 
country,  a  readiness  for  unlimited  sacrifice!  It  was  an  in- 
spiring sight;  but  to  the  few  who  realized  that  this  splendid 
enthusiasm  was  founded  on  error,  that  this  ideal  spirit  of  devo- 
tion of  a  generous  and  impulsive  people  to  what  was  honestly 
believed  to  be  a  great  and  righteous  cause  was  the  result  of 
excusable  ignorance  and  of  the  heartless  exploitation  by  an 
interested  and  unscrupulous  war  clique  of  these  noble  qualities 
of  this  people — it  was,  on  the  contrary,  a  most  depressing  sight! 
But  the  conflagration  which  had  been  started  could  no  longer 

133 


be  arrested.  Like  a  hurricane  it  overwhelmed  the  Germans 
and  German-Americans  in  the  country.  The  violence  to  which 
it  rose  exceeded  the  bounds  of  all  reason  and  decency  and  is 
scarcely  comprehensible  as  we  look  back!  Immediately  the 
strictest  police  measures  were  inaugurated  against  German 
aliens,  men  and  women.  German-Americans  (German-born 
American  citizens)  who  were  known  or  assumed  to  have  strong 
German  sympathies  were  closely  watched.  The  slightest  word 
made  a  man  a  suspect.  Thousands  of  loyal  citizens,  men  and 
women,  were  arrested  and  "interned,"  torn  away  from  their 
families  and  bus'ness  interests  on  the  flimsiest  of  charges.  So' 
cieties  of  hysterical  women  were  formed  to  ostracize  German- 
Americans  socially,  to  boycott  them  in  business,  to  have  the 
German  professors  in  the  universities  dismissed,  the  German 
teachers  in  the  public  schools,  and  others,  who  expressed  Ger- 
man sympathies  expelled.  The  teaching  of  the  German  lan- 
guage in  the  public  schools  was  prohibited,  the  reading  of 
German  newspapers  in  public — street  cars,  trains,  restaurants, 
etc. —  attacked  as  "disloyal,"  the  sale  of  German-language 
papers  interfered  with  and  their  publication  denounced  as  an 
insult  to  Americans.  Boycotts  were  instituted  against  German 
music,  opera,  art  and  artists!  In  Washington  the  statue  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  presented  by  the  Kaiser  to  the  American 
people  as  a  token  of  friendship,  was  pulled  off  its  pedestal  by 
an  infuriated  mob  and  thrown  into  some  public  cellar.  Today, 
after  the  lapse  of  four  years,  it  sounds  like  some  story  from 
the  Spanish  Inquisition!  Is  it  possible  for  man  to  become 
more  narrow  and  befuddled  in  his  normal  view  and  feelings 
by  the  reign  of  unreasoning  war  passion? 

We  will  cite  in  detail  just  one  case  of  persecution,  that  of 
Dr.    Karl    Muck,    director    of    the    Boston    Symphony    Orchestra, 

because  of  the  gentleman's  prominence.  He  was  subjected 
to  the  humiliation  of  public  odium,  the  indignities  of  arrest 
and  imprisonment  in  Boston,  and  was  interned  for  nearly  two 
years  as  a  dangerous  alien  enemy!  He  was  torn  out  of  his 
artistic  career  in  a  vulgar  and  violent  manner.  His  alleged 
crime  consisted  in  refusing  to  have  his  orchestra  play  the 
national  anthem  at  the  opening  of  his  concerts.  His  principal 
reason  was  that  he  did  not  consider  it  correct  musical  taste 
and  tradition  to  open  concerts  of  the  class  he  conducted  with 
a    piece    of    music    of    that    description.       (This    objection    is 

134 


probably  incomprehensible  to  all  but  those  of  high  musical 
training  and  feeling.)  After  a  violent  agitation  in  the  papers, 
and  pressure  brought  upon  him  by  Col.  Higginson  (Prest.  of 
the  B.  S.  Co.,  and  a  noble  American)  in  the  interest  of  the 
orchestra  organization,  Dr.  Muck  consented  to  have  the  anthem 
played.  But  this  came  too  late  to  soften  the  public  attitude, 
and  the  persecution  went  its  course!  Was  this  man  in  any 
sense  an  active  enemy  of  the  United  States?  After  the  most 
diligent  inquiry  into  his  social  relations  and  private  corre- 
spondence absolutely  nothing  incriminating  was  found  against 
him  except  the  general  fact  that,  as  a  born  German  and  a 
German  citizen — he  being  only  an  occasional  professional 
visitor  to  this  country — his  war  sympathies,  naturally,  were 
with  his  own  country  and  that  he  held  the  German  conception 
of  the  war.  Could  this  man  do  otherwise,  honorably?  No 
American  in  like  circumstances  in  a  foreign  country  would  do 
differently.  There  was  no  crime,  no  serious  provocation  even! 
He  was  just  one  of  the  other  thousands  more  who  had  to  be 
thrown  into  the  maw  of  the  great  man-eating  moloch  of 
American  patriotic  fury!  Probably  his  physical  and  mental 
buyoancy  and  career  as  a  musician  have  been  ru'ned  by  his 
terrible   experiences. 

Daily  the  most  absurd  statements  and  tirades  appeared  in 
print  and  speech  about  "the  seditious  sympathies  of  the  Ger- 
man-Americans with  their  fatherland,"  taunts  about  their 
being  only  "hyphenated  Americans,"  about  their  questionable 
loyalty  to  this  country.  Yet  it  still  remains  to  be  shown  that 
there  is  any  wrong  in  a  man  clinging  to  his  kindred  race  and 
to  the  place  where  his  cradle  stood,  even  though  he  be  a  citizen 
of  a  new,  adopted,  country;  to  be  shown  that  the  one  sentiment 
is  not  compatible  with  the  conviction  and  duty  of  the  other! 
In  times  when  men  are  in  their  right  senses  such  feelings  are 
taken  as  indicating  a  man  of  good  character  and  healthy  na- 
tural instincts.  Can  a  man  who  is  a  man  ever  forget  his  native 
country  and  language,  the  lyric  masterpieces  of  his  people,  its 
songs,  its  history  and  deeds  of  glory,  its  sufferings,  his  own 
family's  story  of  achievements?!  Do  other  races  who  immi- 
grate to  our  country  forget  these  things?  Does  a  foreigner 
change  his  flesh  and  blood  and  "racial"  traits  by  becoming 
an  American  citizen?  Are  not  the  Germans,  next  to  the 
Irish,  the  most  determined  and  permanent  of  our  settlers,  the 
most  faithful  of  all  to  their  new  country?  And  is  it  un- 
natural   for    any    of    these    immigrant    peoples    to    feel    a    keen 

135 


interest  in  a  war  in  which  their  homeland  may  be  involved, 
and,  perhaps,  to  take  sides  with  their  countrymen  if  they  do 
not  think  them  at  fault?  But  the  passions  of  war  corrupt 
reason  and  feeling  alike!  The  German-born  men  and  women 
who  only  yesterday  were  our  friends  well  met,  our  business 
associates,  our  faithful  industrial  helpers,  our  intelligent  and 
devoted  fellow-citizens,  always  found  on  the  right  side  of 
every  movement  for  political  and  social  betterment,  whose 
domestic  felicity  and  sociable  qualities  made  them  a  valuable 
asset  in  our  national  life  were  suddenly  transformed  into  un- 
welcome, disliked  and  distrusted  strangers!  Everything  of 
sentiment,  appreciation,  justice  was  forgotten;  everything  that 
Germans  had  been  and  done  for  America — even  the  men  "who 
went  mit  Sigel,"  Burnside  and  McClellan — forgotten  the  people 
who  above  all  others  had  brought  joviality,  kindliness,  humor, 
music  and  song  into  the  stern  and  crude  realities  of  American 
pioneer   life! 

The  degree  of  abuse  meted  out  defies  adequate  description; 
it  is  a  page  of  shame  to  bring  a  blush  to  American  cheeks! 
Where  England  was  malicious,  destructive  and  unspeakably 
cruel,  where  France  was  savagely  vengeful  and  hurled  her 
unmeasured  scorn  and  disdain  at  Germany  it  remained  for  the 
United  States  to  be  coarsely  insulting  and  vulgar  in  all  her 
anti-German  war  manifestations!  We  exposed  therewith  the 
superficiality  of  our  culture  to  the  view  of  the  whole  world! 
That  lack  of  "decent  respect  for  an  adversary"  which  is  so 
deplorable  a  feature  of  our  politics  and  election  campaigns 
was  outdone  a  hundred-fold.  Newspapers  and  magazines  vied 
with  each  other  in  the  boldness  of  their  misrepresentations 
and  the  virulence  of  their  abuse.  The  few  who  strove  to 
maintain  at  least  a  semblance  of  reason  in  this  pandemonium 
of  hate,  and  to  uphold  the  torch  of  American  chivalry  and 
fairness,  were  cried  down  as  being  "pro-German,  unpatriotic, 
seditious!"  Think  again  of  those  shameful  newspaper  head- 
lines: "The  Huns!  the  Barbarians!  the  Outlaws!  the  Savages! 
the  Murderers!;  those  insulting  illustrations  in  the  press  and 
in  war  posters!;  those  rabid  expressions  of  hate  and  contempt 
in  public  addresses,  books,  from  the  pulpit  even!;  those  despic- 
able   books    of    manufactured    "revelations"    about    German    po- 

136 


I 


litical  and  social  conditions  or  the  personality  of  the  Kaiser 
in  the  style  of  that  venomous  book  by  former  Ambassador 
Gerard!;  those  scandalous  plays  like  "The  Kaiser,  the  Beast 
of  Berlin"!;  the  whole  monstrous  structure  of  lies,  insults  and 
hate  makes  an  exhibition  of  abandoned  passion  the  parallel  of 
which  has  not  been  seen  in  the  world  before!  No  such  revolting 
expression  of  war  hate  was  shown  in  any  country  of  Europe ; 
the  American  pupil  had  far  outdone  their  British  and  French 
masters!  It  was  comparable  to  a  tempest  of  the  cosmic  ele- 
ments let  loose  over  the  land  and  which  nothing  could  arrest 
till  its  fury  was  appeased  by  a  brute-force  victory — right  or 
wrong!  Blood!  Blood!  Blood!  was  wanted;  this  peaceable 
nation  had  become  a  ferocious  monster  thirsting  for  the  life 
of  a  fellow-people — one  who  had  done  America  no  intentional 
and  ill-willed  wrong  such  as  might  have  justified  the  drawing 
of    the   sword! 


TTTE  have  previously  expressed  the  conviction  that  95  per 
^  *  cent  of  the  American  people  were  perfectly  honest — 
though  misguided — in  their  war  motives  and  beliefs.  Even  in 
a  republic  the  majority  is  led  by  a  minority  ruling  element 
which  shapes  policy  and  imposes  its  will.  What  this  element 
lacks  in  numbers,  it  more  than  makes  up  in  power — ability  and 
education,  social  position,  international  connections,  wealth, 
financial  influence,  business  interests  and  connections,  material 
ambition  to  make  money,  to  direct  affairs,  to  acquire  distinc- 
tion! We  have  already  indicated  that  there  was  a  war  clique, 
or  party,  a  minority  directorate  of  the  above  character  in 
America  which  stood  behind  the  general  public,  more  or  less 
hidden,  and  directed  this  country  intentionally  towards  war. 
The  motives  which  animated  them  were  not  in  all  respects 
the  same  ones  which  were  advanced  to  the  general  public; 
some  were  of  a  kind  not  to  be  publicly  acknowledged  amidst 
the  thunder  of  our  high-flown  program  of  fighting  for  liberty 
and  universal  justice.  In  a  previous  article  the  author  drew 
attention  to  the  envy  and  jealousy  aroused  in  American  visitors 
to  Germany  by  the  exemplary  progressive  institutions,  the 
capability  and  honesty  of  administration  of  that  country.   These 

137 


achievements  were  felt  to  be  a  reproach  to  our  country,  in 
which  under  free  democratic  government  there  were,  by  com- 
parison, most  glaring  deficiencies.  Nor  were  we  untouched 
by  a  sense  of  envy  and  resentment  at  Germany's  growing  com- 
mercial position  in  the  world,  at  her  keen  competition  with  us, 
at  her  magnificent  shipping  fleet  and  great  transatlantic  liners, 
as  fine  as  any  in  the  world,  second  in  size  only  to  that  of 
England  and  built  completely  in  her  own  yards — at  the  power- 
ful hold  she  had  on  Mexican,  Argentinian,  and  other  South- 
American  trade  while  we  went  almost  empty-handed !  These 
Germans  had  to  be  downed;  they  were  too  clever  and  too 
enterprising!  Did,  perhaps,  English  and  American  business 
men  "put  their  heads  together"  in  those  pleasant  after-lunch 
confabs  in  the  Pall  Mall  club  houses  and  London  city  cafes? 
And  was  there  not  something  very  tangible  behind  this  jealous 
feeling  close  at  home?     There  was,  unquestionably! 

After  the  enactment  of  the  Dingley  Protective  Tariff,  the 
German  manufacturers  found  themselves  hard  hit;  importation 
into  the  United  States  of  many  of  their  products  had  been 
made  almost  impossible  by  the  high  duties.  But  there  was  a 
way  open.  They  were  in  possession  of  many  valuable  patented 
processes  and  special  machinery  for  such,  against  the  products 
of  which  competition  would  be  almost  impossible  if  they  could 
manufacture  these  goods  in  the  United  States  and  thereby  save 
paying  those  tariff  duties.  The  American  public  wanted  these 
goods,  without  doubt.  After  investigating  all  the  legal  and 
material  difficulties  in  the  way  of  such  a  plan,  they  found 
that  it  could  be  carried  out  and  made  a  success — and  they 
went  right  to  work  to  do  it.  Thus,  during  nearly  twenty  years 
before  our  entry  into  the  European  war,  a  considerable  number 
of  large  German  manufacturing  concerns  established  branch 
factories  in  this  country,  under  American  incorporations,  in 
such  protected  special-process  lines.  These  establishments 
were  backed  up  by  effective  selling  agencies  and  banking  i*e- 
sources.  They  did  a  large  and  profitable  business,  were  cap- 
italized at  nearly  a  billion  dollars,  and  cut  a  great  swath  into 
native  American  business  in  some  lines.  Naturally  they  en- 
gendered envy  and  stiff  opposition. 

When    we    declared    war    on    Germany   this   jealous    and    of- 

138 


I 


fended  American  business  sense  came  to  the  front  immediately 
and  found  ways  and  means  of  making  itself  felt.  Here  was  a 
grand  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  a  troublesome  competition  in 
business  and  get  possession  of  a  fine  line  of  factories  and  a 
fleet  of  fine  ships  at  one  stroke!  Accordingly,  one  of  the  first 
acts  of  the  government  to  prove  our  "material  disinterested- 
ness" in  the  war  was  to  seize  the  entire  fleet  of  German  ships 
in  the  United  States  ports  at  the  time,  amounting  to  a  very 
large  tonnage  and  comprising  many  of  the  finest  and  largest 
ships  afloat,  of  a  value  of  over  two  hundred  million  dollars. 
America  thus  acquired  over  night  a  fleet  which  twenty  years 
of  ship-building  under  unlimited  subsidies  could  not  have  pro- 
duced !  The  second  practical  war  act  of  the  same  "disin- 
terested" class  was  to  establish  the  office  of  the  "Alien  Property 
Custodian,"  whose  duty  it  became  to  ferret  out,  investigate, 
seize,  dissolve  and  acquire  for  American  owners  and  operation 
the  entire  number  of  those  German  manufacturing  and  com- 
mercial branch  establishments  of  which  we  have  spoken,  in- 
cluding all  patents,  royalty  rights,  machinery,  equipment,  stock 
and  real  estate.  This  second  acquisition  represented  over  750 
million  dollars'  worth  of  property.  It  eliminated  the  offensive 
competition,  at  least  to  the  extent  that  the  money  to  be  made 
out  of  these  establishments  in  the  future  would  be  for  Ameri- 
cans and  not  for  Germans!  In  these  measures  of  "alien-enemy" 
control  were,  furthermore,  included  German  shipping  lines 
from  American  ports  to  South  America  and  other  parts  of 
the  world,  financial  institutions;  life,  accident  and  fire-insur- 
ance companies;  metal-mining  and  development  syndicates. 
These  seizures  were  possible  to  be  made  with  great  assurance 
because  the  degree  in  which  Germany  might  be  able  to  "re- 
taliate in  kind"  upon  American  establishments  in  Germany  was 
trifling  in  comparison.  What  a  spectacle  of  sordid,  narrow- 
minded  rivalry  and  jealousy  the  world  presents!  What  a  hollow 
mockery  our  high-pitched  speeches!  While  with  r.he  mouth  we 
talk  "ideals,"  we  draw  the  dagger  of  selfishness  from  our 
breast  and  strike  our  fellow-man  helpless  to  the  ground! 

That  business  interests  were  the  real  motives  behind  these 
seizures  was  publicly  admitted  by  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  the 
Alien   Property  Custodian  at  the   time,   in   a  statement  made 

139 


before  the  N.  Y.  City  Bar  Association  on  the  evening  of  De- 
cember 10,  1918.  He  also  furnished  the  information  that  of 
chemical-dye  patents  some  4,500  were  seized  and  the  estab- 
lishments which  owned  them  organizd  into  a  million-dollar 
American  trust  for  their  further  exploitation  for  American 
benefit.  The  large  hold  which  German  firms  had  obtained  over 
certain  lines  of  the  American  metal  ti-ade  and  mining  opera- 
tions was  similarly  broken  up  by  the  seizure  of  the  stock  and 
properties  and  their  organization  into  American  controlling 
syndicates.  At  Paris,  in  the  financial  and  economic  commis- 
sions of  the  peace  conference,  similar  "disinterested"  ideas 
were  at  work  in  making  it  a  part  of  the  peace  settlement  to 
cancel  all  the  German  pre-war  contracts  for  raw  materials  from 
other  countries,  amounting  to  the  sum  of  one  billion  dollars 
annually,  the  object  being  to  throttle  the  revival  of  German 
manufacturing  and  trade  after  the  war,  and  for  years  to  come! 
The  shortsightedness  of  this  policy  of  greed  and  vengeance 
has  since  been  proven,  to  the  detriment  of  all,  in  the  present 
condition  of  Europe.  With  one  hand  we  deprived  the  stricken 
peoples  of  the  means  with  which  to  work  and  live  and  drove 
them  into  total  helplessness,  with  the  other  we  dole  out  to 
them  pittances  of  assistance  to  keep  them  from  actual  annihi- 
lation— and  we  take  great  credit  for  our  show  of  generosity 
and  human  sympathy!  The  open  exultation  of  the  American 
press  at  these  "successful  business  reprisals"  against  Germany 
was  general;  its  joy  refused  longer  to  be  suppressed  when  it 
was  believed  that  she  had  been  downed  for  good  and  would 
be  unable  ever  to  retaliate  for  our  acts  in  the  future.  This 
"superior  efficiency"  and  "super-man  business"  was  at  last 
out  of  the  way! 

We  must  not  neglect  to  speak  of  the  ten  or  more  billions 
of  dollars  of  money  loans — war  ci-edits — we  made  to  our  allies 
in  Europe — who  never  really  were  our  allies  or,  rather,  to 
whom  we  never  were  propei'ly  "allied"  for  the  full  interests 
to  be  won  out  of  the  war — only  for  the  obligations  to  be  shoul- 
dered! All  of  these  countries  have  accumulated  enormous 
war  debts;  all  of  them,  with  the  exception  of  England,  are 
practically  bankrupt.  For  many  years  to  come  their  entire 
prospective    surplus    incomes    are    pre-empted    to    pay   the    in- 

140 


terest  on  their  own  war-loan  issues;  the  principal  will  probably 
run  on  for  a  long  period  of  years  and  may  even  be  repudiated 
in    some    cases.       What    are    our    chances    of    having    the    loans 
repaid?      There   is   an   insidious   insinuation    being   spread,    in 
fact,  that  we  should  cancel   these  loans   out  of  the  fulness   of 
our  generosity.     It  is  even  hinted  that — really — we   owe  this 
amount — or  more — for  an  advance   of  money  made  by  Louis 
XVI  of  France  to  the  revolutionary  government.     The  whole 
matter  is  a  strange  entanglement!     First  we  sold  to  these  war 
nations  large  supplies  of  food  and  war  material;  when  orders 
came  from  them  mounting  into  the  hundreds  of  millions,  we 
were  obliged  to  lend  them  billions  to  enable  them  to  continue 
their  war  expenditures  at  home  and   their  purchases   in   this 
and  other  foreign  countries;  we  were   obliged  to  protect  our 
manufacturers  and  merchants  in  these  transactions  by  paying 
them  out  of  our  own  treasury  and  charging  the  amounts  off 
against  the   loans,   so   that,   out   of   the   fulness   of   our   strict 
neutrality,   we   furnished   them   with   both  arms   and   the   money 
wherewith  to  get  them.     When  these  allies  were  on  the  point 
of  losing  the  war — and  would  have  surely  lost  it  without  our 
help — we  were  compelled  to  go  on  in  this  endless-chain  tread- 
mill and  lend  them  more  billions,  and  go  into  debt  ourselves 
for  about  twenty  billions  of  dollars  to  raise  an  army  and  go  to 
war  to  save  these  our  pseudo-allies  from  defeat  and  ruin.      Had 
we  not  done  this,  all  our  loans  and  investments  would  probably 
have  been  worth  as  little  as  any  other  scrap  of  paper.     We 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  this  was  the  only  or  the  chief  reason 
why  we  went  to  war  with  Germany,  but  that  our  deep  financial 
entanglement   with   Europe   doubtlessly  was  a  powerful   factor 
for  war!     The   interesting   question  arises:     Did   investments 
and    other    material    considerations    on    our    part    precede    the 
idealistic  views  we  advanced — or  did  these  ideals  dictate  them? 
In  other  words,  did  investments  and  other  cold  facts  dictate 
pretended  ideals,  and  did  these,  later,  furnish  the  grounds  for 
more  investments  and  even  terrible  war?     From  the  chrono- 
logical dates  of  events  we   can  gather  that  we  had  sold   our 
friends  enormous  bills   of  supplies  and   lent  them   over  three 
billion  dollars  before  any  one  had  heard  of  "liberty  and  democ- 
racy" having  been  a  leading  factor  in  the  origin  of  the  Euro- 

141 


pean  war.  From  these  tantalizing  propositions  we  may  draw 
the  deduction  that  the  exact  determination  of  our  true  or 
pretended  idealism  in  our  war  actions,  and  of  our  disinterested- 
ness of  motives,  will  be  a  problem  of  nice  balance  between 
material  and  moral  values  for  the  future  historians  of  the  war 
to  determine,  when  the  lapse  of  time  will  have  laid  all  the 
facts  bare  beyond  the  possibility  of  a  doubt! 


'T^HE  political  measures  which  our  entry  into  the  war  made 
necessary,  and  the  effects  which  they  will  produce  upon 
our  future,  are  matters  of  the  utmost  importance.  We  have 
spoken  of  the  objectionable  steps  taken  to  regulate  and  suppress 
alien  enemies,  German-American  "sympathizers,"  agitators 
and  native  "pacifists,"  but  these  measures  were,  after  all, 
more  in  the  nature  of  political  police  regulations.  Of  much 
more  sweeping  nature  and  far-reaching  consequence  were  the 
restrictions  imposed  upon  the  guaranteed  personal  liberties  of 
the  people — the  freedom  of  speech,  of  publication,  of  public 
assembly  and  open  discussion  of  the  war  issues  and  actions. 
Through  these  stringent  measures  any  and  every  expression  of 
opinion  in  criticism  of  our  entry  into  the  war  and  of  the 
steps  taken  by  the  government  in  its  prosecution,  whether 
uttered  in  private  conversation,  public  address  or  by  publication 
were  declared  to  be  treasonable  and  seditious  practices,  subject 
to  a  heavy  punishment.  Sundry  zealot  organizations  were 
formed,  local  and  national,  to  spy  out  and  accuse  of  disloyalty 
business  men  and  political  men  who  refused  to  subscribe  to  an 
unconditional  endorsement  of  the  war.  The  most  notorious 
of  these  was  the  National  Security  League  whose  illegal  activi- 
ties of  blackmail,  financial  election-pressure,  etc.,  were  exposed 
and  denounced  in  the  Congress.  This  submersion — perhaps 
permanent  abrogation — of  the  liberties  guaranteed  by  the 
U.  S.  Constitution  to  every  citizen  is  the  denial  and  violation 
of  the  most  fundamental  principle  of  popular  government  which 
affirms  that  there  shall  be  no  arbitrary  power  reposing  at  any 
point  in  any  department  of  the  government,  in  peace  or  war, 
capable  of  depriving  the  people  of  these  rights.  The  declara- 
tion of  the   Constitution   is  emphatic  and   beyond   qualification 

142 


that  the  citizens  of  this  republic  shall  have  the  right  of  "free 
deliberation"  and  "expression  of  their  opinion"  in  any  situa- 
tion whatever  affecting  the  national  welfare  or  their  individual 
happiness. 

By  these  measures  of  suppression  the  spirit  of  "freedom" 
of  our  institutions  was  ignored  and  the  country  forced  into 
submissive  silence,  into  docile  acquiescense  to  whatever  steps 
the  administration  pro  tem  deemed  proper  to  take.     It  was  the 

substitution  of  the  imperial  one-man  principle  for  the  demo- 
cratic one  of  the  popular  will.  These  measures  of  repression 
were  not  confined  to  the  people  at  large  but  were  imposed 
upon  the  work  of  political  clubs,  associations  of  progressive 
citizens,  upon  the  U.  S.  Senate  itself,  which,  being  opposed  to 
the  war  administration  on  party-majority  lines,  was  practically 
ignored  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The  President  took  no 
counsel  with  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  in  regard 
to  the  war  policy  to  be  pursued,  and  no  consideration  in  the 
makeup  of  the  numerous  American  peace  commissions  for 
the  Paris  Conference  was  given  to  the  senators  individually, 
of  either  party.  The  public  press,  being  in  the  power  of  the 
war  propaganda  and  censorship,  completely  lost  its  former 
position  as  the  vehicle  for  the  free  expression  of  popular  opinion 
except  such  as  was  in  laudation  of  the  war.  In  this  way 
enlistment,  conscription,  war  loans,  high  taxes,  rise  in  the 
cost  of  living,  disruption  of  business  and  income  all  went 
down  the  country's  throat  without  resistance.  No  such  strangl- 
ing of  free  opinion  had  been  enacted  in  England  or  France, 
nor  even  in  autocratic  Germany  or  Russia.  The  American 
people  was  completely  "gagged";  it  was,  furthermore,  "goaded" 
daily  to  greater  war  fury  by  the  ranting  calls:  "Stand  behind 
the  President";  "follow  the  President";  the  country,  right  or 
wrong!  Can  there  be  anything  more  presumptive?  The  moral 
law  must  ever  be  the  highest  guide  for  nations  as  well  as 
individuals!  The  country  was  not  only  prevented  but  pro- 
hibited forming  a  calm,  rational  opinion  about  the  events 
going  on;  those  who  attempted  to  steer  the  way  to  reason  were 
arrested  as  "traitors"  and  sent  to  prison ;  the  country's  opinions 
were  officially  supplied  to  it  from  Washington  in  the  ingenious 
and  resounding  text:  "Liberty  and  Justice";  "Make  the  World 

143 


Safe  for  Democracy";  "Down  with  Militarism  and  the  Kaiser"; 
etc.      But  all  the  while  liberty  was  being  struck  down  at  home! 

To  this  degree  had  the  American  people  allowed  itself  to  be 
abashed,  schoolmastered  and  commandeered! 

Many  of  our  foremost  and  patriotic  men  are  deeply  alarmed 
about  the  inevitable  consequences  of  these  arbitrary  departures 
from  correct  constitutional  practice.  But  another  kind  of 
error  was  committed,  one  not  specifically  a  violation  of  any 
written  rights  of  the  Constitution  but  of  an  essential  "implied 
right"  of  popular  government — the  right  of  the  people  to  be 
directly  heard  in  special  cases — a  right  now  embodied  in  many 
State  Constitutions  under  the  name  of  the  "Initiative  and 
Referendum."  This  error,  or  fault,  was  the  refusal  of  the 
government  to  submit  the  question  of  our  declaring  war  on 
Germany  to  the  judgment  and  direct  decision  of  the  people 
after  insistent  demand  for  this  had  arisen  in  all  parts  of  the 
country.  If  there  is  one  thing  which  should  favorably  dis- 
tinguish a  republic  from  a  monarchy  it  is  the  right  of  the 
people  to  be  directly  heard  on  questions  of  great  weight,  such 
as  a  declaration  of  war — in  which  they  will  be  called  upon 
to  do  the  fighting  and  bring  the  sacrifices.  It  is  precisely 
this  autocratic  power  in  the  hands  of  a  King  or  Kaiser  and 
his  immediate  advisers — the  right  to  declare  war —  that  has 
brought  on  many  a  revolution.  In  our  case,  moreover,  the 
European  war  had  gathered  in  so  short  a  space  of  time  that 
our  representatives  and  senators  cannot  be  said  to  have  held 
"a  mandate"  from  the  people  on  the  issue,  nor  even  the  Presi- 
dent himself.  The  situation  at  the  time  of  the  fall  election 
of  1916,  as  to  war,  while  dangerous  was  not  yet  acute  and 
still  in  the  stage  of  negotiations  as  to  our  expected  "responsive 
action"  on  the  U-boat  warfare.  The  President  had,  in  fact, 
been  largely  re-elected  on  the  point  of  "having  kept  us  out 
of  war  with  Mexico"  and  as  being  a  man  committed  to  main- 
taing  peace. 

Therefore,  when  the  situation  had  rapidly  changed  for  the 
worse  and  war  seemed  imminent,  there  arose  a  loud  call  from 
all  sections  of  the  public  that  the  question  be  submitted  to 
a  direct  majority  vote  of  the  people.  Apprehension  was  felt 
that  the  extra  "war  powers"  which  the  President  had  already 

144 


obtained  and  which  would  be  greatly  augmented  by  actual  war, 
together  with  his  studied  disregard  of  the  Congress  (Repub- 
lican) and  dictatorial  attitude,  which  limited  the  proper  func- 
tioning of  that  body  as  the  representative  of  the  people,  would 
create  a  situation  of  peril  to  the  nation — an  unconstitutional 
extension  of  the  executive  power.  Hence  it  was  felt  that  a 
free  popular  discussion  of  the  war  issues  was  the  only  way 
to  bring  the  light  of  truth  and  reason  upon  the  complicated 
problem,  and  a  popular  majority  vote  the  only  method  of  deci- 
sion which  would  carry  with  it  the  authority  of  the  whole 
people's  right  and  might!  But  the  powers  and  interests  behind 
the  scenes,  who  wanted  war  and  directed  events,  did  not  wish — 
did  not  dare — to  submit  the  question  to  a  popular  discussion 
and  vote;  they  knew  very  well  that  they  would  be  overwhelm- 
ingly defeated!  There  was,  without  doubt,  a  growing  feeling 
for  war,  a  strong  resentment  against  Germany,  seemingly 
justified;  yet,  as  we  have  argued  at  length,  much  of  this  was 
built  up  on  misinformation  and  artificial  pressure  which,  under 
a  full  discussion  might  have  been  dissipated  and  changed  to 
calmer  views  and  saner  counsels!  There  might — probably 
would — have  been  a  reaction  for  remaining  at  peace  with  Ger- 
many and  confining  ourselves  to  a  stricter  neutrality  observance 
and  the  resolution  to  keep  to  an  equable  position  amidst  the 
great    storm! 

To  summarize  this  topic,  the  following  facts  are  apparent: 
The  people  of  the  United  States,  either  directly  or  indirectly 
through  their  representatives  in  Congress,  practically  had  no 
voice  in  the  decision  for  war  or  in  its  measures;  the  Congress 
had  been  reduced  through  the  President's  authoritative  methods, 
and  its  own  lack  of  initiative  and  sense  of  responsibility,  to 
the  position  of  a  complaisant  "recording  body";  the  war  was 
"wanted"  and  decided  upon  by  a  composite  war  party  of 
American  "jingoes,"  Anglophiles  and  Francophiles,  political 
and  humanitarian  "sentimentalists,"  our  military  and  naval 
cliques,  American  and  international  financiers,  and  last,  but 
not  least,  by  a  covetous  horde  of  "business  interests"  of  every 
description  which  scented  the  great  fortunes  which  might  be 
made  out  of  such  a  conflict.  The  war  was  directed  and  the 
country  governed  by  the  President  and  his  cabinet  of  appointed 

145 


chiefs  and  by  the  various  special  administration  boards,  the 
directors  of  which  were  appointees  of  the  President.  The 
President  thus  practically  was  "the  country" — much  more  so 
than  the  Kaiser  ever  was  Germany  or  the  Czar  Russia!  Thus 
the  President's  almost  unlimited  authority  and  personal  power 
can  only  be  compared  to  that  assumed  by  Emperor  Napoleon 
the  Great!  Special  enactments  were  passed  by  the  Congress 
to  convey  these  powers  upon  him,  not  willingly,  but  because 
he  demanded  them  and  continued  to  demand  them  until  the 
Congress  acquiesced,  the  President  claiming  "war  necessity" 
for  his  justification.  By  these  concessions  the  divided  con- 
stitutional duties  of  the  legislative  and  executive  departments 
were  in  many  instances  "rolled  into  one."  Just  where  we 
stand  exactly  in  regard  to  these  matters  or  how  they  will 
be  "unrolled"  is  not  easy  to  say. 

Another  serious  violation  of  the  national  Constitution  and 
infringement  of  the  people's  "personal  liberty"  has  been  the 
enactment  of  national  prohibition,  under  the  guise  of  a  war 
measure.  It  repi'esents  the  imposition  of  the  will  of  a  fanatical 
but  powerful  minority  upon  a  helpless  majority,  made  im- 
potent through  the  cupidity,  or  personal  leanings  in  a  matter 
of  social  habit,  of  the  membei's  of  Congress  and  State  legis- 
latures. These  remarks  are  made  without  any  relation  to  the 
merits  of  the  subject  of  "temperance"  or  "total  abstinence." 
The  legislative  and  popular-rights  aspect  of  this  question  and 
the  "social  or  moral  aspect"  thereof  are  two  distinct  matters 
but  not  incapable  of  solution  with  full  satisfaction  to  each 
if  the  perversion  of  view  caused  by  an  attitude  of  selfish 
fanaticism  and  ignorance  were  eliminated.  All  we  are  con- 
cerned with,  in  this  place,  in  connection  with  this  act  is  its 
character  of  usurpation,  intolerance,  ruthless  domination  of 
a  limited  section  of  the  people  over  the  whole  body,  and  with 
the  plain  infringement  of  the  Constitution  as  understood  by 
the  people.  This  question,  like  that  of  peace  or  war,  is  one 
that  the  people  should  have  the  right  to  decide  for  themselves 
by  popular  majority  vote,  cither  by  national  or  state  refer- 
endum. 

The  great  uncertainty  in  all  these  infringements  and  inno- 
vations is  this;   Where   are   we   going?;   where   will   we   finish 

14G 


up?  To  what  extent  are  these  matters  chargeable  to  faults 
and  derelictions  of  individuals — egotism,  personal  ambitions, 
perverted  views,  disturbing  theories — and  to  what  extent  to 
fundamental  defects  in  our  political  system?  Has  the  demo- 
cratic form  of  government  i-evealed  weaknesses  through  the 
war  previously  not  suspected?  Must  we  acknowledge  that  in 
times  of  great  stress — war — when  events  crowd  each  other 
with  lightning  rapidity,  when  often  great  risk  would  attend 
the  submitting  of  delicate  matters  of  diplomacy  to  deliberative 
bodies,  when  quick  decisions  must  be  taken  which  leave  no 
time  for  long  debates  with  "ayes  and  noes,"  when  the  "large 
view"  must  prevail  and  quibbles  over  details  are  insufferable- — 
popular  representative  institutions  without  an  independent  ex- 
ecutive head  (as  the  King  in  England  or  in  any  liberal  mon- 
archy) break  down  and  the  one-man  principle  must  step  in 
and  take  the  helm  to  secure  efficiency?  This  is  what  really 
happened  in  the  late  war;  it  has  happened  before  in  history. 
What  a  strange  irony  of  fate  has  overtaken  us!  While  claim- 
ing to  be  engaged  in  a  holy  crusade  against  monarchy  and 
autocracy  and  for  extending  the  blessings  of  popular  demo- 
cratic government  to  other  peoples,  we  wer'3  compelled,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  this  policy,  to  employ  that  very 
system  and  power  of  one-man  concentrated  government!  How 
strange,  furthermore,  that  while  we  were  in  the  midst  of 
our  exasperated  denunciation  of  our  German  fellow-citizens' 
sentimental  interest  in  their  native  land,  our  own  President 
should  arise  and  proclaim  the  principle  of  "race  nationality" — 
the  unconquerable  tenacity  of  racial  feeling  and  character — 
as  the  corner-stone  of  a  new  era  of  peace  in  the  world!  Thus 
does  war  make  strange  bed-fellows  of  man's  so-called  con- 
victions, aspirations  and   inconsistencies! 


The  Madcap  of  War.  One  of  the  instances  of  the  "tem- 
porary insanity"  which  possessed  this  country  during  the  war 
was  the  prosecution  and  imprisonment  of  Eugene  V.  Debs, 
Socialist  leader  and  Presidential  candidate  of  his  party,  for 
disloyalty  in  opposing  the  selective  draft  for  compulsory  mil- 
itary service  in  the  war.  He  held  it  to  be  unconstitutional  or, 
rather,    opposed    to    the    democratic    principle    of    our    form    of 

147 


government,  as  the  question  of  peace  or  war  had  not  been 
submitted  to  a  vote  by  the  people  at  large.  There  were  millions 
of  rational  and  well-informed  men  in  the  country  who  held 
the  same  opinion,  not  referring  to  men  of  German  nationality 
or  descent  nor  to  the  so-called  "conscientious  objectors"  on 
moral  or  religious  grounds.  Nor  did  Mr.  Debs'  opinion  have 
anything  to  do  with  his  Socialistic  convictions  as  such.  But 
being  a  Socialist,  a  "radical"  and  agitator  for  reform,  progress 
and  improvement  in  all  social  and  political  matters,  he  was 
made  a  "war  victim"  and  sentenced  to  10  years'  impri:,onmont, 
and  is  still  in  prison  to-day.  He  is  a  man  of  remarkable  in- 
telligence, clearness  of  view,  sincerity  and  honesty  of  character, 
and  is  of  unquestioned   American  ancestry. 

The  Reign  of  Blind  Hate.  The  author  herewith  desires  to 
pay  his  compliments  to  those  five  distinguished  ultra-rabid 
Anglophiles  and  Francophiles  and  haters  of  Germans,  indi- 
vidually and  collectively — William  M.  Evarts,  Joseph  H. 
Choate,  Paul  D.  Cravath,  Frederic  R.  Coudert  and  Martin  W. 
Littleton — all  distinguished  lawyers  and  men  of  the  highest 
intellectual  and  educational  attributes.  Mr.  Choate  had  also 
been  our  Ambassador  to  England,  and  American  chief  delegate 
to  the  Hague  Peace  Conference  of  1907.  Mr.  Evarts  had 
been  a  U.  S.  Senator  from  New  York,  U.  S.  Attorney-General, 
U.  S.  Secretary  of  State,  and  counsel  in  national  and  interna- 
tional affairs.  How  men  of  such  equipment  and  position  for 
obtaining  correct  information  can  hold  the  passionately  and 
blindly  biased  opinions  about  Germany  and  the  causes  of  the 
war,  as  expressed  by  them  on  numerous  occasions  and  in 
language  devoid  of  all  restraint,  passes  comprehension!  Their 
utterances  are  on  record  in  the  files  of  the  public  press  and 
magazines  and  are,  doubtless  familiar  to  most  readers  of  this 
book.  We  cannot  give  the  space  to  quote  them  here  fully, 
but  must  utter  our  abhorrent  protest.  As  to  Mr.  Evarts  and 
Mr.  Choate,  the  author  refers  particularly  to  the  virulently 
abusive  anti-German  sentiments  expressed  by  them  as  given 
in  the  communication  to  the  New  York  Herald  of  October  31, 
1920,  by  Mr.  William  V.  Rowe,  on  the  hopes  of  these  two 
men  for  a  "World  Peace"  plan  through  the  agency  of  the 
Hague  International  Tribunal.  Mr.  Littleton  capped  his  many 
impassioned  anti-German  war  utterances  by  his  scurrilous 
speech  at  the  late  "Rhine  Horror"  meeting  in  Madison  Square 
Garden,  New  York. 

But  the  above  men  are  not  singled  out  for  arraignment 
for  any  personal  reason  but  because  of  their  professional  oc- 
cupation as  practicing  lawyers,  from  whose  habits  of  thought  a 
more  judicial,  objective  and  logical  treatment  of  the  case  of 
Germany  might  have  been  expected!     Other  distinguished  and 

148 


intellectual  men  of  prominence — President  Wilson,  Charles  E. 
Hughes,  ex-President  Taft,  Elihu  Root,  Senator  Lodge,  Presi- 
dent Butler  of  Columbia  University,  ex-Attorney-General  Wick- 
ersham,  Henry  P.  Davison,  Red-Cross  chairman  and  many  more 
— uttered  the  same  opinions  in  at  least  parallel  terms  of 
vehemence.  Meanwhile  thousands  and  thousands  of  Americans 
of  equal  intellectuality  who  differed  from  these  views  felt 
themselves  committed  to  silence  from  patriotic  motives.  How 
can  we  explain  this  violently  unbalanced  state  of  mind  in  these 
extreme  "American  patriots"  against  a  country  and  people 
which  have  never  done  America  any  harm?  For,  it  must  be 
understood  that  these  sentiments  were  avowed  and  nurtured 
in  America  for  twenty  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
while  we  were  at  peace  with  Germany  and  professed  friend- 
ship for  her  and  admiration  for  her  achievements.  We  can- 
not but  reiterate  our  previous  statement  of  the  silent  building 
up  of  pro-British  and  pro-French — and  anti-German — feeling 
by  the  British  propaganda  ever  since  about  1880,  by  which 
time  the  empire-consolidation  of  Germany  had  been  accomp- 
lished and  the  policy  of  industrial  and  political  expansion  of 
that  country  had  become  plainly  evident  to  England.  In  her 
far-seeing  political  view,  England  felt  the  arising  of  a  formid- 
able rival  to  her  power  and  position  within  a  measurable  dis- 
tance of  time;  and  it  behooved  her  not  only  to  lay  plans  for 
combining  with  France  and  Russia  in  a  concerted  policy  against 
Germany  in  every  field  where  she  might  be  encountered,  but 
also  to  win  America  to  her  support  because  of  her  physical 
resources. 

Hence  the  fostering  of  these  international  American  mar- 
riages, this  coddling  of  Americans  in  London  and  Paris  society, 
this  fulsome  flattery  and  petting  which  was  showered  upon 
them.  In  every  avenue  of  private,  political  and  business  in- 
tercourse the  British  and  French  object  was  to  impress  their 
point  of  view  of  "Germany's  upstart  rivalry,"  of  her  "crime 
against  France  in  1871,"  of  her  "dangerous  militarism,"  of 
her  "oppressive  autocratic  political  system,"  etc.,  upon  Amer- 
icans who,  in  their  innocence  of  European  political  affairs, 
believed  whatever  they  were  told.  In  this  way  a  strong  pre- 
judice grew  up  in  high  American  circles  against  Germany 
and  was  ready  to  assert  itself  openly  when  the  war  broke  out. 
A  sense  was  bred  among  Americans  of  position  that  by  their 
kinship  with  England  and  their  social  and  sympathetic  relations 
with  France  they  were  to  become  members  of  a  "triumvirate 
of  superior  nations" — -England,  France,  America — which  were 
destined  to  lead  the  world  and  which  stood  heads  above  Ger- 
many and  the  other  continental  peoples! 

This  is  the  amazing  presumption  and  conceit  which  was 
nurtured    in    Americans    and    which    is    eloquently    summed    up 

149 


in  the  above-quoted  Herald  article  giving  the  political  interna- 
tional views  of  Mr.  Evarts  and  Mr.  Choate.  It  pictures  Ger- 
many as  an  inti'actable,  recalcitrant  political  brute  among  the 
nations,  the  Germans  as  barbarians  and  huns,  still  in  "a  low 
animal  state  of  civilization,"  efficient  in  many  ways  but  yet 
"brutish"  and  incapable  of  understanding  the  superior  moral 
nature  and  principle  of  the  three  elect  nations — England, 
France,  and  America!  The  Germans  and  the  other  nations 
are  "not  in  a  class"  with  the  three  anointed  of  the  Lord,  can- 
not comprehend  "their  disinterested  world  views";  you  "cannot 
make  world  peace  with  such  a  lot  of  unrefined,  undeveloped 
brute  nations."  And  more:  "England,  France  and  America 
understand  each  other";  they  have  the  sense  of  "moral  obli- 
gation" and  could  conclude  a  world  peace  treaty,  but  "Germany 
could  never  be  brought  into  such  a  treaty"  because  "what 
does  she  care  or  know  about  morals  or  moral  obligations  as 
we  understand  them?"  And  more:  "The  German  people  are 
now  (1889)  back  in  the  dark  ages,  in  a  class  by  themselves; 
they  are  a  shocking  menace  to  the  good  oi'der  of  the  world — 
like  any  other  beast  in  cultivated  surroundings — and  cannot  be 
trusted."  Mr.  Choate,  who,  at  the  Hague  in  1907,  was  par- 
ticularly incensed  against  Germany  because  she  would  not 
agree  to  the  proposed  arbitration  and  partial  disarmament 
proposals,  is  reported,  in  this  Herald  article  by  Mr.  Rowe,  as 
having  said :  "Arbitration  and  peace  do  not  fall  in  with  her 
(Germany's)  views  at  all.  She  is  a  tough  one!  We  must 
shut  her  out."  Also:  "The  Prussians  are  the  world's  barbari- 
ans, utterly  lacking  in  any  understanding  of  or  capacity  for 
spiritual  development!" 

The  author  submits  that  this  is  the  summit  of  unreasoning, 
ignorant,  hateful  abuse  and  cannot  be  characterized!  Such 
utterances  can  only  be  treated  with  contempt.  They  are  quoted 
only  as  part  of  the  author's  argument.  As  we  have  pointed 
out  before,  the  reason  for  Germany's  opposition  to  the  arbitra- 
tion proposals  of  "these  three  moral  nations,"  in  1907,  was 
that  Germany  had  ground  to  distrust  the  motive  in  these  pro- 
posals in  view  of  the  envious  stand  of  England,  France  and 
Russia  against  her  in  the  Morocco  question,  in  African  coloni- 
zation plans  and  in  the  Asia-Minor  development  and  ti'anspor- 
tation  schemes.  In  her  geographical  position,  agreement  would 
have  made  her  helpless  against  a  sudden  combination  of  these 
three  powers  against  her — which  she  had  every  reason  to 
fear  at  no  very  distant  day!  If  we  grant  that  modern  Germany 
(since  1871)  compared  with  England  and  France,  was  a  young 
and  upstart  nation  and  that  the  encroachments  threatened 
through  Germany's  policy  were,  in  a  sense,  invasions  upon  the 
privileged  domains'  claimed  by  the  older  nations,  this  in  itself 
does  not  constitute  a  charge  against   Germany.      Her  enhanced 

150 


position  and  growing  necessities  clearly  entitled  her  to  the 
right  of  instituting  her  policy  of  material  expansion,  and  the 
opposition  to  it  was  dictated  not  because  "there  was  not  enough 
to  go  around"  but  by  jealousy  against  a  newcomer  and  mean 
greed  by  England  and  France  to  have  all  the  world  advantages 
to  themselves  (leaving  special  political  motives  out  of  the 
consideration).  Germany's  attitude  in  the  prosecution  of  her 
policies  was  always  conciliatory  and  accommodating,  with  the 
object    of    preserving    the   peace    of    the    Avorld. 

At  all  events,  we  can  say  quite  positively  that  the  growth 
of  American  sentiment  against  Germany  before  the  war  was 
not  due  to  any  specific  hostile  act  or  intention  on  her  part 
aimed  against  this  country,  SO  that,  beyond  a  certain  feeling 
of  political  and  business  jealousy  (as  pointed  out  in  the  ar- 
ticle on  Germany)  there  remains  only  the  influence  exerted 
by  the  British  and  French  social  and  political  propagandas 
operating  since  1880,  to  account  for  this  general  enmity  and 
acute  race  prejudice.  To  this  influence  must  be  added  a  certain 
superficiality  in  American  political  and  general  education  which, 
unfortunately,  stops  short  of  thorough  study  and  investigation 
and  makes  us  deficient  in  the  valuable  habit  of  ethical  analysis 
of  opinion  and  conduct. 


XII.     THE   INVASION   OF   BELGIUM   AND   THE 
ENEMY  COUNTRIES 

The  Belgian  Atrocities — The  Devastation  Charge 

The  so-called  "invasions"  of  Russia,  France,  Serbia,  Rou- 
mania  and  Italy  by  the  German  and  Austrian  armies  were 
natural  and  legitimate  operations  of  war.  There  having  been 
in  all  these  cases  a  regular  declaration  of  war  previous  to  these 
military  moves,  there  can  be  no  question  of  "invasion"  about 
them  in  the  correct  meaning  of  that  term,  i.e.,  an  "unexpected 
and  unprovoked  incursion"  of  an  enemy  force  into  another 
country  for  conquest  or  plunder.  The  right  of  a  "declared" 
enemy  to  throw  the  fight  into  the  other's  country  for  the 
obvious  advantages  which  this  gives  has  never  been  questioned 
in  military  practice.  We  draw  attention  to  this  merely  for 
the  reason  that,  in  consequence  of  the  systematic  intent  of  the 
Entente  allies  to  be  unfair  to  Germany  and  Austria  in  every- 
thing they  did  in  the  war,  these  entries  of  their  armies  into 
their  enemies'   countries  were   stigmatized   to   an   uninformed 

151 


public   as   unwari-anted   acts  and   as  examples   of   their   wanton 

methods  of  warfare.  This  construction  was  especially  applied 
to  the  case  of  France.  But  if  Gei-many  had  not  invaded  France, 
the  latter  would  have  invaded  Germany;  in  that  case  it  would 
have  been  German  towns,  villages  and  cathedrals  which  would 
have  suffered  destruction  (see  the  historical  Articles)  as  it 
cannot  be  assumed  that  French  shells  would  have  been  any 
more  clever  or  sympathetic  than  German  shells  to  evade 
churches,  cathedral  spires  and  similar  high  objects  in  the 
flight  to  their  intended  military  targets  beyond. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  by  the  German  armies,  however, 
appears    on    the    surface    at    least   as    a    real,    unprovoked    and 
entirely     unwarranted     invasion     of     a     neutral     country,     of     a 
neutrality  guaranteed  to  be  respected  by  all  the  joint  signa- 
tory powers  of  the  treaty  of  London,  of  18;}2,  by  which  Bel- 
gium  was   created    a   separate    Kingdom    after   her   successful 
revolution    for    independence    from    Holland.       Prussia    was    a 
party    to    that    covenant,    and    the    late    German    empire    un- 
questionably   took    over    this    obligation;    in    fact,    no    attempt 
to  repudiate  it  has  ever  been  made  by  Germany.     This  charge 
of    the    invasion    of    Belgium,    against    Germany,    has    been    so 
assiduously  exploited   by  the   propagandas  by  the   careful   ex- 
clusion  of  all   explanatory  and   extenuating   facts  that   it  will 
be   diflicult  to   change   the   prevailing   opinion    that   Germany's 
act  was  a  deliberate  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.      But  there 
are  qualifying  circumstances  in   the   case  which  it  is  no  more 
than  just  to  state   in  order  to  thi-ow  an   impartial   light  upon 
every  phase  of  this  question.     In  the  first  place,  it  cannot  be 
contended  that  Germany  entered  Belgium  as  a  wilful  enemy  to 
make   war   upon    her;   there   was   no    definite    reason   for   such 
an  action.     Her  sole  object  was  to  obtain  through-passage  into 
France;  and  she  opened  peaceable  negotiations  with  Belgium  to 
obtain  this.     She  offered   full  pay  for  everything  that  would 
be  requisitioned  for  the  army  in  its  passage,  and  for  all  damage 
that  would  unavoidably  be  done.     But  it  is  clear  that  Belgium's 
consent  to  this  request  would  have  been  an  un-neutral  act  on 
her  part  towards   France.      It  can  hardly  be  assumed   that  the 
German   statesmen   could   take  any  other  view  of  this  matter, 
provided  they  believed  in  Belgium's  honest  intention  to  remain 

152 


strictly  neutral  in  respect  of  the  Entente  allies;  and  in  this 
case  Germany's  insistence  can  only  be  explained  as  a  presump- 
tion that  her  power  would  overawe  Belgium  and  compel  her 
to  yield — an  act  of  forceful  coercion!  But — if  Germany  had 
reason  to  doubt  the  reliability  of  Belgium's  neutrality  in  respect 
of  the  Entente  powers,  the  entire  case  obtains  a  different 
aspect!  Whichever  may  be  the  correct  hypothesis,  the  unex- 
pected happened — Belgium  refused  to  yield  and  threatened 
to  resist!  When  Germany  was  face-to-face  with  this  dilemma 
she  should  have  renounced  her  object  and  retired — unless  she 
had  absolute  proof  of  Belgium's  unreliability.  There  were 
other  ways  open  for  her  to  get  into  France,  and  she  cannot 
plead  the  justification  of  that  extreme  physical  necessity  which 
in  war  supplants  all  rights,  agreements  and  other  considera- 
tions. And,  while  these  delicate  and  dangerous  negotiations 
for  this  desired  through-passage  were  in  progress,  the  Ger- 
mans, confident  that  Belgium  would  ultimately  yield,  advanced 
steadily  and  crossed  the  border  for  a  few  miles  in  a  few 
spots,  and  slight  skirmishes  occurred  with  the  Belgian  soldiery 
and  civilians.  Suddenly  a  Niagara  was  reached:  As  the  Ger- 
mans emerged  in  front  of  the  outlying  forts  of  Liege — only 
a  few  miles  from  the  German  frontier — they  were  met  by  a 
rain  of  shells  and  bullets.     That  ended  all  further  negotiations. 

But  behind  the  surface  course  and  meaning  of  these  events, 
there  was,  without  doubt,  a  deeper  significance,  as  we  have 
already  hinted.  Diplomacy  is  a  very  secret  business,  and  many 
of  its  most  intricate  schemes  are  not  put  down  on  paper;  they 
are  in  the  form  of  vei'bal  understandings  the  existence  of  which 
can  only  be  surmised  from  circumstantial  evidence.  Quite  apart 
from  the  exact  value  of  the  assertion  that  the  Germans,  on 
reaching  Brussels,  found  accusing  documents  in  the  govern- 
ment's archives  pointing  to  secret  agreements  between  Belgium 
and  England  in  favor  and  support  of  the  latter  in  the  case  of 
a  European  war,  we  know  that  from  the  very  time  of  her 
erection  to  an  independent  power  Belgium  had  been  the  ad- 
vance agent  and  listening  post  on  the  continent  for  England's 
international  politics.  An  intimate  friendship  had  existed  for 
years   between    King   Leopold    and    Queen   Victoria.      England 

153 


backed  Belgium's  conquest  in  the  African  Congo  and  shared 
the  riches  drawn  from  there  with  her.  Similarly  the  affilia- 
tion of  Belgium  with  France  had  been  close  through  race 
relationship,  language  and  historical  traditions.  In  times  of 
political  troubles  in  France,  Belgium  had  been  the  principal 
haven  for  her  refugees  and  emigrants.  Newspapers  and  books 
were  issued  from  there  which  could  not  have  been  produced 
in  France.  It  appears  therefore  not  only  reasonable  but  ir- 
resistible to  draw  the  inference  that  Germany  had  excellent 
general  reasons  to  assume  and  believe  that  Belgium  would  be 
on  the  side  of  the  Triple  Entente  in  the  war — and  against  her; 
that  she  would,  inevitably,  become  their  helpmate  and — tool; 
and  that  her  neutrality  would  become  "a  scrap  of  paper"  in  any 
case,  the  matter  depending  merely  upon  which  of  the  great 
powers  would  be  the  first  to  succeed  to  lay  her  hand  upon  her! 
A  truly  horrible  revelation  of  the  "inwardness"  of  European 
politics,  but  absolutely  true!!  Full  proof  that  this  was  the 
position  of  Belgium — that  she  was  destined  to  be  a  helpless 
victim  in  either  case — may  be  disclosed  before  very  long. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  Germany's  action  obtains  a  different 
appearance.  In  entering  Belgium  to  march  through  it  into 
France,  she  may  have  seen  the  opportunity — without  creating 
hostilities — of  keeping  her  enemies  out,  of  laying  her  hand 
quietly  upon  a  nest  of  dangerous  intrigue  against  her  of  which 
she  may  have  had  some  proof,  in  short,  of  compelling  Belgium 
to  disclose  her  exact  position.  That  the  existence  of  such 
secret  understandings  between  the  Entente  and  Belgium  should 
be  strenuously  denied  by  them  was  to  be  expected.  For 
Germany  it  was  absolutely  necessary,  from  the  military  point 
of  view,  to  know  Belgium's  political  position;  invasion  of 
German  territory  from  there  by  France  or  England,  under  a 
false  pretended  violation  of  neutrality  by  Belgium  towards 
them,  was  a  danger  of  greatest  importance  to  Germany.  Of 
Holland  she  felt  reasonably  sure;  her  own  French  border  she 
could  protect,  having  only  an  open  enemy  to  face;  in  Belgium 
there  lay  the  danger  of  intrigue  and  surprise!  In  such  situa- 
tions of  perplexity — particularly  in  war — the  strong  man  takes 
the  bull  by  the  horns  to  prevent  him  goring  him! 

154 


'T^HE  charges  of  inhuman  outrages  against  civilians  in  Bel- 
-*■  gium  by  the  German  soldiers  and  military  authorities,  and 
of  wanton  destruction  of  public  and  private  property  in  Bel- 
gium and  France  were  responsible  more  than  anything  else 
almost,  after  the  war  had  well  begun,  for  the  intense  feeling 
manifested  against  the  Germans  in  this  country.  We  cannot 
go  into  details  of  individual  occurrences  .because  even  today 
reliable  and  unexaggerated  accounts  of  these  are  impossible 
to  obtain.  To  be  able  to  appraise  the  whole  matter  at  an 
equitable  valuation,  it  is  necessary,  first,  to  acquire  accurate 
conception  of  what  war  really  is  in  idea  and  practice,  and, 
second,  to  form  a  just  appreciation  of  the  psychological  attitude 
of  the  Germans  in  regard  to  this  war  in  general.  War  is 
a  step  of  desperation — the  final  appeal  to  material  force  and 
challenge  to  mutual  destruction!  In  that  grim  purpose  of 
violence  for  violence  is,  unfortunately,  associated  every  other 
excess  and  crime  of  war — destruction  of  property,  theft,  dese- 
cration, rape  of  women,  outrage  and  killing  of  innocents  and 
the  helpless  old  alike.  Not  that  these  excesses  are  sanctioned 
by  the  army  chiefs,  officers  and  public  opinion,  but  they  are 
the  unavoidable  accompanying  results  of  the  brutal  atmosphere 
of  war.  It  is  an  unleashing  of  all  the  inst'ncts  of  vengeance 
and  injury  in  the  most  morbid  individual  soldiers  and  officers, 
in  the  one  savage  purpose  to  defeat  and  ruin  the  enemy.  In- 
ferentially,  therefore,  the  more  terrible  war  is  made,  the  sooner 
it  may  end!  This  analysis  applies  with  especial  force  to  a' 
war  of  unjust  aggression  which  puts  in  danger  the  national 
existence  of  a  people.  There  have  been  set  up  humanitarian 
agreements  as  to  many  details  of  warfare,  institutions  to 
ameliorate  its  horrors  of  suff'ering  of  every  kind,  also  rules 
for  the  treatment  of  the  non-combatant  people  of  an  enemy 
country  and  against  the  needless  destruction  of  their  private 
property;  yet  those  of  us  who  believe  it  possible  to  make  war, 
in  a  sense,  "civilized,"  to  prevent  excesses  of  passion  under  all 
circumstances,  to  confine  its  operation  and  effects  strictly  to 
the  military  forces  and  to  prohibit  the  employment  of  new 
means  of  destruction  or  exclusive  forms  of  weapons  are  certain 
to  be  disappointed!     The  development  of  modern  war,  in  scope 

155 


and  purpose,  has  made  such  views  untenable.  Looking  back, 
even  in  the  great  Napoleon's  time,  war  was  confined  to  rela- 
tively small  armies  of  professional  soldiers,  but  since  the 
advent  of  popular  intelligence  and  interest  in  national  political 
affairs — a  result  of  the  French  revolution — and  the  introduc- 
tion of  compulsory  military  service,  started  by  Prussia,  the 
whole  aspect  of  war  has  become  changed. 

Today,  war  is  no  longer  merely  a  challenge  of  the  "German 
army"  to  the  French  army,"  etc.,  as  of  old;  the  armies  today 
are  the  people  and  the  people  are  the  armies,  the  challenge  is 
from  one  nation  to  another  and  its  entire  man-power  and 
resources  for  a  desperate  combat  to  annihilation  of  either — or 
both.  Any  means  which  contribute  to  that  purpose  are  re- 
garded as  legitimate.  Implements  of  appalling  power  have 
been  created;  every  resource  of  science  and  ingenuity  is  en- 
listed to  the  end  of  killing,  maiming,  destroying!  The  stakes 
are  so  great,  the  methods  so  gigantic,  the  developments  of 
action  in  the  field  so  rapid  and  terrible  that  "incidental  ex- 
cesses," important  enough  in  the  subjective  view,  are  ignored 
and  swallowed  up  in  the  grand,  overwhelming  awful  objective 
of  the  whole.  In  the  late  war  there  were  the  new  terrors' 
of  the  deadly  machine  gun,  of  poison  gas,  of  artillery  of  in- 
creased caliber  and  amazing  carrying  power,  of  the  "tank" 
monsters,  the  birdlike  aero-planes  and  the  wonderful  "Zeppelin" 
airships,  of  the  sinister  submarine  torpedo  boats,  of  fixed  and 
floating  mines,  of  grand  battleships  of  wonderful  design  and 
destructive  equipment — all  added  to  the  improved  weapons  of 
former  wars.  In  the  midst  of  the  employment,  on  both  sides, 
of  such  colossal  means  of  life-destruction  or  mutilation,  and 
with  millions  of  men  to  operate  them,  how  can  there  be  left 
any  niceties  of  consideration  or  application  in  isolated  cases 
of  individual  provocation?  It  is  beyond  the  power  of  human 
nature  to  give! 

Modei-n  war  is  like  a  great  cosmic  visitation — tidal  wave, 
tornado,  conflagration,  volcanic  eruption — that  stop  for  noth- 
ing in  their  path!  In  such  elemental  commotion  the  psycho- 
logical condition  of  "the  human  war  machine" — the  individual 
soldier  or  officer — becomes  a  factor  of  great  moment.     In  the 

156 


horrible  scenes  and  situations  of  actual  battle  he  is  not  any 
more  a  human  being  of  normal  feeling  and  thought  but  an 
insensible,  irresponsible  mechanism  like  the  machine  gun  which 
he  turns!  His  eye  is  dulled  by  the  sight  of  blood,  of  frightful 
injuries  and  ghastly  death;  his  ear  to  the  cry  of  pain  and  the 
appeal  for  help;  his  whole  sensibilities  are  blunted  and  drowned 
in  the  reign  of  wild  excitement  and  confusion  all  about  him: 
Thousands  of  dead  lying  on  the  ground  with  an  accusing  stare 
to  heaven;  the  wounded  in  every  stage  of  mutilation  and  suf- 
fering, scenes  to  turn  a  stone  to  tears— heads  blown  off, 
legs  and  arms  torn  out,  jagged  bones  protruding  through  the 
bleeding  flesh,  breasts  cut  open  and  abdomens  disemboweled, 
dismembei'ed  hands  and  feet  strewn  over  the  ground — all 
around  the  roar  of  a  thousand  cannon  mouths  belching  forth 
shells  and  shrapnel  and  tens  of  thousands  of  machine  guns 
rattling  amidst  the  detonations  of  exploding  bombs  and  shells, 
the  whole  a  deafening,  suffocating,  bewildering  turmoil  that 
makes  it  impossible  to  speak  a  word  of  comfort  or  a  sad  adieu 
to  the  comrade  falling  at  your  side!  Add  to  this  the  life  of 
exposure  in  the  open  or  in  the  trenches,  the  dangers  of  the 
dugouts,  the  living  hell  inside  the  "tanks,"  add  hunger  and 
thirst  and  superhuman  physical  exeitions — and  we  may  realize 
how  impossible  it  is  for  the  soldier  to  remain  a  human  being 
of  normal  mind  and  feeling  and  rational  judgment  in  fhe 
grasp  of  such  a  cataclysm!! 

That  men  so  placed  and  affected  will,  at  times,  commit 
excesses  of  unthinking  rage  and  revenge  under  special  provo- 
cations, of  desperate  protest  against  their  hard  lot,  deeds  at 
times  inhuman  and  brutal  is  comprehensible;  that  officers  even, 
whose  higher  intelligence  and  training  should  tend  to  fortify 
their  characters,  should  lose  their  self-control  and  sense  of 
responsibility  and  order  or  condone  such  acts  of  brutality  is 
also  comprehensible.  Not  even  the  high  degree  of  discipline 
which  has  ever  distinguished  the  German  army  and  been  its 
proudest  record  was  able  to  guard  entirely  against  such  ex- 
cesses. The  charge,  however,  that  the  responsible  German 
army  command  and  its  sub-officers  had  instigated,  countenanced 
or  condoned  a   spirit  of  vengeful  violence  against   Belgian   and 

157 


French  civilians,  to  be  given  free  vent  irrespective  of  special 
provocation,  must  be  dismissed  as  pure  and  unsupported  slander! 
As  to  the  charges  of  wanton  devastation  of  Belgian  and  French 
cities,  private  estates,  churches,  factories,  mines,  etc.,  there 
was,  with  rare  exceptions,  no  other  motive  than  that  of  justi- 
fied military  action  or  military  necessity.  It  is  not  to  be 
denied  here,  that  there  were  a  number  of  cases  of  such  depre- 
dation which  cannot  be  excused.  One  matter  which  was  assidu- 
ously worked  up  by  the  propagandas  to  evoke  a  great  deal  of 
acute  sympathy  and  indignation  in  this  country  was  the  so- 
called  "wholesale  deportation  of  Belgian  workmen"  to  work 
in  German  factories,  etc.  Information  since  released  on  this 
subject  shows  that  this  deportation  was  fully  warranted  on 
moral  and  social  grounds;  the  men,  and  women  as  well,  in 
their  idleness,  mental  suffering  from  the  war  and  half-starved 
condition  were  falling  into  sloth  and  vice  from  which  regular 
occupation  alone  was  able  to  rescue  them.  Such  facts  the 
British  censorship  never  allowed  to  come  to  America;  there 
was  no  limit  to  its  capacity  for  spiteful  calumny,  either  by 
commission  or  by  omission. 

To  all  the  preceding  explanatory  and  extenuating  state- 
ments to  weaken  the  charges  under  considei'ation  we  must  add 
the  psychological  factor,  the  mental  attitude  of  the  German 
soldier  and  officer,  of  the  whole  army,  of  the  whole  German 
people  towards  the  war,  as  repeatedly  described,  to  enable 
us  to  comprehend  the  point  of  view  from  which  they  regarded 
the  enemy  in  France  and  Belgium,  his  country  and  cities,  the 
non-combatant  inhabitants,  the  very  ground  upon  which  the 
war  was  fought!!  They  saw  their  fatherland  suddenly  arrested 
in  its  path  of  progress  and  challenged  to  a  war  of  life  and 
death,  their  enemy  avowedly  bent  upon  its  desti'uction ;  they 
heard  false  and  ignoble  motives  invented  to  charge  upon  them- 
selves the  guilt  for  the  terrible  war;  they  were  outraged  and 
insulted  by  false  or  exaggerated  charges  of  inhumanity,  while 
their  own  civilian  non-combatant  people  at  home  were  being 
subjected  to  the  greatest  inhumanity  perpetrated  in  the  war — 
slow  but  certain  physical  attrition,  starvation  and  finally  col- 
lapse through  the  working  of  the  Bi-itish  blockade!     What  a 

158 


proposition — all  this  together — to  put  before  a  people  of  sixty- 
five  millions,  one  of  the  leading  nations  of  the  world!  Under 
such  unbearable  provocation — unparalleled  in  all  history — could 
there  be  expected  from  the  Germans  a  punctilious  weighing 
of  minor  fgcts  and  considerations;  could  men  and  officers  be 
expected  to  exercise  strict  self-control  and  impartial  judg- 
ment in  all  situations  in  the  face  of  the  exasperating  provoca- 
tions offered  them  by  the  enemy  civilians  and  the  town  ad- 
ministrations, amidst  all  the  bewildering  circumstances  of  the 
war  that  moved  along  from  day  to  day  with  lightning  rapidity? 
Under  this  perspective,  were  these  occasional  isolated  out- 
breaks of  cruel  violence  and  revenge  against  the  people  of 
Belgium,  Fi'ance  and  England  for  bringing  this  trial  and 
injustice  upon  the  German  nation  anything  SO  very  remarkable 
and  inexcusable?  What  were  the  few  deaths  caused  by  the 
Zeppelins  in  England  and  in  Paris,  those  in  the  proven  cases 
of  "atrocities,"  the  deaths  by  submarines,  by  the  70-mile 
cannon  in  Paris,  by  military  executions  compared  with  the 
four-hundred  thousand  deaths  of  civilians  in  Germany  by  slow 
starvation  and  the  physical  breakdown  of  several  millions  of 
them  by  the  operation  of  the  British  blockade — a  measure  of 
silent  but  sure  annihilation,  and  which  was  continued  for  six 
months  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  by  these  allies  of 
pretended  "humanitarianism"? 

The  preceding  is  the  broad  view  to  bring  upon  these  much- 
exploited  charges  against  Germany.  There  were,  admittedly, 
many  proven  cases  of  violence  and  outrage  and  wanton  destruc- 
tion which  served  no  military  purpose  or  necessity.  It  could 
not  have  been  otherwise  with  an  army  of  from  four  to  five 
million  men.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  undeniable  that  over 
the  actual  facts  there  was  spread  a  network  of  malicious  and 
gross  exaggeration  as  to  the  number  and  character  of  these 
cases,  as  a  part  of  the  general  program  of  defamation  by 
the  British  propaganda,  and  particularly  to  inflame  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  American  public.  It  should  be  allowed  that  no 
war  has  ever  been  fought  by  any  nation  without  many  inci- 
dents of  violence  and  brutality  having  occurred  apart  from 
the  regular  actions  of  war.     Alas!  human  life,  suffering,  rights 

159 


are  cheaply  held  among  the  torrent  of  passions  which  war 
lets  loose  and  which  shame  those  boasts  of  "sentiments  and 
sympathies"  which  we  so  loudly  make  in  times  of  peace — 
and  even  in  the  midst  of  cruel  war!  History  only  will  be 
able  to  weigh  this  charge  against  Germany  with  accuracy!  It 
will  require  the  lapse  of  ten  years  more  before  the  true  facts 
and  the  proper  perspective  on  these  events  will  be  obtained, 
but  it  may  be  confidently  predicted  now  that  the  present  judg- 
ment thereon  will  not  be  sustained! 

XIII.  THE  DEFEAT  OF  GERMANY  AND  HER 

ALLIES 

A.    STRAIN    UPON    GERMANY.     DEMOCRACY'S    OPPOR- 
TUNITY. THE  WILSON  GOSPEL.   MILITARY  PUZZLES 
EXPLAINED.     AMERICA   TURNS   THE   TIDE   TO 
VICTORY.     THE   AFTERMATH. 

In  our  previous  article  on  Germany  we  drew  attention  to  the 
many  measures  of  social  amelioration  for  the  benefit  and  se- 
curity of  the  working  classes  which  had  been  inaugurated  by 
the  German  government.  Although  a  semi-autocratic  mon- 
archy, Germany  had  really  become  the  most  advanced  socialistic 
State  in  the  world,  not  excepting  any  of  the  republics.  To  some 
extent,  however,  this  socialist  progress  had  the  character  of 
"patronizing  class  legislation";  it  was  not  the  result  of  the 
evolution  of  the  State  as  a  whole  to  political  freedom,  and  not 
due  to  the  full  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  individual  on 
principle.  The  Gei'man  worker  was  subject  to  "class  limita- 
tions" beyond  which  it  was  difficult  for  him  to  reach  and  rise, 
and  his  political  freedom  and  equality  were  restricted,  especially 
in  Prussia  proper.  A  similar  limitation  prevailed  in  the  sec- 
tions of  the  people  just  above  the  working  classes  in  the  social 
scale.  It  is  not  easy  for  the  American  reader,  reared  in  com- 
plete freedom  of  personal  recognition  and  opportunity,  to  re- 
alize to  how  great  an  extent  "class  spirit,  limitations,  preroga- 
tives, animosities"  were  still  prevalent  in  the  German  empire 
in  spite  of  the  advanced  institutions  previously  described. 
Similar  conditions  exist,  in  the  other  countries  of  Europe,  even 

160 


in  democratic  England  and  republican  France;  they  represent 
the  tenacious  spirit  of  the  past  still  active  in  the  changing  pro- 
gressive present.  Yet  Germany  had,  as  much  as  France,  been 
for  many  yeai's  back  the  fighting  ground  for  progress  towards 
the  democratic  ideal  of  freedom,  for  establishing  the  republican 
form  of  government.  We  have  in  previous  articles  spoken  of 
these  successive  periods  of  republican  attempts  and  subsequent 
reactions  in  France  and  Germany  and  other  countries  of  Europe. 
With  the  advent  of  the  German  empire — in  1871 — and  its  polit- 
ical and  material  success,  these  strivings  of  many  sections  of 
the  people  for  greater  political  liberty  became  somewhat  sub- 
merged in  the  general  satisfaction  with  the  new  conditions,  and 
were  at  least  partially  disarmed  by  the  practical  socialistic  con- 
cessions of  which  we  have  spoken. 

For,  in  Germany,  as  much  as  in  France,  the  development  of 
thought  towards  political  democracy  was  paralleled  by  a  move- 
ment even  deeper  and  more  powerful — because  moi'e  directly 
personal — this  humanitarian  movement  of  "socialism"  as  per- 
taining to  increased  individual  rights  and  consideration  in  all 
the  material  matters  of  life  affecting  individual  and  collective 
wellbeing,  satisfaction  and  security  of  physical  existence.  The 
beginnings  of  this  movement  reach  back  to  the  writers  who  pre- 
ceded the  French  Revolution,  and  were  augmented,  later,  by 
the  systems  of  practical  application  as  evolved,  step  by  step,  by 
such  men  as  Proudhon,  Louis  Blanc,  Fourier,  Lasalle,  Engels 
and  finally  Karl  Marx,  with  his  famous  book  "Das  Kapital,"  the 
corner-stone  of  modern  co-operative  socialistic  theory.  Marx 
was  followed  by  Bebel  and  other  German,  Russian,  French  and 
English  social  writers  who  modernized  some  of  his  theories 
about  capital,  labor  and  property.  The  ideas  of  this  school  of 
thought  were  spread  among  the  German  people  under  the  em- 
pire (not  without  official  opposition)  by  books,  newspapers, 
societies,  addresses,  and  reached  all  classes.  The  propaganda 
resulted  in  the  formation  of  "the  socialistic-political  party" — 
of  various  groups  of  opinion — which  finally  grew  to  such  num- 
bers that  it  secured  representation  in  the  "Reichstag,"  the  Ger- 
man national  parliament.  It  was  in  a  large  measure  through 
the  agitation  of  this  party  that  the  socialistic  enactments  for 
the  working  classes  were  secured. 

161 


From  the  above  explanation,  therefore,  the  American  reader 
will  understand   that  socialism  is,  in  a  measure,  a  movement 
independent  from  that  for  political   democracy.      A   man  may 
be  a  staunch  democrat — strong  for  representative  "popular  gov- 
ernment  and   personal   rights  and  freedom — and   yet  opposed 
to    even    moderate    socialistic   views   on    property,    co-opei'atJve 
working  of  industries,  public  ownership  and  working  of  public 
utilities,  etc.     This  condition  of  opinion  is  illusti'ated  by  all  the 
existing  republics,  none  of  which  are  distinctly  or  in  equal  de- 
gree socialistic,  and  most  of  which  have  less  of  such  legislation 
than  Germany  possessed  under  the  empire.  In  the  United  States, 
for  instance,  up  to   188.5,  all  socialistic  propositions  were  de- 
nounced as  being  "paternal  legislation"  and  politically  objection- 
able.   On  the  other  hand,  however,  all  socialists  are,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  democrats  and  in  favor  of  representative  government; 
but  with  them  the  socialistic  side  usually  dominates  the  political 
side ;  if  their  aim  is  a  republic  it  is  the  socialistic  republic,  and 
the  precise  ideas  as  to  such  a  republic  may  differ  as  widely  as 
do  their  socialistic  leanings.      This  accounts  for  the  fact  .that  in 
the  new  German-republic  Reichstag  of  today    (since  the  revo- 
lution) there  are  three  democratic-socialistic  groups  (with  minor 
divisions)  and  several  democratic  anti-socialistic  groups,  all  of 
which  together  make  up  the  "republican-majority  party"   op- 
posed by  the  conservative  monarchical  minority  party.      Quite 
similar  was  the  character  of  the  various  groups  of  "socialists" 
and  "liberals"   in  the  old   imperial  Reichstag',   except  that  the 
spell  of  the  empire  lay  upon  the  former  almost  as  much  as  upon 
the  latter  and  the  consei'vatives,  and  confined  their  activities  to 
the  framing  of  additional  enactments  for  the  social,  betterment 
of   the   dependent  working  classes   of  all   degrees.     While   all 
was  well  and  went  well,  and  sentiments  of  appreciation  of  the 
Imperial  government's  attitude  and  efforts  for  the  welfare  of 
the  country  as  a  whole  pervaded  all  classes  of  society  and  all 
political  parties    (excepting  the  very  extreme  wing  of  the  so- 
cialistic "radicals")    plans   for  attempting  more  radical  reforms 
affecting  the  fundamental  political  constitution  of  Germany  and 
carrying    these    democratic    and    socialistic    aspirations    to    their 
logical  conclusion  had  to  be  deferred  to  a  later  and  more  oppor- 
tune day — a  day  that  has  now  come. 

162 


The  government  ruled  with  a  strong  hand  and  had  a  working 
majority  of  conservatives  and  allied  groups  of  monarchical  con- 
victions; yet  the  combined  vote  of  the  democi'atic  liberals  and 
socialists  of  the  1914  Reichstag  represented  a  formidable  oppo- 
sition. The  propaganda  of  the  socialists  was  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  the  lower  working  people  but  had  entered  the  middle 
classes  of  society,  the  army,  the  navy  and  the  civil  service. 
Only  the  deeply  religious  sections  and  the  agricultural  popu- 
lation had  not  become  jnuch  affected  by  it.  In  the  cities,  fac- 
tories and  among  the  industrial  workers  generally,  socialism 
was  strongly  prevalent.  This  situation  ran  strangely  parallel 
with  that  in  the  larger  political  life  of  the  nation:  While  all 
seemed  secure  externally,  on  the  surface,  yet  there  was  the 
ever-present,  ever-growing  threat  of  war;  while  all  seemed 
serene  internally,  yet  thei-e  was  the  evei'-present  spread  of 
social  discontent  and  socialistic  and  democratic-political  agi- 
tation. 

The  preceding  recital,  or  sketch,  may  seem  uninteresting  and 
irrelevant  to  some  readers,  but  the  author  must  ^sk  for  their 
kind  attention  as  this  sketch  is  of  vital  consequences  to  the 
development  of  the  main  argument  of  this  article,  to  wit:  That 
Germany  was  defeated  more  by  her  internal  political  schism 
and  its  harassing  effect  upon  the  government  leaders,  the 
military  chiefs  and  the  fighting  forces  than  by  her  external 
enemies!  When  the  war  broke  out,  the  first,  the  only  apprehen- 
sion felt  by  the  ruling  classes  of  Germany  and  the  government 
was  in  regard  to  the  attitude  which  these  very  political  parties 
— the  democratic  liberals  and  socialists — would  take  in  regard 
to  the  war.  The  Kaiser  and  his  "cabinet"  held  the  prerogative 
right  to  declare  war,  but  the  financial  measures  necessary  to 
carry  on  a  war  required,  under  the  German  constitution,  to  be 
approved  by  the  Reichstag;  the  latter,  by  refusing  to  vote  the 
budget  had  it  in  its  power  to  frustrate  the  war  and  defeat  the 
government  policy.  But  no  such  show  of  unpatriotic  vacil- 
lation occurred  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  in  spite  of  socialistic 
and  democratic  rumblings.  When  the  moment  came  for  the 
Reichstag  to  sustain  the  government,  after  the  declarations  of 
war  had  been  made,  and  to  vote  the  needed  supplies  and  ex- 
traordinary powers  asked,  patriotism  won  the  day  easily  over 

163 


the  separate  and  specific  interests  of  these  parties,  and  they 
rallied  to  the  support  of  Kaiser,  government  and  fatherland 
with  splendid  unity  and  enthusiasm!  This  spirit  would,  no 
doubt,  have  continued,  had  the  war  brought  an  early  victory; 
but  under  the  long-continued  strain  which  ensued  and  the  vision 
of  ultimate  defeat  it  was  gradually  swept  aside. 

After  a  brilliant  opening  by  Germany,  followed  by  the  check 
at  the  Marne,  the  war  proceeded  on  its  exhausting  course  with- 
out decisive  results  despite  the  I'emarkable  deeds  of  German 
arms.  Russia  had  been  defeated  and  Poland  and  the  eastern 
provinces  occupied,  November,  1916;  England  had  been  forced 
to  retire  from  the  Dardanelles  campaign  by  the  splendid  de- 
fense made  by  the  Turks  under  German  leadership;  Roumania 
had  been  punished,  conquered  and  overrun,  December,  1916; 
Serbia  was  prostrate,  September,  1915,  and  in  the  possession 
of  Austria,  her  army  and  government  driven  out.  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey  were  holding  well  in  Macedonia,  Mesopotamia  and 
Palestine;  the  submarines  were  sweeping  the  seas;  France  had 
been  checked  and  held  steadily  after  the  first  repulse  of  Ger- 
many at  the  Marne  and  varying  successes  on  both  sides  in  the 
different  positions  between  the  Moselle  and  the  Somme ;  Eng- 
land, in  the  northern  war  sector,  had  been  repulsed  and  driven 
west  after  her  two  successful  advances  towards  Bapaume ;  Bel- 
gium was  completely  in  the  power  of  Germany  except  for  a 
small  area  in  the  neighborhood  of  Nieuport.  Yet,  there  was 
neither  a  real  victory  for  Germany  nor  a  real  defeat  for  the 
enemy;  the  latter  was  hard-pressed  but  stubborn  and  defiant;  in 
military  achievement  the  central  allies  were  easily  in  the  lead 
but  in  power  of  further  and  long-continued  resistance  the  En- 
tente allies  held  the  advantage.  Meantime  the  strain  upon 
Germany  had  been  terrific ;  the  losses  in  casualties  were  colossal ; 
the  cost  of  the  war  had  mounted  into  many  billions  of  mai'ks; 
under  the  relentless  pressure  of  the  blockade,  the  extra  hard- 
ship of  two  meagre  harvests  and  but  scant  relief  from  the  stocks 
of  food  captured  in  Russia  and  Roumania  the  shoe  was  begin- 
ning to  pinch.  The  civil  population  was  not  only  living  on 
starvation  rations  but  sufl^ering  the  most  intense  mental  distress. 
Stocks  of  metals,  leather,  rubber,  nitrate  and  other  materials 
needed  for  war  were  running  low.     It  was  the   beginning  of 

164 


being  ground  to  pieces  between  the  upper  and  nether  millstone 
if  a  quick  military  decision  could  not  be  brought  about  or  an 
acceptable  peace  obtained  by  negotiation. 

Germany  and  Austria,  individually,  had  made  several  over- 
tures for  peace,  but  without  success.  President  Wilson,  also, 
tardily  made  a  move  for  peace.  All  this  has  been  related.  The 
effort  of  the  Pope  of  Rome  had  found  no  response,  either.  >  It 
was  quite  plain:  The  allies  did  not  want  peace;  it  was  not  a 
question,  so  much,  of  the  bases  of  negotiation  which  Germany 
had  offered  as  of  the  growing  conviction  that  they — the  En- 
tente allies- — had  a  strong  chance  to  win  in  spite  of  their  pre- 
carious military  position — win  by  endurance !  This  was  the  sit- 
uation from  the  fall  of  1917  to  the  spring  of  1918,  before  the 
opening  of  the  great  German  drive  towards  Amiens  and  Ypres 
from  their  positions  on  the  St.  Quentin-La  Fere  line.  The  allies 
understood  correctly  the  coming  economic  exhaustion  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria  and  the  political  tribulations  which  were 
brewing  for  the  undoing  of  both.  America's  entry  into  the 
war  had  not  yet  begun  to  count  actively,  but  the  most  gigantic 
preparations  were  being  made.  Material  and  men  were  arriv- 
ing; depots  and  camps  had  been  constructed,  training  was  in 
progress;  there  could  now  be  no  further  doubt  that  the  mag- 
nificent promise  made  was  being  carried  out.  Why  make  peace 
when  the  sun  of  victory  was  about  to  rise?  Germany  was  in 
a  trap  from  which,  though  still  strong,  she  had  but  small  chance 
to  escape,  with  this  new,  unlimited,  help  from  America  added  to 
the  allies'  strength  and  all  the  other  influences  for  her  defeat. 


npHESE  increasing  difficulties  began  to  overwhelm  Germany, 
but  not  militarily  at  first,  but  politically  and  morally.  The 
people  began  to  lose  heart;  they  were  tired  of  the  war!  Mal- 
nutrition was  sapping  their  moral  stamina;  hope  for  relief  of 
their  physical  suffering  was  waning;  confidence  in  the  ability  of 
the  government  to  win  the  war  was  tottering;  the  belief  in  the 
"invincibility"  of  the  German  army  and  the  unquestioning  de- 
votion of  the  people  and  soldiers  "for  god  and  king"  was  break- 
ing up.     This  popular  frame  of  mind  found  political  expression 

165 


and  sent  increased  democratic  and  socialistic  representation  to 
the  Reichstag;  under  the  constant  urging  of  these  leaders  it  de- 
manded the  reform  of  the  Prussian  electoral  system  to  a  more 
extended  and  "undirected"  declaration  of  the  popular  will 
through,  the  introduction  of  the  secret  ballot  and  the  rc-appor- 
tionment  of  voting  districts  so  as  to  produce  increased  popular 
representation;  above  all  it  demanded  the  speedy  conclusion  of 
the  war.  Thus  the  time  had  arrived  when  the  combination  of 
discontent  and  anxiety  in  the  country,  to;?othcr  with  moral  de- 
pression due  to  hunger,  offered  a  great  opportunity  to  the  pro- 
gressive parties  to  pluck  a  political  victory  from  the  tree  of 
perplexities  with  which  the  Imperial  government  was  beset.  It 
appeared  to  them  clearly  necessary  that  an  acknowledgement  of 
the  war  situation  be  made,  that  the  same  be  frankly  and  reso- 
lutely met  by  a  policy  working  for  peace,  that  pressure — of  an 
extreme  kind,  if  necessary — be  brought  upon  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment to  follow  this  line  of  action. 

In  July,  1917,  the  famous  Reichstag  peace  resolution  of  "no 
indemnities  and  no  annexations,"  as  a  basis  of  peace  offers,  had 
been  adopted.  Insistent  demand  was  now  made  that  effect  be 
given  to  this  resolution  by  more  liberal  peace  terms  to  the  allies; 
the  immediate  enactment  of  the  Prussian  electoral-reform  bill 
was  demanded  as  an  implied  condition  of  further  war  credits 
being  voted  by  the  Reichstag.  The  government,  however,  pur- 
sued a  policy  of  indecision,  of  hesitation  between  one  of  peace 
and  one  of  determined  war  resistance,  alternately  allowing  itself 
to  be  swayed  by  each  of  these  opposing  political  currents.  The 
conservative  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  the  government,  the  mili- 
tary and  navy  were  unfalteringly  in  favor  of  unbending  re- 
sistance unless  peace  terms  in  proportion  to  Germany's  posi- 
tion in  the  field,  and  in  agreement  with  her  conception  of  the 
war,  could  be  obtained;  yet  they  lacked  unity  of  view  and  effort 
and,  above  all,  unity  of  determination  against  the  onslaught  of 
the  social-democratic  peace  parties.  Thus  the  necessity  to  act 
was  more  and  more  put  before  the  latter,  both  in  their  own 
interest  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  entire  German  nation.  (See 
the  explanatory  notes — "The  Chancellor  Crisis  and  New  Peace 
Moves.") 

166 


This  progress  of  sentiment  in  Germany  for  peace  and  for  a 
change  to  a  democratic  form  of  government  was  powerfully- 
stimulated  by  the  Wilsonian  propaganda,  the  seductive  Ameri- 
can war  calls  of  "liberty  and  justice  to  all  the  world"  which 
the  western  breezes  wafted  across  the  ocean.  The  simple- 
minded  German  people,  in  their  state  of  suffering  and  deep  dis- 
appointment over  the  war  situation,  received  these  alluring  sen- 
timents with  open  hearts,  as  a  word  of  hope  and  help.  The 
many  declarations  of  President  Wilson  had  found  entrance  into 
Germany  in  various  ways  and  had  been  eagerly  read  in  wide 
circles;  they  came  to  their  distracted  ears  like  a  new  gospel: 
"Peace  without  victory,  no  peace  with  any  autocratic  Hohen- 
zollern  ruler!  No  war  upon  the  German  people!  only  upon 
their  arbitrary  government;  peace  with  a  duly  authorized 
government  representing  the  German  people!"  In  these  com- 
manding words,  added  to  those  others  of  "liberty,  democracy 
and  justice  for  all"  there  was  contained  the  promise  of  a  speedy, 
an  honorable,  a  fair  peace,  an  end  to  their  misery,  the  promise 
of  the  political  reorganization  of  the  fatherland  to  a  new  future! 
They  took  it  all  in  real  earnest — people  and  leaders  alike;  they 
little  dreamt  how  cruelly,  how  shamefully  they  were  to  be  de- 
ceived! But  the  armistice  terms  opened  their  eyes  to  tjjie  awful 
reality. 

Towards  the  fall  of  1917  the  Imperial  government,  the  con- 
servatives and  the  military  party  were  beginning  to  be  overawed 
and  harassed  by  these  developments — the  spectre  of  a  revo- 
lution rose  before  their  eyes.  The  various  peace  overtures  to 
the  Entente  had  brought  no  results;  it  was  useless  to  go  further 
upon  that  road  in  spite  of  the  pressure,  the  threats  of  the 
political  opposition  and  the  popular  clamor.  It  had  become 
demonstrated  beyond  a  question  that  the  allies  were  resolved  to 
continue  the  conflict — and  the  government  now  turned  with  re- 
newed determination  to  military  resistance.  A  victory  in  the 
field — or  a  defeat — was  the  only  way  to  end  the  war  and, 
equally,  the  only  means  of  regaining  public  confidence  at  home. 
In  pursuance  of  this  new  determination  for  aggression,  the 
Germans  and  Austrians  undertook  early  in  November,  1917, 
the  great  advance  movement  against  the  Italians  who  had,  so 
far,   been   victorious   against   Austria,   had   advanced   into   the 

167 


Trentino,  captured  Goritzia,  in  the  east,  and  pushed  forward  to 
within  fifteen  miles  of  Trieste.  The  campaign  of  the  com- 
bined Austro-German  armies  against  the  Italians  was  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  operations  of  the  great  war.  The  enemy  was 
rapidly  thrown  back  across  the  three  main  rivers  in  the  province 
of  Venice — the  Tagliamento,  Livenza  and  Piave — and  dis- 
lodged from  his  Trentino  Alpine  heights,  all  within  the  time 
of  about  one  month.  Then,  however,  came  a  draw  and  stand- 
still— the  first  of  the  military  puzzles.  The  Teutonic  allies  had 
the  Italian  plains  before  them;  the  cities  of  Vicenza,  Verona, 
Padua,  Venice  were  seemingly  at  their  mercy;  the  Italians  were 
utterly  routed  and  demoralized  and  had  suffered  heavy  losses 
in  killed,  in  prisoners  and  artillery  captured  by  the  enemy. 
Why  was  this  victory  not  pressed  home?  From  December. 
1917,  to  June,  1918,  there  was,  unexplained,  next  to  total  in- 
activity on  this  battle  front.  This  great  "drive"  had  cost  the 
Teuton  Allies  heavily,  no  doubt;  the  winter  season  in  the  Tyi'o- 
lean  Alps  was  unfavorable  for  active  operations.  Yet,  it  was 
plain  that  the  victory  was  not  exploited;  even  a  small  addi- 
tional army,  operating  from  the  south,  would  have  dislodged 
the  Italians  in  the  passes  and  compelled  them  to  seek  a  new 
stand  in  the  Lombardian  plains. 

Again,  in  the  spring  of  1918,  Germany  prepared  to  launch 
her  great  offensive — from  about  the  middle  of  March  to  the 
end  of  April — against  the  French  and  English  in  the  advance 
from  the  St.  Quentin-La  Fere  line.  In  a  stupendous  campaign, 
in  three  separate  onslaughts,  her  armies  swept  everything  be- 
fore them,  from  Ypres  to  Montdidier,  on  a  front  of  a  hundred- 
and-fifty  miles,  and  had  arrived  to  within  nine  miles  of  the 
city  of  Amiens.  The  defense  and  retreat  of  the  French  and 
British  had  been  skilful  and  tenacious,  yet  they  were  steadily 
driven  back  with  heavy  losses  in  men  and  cannon.  The  cost  to 
the  Germans  had  been  even  heavier;  still  it  was  a  great  victory 
for  them  and  a  wonderful  military  feat  that  stirred  up  afresh, 
for  the  moment,  the  moral  courage  of  the  nation  and  faith  in 
the  final  outcome.  The  enemy  was  not  only  driven  back  but 
badly  demoralized  and  thrown  into  consternation  lest  their 
military  calculations  should,  after  all,  be  defeated.  Then,  how- 
ever, instead  of  a  decisive  blow  and  victory  at  one  of  the  main 

168 


fronts  by  the  German  armies — there  came  another  draw  and 
stillstand — the  second  of  the  military  puzzles.  With  the  full 
advantage  in  their  hands,  and  ample  reinforcements  available, 
within  sight  of  the  spires  of  Amiens  cathedral  and  scarcely 
more  than  twenty-five  miles  away  from  Dunkirk  in  the  North — 
why  was  this  victory  not  pressed  home,  at  least  at  one  or  two 
of  the  most  important  points?  Instead,  there  was  practical  in- 
activity for  many  weeks.  In  this  case,  also,  the  exhaustion  of 
the  Germans,  their  losses  and  other  difficulties  do  not  seem  to 
fully  explain  their  failure. 

Again — at  the  end  of  May — the  Germans  began  an  offensive 
of  the  most  determined  character  betwe'en  Rheims  and  Soissons. 
They  stormed  the  Chemin-des  Dames  successfully  and  pushed 
across  the  Aisne  and  drove  the  French  out  of  the  Northern  part 
of  Chateau-Thierry.  This  was  followed  by  a  movement  be- 
tween Noyon  and  Montdidier,  extending  as  far  south  as  Com- 
piegne,  by  June  15th.  The  initial  success  had  been  rapid  and 
decisive.  Then  came  another  halt  and  stillstand  of  a  full  month 
— the  third  of  the  military  puzzles.  In  these  later  actions  the 
German  forces  encountered  stiff  resistance  by  the  French  at 
Noyon  and  by  the  Americans  at  Belleau  Wood,  June  12th.  The 
American  effective  help  in  Fi-ance  had  now  reached  some 
600,000  men,  and  they  showed  a  fair  degree  of  training,  and 
unlimited  courage.  They  had  come  in  the  very  nick  of  time  to 
rescue  the  French  and  British  from  their  desperate  situation. 
The  German  armies  suffered  proportionately  greater  casualites 
than  those  of  the  enemy  in  these  campaigns;  yet,  there  was  no 
actual  defeat  of  the  Germans  at  any  point,  no  rout  or  surrender. 
The  entire  series  of  negative  campaigns,  since  the  fall  of 
1917,  cannot  be  explained  on  military  grounds  alone.  What 
was  going  on? 

A  fourth  great  offensive  was  launched  by  the  German  com- 
mand on  July  15th,  a  forward  movement  southeast  and  south- 
west of  Rheims  in  the  Marne  and  St.  Mihiel  salients.  They 
crossed  the  river  with  masses  of  artillery  at  several  points  and. 
turned  westward — to  Paris  perhaps.  But  now  a  new  kind  of 
stillstand  and  hesitation  occurred — they  met  a  superior  enemy 
and  were  checked!  The  French  and  Americans  had  been  or- 
ganizing for  weeks  for  determined  resistance — and  succeeded. 

169 


It  turned  out  to  be  the  beginning:  of  the  German  Armageddon! 
Indeed,  the  most  important  effect  of  the  German  series  of  at- 
tacks had  been  to  rouse  the  Entente  powers  to  the  utmost  ex- 
ertions, backed  by  Amei-ica's  promise  and  new  British  contin- 
gents and  stimulated  by  the  new  unified  command  under  General 
Foch.  The  check  was  the  more  remarkable  as  subsequent  dis- 
coveries revealed  that  this  campaign  had  been  equipped  with 
very  large  supplies  for  artillery  and  machine  guns,  distributed 
in  reserve  depots  along  the  line  and  indicating  that  large  bodies 
of  troops  were  to  follow  the  advance  army.  Why  was  this 
strong  attack  not  properly  supported,  as  planned,  and  allowed, 
instead,  to  be  checked,  driven  back  across  the  Marne,  the  Aisne, 
the  Vesle,  the  Chemin-des-Dames  and  all  the  way  to  the  Hinden- 
burg  line?     What  had  happened  to  the  Gennan  army? 

For  the  full  answer  to  these  military  puzzles  we  must  turn 
to  Berlin.  The  political  battle  raging  there  had  assumed  greater 
intensity  and  importance  even  than  the  military  moves  in 
France.  It  was  the  battle  between  the  confident  and  aggres- 
sive social-democratic  forces  and  the  disconcerted  and  vacil- 
lating forces  of  the  government.  The  elements  of  this  struggle 
have  been  outlined  above.  The  demand  was  for  immediate 
peace,  for  stopping  the  war  at  almost  any  price.  The  call 
was  loud  for  no  more  bloodshed ;  enough  men  had  been  sacri- 
ficed in  battle;  enough  had  died  from  starvation;  enough  public 
and  private  wealth  had  been  wasted;  the  cup  of  the  German 
people  was  full!  There  was  no  permanent  "responsive  ela- 
tion" over  the  brilliant  deeds  of  the  ai'mies  in  these  campaigns, 
from  the  fall  of  1917  to  July  1918.  The  struggle  in  France 
was  looked  upon  as  a  useless  sacrifice  of  lives  and  treasure;  the 
war  was  believed  to  be  lost  beyond  retrieve;  the  people  seemed 
to  realize  better  than  the  government  and  military  leaders  that 
the  combination  of  forces  against  them  was  insurmountable! 
To  these  general  motives  of  the  ascending  popular  parties  for 
ending  the  war  by  a  peace  "without  indemnities  and  annexa- 
tions"— even  by  one  of  humiliation — must  be  added  their  sel- 
fish political  motives,  the  political  opportunity  it  brought  to 
them:  The  charging  of  the  loss  of  the  war  upon  the  Kaiser  and 
his  government,  and  their  consequent  disgrace  and  overthrow; 
they  did  not  want  them  to  win  a  victory  in  the  field  because  that 

170 


would  have  rehabilitated  them  with  the  people.  They  had  suf- 
ficiently demonstrated  their  incapacity  to  conduct  the  war  to 
success  in  the  diplomatic  line,  and  almost  equally  so  in  the  field 
and  on  the  sea.  The  German  people  had  brought  the  sacrifice 
of  sacrifices  in  vain;  the  time  had  arrived  for  a  nev^r  government 
to  take  charge — a  government  of  the  people ! 

For,  had  it  been  merely  for  obtaining  an  occasional  enact- 
ment, by  grace  and  concession,  of  socialistic  measures  for  the 
benefit  of  the  toiling  masses  that  they  had  striven  and  battled 
these  many  years  in  the  political  arena?  By  no  means!  The 
object  had  been  a  wider  and  greater  one.  They  were  convinced 
not  only  of  the  obsoleteness  of  form  and  idea  of  an  autocratic 
monarchy  but  of  the  natural  right  of  the  German  people  to 
freer  institutions;  they  were  convinced  of  their  fitness  for  a 
republican  form  of  government,  for  a  socialistic  republic  even. 
And  here  was  the  opportunity  spread  before  them- — strangely 
enough — by  the  lamentable  disaster  of  the  war — an  opportunity 
which  they  were  justified  to  seize  (from  their  political  point 
of  view)  to  achieve  in  six  months  of  a  parliamentary  revolu- 
tion what,  under  the  empire,  might  not  have  been  achieved  in 
sixty  years!  Hence,  even  a  mediocre  military  victory  under 
the  auspices  of  the  Imperial  government  and  its  supporters  was 
to  be  deprecated  because  of  its  political  effect  and  the  possi- 
bility of  its  leading  to  a  passably  favorable  peace  under  their 
direction  and  prestige.  Therefore,  from  the  time  that  these  bold 
views  and  conclusions  had  penetrated  to  the  clear  consciousness 
of  a  political  program — from  the  summer  of  1917 — the  Reichs- 
tag majority  rose  in  loud  and  angry  protest  at  every  new 
military  move,  at  every  partial  success  in  the  field,  at  the  U-boat 
warfare,  and  cried:  "Halt!,  halt!,  peace!,  peace!  No  more 
bloodshed;  we  cannot  win!,  and  held  up  the  military  arm  with 
the  threatening  spectre  of  revolution  and  the  demand  for  the 
Kaiser's  abdication.  This  was  the  conflict  of  the  Kaiser,  the 
government  and  the  military  party  with  the  Reichstag  majoi'ity 
and  the  people  at  large  who  stood  behind  it.  It  accounts  for 
the  many  changes  of  policy,  of  Chancellors  and  Foreign  secre- 
taries, and  of  the  several  instances  of  puzzling  hesitation  in 
the  field,  as  above  recounted,  at  the  very  moment  of  successes 
which  should  have  led  to  victory  if  pushed  home  with  unity  and 

171 


confidence!  That  this  was  not  the  attitude  of  the  influential 
and  wealthy  social  and  business  classes  of  Germany,  of  the 
aristocracy,  the  military  and  government  cii'cles  need  hardly 
be  stated,  but  it  was  the  majority  attitude  of  the  great  masses 
of  the  people  who  were  in  political  ascendency  by  and  through 
their  representatives  in  the  Reichstag  and  ultimately  carried 
the  day. 

The  demoralizing  effect  upon  the  German  troops  in  the  field 
of  this  policy  of  alternate  advance  and  hesitation,  of  this  callous 
wasting  of  their  lives  and  strength,  may  be  easily  imagined! 
Was  the  soldier  no  more  than  a  block  of  wood  to  be  thrust  into 
the  fire,  pulled  out  of  it  and  thrust  back  by  the  necessities  or 
the  caprice  of  political  machinations?  The  influence  of  this 
feeling  upon  the  men  must  have  been  more  disastrous  than  a 
defeat  by  the  enemy!  It  ruined  their  morale,  sapped  their 
courage,  weakened  their  discipline,  took  the  heart  out  of  their 
fighting,  after  four  years  of  battling  and  ti'ench  life.  The 
troops  which  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  Russian  front  and 
sent  west  and  the  new  recruits  from  Germany  brought  no  in- 
crease of  moral  fibre  to  the  veterans  of  the  western  front.  These 
soldiers  were  in  touch  with  the  political  drama  developing  at 
home  and  knew  of  the  disruption  going  on  there;  they  felt  that 
their  efforts  and  sacrifices  were  useless,  that  any  day  might 
bring  a  political  stoi-m  which  would  lead  to  an  ignominious 
peace.  They,  too,  had  heard  the  Wilson  gospel,  and  had  been 
similarly  affected  like  the  people  at  home.  No  particular  propa- 
ganda for  democracy  was  necessary  among  them,  and  they  were 
60  per  cent  socialists  before  they  had  been  called  to  the  war. 
All  this  made  them,  from  the  summer  of  1918  on,  a  different 
body  of  troops  for  a  determined  enemy  to  meet.  At  this  favor- 
able conjunction  the  Americans  entered  the  conflict! 


'T^HE  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war,  April  6th,  1917, 
had  been  received  by  Germany  with  sullen  silence  and  out- 
ward indifference.  She  did  not  expect  much  practical  effect  to 
come  from  this  decision.  One  reason  for  this  opinion  was  the  lack 
of  military  preparedness  by  America,  and  the  other  the  great 
distance  across  the  sea.     That  an  army  of  a  million  or  more  of 


172 


ready  fighting  men  could  be  raised,  trained,  equipped  and  trans- 
ported across  the  ocean,  with  cannon,  aeroplanes,  and  all  other 
necessities  in  time  to  become  a  real  factor  in  the  conflict  was 
not  thought  poffeible.  Yet  it  was  seen  that  the  unbounded  re- 
sources of  America,  which  now  would  be  put  at  the  allies'  call 
without  reserve,  would  play  an  important  part  in  the  final  re- 
sult. It  was  a  great  surprise  to  the  German  commanders,  there- 
fore, when  they  finally  realized  that  a  magnificent  fighting  force, 
splendidly  equipped  and  supplied,  was  coming  in  large  numbers 
from  America  to  help  the  French  and  British.  And  these  husky 
Yankee  boys — the  pick  of  the  prime  manhood  of  a  physically 
strong  nation  of  a  hundred  million  people — were,  many  of 
them,  filled  with  the  ideal  and  ambition  that  they  were  to  fight 
for  freedom,  justice  and  democracy,  that  they  were  to  beat  the 
Germans  and  to  end  the  war.  When  they  struck  the  discour- 
aged German  troops  in  Belleau  Wood,  at  Chateau  Thierry  and 
in  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  there  was  no  giving  way  on  their  parti 
With  all-defying  recklessness  and  unshakable  determination — 
in  true  football  style — they  threw  themselves  into  the  fight  and 
by  the  impetus  of  their  enthusiasm  turned  the  tide  to  victory! 
Their  glorious  example  inspired  the  French  and  British  with 
new  courage  and  resolution  to  win.  They  too,  like  the  Ger- 
mans, had  begun  to  feel  the  reducing  effect  of  four  years  of 
terrible  warfare.  With  the  beginning  made  by  the  Americans 
and  French  in  the  Marne  Salient,  which  was  soon  followed  by  a 
French  and  American  offensive  in  the  Amiens  sector  and  by 
British  movements  north  of  Arras,  Marshal  Foch,  the  new 
Generalissimo  of  the  allies,  attacking  and  pushing  at  different 
positions  of  the  battle  lines — now  here,  now  there — incessantly 
driving  and  tearing,  gave  the  surprised  and  dejected  enemy  no 
chance  to  draw  his  breath,  to  pull  himself  together,  to  concen- 
trate for  a  determined  stand.  The  fighting,  thenceforth,  be- 
came one  continuous  push-back  and  retreat,  one  long-drawn 
rear-guard  action,  from  Lorraine  to  the  Belgian  coast,  with 
heavy  losses  to  the  German  armies  in  men  and  guns.  Line 
after  line,  army  after  army  fell  and  retired  before  the  unceas- 
ing hammering  of  the  allied  troops!  The  vaunted  Hindenburg 
and  Wotan  lines  of  trench  fortifications  melted  away  before 
the  withering  fire  of  the  British  artillery,  and  the  fleeing  Ger- 

173 


mans  crossed  the  border  at  various  points  to  prevent  captui-e. 
Political  events  had,  meantime,  moved  apace  and  the  armistice 
commission  was  in  session  during  the  last  actions  of  the  military 
struggle.  All  was  ended  with  the  signing  of  tne  armistice  on 
November  11th,  1918. 

While  these  disasters  to  the  German  arms  were  taking  place 
in  France  and  Belgium,  England  was  defeating  Turkey  in  Pale- 
stine, Syria  and  Mesopotamia,  and  the  French  and  Serbians 
were  driving  the  Bulgarians  in  front  of  Salonica  to  .-surrender, 
after  which  they  quickly  reconquered  Serbia.  In  the  middle 
of  June,  1918,  the  Austi-ian  forces  began  to  move  dov/n  from 
their  Tyrolean  mountain  fastness  and  to  drive  the  Italians 
westward  across  the  Piave  river.  The  latter,  however,  rallied 
quickly  and  reversed  the  action,  pushing  the  Austrians  back 
eastward  and  across  the  several  rivers,  exactly  as  they  had  come 
in  the  preceding  November,  and  soon  to  final  defeat.  All  the 
allies  of  Germany  were  completely  exhausted,  and  Germany 
herself  was  unable  to  render  them  any  further  assistance. 
Armistice  agreements,  involving  complete  submission,  were  con- 
cluded with  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  in  the  first  days  of 
November.  These  depressing  events  greatly  hastened  the  Ger- 
man collapse  in  France  and  ended  the  war  with  the  defeat  of 
the  Central  powers  on  all  fronts. 

Whether  the  Entente  powers  could  have  won  the  war  without 
the  dash  and  inspiration  of  the  Americans  to  fire  them  to  new 
life  is  a  question  difficult  to  answer  positively;  they  would 
probably  have  succeeded  to  do  so  in  a  somewhat  longer  space 
of  time  provided  that  America's  material  aid  had  continued. 
The  greatest  help,  therefore,  of  America  to  the  Allies  was  the 
material  help  with  money,  food  and  war  supplies.  Had  this 
fallen  out  at  any  time,  France  and  England  and  Italy  must  have 
succumbed  unquestionably!  With  the  full  recognition  of 
this  fact,  and  adding  thereto  the  brilliant  direct  military 
help  and  inspiration  given  by  us,  it  must  be  conceded  that 
to  America  must  be  accorded  the  ultimate  credit  of  having  won 
the  war!  What  a  stain  it  is  for  all  time  to  come  upon  England's 
proud  escutcheon  to  be  compelled  to  admit  that  she  could  not 
beat  her  hated  rival  militarily,  not  even  with  the  aid  of  France, 
Russia,  Belgium,  Italy,  Serbia,  Greece,  Roumania,  and  of  her 

174 


colonial  troops  from  Canada,  Australia,  Africa  and  India!  Of 
Japan  and  China  and  the  South  American  republics  we  will 
not  speak  at  all  in  this  sense.  She  was  compelled  to  resort  to 
the  ignominious:  blockade  of  the  German  coast,  and  even  with 
that  far-reaching  aid  was  saved  from  utter  defeat  only  by 
America's  timely  and  powerful  arm!  This  brings  US  to  the 
startling  conclusion  that  it  is  the  United  States  of  America  who, 
first,  by  her  open  unneutrality  and,  second,  by  her  active  en- 
trance into  the  war  has  deprived  Germany  of  the  victory  which 
belonged  to  her  both  by  force  of  might  and  force  of  right.  No 
matter  what  our  explanations  and  excuses  may  be,  this  verdict 
is  an  unalterable  historical  fact  which  cannot  be  without  de- 
plorable consequences  unless  America  will  do  the  act  of  admis- 
sion and  redress  called  for  in  this  book. 


T  T  AD  Germany  suffered  a  real,  a  complete  military  defeat? 
■*■  -*•  This  can  scarcely  be  said ;  there  was  no  surrender,  no  rout 
at  any  point.  Considered  only  militarily,  the  end  was  more  a 
sullen  retreat  under  the  conviction  that  they  could  not  cope 
offensively  with  the  overwhelming  forces  of  their  enemies  along 
the  entire  battle  front.  Had  this  enemy  been  concentrated  at 
one  or  two  points,  the  Germans,  also  concentrated,  might  have 
risked  a  great  battle,  but  with  a  long  drawn-out  line  it  was 
impossible  for  them  to  resist  effectively  against  his  superior 
forces.  Their  problem  was  to  prevent  an  encircling  movement 
and  surrender,  at  any  point,  in  great  numbers  and — for  politi- 
cal reasons — to  save  as  much  as  possible  of  the  army,  while,  in 
the  meantime,  armistice  negotiations  were  being  carried  on  with 
the  object  of  definite  peace.  The  German  generals  accom- 
plished this  defensive  slow  retreat  movement  with  admirable 
skill.  The  military  movement  to  save  the  army,  the  political 
movement  for  a  revolution  and  republican  form  of  government 
and  the  movement  for  securing  peace  all  went  hand  in  hand. 
The  march  of  political  events  in  Germany  in  the  last  few 
weeks  of  the  war  was  startling  and  gigantic.  Chancellor  Hert- 
ling  had  resigned  and  Prince  Max,  of  Baden,  had  taken  his 
place,  late  in  October,  1918.  New  peace  overtures  with  Wash- 
ington now  followed,  and  President  Wilson's  "fourteen-points 

175 


program"  was  accepted  by  Germany  as  the  basis  for  negotia- 
tions. While  pourparlers  were  being  cai'ried  on  by  America 
with  the  Entente  Allies  to  obtain  their  agreement  to  the  peace 
request  by  Germany,  the  revolutionary  committee  of  the  social- 
demociatic  forces — now  resolved  to  seize  power — imposed  upon 
Prince  Max  not  only  the  demand  for  the  immediate  conclusion 
of  an  ai'mistice — on  almost  any  terms — but  also  for  the  addica- 
tion  of  the  Kaiser.  To  exert  additional  pressure  upon  him  on 
the  armistice  count,  a  report  was  secured  from  General  Head- 
quarters declaring  that  the  position  of  the  armies  was  most 
precarious  and  that  an  immediate  armistice  must  be  concluded 
to  prevent  a  surrender  disaster.  This  report,  frequently  de- 
mented at  the  time,  has  since  been  affirmed  by  General  Luden- 
dorff;  it  was  made  for  reasons  which  are  explained  in  Article, 
XVI.  As  to  the  Kaiser's  abdication,  the  imminence  of  a  bloody 
revolution  was  held  before  the  Prince-Chancellor  in  case  of 
refusal. 

But  the  sinister  forces  of  open  revolt,  nurtured  for  so  many 
months,  no  longer  could  be  restrained,  no  matter  how  the 
Kaiser  would  act.  The  revolution  actually  broke  out  in  Berlin 
on  November  ninth,  accompanied  by  acts  of  great  violence  and 
intensely  hostile  demonstrations  against  the  Kaiser  and  his 
government.  Other  leading  cities  followed  suit.  The  insur- 
rection of  the  naval  forces  at  the  port  of  Kiel  had  preceded 
the  outbreaks  in  the  cities,  and  similar  demonstrations  occurred 
at  the  ports  of  Hamburg,  Bremen,  Stettin  and  others.  The 
gi'anting  of  an  armistice  to  Germany  had,  meantime,  been 
agreed  to  by  the  powers;  commissioners  were  appointed  and 
deliberations  held,  under  the  presidency  of  Marshall  Foch.  An 
agreement  on  the  conditions  was  reached  in  about  a  week's 
negotiations  and  signed  by  the  German  representatives  in  spite 
of  their  strong  protest  against  the  unprecedented  harshness  of 
the  terms  and  the  total  disregard  of  the  Wilson'an  fourteen 
points  which  ware  to  be  the  basis  of  the  peace.  The  Germans 
were  helpless;  under  the  political  and  military  situation  which 
prevailed,  acceptance  was  imperative;  they  would  have  signed 
almost  any  terms!  This  armistice  was  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant compacts  ever  concluded  in  history,  as  it  ended,  provision- 
ally at  least,  the  greatest  war  of  history.      It  was  signed  on  the 

176 


morning  of  November  eleventh,  1918.  By  that  day  Germany 
was  in  the  full  grip  of  the  revolution ;  bloodshed,  destruction 
and  teiTor  were  reigning  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

Under  the  joint  pressure  of  these  tragic  events  the  Kaiser 
had  abdicated  his  throne,  November  ninth,  and  seeing  the  fu- 
tility of  returning  to  Germany,  (he  was  at  military  headquarters 
at  Spa  at  the  time)  and  the  danger  of  his  capture  by  the  enemy, 
fled  to  Holland.  Army  and  navy  chiefs  and  government  heads 
likewise  scattered  in  all  directions;  the  military  caste,  the 
nobility  and  the  monarchical  and  conservative  business  classes 
sank  into  obscurity  and  inactive  resignation  to  the  cataclysm 
which  had  broken  over  Germany.  Political  and  social  chaos 
settled  upon  the  country.  What  an  incomprehensible  transfor- 
mation in  four  short  years!  From  the  heights  of  renown,  power 
and  adulation  fallen  to  the  depths  of  misery  and  contempt! 
Poor  old  Germany!  bled  to  death  on  the  battlefield,  starved  to 
death  at  home  and  now  groaning  in  the  throes  of  a  revolution! 
Her  people  were  called  to  the  apotheosis  of  suffering  and  sacri- 
fice for  their  country! 

This  unparalleled  national  disaster  had  been  brought  about, 
as  we  have  shown,  by  three  agencies:  The  weakened  condition 
and  moral  depression  of  the  troops  in  the  field;  the  economic 
and  moral  pressure  of  the  food  blockade;  the  political  pressure 
of  the  revolutionary  parties  who  saw  their  opportunity  for 
breaking  the  imperial  government  in  the  hour  of  defeat  and 
establishing  a  republic  amidst  the  existing  resentment  and  con- 
sternation. And  it  is  quite  certain  that,  but  for  the  latter 
cause,  Germany  need  not  have  fallen!  This  conclusion  bears  a 
terrible  complexion,  carries  a  terrible  accusation,  but  it  is  irre- 
sistible. The  internal  sti-ife  had  broken  up  the  moral  coherence 
of  the  empire  and  the  determination  to  resist  to  the  last;  the 
Wilsonian  call  to  political  freedom  had  borne  terrible  fruit  in 
Germany  at  a  time  when  the  nation  needed  internal  unity  to 
devolop  its  strength  in  adversity  !  .  .  But  for  this  political  and 
moral  disintegration  there  would  have  been  a  united  parlia- 
mentary and  military  direction ;  the  magnificent  army  and  navy 
would  have  been  confident  and  irresistible;  successes  would 
have  come  and  been  driven  home.  There  were  still  nearly  four 
million  soldiers  under  arms  at  the  breakup,  and  abundant  equip- 

177 


merit;  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  could  have  been  effectively 
supported  and  their  collapse  prevented.  And,  if,  under  all 
the  conditions,  a  sweeping  victory  by  Germany  was  scarcely 
possible,  the  final  outcome  of  the  war  might  have  been  such 
as  to  leave  her  at  least  partly  victor  and  greater  and  stronger 
than   before. 

Under  such  an  outcome  the  empire  would  have  been  polit- 
ically regenerated  and  presei^ved.  What  a  vision  of  magnifi- 
cence this  calls  up!  A  great,  powerful  central-European  state 
— firm,  enlightened  and  liberal — to  impress  its  authority,  prin- 
ciples of  order,  system,  honesty,  efficiency  and  general  spirit 
of  progress,  of  wise  and  safe  social-justice  legislation  upon  all 
the  neighboring  continental  nations  east  of  the  Rhine  to  an 
orderly  and  rational  development!  Instead  we  have  chaos  and 
disintegration  in  all  these  countries.  Two  splendid  empires 
are  broken  up,  ruined  politically  and  economically,  liberated 
to  violence  and  anarchy  by  suffering,  exasperation  and  remorse. 
The  newly  formed  states  are  floundering  helplessly  in  a  fierce 
wrangle  of  factions,  their  political  character  a  blank,  their 
economic  organization  a  zero,  their  whole  future  as  independent 
"nations"  as  uncertain  as  a  lottery!  It  is  a  grand  achieve- 
ment for  the  allies,  with  their  professions  of  lofty  purposes! 
And  yet,  it  would  not  be  just  to  ascribe  all  of  this  debacle 
to  the  political  factors  of  the  war  and  the  exorbitant  and  im- 
practical peace  terms.  A  considerable  measure  of  it  attaches 
to  the  growth  of  extreme  socialistic  and  disintegrating  ethical 
ideas  which,  while  resting  upon  sound  premises,  are,  as  yet, 
deficient  in  clarity  of  thought  and  firmness  of  system.  While 
the  old  codes  and  moral  guides  are  disregarded  because  uncon- 
vincing, no  new  satisfactory  ones  have  been  perfected  for 
practical  application.  This  important  topic,  so  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  war,  will  be  discussed  in  the  succeeding  articles. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  Germany's  spectacular  political 
and  military  collapse,  it  may  be  well  to  focus  once  more  the 
inteiTelation  of  the  events  of  the  last  months  of  the  war — so 
incomprehensible  at  the  time  and  so  unclear  to  many  even 
today.  We  have  explained  the  meaning  of  the  unfruitful  cam- 
paigns of  the  fall  of  1917  and  the  spring  and  summer  of  1918. 
At  this  time,  seeing  the  coming  of  the  political  storm,  it  was, 
no  doubt,  the  purpose  of  the  Kaiser  and  his  advisers  to  check- 

178 


mate  the  rising  revolution  by  a  military  victory.  They  failed 
in  this;  but  not  so  much  because  the  armies  failed  but  because 
they,  the  leaders,  lacked  the  resolution  to  bring  their  military 
work  to  a  successful  finish  and  to  challenge  therewith  the  polit- 
ical forces,  which  were  opposed  to  these  campaigns  and  a  pos- 
sible success  in  the  field,  to  an  issue.  For,  it  must  be  recognized 
that  the  object  of  the  army  leaders  and  the  government  party 
was  not  only  to  achieve  a  victory  of  arms  to  save  Germany 
politically  but,  equally,  to  save  the  monarchy!  That,  however, 
was  the  exact  opposite  of  the  object  of  the  revolutionary 
parties  at  Berlin.  After  timidly  relinquishing  their  military 
plan  of  aggressive  action  from  fear  of  the  political  conse- 
quences, the  government  leaders  veered  around  once  more  to 
the  "peace  movement"  method  of  attaining  their  object.  In 
Austria  the  political  and  military  situation  was  exactly  parallel 
to  that  of  Germany.  From  both  governments,  from  late  in 
August  to  middle  of  October,  new  "feelers"  and  suggestions 
for  peace  were  now  issued,  addressed  to  America  and  Belgium. 
Germany  declared  herself  willing  to  accept  the  "fourteen 
points"  of  President  Wilson  as  the  basis  of  the  negotiations 
and  to  meet  the  President's  dictum  against  the  Kaiser  and  any 
government  "not  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  German 
people";  they  indicated  a  liberal  reform  of  the  Imperial  Con- 
stitution. This,  together  with  the  pronounced  social-democratic 
majority  just  then  returned  to  the  Reichstag,  the  ending  of 
the  Hertling  chancellorship  and  appointment  of  the  liberal 
Prince  Max  in  his  stead,  was  hoped  would  be  accepted  by  the 
President  and  the  Entente  as  a  government  not  only  having  the 
support  of  but  being  "of  the  people,"  and  that  an  acceptable 
peace  would  be  concluded  with  it  and  the  monarchy  saved  from 
destruction. 

Part  of  the  plan  of  the  defensive  retreat  on  all  fronts  in 
France  was  to  save  the  army  for  Germany — and  particularly 
for  the  rupport  of  the  monarchy.  It  was  in  pursuance  of  this 
general  object  that  the  strong  representations  were  made  by 
the  High  Army  Command  to  Chancellor  Prince  Max  of  the 
supposedly  "imminent  peril  of  the  armies" — foreshadowing  a 
possible  surrender  to  eclipse  that  of  Sedan — and  pressing  him 
to  bring  about  the  armistice  (in  the  interest  of  the  monarchy) 
as  f.peedily  as  possible.    But  the  governmental  plan  was  doomed. 

179 


Early  in  the  first  week  of  November — when  the  armistice  nego- 
tiations were  already  assured — the  startling  information  came 
to  headquarters  from  Berlin  that  the  moves  for  a  republic  and 
the  deposition  of  the  Kaiser  and  imperial  government  could  no 
longer  be  arrested.  At  the  same  time  sufficient  had  become 
known  from  the  preliminary  negotiations  for  the  armistice  to 
indicate  what  those  terms  would  be  and,  also,  that  the  revo- 
lutionary parties  were  prepared  to  accept  almost  any  condi- 
tions in  order  to  prevent  interference  with  their  planned  polit- 
ical coup.  Upon  this  the  military  and  government  pai'ty  re- 
versed their  policy  once  more  at  the  eleventh  hour,  and  the 
generals  called  upon  Germany  and  the  army  to  make  a  last 
determined  effort  in  the  field  to  -wrest  sufficient  of  a  victory 
from  the  enemy  to  defeat  the  imposing  of  onerous  terms  of 
armistice  and  peace,  to  save  the  monarchy  and  stifle  the  revo- 
lution ! 

But  these  efforts  came  to  naught  by  the  rapid  march  of 
events;  the  floodgates  of  Germany's  destiny  were  wide  open 
and  nothing  could  retard  the  rush  of  the  Niagara  of  destruc- 
tion !  While  the  army  chiefs  were  issuing  their  call  and  making 
preparations  for  a  last  great  stand,  the  armistice  commission 
had  begun  its  sessions.  The  insurrection  at  Kiel  and  other 
ports  was  already  under  way,  and  on  November  9th  the  revo- 
lution actually  broke  out  in  Berlin.  That  ended  all  for  the 
Kaiser  and  his  government.  He  abdicated  on  the  same  day. 
Two  days  later  the  armistice  was  signed.  The  author  holds 
that  no  other  explanation  than  the  above  is  possible  of  the 
strange  and  contradictory  events  of  the  closing  months  of  the 
v/ar.  His  views  have  since  been  fully  confirmed  by  the  publi- 
cations quoted  in  Article  XVI   "After-Peace   Conclusions." 


The  Chancellor  Crisis,  New  Peace  Moves  and  Reichstag 
Resolution  of  July  17,  1917.  These  events  are  of  such  impor- 
tance in  the  German  war  story  and  so  closely  interrelated  that 
a  short  detail  sketch  seems  desii-able  for  the  better  under- 
standing of  the  great  diplomatic  year  of  the  war — 1917.  After 
the  failure  of  the  German  peace  overture  at  the  end  of  1916, 
as  related  in  the  preceding  text,  and  of  President  Wilson's 
procrastinated  move  of  December,  1916,  to  January,  1917 — 
followed  by  the  new  submarine  campaign  of  February  1,  1917 
— there  ensued  a  series  of  new  essays  for  peace,  beginning  in 
April    and    extending    into    August.      In    this    series    of    peace 

180 


essays  must  be  included  the  German  Reichstag  peace  resolution 
of  July  ]  7th  because  it  was,  in  its  essential  character,  a  new 
indirect  peace  bid  by  Germany  through  the  Reichstag  and  its 
inherent  pressure  upon  the  government.  At  the  time  these 
various  peace  overtures  appeared  as  disconnected,  separate  and 
even  "secret  "  moves  and  were  only  obscurely  understood,  but 
today  we  know  that  a  connecting  thread  of  agreement  in  aim 
ran  through  them  all.  The  first  of  this  series  was  the  attempt 
made  by  Austria,  early  in  April,  1917,  to  approach  France 
through  Prince  Sixtus  of  Bourbon  Parma,  brother-in-law  of 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria.  It  was  a  very  guarded 
venture,  knowledge  of  which  was  confined  to  the  emperor's 
most  immediate  circle,  to  President  Poincare  of  France  and 
Premier  Ribot  and  a  confidential  officer  of  the  French  war 
bureau.  It  is  possible  that  Germany  was  in  ignorance  of  this 
move  in  its  inception.  These  negotiations  soon  came  to  a  dead- 
lock.     (See  below.) 

The  second  overture  directly  from  Austria  was  that  con- 
ducted through  Count  Revertera  of  Austria,  and  Count  Armand 
of  France,  an  officer  of  the  second  bureau  of  the  French  war 
office.  The  first  phase  of  this  second  approachment  occurred 
early  in  June,  but  was  soon  discontinued,  probably  through 
pressure  from  Germany.  It  was  resumed  at  the  end  of  July, 
after  the  fall  of  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-HoUweg,  and  this 
time  secured  the  sympathetic  attention  of  France  and  also  the 
approval  of  Prime  Minister  Lloyd  George  of  England.  The 
King  of  Spain  was  favorable  to  the  move  and  offered  to  act  as 
mediator,  if  required.  It 'really  looked,  for  a  time,  as  if  a 
favorable  result  might  be  achieved.  The  sincerity  of  Austria's 
desire  for  peace  was  not  questioned  and  evidence  was  abun- 
dant of  her  growing  internal  political  difficulties,  her  economic 
pinch  and  the  stress  of  her  association  with  Germany.  In  judg- 
ing these  "sepai-ate  peace"  moves  of  Austria  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that,  while  she  was  an  ally  of  Germany  under  the 
Triple  Alliances,  she  was  still  an  independent  political  entity 
with  conditions  and  problems  of  her  own.  On  the  part  of  France 
the  general  uncertainty  of  the  war  and  the  defection  of  Russia 
as  an  active  ally,  through  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  against 
the  Czar's  government  in  March  of  the  same  year,  made  the 
moment  opportune  for  a  separate  peace  with  Austria  to  relieve 
the  general  tension  of  the  war  and  weaken  the  chief  enemy, 
Germany,  at  the  same  time.  Meanwhile,  Germany  had  become 
fully  informed  about  Austria's  move;  and  when  the  final  inter- 
views between  the  intermediaries  took  place  in  Switzerland 
all  these  fine  schemes — which  had  even  contemplated  a  fake 
Austrian  defeat  in  the  field  to  give  countenance  to  her  separate 
peace  efforts  (towards  Germany) — came  to  naught  through 
Austria's  definite  refusal  to  surrender  Trieste  and  a  section  of 
the  Trentino  to  Italy,  as  part  of  the  peace  price,  and  through 

181 


Germany's  positive  assurances  of  being  able  to  achieve  a  mili- 
tary victory  in  a  short  time. 

While  this  demarche  towards  France  was  proceeding,  Aus- 
tria was  also  devising  means  to  influence  Germany.  This  step 
was  in  connection  with  a  highly  confidential  report  made  by 
Count  Czei'nin,  Austrian  Premier,  to  Emperor  Charles,  setting 
forth  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  counti'y  and  the  progress 
of  political  disaffection ;  and  urging  him  to  press  upon  Emperor 
William  of  Germany  the  advisability  of  a  free  surrender  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  as  the  prime  requisite  to  secure  the 
peace  which  was  so  badly  needed  by  both  countries!  It  was 
an  appeal  to  Emperor  William  against  the  policies  of  the  Ger- 
man militarist  and  annexationist  parties,  whose  objects  Count 
Czernin  felt  to  be  the  great  obstacle  to  a  "joint  peace"  and 
even  to  a  sepai'ate  peace  for  Austria.  This  important  I'epre- 
sentation,  made  April  12th  to  14th,  was  intended  solely  for 
the  two  emperors  and  the  German  chancellor;  yet,  this  secret 
report  came  purposely  into  the  possession  of  Mathias  Erzber- 
ger,  piominent  member  of  the  German  Center  or  Clerical 
(Catholic)  party  in  the  Reichstag,  through  a  confidential  inter- 
mediary representing  Emperor  Charles  himself.  Of  this  secret 
"leak"  Count  Czernin  was  not  advised  at  the  time.  The  evident 
intention  was  for  Herr  Erzberger  to  use  this  report  in  Ger- 
many in  the  most  effective  manner  in  the  interest  of  peace, 
guarding  only  the  secret  of  its  high  origin.  In  fulfillment  of 
this  intention  Hei-r  Erzberger  read  the  report  to  the  members 
of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the  Center  party  of 
the  Reichstag,  in  a  secret  session  held  at  Frankfurt  during 
the  Bethmann-Hollweg  Chancellor  crisis,  and  under  injunctions 
of  the  strictest  secrecy.  The  high  and  confidential  character 
of  the  report,  and  its  exact  wording,  were  guarded  for  a  long 
time,  but  the  essence  of  the  communication  soon  became  known 
in  the  higher  political  circles  in  Germany  and  also  in  the 
Entente   countries. 

The  effect  of  this  revelation  of  Austria's  condition  and 
"frame  of  mind"  was  tremendous!  In  Germany  it  achieved  its 
object;  it  powerfully  influenced  the  passage  of  the  "July  peace 
resolution"  of  the  Reichstag.  To  the  Entente,  however,  it  was 
a  stimulant  for  war  and  not  for  peace.  It  was  to  them  a  reve- 
lation of  major  import;  taken  together  with  the  Chancellor 
crisis  and  the  fight  for  the  Prussian  electoral  reforms  bill,  it 
disclosed  to  them  "the  Achilles  heel"  of  the  Central  powers — 
internal  political  dissentions  and  growing  physical  exhaustion — 
at  a  time  when  they,  the  allies,  were  at  a  disadvantage  mili- 
tarily, were  being  closely  pressed  by  the  U-boats  and  were 
fast  drifting  into  a  disposition  to  make  peace.  These  revela- 
tions put  new  courage  into  them — and  this  effect  upon  the 
Entente  was  immediately  demonstrated  by  its  defiant  answer 
to  the  suggestions  of  the  Reichstag  peace  resolution — its  bid 
was  disdainfully  rejected.    It  need  scarcely  be  pointed  out  that 

182 


these  sevei'al  peace  efforts  by  Austria,  more  or  less  secret  and 
"separate,"  were  very  irritating  and  depressing  to  the  German 
government,  especially  the  suggestion  for  the  voluntary  sur- 
render of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  v^^hich  was  indignantly 
rejected. 

Even  while  all  the  above  related  peace  manoeuvres  were 
proceeding,  the  Pope  of  Rome  was  actively  preparing  his  peace 
appeal  to  the  powers,  issued  August  1,  1917,  in  the  name  of 
humanity,  mercy,  religion  and  sound  reason.  Its  arguments 
were  worded  with  force  and  lofty  dignity  of  language  and  con- 
tained practical  proposals  for  opening  negotiations  between  the 
belligerents.  Alas!  it  mostly  fell  on  deaf  ears,  on  minds  filled 
only  with  war  passions!  Germany  and  Austria  were  the  only 
countries  which  made  prompt,  polite  and  sympathetic  reply 
to  the  Pope's  entreaty.  Of  the  Entente  countries.  President 
Wilson  alone  replied — at  the  end  of  a  month  of  waiting — in  a 
violent  tirade  against  Germany  "that  this  usurping  power  must 
give  much  more  definite  declarations  than  were  contained  in  her 
answer  to  the  Papal  note"  before  overtures  of  peace  could  be 
considered.  The  other  Entente  powers  merely  made  a  short 
acknowledgment  of  the  Pope's  note  and  concurrence  in  Mr. 
Wilson's  reply.  The  reaction,  of  hope  and  defiance  which  re- 
sulted from  the  July  Reichstag  resolution,  etc.,  was  already 
at  work!  We  may  safely  add  that  Mr.  Erzberger's  action  in 
Germany,  as  related  above,  was  largely  inspired  by  private 
knowledge  of  the  Pope's  proposed  peace  move  (in  addition  to 
the  Emperor  Charles'  secret  step)  and  the  desire  to  make  it 
successful  and  win  the  glory  of  this  achievement  for  the  Catho- 
lic party  and  church  and  for  the  Pope  personally.  He  probably 
had  no  idea  of  the  "contrary  effect"  upon  the  Entente  which 
followed  upon  the  damaging  disclosures;  he  shared  with  his 
party  and  the  majority  social-democrats  the  fatal  illusion  that 
it  was  the  aggressive  aims  of  the  German  government  and  the 
so-called  military  party  which  w^ere  the  obstacles  to  all  the 
peace  proposals  which  had  emanated  from  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria and  the  Pope  of  Rome,  instead  of  the  determination  of  the 
Allies  to  fight  the  war  to  a  victorious  finish,  to  beat  and  humili- 
ate Germany  and  attain  all  the  sundry  selfish  objects  for  which 
they  had  set  out. 

From  all  this  it  is  apparent  that  the  famous  Reichstag  reso- 
lution of  July  17,  1917,  was  a  fatal  mistake.  It  probably  cost 
Germany  the  war!  It  was  preceded  by,  and  was  partly  the 
cause  of  the  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  Chancellor  crisis.  His  fall 
was  brought  about  by  a  coalition  of  parties  against  him  from 
contrary  motives,  and  accellerated  by  the  opposition  of  the 
military  leaders  who  suspected  h's  willingness  to  accept  "the 
resolution,"  and  justly  feared  a  weakening  influence  from  this 
upon  the  spirit  of  the  army.  The  Kaiser  and  conservative 
parties  did  all  they  could  to  hold  him,  being  convinced  of  his 
ability,   but   the    Chancellor   himself   was    persistent   to    leave, 

183 


weary  of  the  unreasoning  opposition  against  him.  The  depths 
of  political  passions  which  had  been  stirred  up  in  this  compli- 
cated crisis  may  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that  the  famous  x-eso- 
lution  was  prematurely  published  in  the  press  as  a  "fait  accom- 
pli" before  its  actual  adoption.  The  crisis  had  come  at  a 
moment  when  it  was  particularly  necessaiy  for  Germany  "to 
keep  its  nerves"  in  order  to  reap  the  benefits  available  from 
the  favorable  external  situation :  The  U-boat  war  had  begun 
to  tell  seriously  upon  England ;  the  British  and  French  offen- 
sives were  being  resisted  successfully;  the  pi'ogress  of  the  cam- 
paign in  Poland  against  the  Kerensky  government  of  Russia 
was  rapidly  putting  that  country  out  of  the  war.  It  behooved 
Germany  and  Austria  now  to  hide  their  internal  troubles,  eco- 
nomic and  political,  and  to  deceive  the  enemy  by  a  confident 
attitude.  Instead  there  came  this  resolution  of  self-abnegation 
— and  all  the  attendant  revelations — which  disclosed  to  the 
enemy  the  real  situation  and  steeled  him  to  renewed  resistance! 
And  while  the  July  crisis  ended  with  the  adoption  of  this  reso- 
lution by  a  large  majority  and  brought  a  new  chancellor  and 
the  Kaiser's  definite  pledge  for  the  Prussian  electoral  reform, 
it  proved  a  failure,  internally  also;  it  did  not  achieve  the  polit- 
ical party  harmony  and  firmness  of  purpose  so  badly  needed, 
nor  a  smooth  working  between  the  new  chancellor  and  the  mil- 
itary chiefs.  Chancellor  Michaelis,  who  had,  confessedly,  ac- 
cepted the  results  of  the  July  crisis  with  "a  resei'vation  of  his 
own,"  being  a  thoroughly  honest  man  and  at  heart  a  "Con- 
servative," soon  felt  the  untenability  of  his  position  and  re- 
signed— and  was  compelled  to  resign  for  other  reasons  also — 
on  October  7,  1917.  He  was  followed  by  Count  Hertling, 
former  Bavarian  Premier.  His  advent  signaled  the  change 
from  the  German  Constitutional  to  the  "parliamentary"  sys- 
tem of  government. 

The  Entente's  Persistence  in  War.  That  the  Entente 
Powers  were  resolved  to  continue  the  struggle  to  victory  is 
further  attested  by  their  haughty  declination  to  participate 
in  the  "Conference  of  peace  and  disarmament"  which  the 
Russian  Bolshevist  government  proposed  to  the  war  nations  at 
the  end  of  December,  1917,  after  their  success  in  the  November 
revolution.  They  had  no  interest  in  the  lofty  altruistic  pro- 
posals issued  by  the  Russian  dreamers.  Russia  was  now  lost 
to  the  Entente  as  a  war  ally,  but  the  nose  ring  and  chain  of 
the  Russian  bear  were  tightly  fixed  on  the  American  people, 
with  a  tenfold  compensation.  The  reigning  harmony  was  sub- 
lime! The  utterances  of  President  Wilson  for  the  necessary 
"democratization  of  Gei'many  and  against  the  Hohenzollern 
monarchy,  as  the  source  of  all  evil,  were  seconded  by  similar 
speeches  by  Prime  Minister  Lloyd  George  in  December,  1917, 
and  notably  by  his  important  speech  of  January  5,  1918,  in 
answer  to  the  above  Russian  peace  conference  proposal.     "This 

184 


speech,  in  its  turn,  was  seconded  and  emphasized  in  all  essen- 
tials by  President  Wilson's  speech  to  the  American  Congress, 
a  few  days  later,  supplemented  by  the  famous  "fourteen  points" 
of  peace  settlement  which  were  given  out  as  the  final  answer 
of  the  Entente,  through  its  American  spokesman,  to  all  peace 
overtures  which  had  preceded.  It  was  these  "fourteen  points," 
together  with  many  others,  which  were  strangely  lost  when 
the  Allies  had  won  a  military  victory.  In  France  the  declara- 
tion of  policy  by  Premier  Clemenceau  and  President  Poincare 
ran  in  perfect  unison  with  those  of  England  and  America.  Thus 
one  buoyed  the  other,  and  the  result  was  a  "confidence  in  vic- 
tory" which  was  in  reality  not  warranted  by  the  situation  in  the 
field  before  the  failure  of  the  great  German  spring  offensive 
of  1918. 


B.     THE    ARMISTICE.     ABDICATION    OF    KAISER    WIL- 

HELM   II.      THE   REACTION   OF   DESPAIR.      A   NEW 

GERMANY   REVEAT^ED.      THE   MODERN   DRIFT. 

A    NEW    PHILOSOPHY    OF    LIFE    NEEDED. 

THE   GERMAN   STATE. 

As  the  author's  concern  is  more  with  the  ideas  underlying 
the  historical  happenings  than  with  the  occurrences  themselves, 
he  will  now  endeavor  to  analyze  the  ideas  and  the  spirit  re- 
vealed by  the  armistice  terms.  We  have  already  spoken  of  the 
humiliation,  chagrin  and  poignant  disappointment  felt  by  the 
German  people  at  these  terms  in  view  of  what  they  had  been 
led  to  expect  from  President  Wilson's  declarations.  Were 
these  the  terms  of  "justice,"  of  "a  peace  without  victory"  after 
a  war  "not  waged  against  the  German  people";  were  they  the 
terms  of  a  war  fought  "for  political  and  social  ideals"  on  the 
part  of  America?  Were  these  terms  of  armistice  fair  to  a 
valiant  foe  who  was  not  even  fully  beaten  on  the  battlefield 
but  was  compelled  to  give  up  the  struggle  because  a  political 
revolution  had  gripped  his  country  and  because  the  non-com- 
batants at  home  were  being  starved  to  death  by  a  cruel  food 
blockade?  No,  the  truth  about  the  war  was  at  last  revealed! 
These  were  not  terms  to  a  foe  merely  political,  but  such  as  are 
imposed  upon  a  hated  rival,  a  feared  race,  feared  because  of 
their  great  qualities,  to  a  people  that  is  to  be  destroyed,  anni- 
hilatd  utterly!!  These  terms  of  armistice — the  essence  of  the 
prospective  peace  terms — were  not  such  as  properly  arise  out 

185 


of  a  militai'y  victory  or  surrender,  with  its  justifiable  exulta- 
tion and  reasonable  self-interest  on  the  part  of  the  victors, 
but  were  the  consummation  of  a  deep  and  detestable  plot — 
Kaiser  or  no  Kaiser,  autocracy  or  republic — to  despoil  another 
nation  from  motives  of  envy,  jealousy,  revenge,  greed  for  ter- 
ritory and  domination!  These  terms  of  armistice  left  no  fur- 
ther doubt  as  to  the  real  objects  of  the  war  as  far  as  England 
and  America  were  concerned;  there  never  were  any  as  regards 
Russia,  France,  Italy,  Greece  and  Roumania. 

When  the  truth  became  known  to  the  people  of  Germany 
the  shock  was  cruel  beyond  description,  stunning,  paralyzing. 
It  followed  upon  the  tremendous  nervous  tension  of  that  mem- 
orable week  of  intense  excitement — from  November  4th  to  No- 
vember 11th — of  those  momentous  rapid  developments — revo- 
lution, formation  of  a  provisional  government,  abdication  of 
the  Kaiser,  armistice  and  end  of  the  war.  Then,  at  the  end, 
came  those  outrageous  terms  to  grip  the  heart  of  the  people 
in  awe.  They  had  hoped  for  a  peace  of  honor  and  possible 
recuperation;  instead  they  were  given  this  sentence  of  death! 
It  seemed  beyond  the  power  of  belief:  "Was  it  really  true  or 
merely  a  nightmare?"  And  now  the  question  arose  with  a  ter- 
rible accusation:  "Why  v^ere  such  terms  accepted?"  This 
question  has  continued  to  be  asked  with  pressing  insistence 
in  Germany  ever  since,  and  gradually  the  answer  is  beginning 
to  be  understood.  We  have  partly  given  it;  while  the  military 
situation  had  made  peace  necessary  (ostensibly,  as 'we  have 
explained,  to  prevent  a  disaster  to  the  army  and  the  invasion 
of  the  country),  while  peace  was  urgently  required  to  save 
the  imperial  government  and  the  monarchy,  it  was  even  more 

indispensable  to  the  working-out  of  the  political  transforma- 
tion in  Berlin.  The  consummation  of  the  revolution  in  gov- 
ernment absolutely  demanded  peace  and,  above  all,  avoidance 
of  invasion,  because  that  would  have  precipitated  an  eruption 
of  popular  rage  and  violence  of  such  magnitude  that  the 
orderly  establishment  of  the  republic  might  have  been  de- 
feated thereby.  Any  armistice  terms,  therefore,  short  of  absolute 
surrender  of  the  country  were  ordered  to  be  accepted  by  the 
revolutionary  executive  committee  which  had  the  fate  of  Ger- 
many in  its  hands!  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  new  gov- 
ernment  to    be,    this   was   effective    and    justified    policy — and 

186 


it  achieved  success.  Had  the  armistice  been  rejected — with 
revolution  spreading  over  the  country  and  the  Kaiser  and  his 
government  dethroned — the  dejected  armies  in  the  field  would 
in  all  probability  have  been  routed  and  driven  to  surrender, 
and  Germany  would  have  been  invaded.  Beyond  that  point  all 
else  that  would  then  have  happened  is  beyond  the  power  of 
conjecture. 

We  are  now  enabled  to  see  fully— in  connection  with  the 
concluding  paragraph  of  the  preceding  article — that  the  sink- 
ing Imperial  Government  as  well  as  the  rising  republic  both 
strenuously  desired  and  worked  for  armistice  but  from  oppos- 
ing motives  (in  the  purely  political  sense)  and  that  it  was  in 
fact  a  race  between  them  as  to  which  would  be  the  recog- 
nized power  and  government  in  Berlin  at  the  consummation-  of 
the  great  event.  The  republic  won  the  race;  the  Kaiser  and 
his  government  were  dethroned  on  November  9th,  the  armistice 
was  signed  by  the  republic  on  November  11th,  1918! 

There  are  those  who  insist,  vdth  a  cynical  smile,  that  the 
rulers  of  Germany  were  in  their  inmost  heart  glad  rather  than 
otherwise  to  see  the  venturesome  republic  step  in  and  take 
upon  itself  the  odium  and  dangers  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
armistice  and,  later,  of  the  signing  of  the  degrading  peace  of 
Versailles;  to  assume  the  difficult  and  thankless  task  of  lead- 
ing Germany  out  of  the  mire  upon  a  new  and  clean  road;  that 
they,  perhaps,  hoped  then  to  step  in  and  take  possession  by 
the  instigation  of  a  strong  monarchical  reaction,  assisted  by 
the  usual  military  coup.  If  this  insinuation  is  correct,  it  would, 
nevertheless,  be  no  more  ignoble  for  honest  and  sincere  mon- 
archists or  imperialists  to  strive  for  the  restoration  of  the 
monarchy  than  it  is  for  honest  and  sincere  republicans  to  strive' 
for  the  establishment  of  a  republic.  These  political  endeavors, 
provided  they  be  not  merely  vehicles  for  personal  ambitions, 
are  matters  of  vital  convictions,  surely,  but  in  regard  to  which 
the  absolutely  right  and  best  has  not  yet  been  fully  determined 
by  experience — the  verdict  is  still  in  the  making.  But  in  say- 
ing this,  the  author  has  in  view,  only  the  most  advanced  form 
of  constitutional  monarchy.  It,  therefore,  remains  for  the 
uncertain  future  to  determine  whether  the  German  republic 
will  prove  wise,  strong,  popular  and  successful  enough  to  with- 
stand the  attacks  of  the  monarchical  reaction  which  will  surely 

187 


be  directed  against  it  sooner  or  later.  But  we  may  dismiss 
without  further  thought  the  above  insinuation  that  the  Kaiser 
and  monarchical  parties  would  not  have  been  willing  to  assume 
the  making  of  the  armistice  and  peace  and  the  reconstruction 
of  Germany  if  this  had  seemed  possible  without  causing  a  great 
civil  strife  that  would  have  torn  the  country  to  shreds  internally 
and  delivered  it  into  the  complete  dictation  of  the  enemy. 


'T^  HE  abdication  and  flight  of  Wilhelm  II  to  Holland  has 
been  termed  ignominious  and  the  act  of  a  coward.  It  is, 
certainly,  difficult,  from  the  popular-hero  point  of  view,  to  con- 
done his  act  and  appreciate  his  self-restraint  and  self-sacrifice 
in  the  proper  light  and  not  with  a  sense  of  pity.  But  all  in- 
formatijOn  on  the  situation  in  Germany  at  the  time  showed  the 
uselessness,  the  criminality  of  resistance  to  the  popular  trend. 
The  forces  which  worked  for  the  republic — the  inroads  of 
democratic  and  socialistic  propaganda  during  decades,  the  sacri- 
fices and  suffering  of  the  war,  the  lack  of  real  ability  in  the 
war  crisis  on  the  part  of  the  government,  the  final  inglorious 
defeat,  the  Wilsonian  message  of  freedom,  the  whole  terrible 
situation  of  Germany  at  the  brink  of  an  abyss  for  which  the 
government  was  held  responsible — were  too  much  to  overcome! 
We  should  consider,  also,  that  the  Kaiser  was  informed  about 
all  the  slanderous  accusations  which  had  been  made  about 
him  by  the  British  and  American  propagandas  and  even  in  his 
own  Germany.  It  had  produced  its  effect  upon  a  sensitive  man 
who  had  for  years  become  used  mostly  to  praise,  who  had  at 
all  times  tried  to  do  his  duty  and  felt  himself  innocent  of  those 
heinous  charges.  The  Kaiser  undoubtedly  had  the  moral  right 
to  save  himself  in  order  to  see  himself  and  his  government  and 
people  vindicated  in  time  and  the  ocean  of  abuse  rolled  back 
upon  the  foreign  and  native  enemy  after  the  subsidence  of 
the  storm. 

Under  this  viewpoint  it  was  both  wise  ana  patriotic  for  the 
Kaiser  to  efface  himself  from  the  political  strife  and  avoid 
complicating  the  troubles  of  Germany  by  a  challenge  to  a 
contest — involving  invasion  and  civil  war — but  it  may  not  have 
been  very  heroic  in  the  popular  view  to  thus  retire  in  grief  and 
without  protest.    Any  one  of  the  great  heroes  of  old,  and  some 

188 


modern  ones,  including  his  eminent  ancestor,  Frederick  the 
Great,  would  probably  have  acted  diffex'ently.  To  die  at  the 
head  of  your  ai'my  in  defeat,  to  throw  yourself  upon  your 
sword  no  doubt  appeals  to  the  imagination  more  than  to  choose 
self-sacrifice,  to  take  your  cross  upon  your  shoulders  and  walk 
away  with  bowed  head !  But  there  has  always  seemed  to  the 
writer  something  selfish,  bombastic  and  arbitrary  about  the 
heroes  of  history,  a  disposition  (in  most  cases)  not  so  much  to 
sacrifice  themselves  as  their  armies,  their  people,  their  country, 
their  friends  for  their  own  advantage  and  glory.  Wilhelm  II 
chose  renunciation  and  martyrdom  for  the  love  of  his  native 
country  and  people  whose  emperor  he  had  been.  He  failed  to 
prove  himself  a  truly  great  man  and  ruler  in  a  great  crisis;  he 
made  serious  mistakes  of  judgment  and  showed  fatal  weakness 
at  important  situations  in  the  war;  he  carries  a  heavy  respon- 
sibility for  Germany's  debacle,  but  he  was  honest  and  devoted 
through  it  all,  a  man  of  high  moral  honor — and  no  coward! 
The  whole  world  has  sinned  against  this  man,  but  America  has 
surpassed  every  other  country  in  venomous,  insane,  ignorant 
and  most  brutal  abuse  of  him.  This  wrong  will,  no  doubt,  be 
seen  by  the  American  people  in  time;  but  volumes  of  retrac- 
tion and  decades  of  regret  will  not  wipe  out  the  reproach ! 

As  to  the  Kaiser's  attitude  within  the  German  tragedy,  his 
earnest  desire  to  preserve  the  peace  at  all  times,  before  the 
war,  and  at  its  beginning  and  during  its  course,  is  indisputably 
established.  And  in  regard  to  his  future  policy — in  case  of  a 
German  victory — we  are  assured  by  Karl  Helfferich,  ex-German 
vice-chancellor  and  a  man  of  unquestioned  probity,  who  had  ex- 
tended conversations  with  the  Kaiser  in  November,  1914,  when 
all  indications  pointed  to  an  early  German  victory,  that  the 
Kaiser  saw  the  happiest  outcome  to  flow  from  the  war  in  the 
establishment  of  a  strong  practical  continental  union  of  coun- 
tries having  the  sole  object  of  securing  mutual  development 
within  peace  by  a  rational  removal  of  all  points  of  friction. 
Especially  towards  France  the  Kaiser  hoped  to  see  all  misun- 
derstandings and  distrust  removed  and  sincere  friendly  rela- 
tions established.  This  is  the  man  who  has  been  painted  in 
America  as  a  blood-thirsty  tyrant,  arbitrary  autocrat,  usurper, 
oppressor  of  his  own  and  other  peoples  and  bent  upon  unscru- 

189 


pulous  world  conquest.  What  a  blessing  it  would  be  if  his  victory 
and  his  program  were  established  facts  today  instead  of  the 
chaos  of  misery  and  doubt  in  which  the  world  is  floundering! 


'TpHE  collapse  of  Germany  leads  to  strange  revelations  and 
•*■  painful  reflections.  With  all  her  great  military  machine 
of  finest  equipment  and  discipline  and  the  splendid  deeds  of 
this  army  and  its  generals,  success  was,  after  all,  not  attained. 
Considering  her  dominating  position  in  the  field  on  all  fronts, 
including  Italy  and  Macedonia,  in  the  spring  of  1918,  before 
the  great  offensive,  the  reversal  which  followed  seems  almost 
incomprehensible!  We  have  pointed  out  the  causes  in  part, 
as  they  operated  towards  such  an  ending.  To  those  described 
must  be  added  many  diplomatic  weaknesses  and  absolute  blun- 
ders committed  in  all  the  various  acute  situations  of  the  war, 
particulai'ly  with  America  and  in  connection  with  the  peace 
overtures  of  the  last  two  years  of  the  war.  The  diplomatic 
side  in  a  conflict  of  such  I'amifications  almost  surpasses  in 
importance  the  military  side.  Clearly,  there  was  a  lack  of 
connnanding  ability  in  the  diplomatic  direction  of  Germany's 
course  in  the  war.  The  remarkable  fact  is  revealed  that 
this  highly  intellectual  country,  occupying  the  topmost  po- 
sition in  human  achievement  in  every  field,  did  not,  under 
all  the  prodding  stress  of  war  upon  her,  produce  a  single  truly 
great  man  of  superlative  ability,  of  penetrating  insight  to  direct 
with  a  clear  and  firm  purpose  the  conduct  of  Germany's  aff"airs. 
No  Bismarck  arose  as  a  statesman,  no  Moltke  as  a  strategist; 
the  Kaiser  himself  did  not  develop  into  the  leader  that  had 
been  expected  of  him!  There  was  oi'dinary  ability  of  the  high- 
est quality,  maivelous  organizing  and  general  executive  talent 
shown — but  no  genius!  But  this — real  genius- — is  what  the 
situation  requii'ed,  demanded !  Never  before  in  the  history  of 
the  world,  not  in  Greece,  not  in  Rome,  not  in  France  under 
the  great  Napoleon  was  there  ever  a  country  with  but  few  allies 
engaged  in  a  struggle  of  such  magnitude  and  intensity,  against 
such  powerful  and.  numerous  adversaries  of  equal  technical 
equipment  and  more  abundant  material  resources.  Such  a  situa- 

190 


tion  demanded  higher  degrees  of  capacity,  steadiness  of  purpose 
and  diplomatic  finesse  of  direction  than  Germany's  leaders 
displayed. 

But  the  people  itself  as  a  whole,  as  expressed  in  the  Reichs- 
tag representation  with  its  one-sided  warring  "parties"  and 
innumerable  "groups"  and  also  in  the  public  press  showed  sim- 
ilar deficiencies  in  character  and  political  ability.  Starvation 
had  done  its  share  to  undermine  the  steadiness  of  opinion  and 
purpose  of  the  German  people,  but  there  was  also  something 
else  at  work.  The  thousands  of  individuals  who  were  doubt- 
less an  exception  to  this  criticism  were  lost  in  the  millions  and 
were  unable  to  penetrate  to  the  front!  The  fall  of  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  under  the  pressure  of  surging  internal  politics 
was  not  only  a  serious  blow  to  Germany's  success  but  furnished 
an  early  proof,  and  at  a  most  inopportune  time,  of  the  author's 
contention  that  the  restless  ambition  of  the  social-democratic 
parties,  their  lack  of  broad  vision  and  self-control,  lie  at  the 
bottom  of  Germany's  defeat.  But — with  more  ability  and 
courage — the  government,  after  first  making  the  Prussian  elec- 
toral concessions,  might  have  defied  these  disruptive  political 
forces  at  their  first  determined  stand  and  challenged  them  to 
the  utmost — to  revolution  even  in  the  midst  of  war — instead 
of  placating  them  by  promises  of  still  more  concessions.  Not 
that  their  demands  were  not  justified  and  long  due;  but  domes- 
tic legislation  of  that  class  was  inopportune  in  the  midst  of  war 
and  could  have  waited!  What  was  needed  was  unity , of  front 
and  burying  of  all  factional  strife.  A  strong  hand  would  have 
re-established  confidence  at  home  and  in  the  ranks  of  the  army 
and  navy,  and  the  elation  of  ensuing  military  success  would 
have  swept  all  difficulties  of  Germany  aside  and  brought  a  final 
satisfactory  peace,  with  or  without  full  victory. 

Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  while  not  a  brilliant  man,  was  the 
ablest  and  firmest  of  the  chancellors;  had  he  been  allowed  to 
continue  to  the  end,  Germany  would  probably  not  have  ended 
with  the  suicide  of  November  11,  1918.  His  successor,  von 
Michaelis,  was  a  man  of  record  as  a  bureaucrat,  of  proven  ability 
and  character,  devotion  and  sterling  honesty  of  convictions, 
but  was  in  no  sense  a  "diplomatist"  and  leader  of  thought  in 
the  foreign-affairs  department  of  Germany,  and  his  appointment 

191 


as  chancellor  has  remained  somewhat  of  a  puzzle  to  this  day. 
We  have,  in  the  preceding  text,  briefly  indicated  the  reason 
for  his  early  exit  from  power.  Chancellor  Hertling,  his  suc- 
cessor, was  a  man  of  the  highest  ability  and  of  wide  political 
experience  in  internal  and  external  affairs,  but  perhaps  too 
advanced  in  years  and  conservative  in  his  sympathies  to  be 
able  to  fully  estimate  the  strength  and  purpose  of  the  social- 
democratic  movement  and  check  it  in  its  gravitation  towards 
revolution.  He  was  very  ably  seconded  by  his  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, von  Kiihlmann,  who  directed  the  difficult  work  of  the 
Brest-Litowsk  peace  treaty  with  Soviet  Russia  and  the  treaty 
with  Roumania.  In  the  end,  however,  he  fell  a  victim  to  the 
growing  friction  with  the  military  chiefs  and  to  his  statement 
in  his  Reichstag  speech  of  June  24,  1918,  "that  victory  by 
Germany  was  no  longer  possible  by  the  military  forces  of  the 
government  alone,"  that  it  would  largely  have  to  be  "a  victory 
of  negotiation."  Von  Hertling  soon  followed  him  in  retirement, 
unable  to  stem  the  increasing  pressure  for  exclusive  power  by 
the  social-democratic  majority  party. 

Prince  Max,  of  Baden,  was  likewise  a  man  of  ability  and 
highest  culture,  and  much  more  sympathetic  to  the  progressive 
tendencies  of  the  day  than  Count  Hertling,  but  lacked  initia- 
tive and  daring  in  circumstances  which  precisely  demanded 
these  qualities;  Instead  of  acting  promptly  and  secretly  upon 
his  alleged  plan — of  early  November,  1918 — to  go  to  head- 
quarters and  discuss  the  dangerous  situation  directly  with  the 
Kaiser  aftd  the  military  chiefs  to  ascertain  with  certainty  the 
position  of  the  armies  and  their  chances  to  win  or,  at  least,  to 
hold  out  till  the  political  storm  had  been  firmly  taken  in  hand, 
and  thereupon  formulating  a  definite  and  concerted  plan  of 
action,  he  allowed  himself  to  be  kept  in  Berlin,  and  proceeded  to 
discuss  his  plans  with  Representative  Ebert  and  his  party 
associates — the  very  men  who  at  that  very  hour  were  plotting 
the  fall  of  the  government.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day 
of  his  intended  departure  for  France,  he  was  tendered  the 
ultimatum  from  these  same  men  demanding  the  immediate 
abdication  of  the  Kaiser  and  retirement  of  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment! 

The  history  of  these  successive  chancellorships  shows  the  in- 
sufficiency of  these  men  to  firmly  direct  the  German  ship  of  State 

192 


in  these  turbulent  currents  of  internal  factional  politics  added 
to  all  the  external  problems  of  the  war  and,  instead,  to  drift 
along  with  them  to  the  common  cataract!  In  the  military  line, 
also,  there  is  evidence  in  abundance,  lately  supplemented  by 
the  personal  opinions  of '  Marshal  Foch,  that,  while  technical, 
organizing  and  executive  ability  of  the  highest  oi'der  were 
shown  in  every  German  campaign  and  battle,  be  it  in  attack 
or  in  retreat,  real  far-seeing  strategical  capacity  was  wanting. 
There  was  a  lack  of  comprehensive  objective  plan,  a  want  of 
co-operation  of  the  separate  units,  a  lack  of  intimate  direc- 
tion by  headquarters.  Too  much  was  left  to  chance  and  to 
planning  "in  the  field"  according  to  the  momentary  situation. 
These  defects  in  broad  plan  and  definite  military  object — 
beyond  the  general  one  of  beating  the  enemy  somehow — 
faults  of  general-staff  leadership  and  of  over-confidence — were 
responsible  for  the  occurence  and  loss  of  the  first  battle  of  the 
Marne  and  for  the  negative  results  which  ensued  from  the 
brilliant  attack  campaign  of  the  1918  spring  offensives,  as  far 
as  the  latter  wei*e  not  influenced  by  the  political  schisms  at 
home.  In  the  press  in  Germany  during  the  war  the  wrangle  in 
the  Reichstag  was  not  only  reflected,  and  repeated  but  en- 
larged. Popular  sentiment  on  the  war  situation,  on  the  sub- 
marine campaign,  on  the  peace  overtures  was  one  continued 
gamut  of  change  from  the  highest  pitch  of  elation  to  the  low- 
est depths  of  depression.  There  seemed  to  be  a  lamentable 
absence  of  strong  confidence,  firm  self-reliance,  settled  opinion 
of  the  people  as  a  whole  as  to  the  reason,  nature  and  objects  of 
the  war  and  its  conduct  by  the  government. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  year  1917,  the  increasing  disap- 
pointment and  fear  of  ultimate  defeat  opened  up  the  flood- 
gates   of   unrestrained    criticism    of    everything   and   everybody 

actively  connected  with  the  war  and  the  government  from  the 
Kaiser  to  the  last  official,  and  even  the  "particularism"  of  the 
original  German  states — long  believed  buried — raised  its  head 
again.  Into  the  midst  of  this  raging  sea  of  dissention  and 
dejection,  broke  the  voices  of  a  number  of  miscreants,  traitors 
and  spite  dogs,  the  like  of  which  no  country  of  the  Entente 
allies  had  produced!  That  deceitful,  conniving,  calculating  Erz- 
berger;  that  abject,  pitiable,  traitorous  Maximilian  Harden;  that 

193 


string  of  venomous  "authoi's"  and  "journalists"  who  did  not-hes- 
itate  to  use  the  country's  dire  war  situation  as  an  occasion  to 
vent  their  personal  spite  and  revenge  for  past  injuries  done 
them  by  the  Kaiser  or  the  government  and  to  exasperate  still 
more  the  maddened  public;  that  horde  of  radical  socialist  agi- 
tators who  had  no  scruples  to  exploit  the  government's  diffi- 
culties and  the  discontent  of  the  people  in  the  interest  of  their 
own  political  creed  and  policy  of  surrender;  those  minority 
socialists-— Haase,  Dittmann  and  Vogtherr — who  were  disclosed 
as  connected  with  the  revolt  of  sailors  in  Kiel  harbor,  early  in 
October,  1917,  having  the  object  of  making  the  navy  ineffective 
for  the  remainder  of  the  war  through  the  refusal  of  obedience; 
that  band  of  radical  cynics,  devoid  of  ethics  or  religion,  who 
openly  counseled  the  people  in  the  large  cities  to  abandon  honor 
and  honesty,  to  defy  law  and  authority,  to  go  profiteering, 
stealing,  robbing,  repudiating  contracts,  murdering  even  for 
gain  and  in  "resentment"  against  the  government  for  its  in- 
ability to  conclude  the  war  and  relieve  the  people's  hardships! 
This  condition  appeared  in  the  early  fall  months  of  1918.  The 
moral  fibre  of  the  lower  classes  of  the  population  of  Germany 
literally  went  to  pieces  under  this  combined  onslaught;  it  made 
a  ghastly  exhibition  of  the  union  of  empty  heads,  empty  hearts 
and  empty  stomachs! 

When  we  take  together  all  the  facts  in  regard  to  Germany's 
conduct  of  the  war  and  in  the  war,  from  her  leaders  down  to 
the  body  of  the  people — the  absence  of  really  great  capacity, 
unselfish  patriotism,  unity  of  purpose,  stamina,  steadfastness  in 
adversity,  all  joined  to  a  certain  haughty  attitude  and  over- 
confidence — even  those  who  are  sympathetic  with  the  German 
people  in  their  great  failure  and  plight  and  willing  to  allow 
fully  for  all  adverse  circumstances  are  tempted  to  say  "that 
Germany  deserved  to  lose  the  war"!  There  is«  an  unavoidable 
reflex  of  great  sadness,  of  deep  disappointment — of  disdain 
even — from  all  this  lamentable  story  of  collapse  of  a  great  em- 
pire, government  and  people!  But  this  conclusion  does  not 
justify — nor  even  excuse — the  frightful  treatment,  the  unheard- 
of  punishment  meted  out  to  Germany  by  the  Entente  allies  in 
the  armistice  and  the  treaty  of  Versailles — that  instrument  of 
political  and  economic  greed  inspil'ed  by  race  hate  and  Jealousy 

194 


that  stands  unapproached  in  the  world's  long  list  of  political 
wrongs!  But  most  monstrous  of  all  and  least  justified  by  Ger- 
many's true  measure  of  guilt  and  mistakes  is  the  crime  of  heap- 
ing upon  her  the  odium  of  alone  bearing  the  responsibility  for 
the  great  war!  This  wrong  at  least — this  moral  wrong  of  the 
Entente  allies — must  be  righted,  even  if  the  material  punish- 
ment should  finally  be  left  but  little  altered  from  the  present 
demands. 


The  Kaiser's  Failure.  It  was  not  merely  the  want  of  com- 
manding ability  and  force  of  character  which  prevented  Wil- 
liam II  to  I'ise  to  the  height  of  the  war  situation  but  also  the 
constitutional  limitations  of  his  position  which  made  of  him 
more  the  "representative  figure  head"  of  his  country  than  its 
actual  political  ruler,  this  in  spite  of  his  many  "autocratic" 
prerogatives.  This  explains  that  during  the  war  we  heard  of  the 
Kaiser  only  occasionally  when  making  a  patriotic  speech  in 
some  city  or  to  the  army,  or  when  he  was  called  upon  in  some 
political  crisis  in  which  his  prerogatives  were  involved — as  with 
the  chancellor  changes  and  the  Prussian  electoral  reform  mea- 
r.ures.'  The  chancellor  was  the  active  and  responsible  political 
head  in  Germany,  and  in  formulating  his  policy  he  stood  be- 
tween the  ideas  and  wishes  of  the  Kaiser  and  the  ruling  Reichs- 
tag majority.  A  stronger  man  than  Wilhelm  II  would  have  swept 
these  political  limitations  aside  and  assumed  full  power  and 
responsibility.  Thus  the  Kaiser's  attitude  in  the  various  chan- 
cellor crises  was  not  that  of  "directing  and  insisting"  but  rather 
of  "conciliating"  the  contending  factions.  He  endeavored  hon- 
estly to  produce  harmony  between  the  Reichstag  majority,  the 
chancellor  and  the  military  direction  of  the  war,  but  failed  to 
see  the  futility  of  his  endeavors  and  the  real  political  objects  of 
the  parties  opposed  to  the  government.  Instead  of  arresting  the 
stream,  he  drifted  with  it  as  much  as  his  chancellors  did ! 

The  determined  design  to  seize  power  by  the  majority  so- 
cialists was  clearly  revealed  (in  our  present  view)  at  the  mo- 
ment when  Count  Hertling  had  finally  decided,  after  much 
hesitation,  to  assume  the  chancellorship  on  the  condition  that 
before  doing  so  "direct  pourparlers  shall  take  place  between 
himself  and  the  majority  parties'  representatives  in  order  to 
arrive  at  a  full  understanding  on  all  questions  and  thus  secure 
future  unity  of  parliamentary  action.  This  "condition"  was  con- 
trary to  German  constitutional  practice  but  had  been  willingly 
conceded  by  the  Kaiser. >  When  the  moment  for  these  prelim- 
inary conferences  had  arrived,  these  majority  representatives 
were  not  to  be  found;  in  the  midst  of  this  acute  crisis  they  had 
left  Berlin  and  were  only  recalled  with  difficulty  to  incomplete 

195 


conferences!  What  is  the  explanation?  None  other  than  that, 
at  the  last  moment  of  the  full  acceptance  of  their  own  condi- 
tions by  the  Kaiser  and  the  prospective  chancellor,  these  party 
leaders  lost  heart  in  their  own  proposals,  fearful  lest  they  might 
bind  themselves  thereby  to  a  "too  intimate  working  agreement 
with  the  new  chancellor"  which  might — later — jeopardize  their 
freedom  of  action  in  those  ulterior  revolutionary  i)urposes 
which  were  being  harbored  even  at  that  time — fall  of  1917! 
In  the  light  of  to-day,  no  other  explanation  is  possible.  Evi- 
dently, the  Kaiser's  policy  of  conciliation  was  destined  to  fail; 
with  every  concession  new  demands  were  presented.  The 
Kaiser  yielded  at  every  step,  fearing  for  the  existence  of  his 
government  and  hesitating  before  the  threat  of  a  revolution. 
This  was  the  moment  for  establishing  a  "military  dictatorship" 
and  handing  the  definite  challenge  to  the  obstructive  Reichstag 
majority — but  again  hesitation  shut  the  door  to  possible  safety! 

The  recent  publication  of  the  third  volume  of  the  memoirs 
of  Prince  Bismarck  (heretofore  suppressed  by  the  former  Im- 
perial government)  has  again  opened  the  painful  subject  of 
Bismarck's  dismissal  by  the  young  emperor  William,  in  1891. 
Never  in  the  histol-y  of  the  world  has  the  failure  of  grateful 
recognition  by  a  ruler  of  the  merits  of  a  great  national  states- 
man borne  more  terrible  fruit!  It  is  not  possible  here  to  enter 
into  the  details  of  that  political  and  personal  cabal.  That  the 
Kaiser  has  long  and  sincerely  regretted  his  action  cannot  be 
doubted  from  his  public  and  private  declarations!  Had  he  al- 
lowed himself  to  be  tutored  and  guided  by  that  genius  in  pene- 
trative diplomacy  and  constructive  statesmanship,  Germany,  to- 
day, might  not  merely  "have  a  place  in  the  sun"  but  "be  the  sun 
itself"  in  the  constellation  of  prosperous  and  peaceful  European 
States!  That  his  genius  and  its  influence  upon  the  Kaiser — had 
he  permitted  it — during  the  remaining  decade  of  Bismarck's 
life  would  have  made  the  occurrence  of  the  great  war  impossible 
may   be   asserted    without   fear   of   challenge! 

The  Kaiser  has  written  a  book  on  the  war,  giving  his  con- 
ception of  the  causes,  his  own  aims  and  attitude  in  the  great 
crisis  of  July-August,  1914,  and  thereafter.  A  short  reference 
to  this  book  appears  in  Article  XVI. 

The  Prussian  Electoral  Reform  Measure.  The  battle  for 
this  measure  in  the  Reichstag — a  measure  for  the  introduction 
of  the  secret  ballot  and  full  male  suffrage  in  the  Prussian  agri- 
cultural electoral  districts,  from  which  it  had  been  heretofore 
excluded — illustrates  more  than  anything  else  the  stubborn  ob- 
stinacy of  the  Prussian  conservative  agrarian  parties  against 
any  progress  in  the  line  of  modern  political  thought.  This 
measure  had  been  demanded  for  years  by  the  liberal  parties  in 
the  Reichstag  as  one  due  to  the  spirit  of  advancing  political 
freedom.      Why  had  it  not  been  passed?      Not  SO  much  through 

196 


the  Kaiser's  opposition  as  through  that  of  the  conservative 
parties  who  saw  in  it  a-  curtailment  of  their  ancient  "rights." 
Yet  it  was  fully  in  the  Kaiser's  power  to  declare  for  the  justice 
of  this  measure  and  press  its  adoption. 

When  this  proposition  was  again  brought  forward,  with  in- 
creased insistence  by  the  liberal  parties  during  the  war,  the 
Kaiser  seeing  in  the  demand  no  wrong  and  only  the  threat  of 
additional  parliamentary  friction  and  popular  protest  against 
his  rule,  promptly  ordered  its  early  adoption  as  the  policy  of  his 
government.  Yet  the  struggle  for  the  measure  in  the  Reichs- 
tag was  a  tremendous  one.  It  was  an  essential  part  of  every 
chancellor  crisis!  Had  this  measure  been  passed  in  the  times 
of  peace,  it  could  not  have  arisen  as  a  "terrible  nemesis"  in 
the  crucial  days  of  the  war  and  at  that  especially  critical  con- 
junction of  events  of  the  summer  of  1917!  This  electoral 
struggle  sharpened  the  opposition  of  the  Reichstag  majority  to 
the  Kaiser's  government  along  the  entire  line.  The  great  ses- 
sion of  October  6th,  1918,  showed  fully  the  depth  of  grim  de- 
termination of  the  various  opposing  political  parties  and  the 
hopelessness  of  united  action  on  the  war  problems.  In  the  ses- 
sions of  October  9th,  it  became  plain  that  the  majority  social- 
democrats  were  resolved  to  prosecute  their  "peace-at-any-price" 
policy  against  the  "All-German"  or  "Fatherland"  party  at  all 
hazards  as  pi'oven  by  the  revelation  of  the  Kiel  insurrection 
plot! 


A  T  THE  root  of  these  weaknesses  exhibited  by  Germany  there 
■^~*-  lies  the  material  and  moral  transformation  of  large  sections 
of  the  "masses"  of  the  people,  which  had  been  going  on  for 
forty  years  in  the  evolution  of  Germany  to  a  great  "industrial" 
state ;  and  this  change  had  not  taken  place  without  a  corre- 
sponding effect  upon  the  highly  educated,  the  wealthy  and  busi- 
ness sections  of  the  population.  The  war  alone  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  this  change,  or  influence;  it  only  accelerated  and 
intensified  its  consequences.  The  Germany  of  1914  v/as  not 
that  of  1870!  A  different  spirit  had  taken  possession  of  the 
majority  of  those  who  may  be  broadly  called  "the  workers," 
all  those  in  the  industries  and  living  in  the  large  cities.  The 
consequences  of  modern  industrialism  and  commercialism  had 
spread  the  doctrines  of  socialism  and  democracy  among  them 
and,  together  with  the  growth  of  atheism  and  general  irreligion 
and  a  crop  of  negative  "philosophies  of  irresponsibility,"  had 
changed   the   modern   German   of  those   classes  to   a   different 

197 


character  of  man  from  that  of  1848  and  1870.  Gradual  depart- 
ures in  the  former  educational  system  in  favor  of  "practical 
studies"  at  the  expense  of  the  classical,  the  sentimental,  ideal, 
at  the  expense  of  the  study  of  history  and  literature  contributed 
much  towards  the  transformation. 

The  increased  well-being  and  consequent  diminished  neces- 
sity of  constant  frugality,  humility  and  self-discipline  trans- 
formed a  people  once  peculiarly  sentimental  and  sensitive  to 
one  more  "practical"  but  also  more  materialistic,  more  callous 
of  restraint,  more  aggressive.  The  old  German  modesty  of 
bearing  and  timidity  of  expression  and  the  contentment  with 
humble  life  expectations  had  largely  disappeared.  A  fatal  dis- 
illusionment had  taken  place  (not  yet  replaced  fully  and  in  all 
cases  by  a  new  perspective)  so  that  Schiller's  grand  poem  of 
"Die  Ideale  sind  zerronnen"  had  come  true  for  much  of  latter- 
day  Germany.  Under  the  empire  the  sentiment  for  national 
growth,  big  activities,  wealth,  power,  life  enjoyment  had  gradu- 
ally supplanted  that  for  abstract  study,  contemplation,  "ths 
humanities,"  etc.,  formerly  so  all-pervading.  These  changes  in 
the  fundamental  bases  of  character  among  a  large  proportion 
of  the  German  people — excepting  the  aristocracy,  the  very 
wealthy  and  the  agricultural  class — had  occurred  parallel  with 
each  other  and  worked  together  hand-in-hand  at  the  same  time 
— general  materialism,  skepticism,  socialism  and.  republicanism 
— all  permeated  by  a  general  "pessimism"  as  to  the  value  of 
effort  or  virtue,  of  life  itself — it  is  the  modem  drift  everywhere. 
For  the  masses  of  the  people,  those  whose  education  is  con- 
fined to  the  practical  essentials  of  information,  the  loosening 
of  their  former  moral  basis — doctrinal  supernatural  religion — 
was  particularly  disastrous  in  the  absence  of  an  effective  sub- 
stitute; they  were  deficient  in  that  deeper  philosophical  per- 
ception and  firm  ethical  conviction  which  are  the  possession  of 
the  thinker  and  the  highly  educated  man  and  supply  to  these 

that  confidence  and  serenity  of  view  which  it  has  heretofore 
been  the  great  practical  office  of  religion  to  supply  to  all,  par- 
ticularly to  the  man  of  lower  endowment — an  office  and  power 
now   rapidly   waning! 

Considering  socialism  singly  and  without  its  association  with 
morals  or  political  thought,  the  unfortunate  result  of  its  doc- 

198 


trine  and  promises  upon  those  of  only  medium  mental  and 
educational  equipment  consists  in  its  disintegrating  effect  upon 
their  sense  of  personal  independence  and  responsibility,  and 
upon  the  moral  quality  of  self-reliance,  by  producing  an  ab- 
normal, unbalanced  perception  of  human  society  as  a  whole 
and  an  exaggerated  idea  of  dependence  from  and  upon  others. 
Their  understanding  of  socialism  is  narrow,  subjective,  one- 
sided; they  expect  of  it  immediate  rectification  of  all  their 
grievances,  real  and  imaginary.  It  seems  to  them  that  the 
introduction  of  the  more  equitable  distribution  of  property,  of 
the  co-operative  working  of  industry  and  commerce,  and  all 
other  parts  of  the  complete  program,  should  be  simple  of  ac- 
complishment. These  high  expectations  produce  a  state  of  ex- 
'  asperation  against  society  in  general,  of  morbid  impatience  of 
restraint,  of  revolt  against  every  kind  of  authority — all  cul- 
minating in  periodical  outbreaks  of  violence — because  of  the 
long-continued  strain  of  seeing  these  promises  and  expectations 
unfulfilled.  While  Socialism  is  a  plan  of  reform  for  all  classes 
of  society  and  all  activities,  it  finds  its  largest  field  and  support 
in  modern  industrialism,  in  the  abnormal  life  of  millions  of  the 
workers  in  the  crowded  cities  and  depressing  manufacturing 
towns  where  the  months  and  years  roll  by  in  the  dreary,  soul- 
killing  thud  of  monotonous  work  for  mere  existence!  Next  to 
these,  socialism  finds  its  field  among  those  of  particularly  hard 
and  hazardous  occupations — the  miners,  transportation  men, 
chemical  factory  men,  plumbers,  excavators,  etc.  The  condi- 
tions of  living  and  working  in  these  occupations  are  clearly 
abnormal  and  a  getting-away  from  nature,  and  must  bring 
their  penalties! 

But  socialism,  the  promised  remedy,  is  itself  largely  a  get- 
ting away  from  nature,  a  denial  and  defiance  of  her  laws,  and 
also  an  ignoring  of  human-nature  traits.  Before  it  can  become 
a  rational  guide  in  public  life,  society  and  business  it  must  be 
purified  to  a  doctrine  of  broader  reason,  self-restraint  and  equal 
justice  to  all  interests.  As  now  mostly  taught  and  understood, 
socialism  contravenes  in  many  respects  those  laws  of  order,  of 
subdivision  in  graded  ascendency  from  the  lower  to  the  higher 
endowed,  of  authority  and  submission  which  we  find  throughout 
in  the  operations  of  nature  and  which  are  reflected  in  the  char- 

199 


acteristics  of  human  nature.  Neither  seems  capable  of  any 
fundamental  change  in  scope  and  character,  as  demonstrated  by 
nature  and  man  throughout  the  recorded  historical  centuries. 
The  same  inequalities  and  imperfections  of  endowment,  the 
same  passions,  impulses,  caprices  which  are  illustrated  in  the 
history  of  the  earliest  peoples  prevail  and  rule  to-day.  This 
contradiction  in  the  theory  of  socialism  to  that  which  is  inborn 
by  nature  and  unalterable  is  emphatic  and  an  elementary  defect 
in  the  system  which  will  make  it  a  failure  in  practice.  Unless 
changed  in  idea  and  aim  in  the  direction  here  indicated,  social- 
ism can  only  be  a  force  which  will  tear  down,  divide  and  scatter 
instead  of  unite  and  build  up  to  a  successful  whole.  The 
present  result  in  Russia,  as  far  as  it  is  not  produced  by  other 
causes,  is  an  object  lesson.  The  possible  spread  of  this  "ulti- 
mate expression"  of  the  socialistic  thought  to  the  other  coun- 
tries of  Europe,  particularly  Germany,  is  filling  the  world  with 
keenest  apprehension. 

This  Russian  "Bolshevism"  is  socialism  expanded  to  a  com- 
plete and  radical  social-political  plan;  it  means  the  full  pro- 
gram of  a  communistic  state  in  all  the  relations  of  life  and 
work,  combined  with  "internationalism" — being  the  deprecat- 
ing of  narrow  nationalism  and  race  patriotism  and  the  merging 
of  all  the  peoples  of  the  world  into  one  brotherhood  of  the 
ruling  proletariat.  The  basis  of  this  idea,  naturally,  is  the 
fact,  that  the  dependent  workers  and  the  discontents — all  those 
who  gravitate  towards  socialism — outnumber  overwhelmingly 
the  aristocratic,  rich,  independent  and  so-called  "privileged" 
classes  in  every  country  of  the  world — that  they  are  the  vast 
majority  of  mankind.  This  bolshevist  idea  (meaning,  from  its 
origin  in  Russia,  the  full  radical  program  to  its  last  conclusions) 
has  not  yet  taken  political  form  anywhere  except  in  Russia,  but 
its  gospel  is  fast  being  spread  to  all  the  European  nations  and 
America  by  aggressive  and  extended  propaganda.  It  is  finding 
in  organized  labor,  everywhere,  already  permeated  by  socialism, 
not  only  its  easy  converts  but  its  agent  and  active  partner./' 
Labor,  by  its  restless  agitation  for  ever  more  rights  and  more 
pay  and  shorter  hours  of  work,  by  its  strikes  and  boycotts  to 
obtain  by  intimidation,  threat  of  financial  loss  and  physical 
violence  what  equity,  the  gerjeral  interest  and  cool  reason  must 

200 


reject  is  the  most  active  international  Bolshevist  co-worker. 
Together  they  will  soon  uproot  society,  governments  and  peoples 
in  a  world-wide  compound  cataclysm  if  more  "natural  and 
rational"  conceptions  are  not  grafted  upon  this  socialistic  labor 
movement. 

The  steps  necessary  for  curbing  and  purifying  the  socialistic 
communism  known  as  "bolshevism"  will  be  discussed  in  detail 
in  a  later  article.  As  to  the  arbitrary  material  demands  of 
labor,  the  problem  is  really  more  difficult — there  is  no  visible 
end  to  its  extravagant  aspirations.  The  final  step  may  not  only 
take  the  form  of  a  general  reluctance  to  work,  already  much  in 
evidence,  but  of  a  revolt  against  the  unequal  apportionment  of 
occupations,  especially  of  such  of  a  dangerous,  injurious  and 
disagreeable  character.  The  point  taken  is  the  query:  Why 
should  it  be  the  lot  of  some  men,  their  sons  and  sons'  sons  for 
generations  to  come  to  be  coal  and  mineral  miners,  sewer  dig- 
gers, sailors,  freight-car  couplers,  plumbers,  sulphur  or  arsenic 
workers,  ship-boiler  stokers  or  workers  in  any  others  of  the 
many  low-grade  occupations — not  so  much  because  of  these 
being  particularly  hard  work  but  because  of  their  being  dan- 
gerous to  life  and  health,  unclean  and  offensive  to  the  senses 
— while  other  men  and  their  descendants  are  privileged  to  fol- 
low occupations  of  comparative  ease,  security  and  cleanliness? 
The  fundamental  justice  of  this  question  and  protest  cannot  be 
'  denied,  yet  any  attempt  at  solving  it  by  means  of  the  current 
socialistic  ideas  will  destroy  civilization  and  send  man  back  to 
the  caves.  Supernatural  religion  has  a  ready  and  effective 
answer  to  the  conundrum,  and  as  long  as  it  held  implicit  power 
over  men's  minds  was  able  to  discourage  this  inquiry,  but 
philosophies  of  mere  negation  cannot  answer  it. 

In  rationalistic  thought,  as  we  hope  to  explain  it  later,  with 
its  positive  moral  foundation  in  nature  and  purely  mundane 
conceptions,  relations  and  objects,  an  answer  will  also  be  found; 
a  force  of  restraint  and  willing  acquiescence  as  strong  as  that 
of  religion  was  but  more,  effective  and  permanent  because  more 
convincing!  It  is  this  philosophy  which  must  be  grafted  upon 
labor  aspirations  and  socialistic  doctrine  for  their  purification. 
But  in  regard  to  the  coming  socialistic  political  democracy  this 
rational  life  philosophy  will  also  be  the  agency  capable  of  sup- 

201 


plying  that  stability  and  rectitude  which  have  so  far  been 
wanting  in  republics;  it  will  furnish  an  ethical  foundation  which 
will  be  harmonious  with  free  political  institutions — the  un- 
trameled  exercise  of  the  intelligence  and  personal  will,  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  spirit  of  autocracy  and  dictation  which  animates 
religions  and  their  monarchical  associates. 

The  changes  of  character  and  outlook  described  in  the 
foregoing  study  of  Germany  in  the  war  apply  with  no  less 
pertinacity  to  the  other  modern  nations — they  are  the  universal 
attributes  of  our  materialistic,  iconoclastic  and  conceited  age; 
but  they  are  so  much  more  conspicuous  in  the  case  of  Germany 
because  of  the  stronger  contrast  there  with  conditions  of  for- 
mer times.  The  statements  made  were  painfully  illustrated  by 
many  features  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  Germany,  but 
especially  by  the  opportunistic  selfishness  of  the  motives  which 
dictated  the  conclusion  of  a  precipitate  armistice  at  any  price, 
and  later  by  the  rabid  radicalism  and  shocking  violence  which 
accompanied  the  German  revolution.  The  deeds  of  fanatical 
fury,  of  moral  degradation,  of  defiant,  exultant  disregard  of 
all  the  fundamentals  of  civilized  human  society  which  occurred 
in  the  German  revolution  at  the  end  of  the  war  approach  closely 
to  the  wildest  excesses  of  the  great  French  revolution  of  1789- 
1793  and  of  the  Bolshevist  revolutions  in  Russia,  in  March  and 
November,  1917.  A  thoroughly  depraved  state  of  the  percep- 
tions and  emotions  only  can  explain  these  insane  excesses. 
None  of  these  aberrations  and  brutalities  of  conduct  would 
have  been  possible  in  Germany  forty  years  ago;  the  fact  of 
their  occurrence  is  proof  of  that  demoralization  (in  the  literal 
sense   of   the   word)    which  we  have   described. 

But  this  denunciation  of  the  rough  outward  eff'ects  of  the 
imperfect  understanding  of  the  ideas  of  the  new  drift,  moral 
and  social,  must  not  be  interpreted  as  a  condemnation  of  the 
great  thoughts  of  progressive  social  and  ethical  philosophy 
which  underlie  these  conditions,  nor  of  the  natural  and  logical 
principle  of  modern  democracy.  Our  strictures  are  against  the 
methods  of  propaganda,  argument,  teaching  by  which  these 
programs  are  put  before  the  ordinary  man  and  woman  of  only 
partial  education,  resulting  in  the  deplorable  effects  upon  them 

202 


which  we  have  stated.  What  they  undei-stand  and  expect  is  quite 
a  different  thi»g  from  that  which  the  great  thinkers  who  have 
launched  these  systems  expect  from  them  in  their  practical 
application.  The  mischief  is  done  by  the  professional  and 
"interested"  propagandists,  interpreters,  proselyters  and  politi- 
cal party  leaders  who  bring  the  message  from  the  fountain 
heads  to  the  people — but  instead  of  instructing  succeed,  in  most 
cases,  only  to  confound  and  corrupt.  It  is  probably  the  greatest 
of  all  problems  before  the  world — for  the  orderly  development 
and  direction  of  the  stream  now  running — to  so  devise  the 
methods  of  propagation  and  amalgamation  of  modern  political 
and  sociological  thought  that  its  rising  flood  may  not  overwhelm 
us!  This  subject  will  be  pursued  to  a  fuller  conclusion  in  the 
article  "The  Summit.' 

In  the  case  of  the  German  people's  lunatic  and  I'epulsive 
revolutionary  violence,  it  should  be  allowed,  in  fairness,  that 
the  psychological  change  we  have  described  was  accentuated  by 
their  fury  at  the  loss  of  the  war  and  their  chagrin  at  realizing 
how  they  had  been  coldly  deceived  and  their  trust  abused  by 
the  sonorous  and  assuring  declarations  of  President  Wilson 
w^hich  had  been  so  flagrantly  disregarded  in  the  armistice  terms. 
To  their  understanding  the  policy  of  the  social-democratic 
leaders  to  conclude  the  armistice  at  all  hazards,  in  their  political 
interest,  had  no  connection  with  the  plainly  expressed  moral 
obligation  of  the  Entente  countries,  particularly  of  America,  to 
keep  the  promises  given! 


IN  Germany,  as  an  empire,  there-  had  arisen  and  been  prac- 
ticed the  ideal  of  the  individual  citizen  merging  himself  and 
his  all  in  "the  State,"  and  the  State,  in  return,  existing  for  the 
best  interests  and  advancement  of  the  individual.  It  was  the 
greatest  cooperative  society  yet  devised,  in  idea  and  numbers 
concerned!  This  political  ideal  has  been  applied  to  a  similar 
degree  and  result  by  no  other  people  so  far,  ancient  or  modern. 
In  Germany  it  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  empire's  development, 
it  was  its  ethical  foundation  and  the  complexion  of  its  internal 
administration.  This  principle  produced  a  distinctive  kind  of 
civilization  or  "Kultur,"  based  on  a  definite  thought  which  per- 

203 


vaded  all  relations  and  activities  and  lent  its  tone  even  to 
private  life.  Its  results  were  so  remarkable,  considering  the 
comparatively  short  period  of  its  reiign — about  forty  years— 
that  the  German  empire  as  a  State  of  a  distinctive  character 
will  be  a  source  of  study  for  the  political  philosopher  for  many 
years  to  come;  it  may  in  future  times  be  the  inspiration  to 
similar  endeavors  by  other  peoples.  The  outward  political 
form  of  this  State,  a  semi-autocratic  monarchy  of  much  demon- 
strative pomp  and  circumstance,  was  but  a  conventional  garb, 
a  traditional  embodiment.  As  the  heart  of  the  German  em- 
pire's political  life  was  the  thought  of  the  intimate  and  con- 
fidential inter-relationship  of  all  its  parts  and  people  to  the 
^hole — it  was,  in  reality  a  true  democracy,  in  principle  at  least 
if  not  in  details  and  external  form.  Thus  in  fighting,  or  pre- 
tending to  fight,  German  "autocracy,"  President  Wilson  and 
the  Entente  allies  fought  a  Quixotian  windmill!  We  are  quite 
sure  that  the  Kaiser  and  the  leaders  of  the  government  and  of 
political  thought  considered  Germany  to  be,  in  idea  ^nd  objects, 
a  democracy — a  conservative  one,  certainly — but  no  autocracy. 
There  was  no  such  thing  in  the  real  sense  in  Germany;  all  that 
we  have  said  above  and  in  article  VI  and  elsewhere  proves  this 
abundantly.  The  political  contention  in  Germany  was  not 
about  the  democratic  idea,  as  such,  but  about  its  shade  and 
degree  of  application.  The  color  of  German  democracy,  how- 
ever, was  always  more  socialistic  than  purely  political. 

When  this  peculiar  partnership  between  government  and 
people  was  put  to  the  test  in  the  great  war  it  produced,  in  the 
beginning,  an  exhibition  of  harmonious  action  and  wonderful 
power  which  challenged  the  admiration  of  the  world ;  but  when 
the  government,  as  the  executive  head  of  the  State,  failed  to 
win  victory,  and  the  war  in  its  terriffic  strain  brought  physical 
exhaustion  and  moral  despair,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  polit- 
ical partnership  should  suff'er  and  finally  collapse,  and  lead  to 
the  collapse  of  the  country  itself.  The  tie  was  preponderat- 
ingly  political  and  materialistic,  voluntary  but  not  deeply  sen- 
timental nor  unselfishly  patriotic,  and  could  not  withstand  the 
strain  of  external  defeat!  Like  a  partnership  in  business  is 
chiefly  for  making  money  and  a  reputation,  the  German  part- 
nership between  government  and   people  was  for  building  up 

204 


prosperity  and  national  success.  All  this  is  now  changed  under 
the  new  republic;  instead  of  two  positive  agencies  working 
hand-in-hand  we  have  that  peculiar  "looseness  and  uncertainty" 
which  has  so  far  been  the  curse  of  full  popular  government. 

It  remains  now  to  be  seen  what  Germany  will,  do  with  her 
real,  complete  democratic  republic.  She  is  in  many  respects 
better  equipped  for  this  form  of  government  than  most  other 
countries  through  her  experience  in  cooperation  under  the 
empire.  Will  she  succeed  where  so  many  have  failed;  will  she 
be  able  to  overcome  by  her  preparation,  the  intelligence  of  her 
people  and  their  better-balanced  education,  their  natural  hon- 
esty of  purpose  and  thoroughness  of  method  those  obstacles 
and  human  deficiencies  because  of  which  so  many  republics, 
ancient  and  modern,  have  run  to  seed  and  final  dissolution? 
But  whatever  may  happen  in  the  future,  and  with  full  apprecia- 
tion of  what  the  empire  stood  for  and  accomplished,  we  may 
be  sure  of  one  thing,  and  rejoice  in  it:  The  old  idea  of  the 
monarchy  "by  the  grace  of  God"  is  dead  and  will  nevermore 
be  resurrected!  The  connection  with  the  people  having  been 
violently  rent  asunder,  the  spell  of  tradition  and  outward  suc- 
cess broken  and  the  nimbus  of  a  ruler  "by  divine  mission  and 
unction"  dissipated,  Germany  will  never  again  .return  to  the 
monarchy  and  imperialism  of  the  former  empire.  If  monarchy 
is  again  to  come,  it  will  require  to  be  of  the  most  advanced, 
liberal  and  fully  representative  form.  Any  other  would  be  an 
offense  to  common  sense  and  the  healthy  instincts  of  our  times 
of  personal  rights,  political  freedom  and  responsibility  of  the 
individual  citizen. 

The  idea  of  the  "Prussian"  and  "Bourbon"  monarchy  is 
obsolete,  childish,  ludicrous  for  our  day  and  temper!  Presi- 
dent Wilson  spoke  a  true  word  when  he  held  up  to  ridicule 
and  scorn  "the  mediaeval  pomp  and  trappings  and  pretense  of 
divine  sanction"  of  the  orthodox  conception  of  monarchy  as 
illustrated  before  the  war  in  Prussia,  Austria,  Bavaria,  Russia 
and  Spain.  There  is  more  than  enough  of  these  unwarranted 
pretensions  and  silly  court  practices  left  in  the  monarchies  of 
England,  Belgium,  Holland,  etc.,  of  today!  It  would  seem  to 
require  the  atmosphere  of  the  Middle  Ages  for  monarchy  "vo7i 
Gottes  Gnaden"  to  be  sustained  by  genuine  conviction  on  the 

205 


part  of  the  people.  The  return  of  the  old  monarchy  in  Ger- 
many would  plainly  be  in  contradiction  -^ith  the  advance  to  those 
freer  and  bolder  ethical  conceptions,  at  the  expense  of  super- 
natural religions,  which  we  have  indicated,  a  movement  of  which 
we  shall  speak  more  fully  later  and  in  which  Germany  will  be  a 
foremost  leader. 


MORE   LIGHT   ON   SUNDRY   TOPICS   OF   PRECEDING 

ARTICLES. 

A.  World  Conquest  and  German  Jingoism.  The  political 
parties  which  are  credited  with  being  the  so-called  "militarists" 
and  "jingoes"  of  Germany  are  variously  known  as  the  Con- 
servatives, Junkers,  Fatherland  party,  All-German  party,  gov- 
ernment party,  in  opposition  to  five  or  six  groups  of  Liberals, 
Socialists,  Democrats,  People's  parties.  Much  was  made  during 
the  war  of  this  German  "World  Conquest"  charge  without  it 
having  had  any  real  foundation  in  fact,  as  we  have  shown. 
Granted  that  there  was  such  an  element  of  national  ambition- 
ists  in  Germany,  they  were  only  a  small  minority  of  the  Ger- 
man people  and  their  aims  did  not  emanate  fi'om  the  Imperial 
govei-nment  nor  represent  its  policy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
designs  of  these  pai'ties  were  not  at  all  for  the  ruthless  con- 
quest of  any  other  people's  territories,  but  merely  for  friendly 
arrangements  by  treaties  and  compensation,  purchase,  etc.,  to 
extend  Germany's  economic  and  commercial  facilities,  made 
necessary  by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  country.  No  specific 
charges  of  world  conquest  policy,  plots  of  annexation,  etc., 
have  ever  been  brought  forward  by  the  Allies  against  Ger- 
many; the  charge  has  been  nothing  more  than  an  artificial 
manoeuvre  of  the  war!  Nowhere  in  the  world  is  the  German 
known  as  particularly  aggressive,  quarrelsome,  pugnacious, 
selfish  and  unkind  to  others.  And  where,  in  the  past  and  in 
the  present,  has  there  ever  been  a  worthwhile  nation  which  has 
not  had -its  "expansionists"  and  "Jingo"  parties  and  policies? 
Today  the  French  ai-e  "openly  charged  with  following  such  mili- 
tarist and  annexationist  ambitions  to  a  dangerous  degree — 
even  by  President  Wilson.  With  the  British  they  have  been 
"second  natui'e"  since  centuries  and  account  for  their  world 
empire.  They  have  been  the  mainspring  of  the  policies  of 
Russia,  Italy,  Greece  and  Roumania  in  the  war.  The  activities 
of  these  aggressive  parties  of  the  different  nations  made  the 
history  of  the  European  wars!  Why  is  Germany  thus  singled 
out  for  condemnation  in  a  trait  which  is  a  part  of  every  na- 
tion? Even  this  country  was  seized  by  a  jingo  spirit  which 
swept  us  into  the  great  war  against  our  better  judgment;  be- 

206 


cause,  no  matter  how  we  may  justify  this  trend  from  other 
points  of  view,  it  was  largely  a  yielding  to  the  temptation  of 
taking    an    important    position    in    international    affairs — if    not 

for  great  material  or  territorial  gain,  then,  at  least,  for  national 
pride  and  distinction! 

As  for  the  German  nation  as  a  whole — from  this  world- 
conquest  point  of  view — a  very  large  section  thereof  were 
already  too  much  "socialistic"  and  even  "internationalistic"  in 
feeling — altruistic  if  you  will — to  be  selfishly  ambitious  for  ter- 
ritories and  domination  at  the  expense  of  others.  This  is  a 
great  truth  the  realization  of  which  should  open  the  minds  of 
Americans  now  filled  with  prejudice  against  Germany  on  this 
topic.  When  the  war  began  to  go  against  her,  the  conquest 
visions  of  her  limited  jingo  parties  vanished  faster  than  they 
had  come  because  they  were  unnatural  to  the  psychology  of 
the  race,  to  the  majority  sentiment  of  the  nation.  It  was  really 
due  in  a  good  measure  to  the  weakness  of  German  world  ambi- 
tions, to  the  pessimistic  mental  habit  of  a  considerable  part  of 
the  people  and  their  leaning  to  "fatalism"  that  Germany  lost 
the  war.  The  shortcomings  of  which  we  have  spoken  in  detail 
are  largely  traceable  to  the  German's  habit  of  taking  the  "objec- 
tive view"  of  things,  of  philosophical  analj'sis  and  ethical  casu- 
istry— all  points  to  his  credit  generally,  but  opposed  to  the 
requirements  of  political  leadership  in  a  world  of  overwhelm- 
ingly unsci'upulous  selfishness. 

The  Germans  are  a  nation  of  thinkers,  investigators,  orgaa- 
izers  and  administrators,  students  in  every  branch,  ardent 
and  thorough  workers — but  no  politicians  or  diplomatists;  they 
are  great  theorists  on  principles  of  government  and  society, 
intense  partisans  and  earnest  debaters  but  unable  to  negotiate 
and  compromise  for  the  obtainable  practical  result!  Their 
method  of  "directness"  in  thought,  repugnance  at  sham  and 
subterfuge  in  argument,  temperamental  impatience  and  im- 
petuosity unfit  them,  in  a  measure,  for  exhibiting  the  highest 
skill  in  diplomacy.  This  we  know  very  well  in  America  from 
their  record  in  party  politics.  For  their  number,  intelligence, 
degree  of  education,  wealth  and  business  position  they  have 
achieved  only  a  mediocre  position  in  our  national  politics  and 
furnished  a  surprisingly  small  proportion  of  men  of  prominence 
and  influence,  although  their  sincere  devotion  to  the  welfare 
of  the  country  cannot  be  questioned. 

B.  The  Relative  Responsibility  of  Peoples  and  Their 
Rulers.  In  political  discussion,  whether  it  concern  the  prob- 
lems of  war  or  peace,  there  is  no  subject  of  greater  import 
and  perplexity  than  that  of  the  relation  of  a  country's  "people" 
to  its  "rulers"  and  of  the  degree  of  responsibility  of  each  for 
any  political  action  taken — particularly  in  a  decision  for  war — 
be  these  rulers  emperors  or  kings,  autocratic  or  liberal,  a  con- 

207 


stitutional  Prime  Minister  and  his  parliamentary  majority  or 
the  President  and  Congress  of  a  republic.  Volumes  have  been 
written  on  this  topic;  it  is  the  corner-stone  of  rational  political 
doctrine  and  success,  especially  in  a  republic!  These  questions 
ever  and  ever  recur:  What  is  really  understood  by  the  expres- 
sion "the  country,"  and  who  really  are  "the  people";  which 
section  of  the  population  is  "the  people"  truly  representative 
of  the  essence,  character  and  >vlll  of  their  country?  And  this 
other  question  occurs,  independently  of  who  the  "rulers"  may 
be:  Are  "the  people"  willing  victims  of  their  "ruler's"  personal 
opinions,  objects  and  decisions  and  without  responsibility  in 
their  acts? 

This  assumption,  the  author  believes,  must  be  entirely  re- 
jected. It  could  only  be  the  case  in  an  absolute  monarchy  of 
the  oldest  type,  without  any  popular  representation,  in  a  people 
uneducated,  stupid,  in  the  bonds  of  fear  and  superstition.  Leav- 
ing aside  the  conditions  under  the  republics  of  Greece  and 
Rome  we  must,  at  least  since  the  time  of  the  French  revolution, 
assign  to  the  people  of  a  country  a  share  in  formulation  of 
the  opinions  and  aims  of  their  rulers  and  the  responsibility 
for  their  acts.  In  England  since  Cromwell,  in  America  since 
1776,  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  since  the  French  revolution, 
"the  people"  have  been  advanced  enough  in  intelligence  and 
self-confidence  of  thought  to  have  acquired  this  influence  and 
responsibility  in  gi-eater  or  lesser  measure  according  to  their 
degree  of  modern  enlightenment.  This  interest  and  influence 
has,  however,  not  been  strong  enough  to  impress  its  view  deci- 
sively upon  the  rulers  until  the  more  recent  times;  but  in  pro- 
portion as  it  developed  in  strength,  the  "rulers"  have  gradually 
become  less  independent  and  more  nearly  the  figureheads  and 
spokesmen  only  of  the  nations  whom  they  represent;  their 
"personal"  opinions  and  objects  have  become  merged  into  the 
national  aim  and  will,  and  "the  people's"  share  of  responsibility 
in  its  government's  policies  fully  established   and   recognized. 

It  is  this  point  which  interests  us  in  connection  with  the 
war,  as  the  "responsibility"  of  the  German  people  for  the 
acts  of  their  rulers  and  government,  of  the  French,  English, 
American  and  other  peoples  for  their  respective  rulers  and 
governments  have  been  frequent  points  of  debate  and  differ- 
ence of  opinion.  As  indicated,  the  author  holds  the  view  that 
the  people  share  in  the  responsibility  for  their  government's 
acts.  Neither  should  they,  in  defeat,  hide  themselves  behind 
their  ruler's  faults,  nor,  in  victory,  be  denied  their  proper  share 
in  its  attainment.  This  said,  we  have  still  not  established  who 
"the  responsible  people"  are  or,  properly,  should  be.  In  a  re- 
public the  "majority"  rule  must  prevail  in  order  that  political 
action  be  effected,  as  it  would  be  impossible  to  expect  abso- 
lute agi'eement  on  any  question  by  all  those  entitled  to  vote. 
But  who  are  they  who  constitute  this  voting  majority?  Natu- 
rally,  it  is  the   large   body   of  the  ordinary  working  population 

208 


of  a  country,  the  lowest  section  in  the  social  seale,  who  pre- 
dominate decisively  over  all  the  other  sections  or  "classes"  in 
every  country.  These,  also  called  the  "higher  classes,"  are 
such  not  entirely  by  higher  natural  intelligence  and  education 
but  mostly  by  the  possession  of  wealth  and  the  power  it  gives, 
and  by  social  position  derived  from  meritorious  ancestry,  dis- 
tinguished public  service,  etc.  Thus  the  ruling  majority,  while 
not  necessarily  stupid  and  uneducated  as  individuals,  does  in- 
clude, from  the  natural  circumstance  of  its  social  and  material 
position  the  largest  percentage  of  the  stupid,  ignorant,  unedu- 
cated of  a  nation — which  also  carries  with  it  other  well-known 
delinquencies. 

We  can  say,  therefore,  that  in  a  republic  "the  people"  is 
the  aggregate  of  the  voters  who  possess  the  right  to  exert 
political  power  by  voting  and  the  "ruling  majority"  of  these 
voters  are  preponderatingly  those  of  the  lowest  social,  intel- 
lectual, educational  and  moral  standard.  Their  time  is  mainly 
occupied  with  the  business  of  making  a  living;  they  are  the 
least  "responsible"  of  the  citizens  because  they  have  the  least 
to  lose  in  any  policies  involving  sacrifices;  they  are  the  most 
dangerous  to  the  commonwealth,  internally,  because  the  most 
open  to  the  harangue  of  the  agitator  trying  to  make  them  see 
their  lowly  position  as  a  just  grievance  and  onerous  burden 
in  comparison  with  that  of  the  better  situated  man. 

The  above  would  make  a  rather  sad  picture  for  a  republic 
if  these  majority  voters  were  left  to  themselves  and  thrown 
entirely  upon  their  own  resources  (intellectual,  educational  and 
moral)  to  decide  political  issues.  No  matter  how  bright  their 
natural  intelligence,  it  could  not  in  all  questions  overcome  the 
handicap  of  insufficient  special  information  and  the  prejudices 
attached  to  ignorance.  In  practice  they  are  guided  by  their 
party  leaders,  the  opposition  speakers  and  independent  think- 
ers to  find  the  light  and  the  right  way  "by  having  the  questions 
at  issue  explained  to  them  and  their  feeling  and  judgment  clari- 
fied. It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  decisions  by  vote  of  "the 
majority  of  the  lowest  classes"  (for  the  "majority"  necessarily 
always  includes  these  lowest  classes)  in  many  instances  makes 
the  decision  which  agrees  with  the  intelligence,  education  and 
sense  of  moral  responsibility  of  the  classes  of  higher  position 
and  endowment. 

Two  pointed  exhibitions  of  the  working  of  this  principle 
occurred  in  the  history  of  the  United  States  of  recent  years; 
one  in  the  "Bryan"  free-silver  campaign  of  1896,  the  other  in 
the  last  election  on  the  war  issues.  In  both  these  elections 
"popular  opinion"  was  at  first  strongly  opposed  to  the  final  ver- 
dict rendered  by  it,  but  was  successfully  convinced  of  its  error 
by  the  literature  and  oratory  of  the  campaigns.  The  danger  of 
a  possible  mistake  of  decision  roused  the  clearer  thinking  and 
more  "responsible"  element  of  the  voters  to  unusual  efforts  to 
"lead  the  blind  numerical  majority"  out  of  the  woods  of  igno- 

209 


ranee  and  prejudice.  But  this  method  involves  enormous  labor 
and  outlay  and  carries  great  risks  to  the  nation,  as  there  is 
no  possible  guaranty  of  its  successful  working  in  all  cases.  A 
better  method  is  imperatively  demanded  to  give  to  the  "people's 
majority"  a  higher  character  of  intelligence  and  reliability. 

Reasoning  merely  from  points  of  ordinary  common  sense 
and  observation,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  the  part  of  a  popu- 
lation most  broadly  representative  of  a  country's  character 
and  aims  are  the  educated  middle  classes — all  those  of  a  more 
settled  existence  than  the  mere  vi^orkingmen,  those  possessed 
of  some  means  and  homes  of  their  own,  of  at  least  a  grammar- 
school  education,  and  including  also  the  intellectual  and  pro- 
fessional classes  generally.  Numerically,  this  class  is  the  largest 
in  any  nation,  above  the  level  of  the  ordinary  workingmen 
(laborers,  factory  employees,  farm  and  mine  workers,  menial 
servants,  etc.),  and  this  "middle  class"  joined  to  the  uppermost 
section  of  society  and  business  would  appear  to  be  really  the 
representative  and  responsible  "people"  of  a  nation.  The  above 
division,  however,  is  largely  "theoretical,"  in  practice  and  fact 
no  hard-and-fast  rule  of  class  separation  can  be  drawn.  The 
only  way  to  effect  this  desirable — necessary — -separation  is  by 
a  qualiRcation  test  (educational  and  character)  of  men  and 
women  voters — by  limited  qualified  suffrage — as  advocated  by 
the  writer  in  his  book  "National  Evolution,"  and  sustained  by 
facts  and  logic  not  easily  controverted.  Such  a  process  of 
selection  would  give  to  any  nation  based  on  suffrage  by  men 
and  women  its  "real,  responsible  people."  ,  There  can  be  no 
question  that  political  power  and  responsibility  of  a  people 
should  attach  to  a  majority  of  qualified  voters  only  and  not  to 
the  numerical  majority  of  all  those  who  under  the  present  laws 
are  entitled  to  vote,  and  who  may,  in  any  election,  reduce  this 
qualified  majority  to  a  minority  by  the  mere  force  of  their 
numbers. 

From  this  argum.ent  we  see  "who  properly  should  be  the 
people  in  any  country,"  and  also  that  in  constitutional  mon- 
archies, in  which  suffrage  is  restricted  to  householders  and  men 
of  a  certain  minimum  income,  settled  occupation  of  an  advanced 
class  and  some  personal  proven  character  and  responsibility,  thi« 
principle  is  much  better  realized  than  in  republics  of  unqualified 
suffrage.  Were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  other  conditions  and  influ- 
ences which  obtain  in  monarchies  prevent  the  full  and  just 
application  of  the  principle  of  qualified  suffrage,  they  would 
possess  a  certain  degree  of  political  superiority  over  republics 
in  regard  to  this  question  as  to  "who  the  responsible  people 
of  a  country  are  or  should  be."  For  this  I'eason,  every  existing 
republic  which  desires  to  advance  on  the  road  of  purifying  and 
fortifying  its  political  representative  system  should,  in  the 
writer's  opinion,  embody  in  its  electoral  practice  the  principle 
of  limited  and  qualified  suffrage. 

210 


C.     AUSTRIA,  TURKEY  AND  BULGARIA  IN  THE  WAR, 

SELF-DETERMINATION  OF  NATIONS.     POLAND. 

OPPORTUNITIES  FOR  RETALIATION. 

The  political  and  economic  relations  established  by  Germany 
with  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  have  been  sketched  in  con- 
nection with  the  story  of  Germany's  eastern  extension  plans. 
The  Triple  Alliance  had  previously  drawn  intimate  bonds  be- 
tween Germany,  Austria  and  Italy.  As  to  Turkey,  from  the  time 
of  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  after  the  Russo-Turkish  was  (1878),  she 
looked  to  Germany  for  her  economic,  financial  and  military  reor- 
ganization ;  similarly  with  Bulgaria.'  This  relationship  was  a  natu- 
ral result  of  mutual  interests.  It  brought  political  security,  com- 
mercial enterprise  and  prosperity  to  Turkey,  Bulgaria  and 
Austria,  and  in  return  Germany  obtained  those  concessions  and 
guarantees  which  allowed  her  to  plan  and  float  her  Berlin- 
Bagdad  railroad  scheme.  How  great  the  benefits  from  the  suc- 
cess of  that  scheme  would  have  been  to  these  three  countries 
can  easily  be  imagined;  Germany's  success  would  have  been 
their  success!  There  was  never  the  least  question  or  suspicion 
of  political  subjugation  of  these  countries  by  Germany,  and 
the  attempt  of  the  Entente  to  represent  them  as  vassals  of 
Germany  was  but  one  of  its  many  deceiving  war  inventions. 
In  fact,  the  development  of  the  war  showed  that  in  the  case 
of  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  the  political  bonds  tying  them  to  Ger- 
many were  anything  but  categorical  in  case  of  war,  and  both 
countries  took  some  time  to  consider  their  course  before  they 
reached  the  voluntary  conclusion  that  their  moral  obligations 
as  much  as  their  best  interests  dictated  their  entry  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  Germany.  Turkey's  decision  was  announced 
several  months  after  the  opening  of  the  war,  while  that  of 
Bulgaria  did  not  follow  until  the  beginning  of  October,  1915. 

The  military  operations  of  these  three  powers  are  on  record 
and  do  not  concern  us  much  in  detail.  Austria's  offensives 
were  specially  directed  against  Russia  and  Italy;  those  of 
Bulgaria  against  Serbia,  in  the  beginning,  and  later  against  the 
combined  French  and  other  Entente  troops  in  Macedonia,  in 
front  of  Salonica.  Upon  Turkey  fell  the  heavy  task  of  defend- 
ing Constantinople,  which  had  been  threatened  by  a  combined 

211 


Entente  land  and  sea  attack  upon  the  forts  on  the  peninsula 
of  Gallipoli.  Turkey  also  had  to  defend  her  vast  territories  in 
Asia  Minor,  Mesopotamia,  Syria,  Palestine  and  Egypt  against 
the  British,  and  the  Caucasus  and  Armenia  against  the  Rus- 
sians. The  military  assistance  which  Germany  derived  from 
Austria  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  in  the  campaigns 
against  Russia  was  considerable.  As  to  Bulgaria  and  Turkey, 
they  needed  Germany's  help,  rather  than  otherwise,  in  the 
prosecution  of  their  own  immediate  tasks.  As  Austria  grew 
weaker,  she,  also,  became  more  of  a  strain  upon  Germany  than 
a  support.  But  it  must  be  acknowledged,  as  a  matter  of  moral 
credit  due  to  them,  that  all  three  allies  of  Germany  displayed 
splendid  loyalty  and  faithfulness  to  Germany  in  her  great 
struggle;  they  fought  by  her  side  valiantly  and  to  the  limit  of 
their  resources  and  to  the  very  last  until  complete  exhaustion 
compelled  them  to  give  up.  As  to  Germany's  faithfulness  to 
her  ally  Austria  from  the  very  inception  of  the  Entente  con- 
spiracy and  beginning  of  the  war,  as  well  as  to  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria,  in  spite  of  all  the  sacrifices  they  brought  upon  her, 
it  is  a  monument  to  her  character! 

For  the  general  purpose  of  this  book  the  interest  of  this 
article  centers  in  the  breakup  of  the  Austrian  monarchy  as  a 
result  of  her  defeat.  Austria's  defeat  was  similar  in  all  re- 
spects to  that  of  Germany — military  discouragement  and  slack- 
ing of  discipline  in  the  armies,  economic  exhaustion,  stai'vation 
of  the  civil  population  and  political  disruption — all  working 
together.  The  latter  was,  in  the  case  of  Austria,  not  only 
socialistic  and  democratic  but  ultra-Wilsonian  on  the  subject 
of  the  issue  of  racial  self-determination  of  peoples  which  had 
been  injected  into  the  European  peace-and-war  turmoil.  In  the 
earlier  article  on  Austria  we  explained  the  conglomerate 
racial  composition  of  the  country  and  the  troubles  which  this 
had  given  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  to  govern  over  these  antag- 
onistic interests,  nourished  continually  by  intriguing  outside 
agitators.  To  this  condition  must  be  added  the  spread  of  the 
socialistic  doctrine  and  the  general  trend  towards  democracy. 
In  consequence  of  this  co-working  of  disrupting  influences,  the 
dissolution  of  Austria  had  been  freely  predicted  for  years  to 
occur  soon  after  the  death  of  the  old  and  venerated  emperor 

212 


Francis  Joseph.  But  in  the  last  decade  before  the  war  new 
constructive  ideas  had  come  to  the  fx'ont,  represented  by  Arch- 
duke Francis  Fei'dinand,  who  was  assassinated  at  Sarajevo. 
(All  this  IS  partly  recapitulation,  due  to  the  author's  purpose  to 
present  a  rounded  nai*rative  or  argument  in  each  article.) 

This  outward  cause  of  the  war — the  Serajevo  plot — cannot 
be  stated  too  often  because  it  reveals  the  complicated  and 
determined  motives  behind  the  war.  No  misrepresentations 
made  by  the  Entente  nations  in  their  intent  of  fastening  the 
guilt  of  the  war  upon  Germany  exclusively  will  avail  over  these 
plain  facts:  First,  that  the  character  of  the  Serbian  con- 
spiracy and  the  refusal  of  that  government  to  allow  Austria 
herself  to  examine  into  the  secret  police  records  prove  con- 
clusively that  that  country  could  not  face  the  revelation  of  the 
facts  because  she  had  given  herself  up  as  a  willing  tool  into 
the  hands  of  Russia  for  the  furtherance  of  the  latter's  political 
designs;  second,  that  imperial  Russia  had,  from  compound  rea- 
sons which  we  have  previously  examined,  arrived  at  a  stage 
of  such  pressing  political  necessity  that  she  did  not  hesitate 
to  use  desperate  means  to  precipitate  a  war  with  Austria;  third, 
that  this  entire  situation  was  well  known  in  England,  France, 
Germany  and  Austria.  There  was  no  mystery  about  the  out- 
break of  the  great  war;  neither  in  its  long-view  motives  nor  in 
its  short-view  provocation!  All  those  "exchanges  of  notes" 
and  "conference  propositions"  were  mere  diplomatic  play  to 
gain  time,  to  perfect  the  moves,  to  put  one  of  the  powers, — 
Germany — the  intended  victim —  in  the  position  of  being  first 
in  declaring  war! 

The  dissolution  of  Austria  in  the  whirlwind  of  the  war, 
snatched  away,  as  she  was,  from  the  opportunity  of  her  re- 
generation to  an  enlarged  political  destiny,  is  even  a  greater 
tragedy  than  the  fall  of  Germany  because  it  seems  definite  and 
irremediable,  whereas  Germany  will  rise  again  and  continue  to 
live  as  a  national  entity.  Austria  has  been  roughly  torn 
asunder  by  the  application  of  this  "self-determination  of  na- 
tions" idea  which  fell  upon  particularly  fertile  ground,  in  her 
case.  This  principle  is  theoretically  rational  and  just,  provided 
all  the  conditions  for  success  in  its  application  be  present;  if 

213 


not,  then  this  principle  may  block  real  national  progresss  and 
work  injustice  to  its  adherents  and  opponents  alike.  To  be 
successful  the  "nationality"  concerned  must  be  real  and  de- 
veloped to  full  consciousness  of  racial  character  and  aspirations, 
unity  of  sentiment  and  absence  of  strong  religious  dissensions. 
This  feeling  and  complexion  must  not  be  confined  to  a  limited 
number  of  the  most  advanced  classes  of  a  people  but  should 
be  shared  by  a  good  majority  of  the  population.  There  should 
also  be  present  in  such  embryo  states  such  physical  and  cli- 
matic conformation  as  to  provide  a  diversified  agricultural  and 
industrial  activity  in  order  to  insure  to  the  nation  "a  living" 
and  a  fair  degree  of  material  independence.  Without  these 
guarantees  no  modern  independent  country  can  thrive  in  the 
vortex  of  present-day  necessities  and  competition  for  existence. 
Are  the  Czecho-Slovacs,  the  Hungarians,  the  Jugo-Slavs  and 
the  German-Austrians  so  situated?  We  think  not;  the  latter 
are  the  best  equipped  of  them,  except  economically.  They 
could,  however,  by  their  natural  and  strongly  desired  union 
with  the  Greater  German  Republic  as  one  of  its  members  have 
arranged  for  themselves  very  favorable  conditions  of  economic 
life,  combined  with  necessary  national  attributes  and  practical 
political  independence.  The  denial  of  this  desire  of  German- 
Austria  by  the  peace  conference,  lashed  by  French  jealousy, 
speaks  volumes  for  the  lack  of  political  capacity  and  the  nar- 
rowness of  motives  of  that  body.  Of  the  other  three  embryo 
states  not  one  possesses  the  conditions  we  have  named  as  neces- 
sary for  the  promise  of  permanence  and  success;  each  carries, 
even  now,  in  the  circumtances  of  their  formation  the  seeds  of 
dissension  and  failure  which  no  League  of  Nations  or  other 
artificial  agency  will  be  able  to  control.  As  we  expressed  it 
before:  "An  ethnological  pedi^'ee  alone  is  not  a  sufficient  basis 
for  erecting  in  security  an  independent  national  state.  These 
three  peoples  have  for  many  years  indulged  in  dreams  of  inde- 
pendence, inspired  by  advanced  patriots,  without  having  had  a 
very  clear  perception  of  the  how  or  the  wherefor,  or  any  real 
unity  of  effort;  nor  have  they  shown  any  decided  ideas  as  to 
the  political  form,  whether  monarchy  or  republic.  Their 
strongest  animating  impulse  had  been  to  be  free  from  Austria 
chiefly   because   professional   agitators   and   outside   interested 

214 


plotters  had  made  them  believe  that  they  were  being  oppressed, 
that  they  were  being  hindered  in  attaining  their  national  des- 
tiny,   that   they   were    being    "bossed"    by   their    German-race 

rulers. 

By  thus  having  distrust,  jealousy  and  enmity  planted  into 
their  hearts,  they  were  blinded  to  the  substantial  benefits  which 
they  were  receiving  in  education  and  general  wellbeing;  they 
totally  missed  the  rational  point  of  view  of  their  position  and 
opportunities  as  members  of  a  well-ordered  and  important 
State.  Upon  their  distracted  state  of  mind  the  Wilsonian  doc- 
trines fell  like  a  fructifying  shower  of  rain  and  quickly  con- 
firmed these  peoples  in  their  phantastic  fervor  for  freedom  and 
political  independence.  Similarly  to  the  case  of  the  German 
people,  the  strain  and  suffering  of  war,  the  mental  agony  ever 
present  and  the  increasing  hunger  ^ere  the  ready  handmaids 
of  the  whole  process  of  revolution.  Now  it  is  done;  and  left 
to  themselves  these  misguided  peoples  will  soon  discover  how 
much  they  have  lost,  how  little  they  have  gained;  how  much 
they  are  still  in  the  age  of  tutelage  and  how  little  they  are 
fit  for  independence,  especially  for  a  republic.  To  tear  down 
is  easy,  but  to  build  up  from  the  ruins  created  is  quite  another 
matter.  Never  before  have  any  "aspiring  nationalities"  started 
out  on  their  pilgrimage  to  independence  with  a  more  uncertain 
step  and  dubious  prospect! 


REGARDING  Poland  a  situation  exists  of  similar  character- 
istics but  of  even  greater  perplexity.     Not  only  has  the 
central  province   of  the  former  Russian   Poland  proper,  with 
about  60  per  cent  of  real  Polish  people,  been  erected  into  an 
independent  State  by  the  peace  settlement,  but  also  all  those 
parts  of  the  old  kingdom  of  Poland  which  were  separated  from 
it  in  the  first  and  second  partition  of  Poland    (1750-60)    and 
were  joined,  respectively,  to  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria.    This 
old  Kingdom  of  the  18th  century  had  at  no  time  been  a  real 
homogeneous  State  as  to  race  and  language,  and  had  for  decades 
been  a  country  of  dissensions  and  sti'ife.     It  was  this  disorder 
and  lack  of  political  ability  which  brought  on  the  wars  of  con- 
quest and  annexation  by  Prussia,  Russia  and  Austria  and  the 

215 


partition  of  the  country  by  these  neighboring  states  in  order  to 
obtain  settled  political  conditions.  These  three  parts,  of  mixed 
population  even  at  the  time  of  the  partition,  have  in  the  many 
decades  which  have  since  elapsed  become  so  thoroughly  ti'ans- 
fused  by  the  people  of  the  respective  ruling  nations,  and  by 
the  all-permeating  Jews,  that  they  are  today  Polish  only  to  the 
extent  of  from  25  to  40  per  cent  of  the  total  inhabitants. 
This  remnant  of  oi'iginal  Polish  stock  now  left  in  the  former 
Russian,  Prussian  and  Austrian  provinces  belongs  in  overwhelm- 
ing proportion  to  the  lower  classes  of  the  people.  The  Polish 
middle  class  had  died  out,  leaving  only  the  poor  peasants  and 
the  land-owning  nobility.  The  business  life  and  progress  of 
these  provinces  and  all  the  activities  of  education  and  refine- 
ment were  in  the  hands  of  the  respective  Russian,  Prussian 
and  Austrian  nationals  and  of  the  upper  "mixed  classes"  of 
the  native  population,  who  were  not  more  than  15  per  cent  of 
the  total.  The  idea  that  these  provinces  were  "conquered  sec- 
tions" and  still  in  a  state  of  amalgamation  had  almost  dis- 
appeared, especially  in  the  large  cities,  except  in  the  joint  use 
of  the  Polish  language  together  with  German,  Russian  and 
Yiddish. 

In  spite  of  these  indisputable  facts,  the  Entente  allies  have 
not  hesitated,  under  the  impulse  for  a  free  and  independent 
Poland,  to  sanction  the  Polish  claims  to  the  German  province 
of  Posen,  to  parts  of  German  Silesia,  to  a  large  part  of  former 
Austrian  Galicia  and  to  the  outlying  Russo-Polish  sections  and 
to  include  all  this  territory,  with  Old-Poland,  in  the  new  State. 
All  these  parts  had  become  thoroughly  amalgamated  with  the 
countries  to  which  they  belonged  in  1914.  This  disposition 
was  particularly  unjust  to  Germany.  Not  only  had  the  pro- 
vince of  Posen  been  entirely  Germanized,  but  all  the  large 
manufacturing  cities  of  Old-Poland — Plock,  Lodz,  Lublin,  War- 
saw itself — were  almost  wholly  German  cities  in  all  their  busi- 
ness and  social  activities.  Granting  fully  the  justice  of  creat- 
ing a  free  and  independent  Poland,  the  preponderatingly German 
province  of  Posen  should  have  been  left  to  Germany,  providing 
for  liberal  expropriation  by  purchase  for  such  of  the  Poles  as 
would   not  have  cared   to   remain.     For  identical  and   equally 

216 


strong  reasons,  the  section  of  Silesia  which  has  (subject  to  a 
plebiscite)  been  awarded  to  Poland,  should  have  been  left  to 
Germany.  Every  consideration  of  equity,  political  wisdom  and 
stability  of  the  peace  should  have  dictated  such  a  decision. 
But,  not  enough  with  this  high-handed  imposition  of  the  arro- 
gant will  of  the  victor,  it  was  further  decided  at  Paris  to  take 
from  Germany  a  strip  of  land  cut  out  of  the  heart  of  her  own 
country,  and  separating  thereby  East  Prussia  from  West  Prus- 
sia, to  provide  a  sea-coast  continuity  for  this  greater  Poland  to 
the  Baltic  Sea,  with  the  fine  sea-port  city  of  Dantzig  at  the 
end  thereof,  a  city  German  to  the  core  back  to  the  Middle  Ages. 
A  truly  wise  and  noble  scheme  it  is —  this  Polisii  settlement — 
one  that  does  honor  to  tho  Paris  conference  of  justice  and  en- 
lightened action  for  the  prevention  of  future  wars!  The  bold 
outstanding  fact  of  the  arrangement  is  this:  The  cupidity  of 
motives  of  the  Entente  nations  w^as  so  great  and  their  political 
density  so  deep  that  it  appeared  fair  and  proper  to  them  to  rob 
and  dismember  Germany  to  make  the  "sentimental  experi- 
ment" of  setting  up  as  a  nation  this  half-developed  people — • 
mixture  of  Poles,  Russians,  Czechs,  Ruthenians,  Slovacs  and 
Jews — which  makes  up  the  geographical  term  of  the  new 
greater  Poland ! 

What  has  this  Polish  people  ever  been  and  done  to  deserve 
all  this  consideration?  The  true  explanation  is  simple:  In  the 
case  of  Poland  as  in  that  of  the  four  new  states  carved  out  of 
former  Austria,  independence  was  literally  thrown  at  them 
by  the  victorious  Allies  because  the  defeat  of  Germany  and 
Austria  and  the  existing  impotence  of  Russia  made  it  possible 
for  them  to  give  ostentatious  application  thereby  to  two  of  their 
much-advertised  "idealistic  war  principles"  without  risk  of  op- 
position, the  principles  of  the  protection  of  small  nationalities 
and  that  of  the  right  of  self-determination  of  peoples.  But  in 
the  case  of  Ireland — an  island  nation,  racially  clean-cut,  able, 
virile,  complete,  advanced,  the  mother  of  a  good  share  of  Eng- 
land's greatness  in  every  direction,  the  case  is  different  because 
her  liberation  is  opposed  by  one  of  the  Entente  partner  nations 
— a  powerful  one,  ready  to  make   opposition — England.     She 

217 


needs  but  to  say:  "Hands  off;  this  is  a  domestic  question  and 
our  own  private  affair" — and,  behold,  the  "self-determination- 
of-nations"  call  is  smothered  and  buried  in  a  maze  of  explana- 
tions, accusations  and  exceptions! 


T  N  view  of  the  fact  that  whatever  there  is,  today,  of  wealth, 
established  business  enterprise,  public  improvements,  com- 
merce, education  and  culture  in  these  countries  of  Poland, 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Hungary  and  Jugo-Slavia  is  due  to  the  extent 
of  fully  75  per  cent  to  the  direct  work  or  inspiration  of  Ger- 
many and  German-Austria,  respectively,  and  considerably  also 
to  Russia,  these  countries  would  be  justified  to  bring  every 
possible  reprisal  upon  these  ungrateful  and  treacherous  peoples 
who  forsook  their  benefactors  in  their  great  hour  of  need. 
This  strictui'e  applies  much  less  to  German-Austria  and  Hun- 
gary than  to  Bohemia,  Poland  and  Jugo-Slavia.  These  per- 
fidious would-be  nations  deserve  nothing  but  cold  indifference 
and  contempt  from  Germany  and  Austria  in  their  struggle  to 
stay  on  their  feet.  But  measures  of  practical  retaliation  are 
also  justified  to  be  undertaken  and  are,  in  fact,  partly  under 
way:  Retirement  from  these  countries  by  the  German  forces 
of  energy  and  advance,  and  carrying  away  of  their  capital, 
business  organizations,  machinery  and  other  transportable 
equipment  and  property  to  their  own  home  lands.  This  done, 
signs  might  se  set  up  along  the  highways  of  these  countries 
reading:  "If  you  fall  behind  and  need  any  help,  apply  to  the 
Entente  nations." 

This  sentiment  of  retaliation  might  also  very  properly  be 
the  attitude  of  Germany  and  German-Austria  towards  their 
Entente  enemies, — England,  France,  Italy,  America  and  Japan. 
— in  protest  of  the  shocking  abuse  and  wrong  inflicted  upon 
them, — if  a  juster  attitude  towards  them  will  not  soon  be  in- 
augurated. The  threatened  English  and  American  boycott  of 
German  and  Austrian  manufactures  may  very  readily  be  made 
a  "two-edged  sword  of  Damocles."  If  a  change  of  feeling  will 
not  soon  take  place,  business  men  and  manufacturers,  financial 
men,  scientists  and  artists,  technical  experts  and  helpers, 
teachers,  linguists,  artisans,  commercial  clerks  and   high-class 

218 


mechanics,  men  and  women,  citizens  and  aliens  will  be  justified 
to  pull  up  stakes,  and  with  their  families,  money  and  belong- 
ings leave  these  countries  and  return  to  their  native  peoples. 
This  would  apply  especially  to  the  United  States  of  America 
where  the  character  and  qualities  of  Germans  have  been  as- 
sailed and  defiled  in  a  manner  to  bring  the  fire  of  rage  and 
scorn  and  eternal  hatred  to  every  German  and  Austrian  who 
has  been  a  witness  of  this  abuse.  With  the  coming  political 
and  commercial  amalgamation  between  Germany,  German- 
Austria  and  Russia,  and  not  unlikely  Hungary,  into  a  territory 
of  over  two-hundred  millions  of  people,  commanding  untold 
natural  resources  in  coal,  oil,  wood;  iron  and  other  metals;  clay, 
building  stone,  minerals  and  chemicals;^  with  unlimited  and 
diversified  agricultural  lands,  a  great  railroad,  river  and  canal 
system  of  transportation ;  with  sea-coast  front  in  the  North, 
on  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Black  Sea  (now  with  unrestricted 
passage  through  the  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles) — and  the  Scan- 
dinavian countries,  Holland,  Spain,  Bulgaria,  Turkey,  China, 
Mexico  and  Argentina  friendly — this  "continental  econontic 
union"  would  be  big  and  self-supporting  enough  to  be  able  to 
live  and  prosper  without  the  favor  of  the  Entente  countries,  and 
could  dispense  with  it  if  conditions  of  mutual  respect  and  a 
remodeled  peace  of  Versailles  of  honor  and  fairness  cannot  be 
obtained  from  them. 


Influence  of  the  Russian  Revolution  on  the  Course  of  the 
War  and  on  Germany's  Defeat.  This  influence  was  twofold, 
military  and  social,  through  the  revolution  and  the  subsequent 
regime  of  "bolshevist"  communism.  The  first  Russian  revolu- 
tion broke  out  against  the  government  of  the  Czar  early  in 
March,  1917,  and  led  in  the  course  of  a  few  days  to  the  abdica- 
tion and  imprisonment  of  the  Czar  and  his  family  and  the  com- 
plete overthrow  of  the  Imperial  Government.  The  forces  in 
this  first  rising  included  all  shades  of  liberal  democratic  opin- 
ion, from  Constitutional  republicanism  to  extreme  radicalism. 
The  general  aim  was  to  found  a  liberal  republic  of,  as  yet,  in- 
determinate shade  of  principles;  to  do  away  definitely  with 
monarchy,  autocracy  and  Court  rule ;  to  continue  cautiously  the 
agreements  with  the  Entente  and  participation  in  the  war. 
The  latter  had  been  one  strictly  of  the  aristocratic  ruling 
classes  and  government  circles  and  was  very  unpopular  with  the 
people  at  large,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  previous  articles 
of  this  book  on  the  subject. 

219 


Professor  Miliukoff,  as  President  of  the  Conservative  Con- 
stitutional Ministry,  was  in  sympathy  with  popular  feeling  on 
the  war,  but  Entente  influence  gradually  obtained  control,  and 
under  the  leadership  of  the  talented  Kerensky,  as  Minister  of 
War,  a  new  offensive  against  Germany  was  begun  in  June^ 
1917.  This  was  of  a  desultory  character,  however,  the  Russian 
troops  having  been  demoralized  by  the  advent  of  the  revolu- 
tion. Political  sentiment  meanwhile  drifted  gradually  towards 
the  radical  parties,  largely  due  to  the  popular  discontent  with 
the  war,  and  on  November  8th-9th,  the  second  revolution  broke 
out,  directed  against  the  Kerensky  Constitutional  Republic  and 
placing  power  into  the  hands  of  the  extreme  socialist  wing, 
represented  by  Trotzki  and  Lenine  as  heads  of  the  Congress  of 
Workmen  and  Soldiers.  They  assumed,  or  were  given,  the 
name  of  "Bolshevists,"  meaning  those  ready  to  occupy  the 
extreme  position  on  socialism  and  ready  to  apply  the  measures 
requisite  to  establish  the  radical  communistic  republic  and  the 
rule  of  the  "proletariat."  The  movement  was  an  aggressive 
one,  realizing  that  it  would  have  to  combat  strong  internal  and 
external  opposition.  It  prepared  for  this  struggle  by  measures 
and  methods  of  great  energy  and  authority  in  order  to  achieve 
success.  This  revolution  was  accompanied  by  much  violence 
arkd  bloodshed  and  wholesale  arrests  of  the  nobility  and  ad- 
herents of  the  former  Czar's  government.  Many  executions 
took  place  and  a  reign  of  terror  prevailed  for  about  two  weeks. 

As  this  book  is  not  a  history  of  the  war,  we  cannot  go  much 
into  details  of  events,  and  the  reader  is  assumed  to  be  informed 
on  the  political  and  socialistic  character  of  the  bolshevist  move- 
ment. Reference  has  been  made  to  its  general  scope  and  aim 
and  important  "world  interest"  at  several  points  in  our  text. 
The  first  act  of  the  Soviet  government  which  affected  the 
course  of  the  war  and  the  position  of  Germany  was  its  imme- 
diate call  for  a  three  months'  armistice  and  an  invitation  to  all 
the  war  nations  to  meet  in  a  general  peace  conference.  All 
former  secret  agreements  between  the  Czar's  government  and 
the  other  allied  nations  were  now  made  public  and  repudiated 
on  the  part  of  Russia.  Germany  and  her  allies  accepted  the 
proposal  for  an  armistice  and  peace  conference,  and  entered 
upon  the  negotiations  at  Brest-Litowsk  on  December  3rd,  1917, 
but  the  Entente  powers  declined  to  participate,  refusing  to 
recognize  the  authority  of  the  Soviets  as  representing  the  Rus- 
sian people.  (As  we  have  shown  in  the  text,  they  had  at  that 
time  fully  determined  on  a  peace  by  victory  only.)  On  December 
12th,  1917,  the  Russian  Government  issued  its  famous  procla- 
mation for  "a  peace  without  indemnities  and  annexations" 
(adopting  the  wording  and  spirit  of  the  German  Reichstag 
resolution  of  July  of  the  same  year)  and  throwing  the  I'espon- 
sibility  for  the  limited  efforts  at  Brest  Litowsk  upon  the  En- 

220 


tente  powers  who  had  ignored  Russia's  call.  The  peace  WES  to 
be  one  of  honor,  by  the  people  themselves,  concluded  in  frater- 
nity and  justice  and  the  right  of  "self-determination"  for  all 
individual  countries.  It  called  this  the  hour  for  the  proletariat 
of  all  countries  to  come  together,  and  for  the  beginning  of  a 
new  and  true  liberty!  It  was  an  appeal  over  the  heads  of  the 
existing  governments  to  the  people  of  the  world  at  large,  es- 
pecially to  the  socialist  masses  and  the  labor  class,  to  rise  in 
protest  and  insist  on  the  termination  of  the  cruel  war.  But  the 
appeal  failed:  the  people  in  all  countries  were  under  military 
domination  and  themselves  affected  and  divided  by  their  war 
sympathies;  moreover,  the  tenure  of  power  by  the  Soviets  was 
arbitrary  and  uncertain,  was  itself  sustained  by  "force"  and 
not  by  the  free  voice  of  the  Russian  people  as  expressed  in  a 
representative  elected  body  like  the  former  "Duma"  had  been. 
This  discouraged  confidence  in  Russia's  appeal.  In  conse- 
quences of  the  above  proclamation,  the  Ukraine  and  the  former 
Rus.sian  Baltic  States  and,  later,  Siberia  declared  themselves 
as  independent  republics. 

On  December  17th,  1917,  the  armistice  between  Russia  and 
the  Central  Powers  was  concluded,  and  a  few  days  later  peace 
sessions  began.  They  were  stormy  meetings  full  of  friction 
between  all  the  participants.  On  February  9th,  1918,  the  first 
peace  of  the  war  was  concluded  at  Brest-Litowsk,  that  between 
the  Central  Powers  and  the  new  independent  Russian  republic 
of  the  Ukraine.  On  the  day  following,  Trotzki  announced  that 
on  account  of  the  inability  to  agree  on  peace  terms  between 
the  Central  Powers  and  Russia,  the  latter  considered  the  war 
as  ended  between  them  even  without  a  formal  peace  being 
signed,  and  would  withdraw  her  troops  from  the  fronts  into 
Russia  and  begin  their  complete  demobilization.  This  conclu- 
sion was  not  agreed  to  by  Germany  and  Austria,  as  being  in 
no  sense  a  settlement  of  the  many  complicated  territorial,  racial 
and  economic  questions  which  had  divided  the  peace  confer- 
ence ;  they  construed  it,  on  the  contrary,  merely  as  the  termin- 
ation of  the  armistice.  Accordingly,  the  German  armies,  on 
February  17th,  1918,  began  to  advance  upon  Petrograd,  and 
Austro-German  forces  prepared  to  move  into  the  Ukraine  to 
help  that  new  State  to  defend  its  independence  against  the  bol- 
shevist  attack  which  was  being  planned.  This  combination 
brought  the  Soviet  government  to  surrender,  and  to  accept  the 
terms  of  the  Central  Powers  as  laid  down  in  Germany's  ulti- 
matum of  February  28th.  Peace  was  definitely  concluded  on 
March  3rd,  1918.  The  peace  was  accepted  by  Russia  under 
protest  as  "not  one  of  understanding  but  of  force,"  and  in  a 
proclamation  the  Bolshevist  Republic  called  upon  German  labor 
and  the  soldiers  in  the  armies  "to  rise  in  condemnation  and 
defiance  against  this  strangulation  of  their  Russian  brothers. 
But  as  in  the  former  case,  the  call  failed  of  response — not  for 

221 


lack  of  agreement  and  sympathy  but  because  of  the  iron  exig- 
encies of  the  war.  In  the  meantime  peace  negotiations  had 
also  been  proceeding  between  the  Central  Powers  and  Rou- 
mania,  and  ended  in  peace  being  concluded  on  May  7th.  On 
the  same  date  a  separate  peace  was  signed  with  the  indepen- 
dent Russian  State  of  Finland,  which  had  taken  position  against 
the  Soviet  Government  and  in  favor,  of  suppoi"ting  the  Entente. 
This  ended  the  war  on  all  the  eastern  fronts  of  the  Centi-al 
Powers. 

Of  this  eastern  peace,  however,  neither  the  political  nor  the 
military  results  came  up  to  the  high  expectations  which  had 
been  entertained  in  Germany  and  Austria  in  regard  to  it. 
Politically,  it  hurt  Germany  in  the  eyes  of  the  Entente  and  the 
world  in  general  by  the  harshness  of  the  methods  and  the 
severity  of  the  terms  imposed  upon  Russia,  and  it  may  be 
said  that  at  Brest-Litowsk  Germany  laid  the  foundation  of 
much  of  the  hard  treatment  she  herself  later  received  at 
Paris.  Also,  by  negotiating  with  Russia  (after  the  conclusion 
of  the  general  peace  with  the  four  Central  powers)  a  separate 
supplementary  convention  in  her  exclusive  interest,  and  in 
which  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  were  ignored,  she  affronted 
them  sharply,  especially  Austria,  and  with  it  laid  the  foundation 
for  the  diplomatic  estrangement  with  her  allies  which,  later,  bore 
such  disastrous  fruit  in  their  disposition  to  try  separate  peace 
overtures  and  act  independently  for  peace  at  the  end.  These 
political  currents  developed  apace  while  the  German  March 
offensive  in  France  had  already  spent  its  initial  force  and  was 
in  process  of  being  arrested  and  turned  into  a  reverse.  Had 
the  Central  Powers  held  together  politically  and  presented 
a  united  entity  in  defeat,  their  position  at  the  Pai'is  confer- 
ence would  have  been  very  different,  and  no  such  ai'mistice  and 
peace  terms  would  have  been  written  as  were  dealt  out  to  them 
separately.  The  spirit  of  the  negotiations  at  Brest-Litowsk  and 
the  succeeding  steps  were  a  great  diplomatic  blunder  on  the 
part  of  Germany  of  wide  consequences.  We  can  only  under- 
stand these  mistakes  of  Germany  by"  putting  oui'selves  in  her 
position  and  realizing  the  feeling  of  resentment  and  vengeance 
which  pervaded  the  whole  nation  for  having  the  cruel  war 
thrust  upon  her. 

Militarily,  the  peace  in  the  East  freed  considerable  masses 
of  troops,  ultimately,  for  use  on  the  French  fronts,  but  on 
account  of  the  unsettled  situation  in  Russia,  the  Uki-aine  and 
the  new  Baltic  States,  and  in  Poland,  this  retirement  had  to  be 
made  slowly;  and  these  Gei-man  eastern  forces  had  become 
somewhat  demoralized  by  their  long-continued  idleness  and 
were  filled  with  radical  socialistic  ideas  by  the  bolshevist  propa- 
ganda carried  on  among  them.  Hence,  the  gain  to  the  ex- 
hausted troops  in  France  was  not  as  large  numerically  and  as 

222 


stimulating  morally  as  had  been  anticipated.  The  final  result 
in  France  was  scarcely  affected  by  the  additional  strength  they 
lent;  but  if  these  troops  had  been  divided  between  the  Turco- 
Bulgarian  forces  in  front  of  Salonica  and  the  Austro-German 
forces  in  the  Trentino,  the  military  result  in  these  two  theatres 
of  the  war  might  have  been  entirely  different! 

While  the  peace  with  Russia  had,  truly,  removed  her  as  a 
military  enemy  of  the  Central  Powers,  a  greater  enemy  to 
Germany  has  arisen  thereby  in  Bolshevism  to  undermine  the 
moral  courage  of  the  German  people  and  armies  and  break  their 
resistance.  Pursuant  to  the  peace,  the  Russian  Soviet  Minister 
Joffe  arrived  in  Berlin  in  the  late  summer  of  1918,  ostensibly 
sent  to  pave  the  way  for  the  resumption  of  diplomatic  and 
commercial  relations  with  Germany.  He  established  himself 
in  the  sumptuous  former  Russian  embassy,  with  a  retinue  of 
secretaries  and  servants.  The  German  government  received 
him  cordially  and  extended  to  him  all  desired  facilities  for  his 
mission  of  peace  and  rapprochement.  But  this  same  Minister 
Joffe  was  later  disclosed  to  have  been  the  head  and  front  of 
an  official  bolshevist  mission  to  disseminate  these  doctrines 
throughout  Germany  and  in  the  armies  by  a  flood  of  "litera- 
ture," personal  proselyters,  bribes  and  promises  of  political 
reward.  The  embassy  quickly  became  the  headquarters  of  the 
advanced  groups  of  the  German  socialist  parties,  who  were  in 
sympathy  with  Joffe's  work;  they  were  then  plotting  the  fall 
of  the  Imperial  government  and  the  establishment  of  a  social- 
istic republic  by  revolution.  This  nefarious  activity  was  finally 
discovered  by  the  German  government  and  eradicated,  but  not 
before  much  undermining  work  had  been  done  by  it  which 
told  its  disastrous  story  on  the  battlefields  of  France,  in  the 
disrupting  parliamentary  battles  in  the  Reichstag,  in  the  armis- 
tice conspiracy,  the  degrading  peace,  the  bloody  revolution  and 
ignominious  collapse  of  the  German  nation! 

Materially,  the  results  of  the  eastern  peace  were  also  very 
disappointing.  The  hoped-for  stocks  of  food,  materials,  oil, 
coal,  etc.,  which  Germany  and  Austria  had  expected  to  find  in 
Roumania,  the  Ukraine  and  Central  Russia  were  not  consider- 
able, and  their  ready  transportation  was  made  almost  impossible 
by  the  complete  breakdown  of  the  railroad  systems  in  these 
countries.  Thus  the  expected  relief  from  the  pressure  of  the 
English  Food  Blockade  did  not  materialize  and  the  hopes  of 
the  suffering  German  people  were  dashed  to  the  ground. 

There  was  also  a  dramatic  sequel  of  intense  hate,  leading 
to  assassination,  to  the  eastern  peace  "by  force."  It  had  left 
a  feeling  of  bitter  resentment  in  Russia  against  Germany, 
which  found  vent  in  many  demonstrations  of  violence  in  Mos- 
cow, Petrograd  and  other  cities.       It  culminated  in  the  brutal 

223 


murder  of  Count  Mirbach,  German  envoy  in  Moscow,  and  of 
General  Eichhorn,  in  the  Ukraine.  And  when,  in  August, 
1918,  in  consequences  of  these  occurrences,  and  to  settle 
many  details  of  the  peace  agreement,  Karl  Helfferich  was  sent 
to  Moscow  on  a  mission  by  the  German  government,  he  had  a 
narrow  escape  of  being  overtaken  by  a  like  fate! 


XIV.     PEACE  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

A.      THE   PEACE   AND   LEAGUE   OF   FALSEHOOD.      THE 
FUTURE  ARMIES  AND   DISARMAMENT.      THE   WAR 
A  FIASCO.     IRELAND'S   TITLE   TO   INDEPEN- 
DENCE.     AMERICA'S   DISAPPOINTMENT 
AND  AWAKENING. 

In  taking  up  this  subject  we  shall  approach  and  discuss  it 
from  an  entirely  different  point  of  view  than  that  which  pre- 
vailed in  the  peace  conference  at  Paris,  in  the  newspaper  treat- 
ment of  it  and  which  colors  the  past  and  present  debate  of 
this  subject  in  America,  in  and  out  of  Congress.  The  question 
whether  or  not  the  United  States  should  shoulder  the  obligation 
of  this  league,  and  whether  or  not  it  was  wise  to  include  this 
league  in  the  peace  terms  do  not  interest  us  so  much  at  the  out- 
set. For  the  purpose  of  this  book  this  subject  must  first  be 
investigated  ethically  before  we  can  enter  into  the  manner  of  its 
disposition. 

Peace  and  peace  terms  are  obviously  interdependent,  almost 
synonymous  conceptions.  Peace  is  a  state  of  agreement  among 
a  number  of  contestants  who  have  been  in  a  strife — and  may 
be  again  arrayed  against  each  other — to  live  together  without 
open  enmity  on  a  basis  of  terms  freely,  if  humbly,  accepted 
by  the  party  which  lost  the  fight  as  a  fair  settlement  which  can 
and  is  intended  to  be  carried  out.  The  terms  must  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  fundamental  idea.  Any  such  rational  peace 
will  be  a  "peace  of  justice,"  any  other  which  does  not  fulfill 
this  condition  is  merely  a  settlement  accepted  under  duress  at 
the  point  of  the  victor's  sword.  From  the  information  presented 
in  the  preceding  articles  it  should  appear  quite  clear  that  the 
position  occupied  by  the  peace-dictating  side  at  Paris  was  not 
only  one  of  error  of  fact  but  of  inescapable  and  forcible  decep- 

224 


tion  in  consequence  of  the  web  of  hypocrisy,  lies  and  slander 
which  had  been  woven  around  the  war.  The  victors  were  com- 
pelled to  maintain,  or  to  pretend  to  maintain,  this  position  to 
the  end;  they  were  caught  in  their  own  net  of  falsehood  as  to 
the  origin  and  objects  of  the  war,  and  in  the  false  accusations 
which  they  had  made  against  the  Germans  and  their  allies,  and 
could  not  now  easily  disembarrass  themselves  of  these  and 
reach  a  basis  of  truth  and  equity.  In  consequence,  the  peace 
discussions  were  rooted  in  false  pretenses  and  had  to  proceed 
in  wrong  and  deception ;  there  was  no  one  there — not  even 
President  Wilson,  with  all  his  avowed  idealism — who  had  the 
moral  grandeur  to  rise  up  and  demand  recognition  of  the  truth 
and  nothing  but  the  truth,  and  thus  prevent  the  colossal  wrong, 
the  monumental  fraud  of  the  deliberations  at  Paris  and  their 
final  embodiment  in  the  Peace  of  Versailles.  Yet  this  truth 
was  well  known;  the  totally  mendacious  position  of  the  Entente 
allies  in  the  war  and  at  Paris,  as  explained  in  a  previous  article 
of  this  book,  was  known  to  the  Entente  allies  themselves,  to 
President  Wilson,  to  every  diplomatist,  to  every  well-educated 
man  in  Europe  of  any  political  acumen.  It  was  due  to  the 
failure  of  England's  calculations,  the  Allies'  wrath  at  the  unex- 
pected defiance  by  Germany,  and  their  determination  to  throw 
the  responsibility  for  the  war  upon  her  shoulders  alone  and,  in 
revenge,  to  ruin  that  country  for  all  time  through  the  terms 
of   the   armistice   and   peace! 

What  a  horrible  situation;  how  could  a  peace  of  justice  come 
out  of  a  situation  so  thoroughly  perverted!  The  allies  were 
strangled  by  their  own  deceptions,  and  the  whole  world — 
poisonously  inoculated  against  Germany  — had  to  follow  suit 
upon  this  path  of  infamy!  Such  was  the  psychological  charac- 
ter of  the  peace  conference ;  and  it  would  have  taken  a  miracle 
to  change  it.  This  miracle  might  have,  possibly,  happened  at 
the  last  moment  when  the  time  had  arrived  for  the  presentation 
of  concrete  demands,  for  the  revelation  of  the  secret  agree- 
ments, for  the  disclosing  of  inmost  policies — to  some  extent 
at  least.  But  it  was  right  at  this  point  that  the  League  of 
Nations  proposition  stepped  in  and  prevented  a  tense  situation 
of  threatening  avowal  of  the  truth  by  offering  a  refuge  under 
the  shelter  of  which  secrecy  and  deception  could  be  maintained 
to    the    end    and   public    revelation    delayed    till    the    to-morrow. 

225 


Under  cover  of  the  League,  with  its  plausible  plan  of  peaceful 
world  regulation  without  war which  the  four  European  En- 
tente nations  and  Japan  assiduously  acclaimed — these  five 
powers  saw  that  their  real  war  motives  and  future  schemes 
might  very  conveniently  and  safely  remain  unconfessed  a  little 
longer  under  the  cloak  of  these  sanctimonious  pretensions  till 
the  overshadowing  purpose  of  their  deliberations  had  been 
accomplished — a  crushing  peace  for  Germany,  the  complete 
destruction  of  Austria,  reduction  of  Turkish  sovereignty  to  a 
name  only — and  the  exclusion  of  all  these  fi'om  the  League 
(also  Russia),  in  order  to  leave  themselves  free  to  exercise 
their  domination  over  the  smaller  nations.  Meanwhile  they 
would  be  able  to  pursue  their  separate  interests  in  individual 
alliances,  but  under  the  cover  of  this  "league-of-peace"  of 
merely  complimentary  functions!  Of  the  impx-acticability  of 
the  League  they  were  quite  convinced,  and  for  its  altruistic 
purposes  they  felt  nothing  but  supreme  contempt.  Thus  was 
the  humanitarian  thought  of  the  League  of  Nations,  sponsored 
so  enthusiastically  and  disinterestedly  by  our  President  and 
the  Amei'ican  people,  quickly  reduced  at  Paris  to  a  proposition 
of  false  pretenses  under  which  every  iniquity  of  the  war  and 
every  selBsh  design  of  future  activity  could  be  ignored  with 
a  brazen   face  and  hidden ! 

That  the  peace  terms  imposed  upon  Germany,  Austria,  Bul- 
garia and  TurTcey  cannot  endure  has  been  abundantly  demon- 
strated since  their  enactment.  They  were  accepted  only  as  a 
matter  of  physical  necessity,  absolute  helplessness,  after  violent 
struggles  to  obtain  conditions  more  within  reason,  honor  and 
ability  of  being  fulfilled.  No  matter  what  the  final,  definite 
settlement  with  all  of  them  shall  be,  the  terms  will  be  observed 
only,  in  spite  of  "guarantees"  and  "sanctions,"  so  long  as  the 
strongest  compunction  to  do  so  shall  exist.  Can  anything  else 
be  expected?  This  compunction  is  not  at  all  one  of  "moral 
responsibility"  on  the  part  of  the  vanquished;  moral  responsi- 
bility does  not  apply  when  imposed  under  a  threat  of  death  by 
violence  on  a  foundation  of  unreason!  Individuals  and  na- 
tions so  placed  have  the  moral  right  to  promise  the  impossible 
in  order  to  save  their  existence!  This  being  our  conclusions 
on  the  peace  which  has  been  made  and  on  the  League  "to  pre- 

226 


1 


vent  future  wars,"  it  follows  that  the  latter  can,  at  best,  only 
be  a  means  of  enforcing  this  onerous  peace.  Moreover,  the 
enemy  countries  and  Russia  being  excluded,  this  League  will 
be  an  anomaly  from  the  beginning  and  merely  an  association  of 
the  great  powers  to  impose  their  will  upon  the  others.  But 
even  for  this  purpose  the  League,  having  no  definite  and  ready 
power  for  enforcement  of  its  decisions,  will  be  merely  a  for- 
jnidable  threat,  capable  of  being  defied  for  a  long  time,  even 
by  a  small  nation ;  for  history  proves  abundantly  that  when 
great  passions  or  ambitions  are  aroused,  the  mere  size  of  a 
nation  is  no  limit  to  action.  In  such  a  case  much  disturbing 
work  might  be  set  in  motion — starting  of  a  revolution,  invasion 
of  another  country — before  the  cumbersome  machinery  of  the 
executive  military  forces  of  the  League  (formed  by  propor- 
tional contribution)  could  be  set  in  motion. 

But  such  "disturbances"  are  precisely  what  we  must  expect 
in  Europe  under  the  present  settlement.  Is  there  anyone  inno- 
cent enough  to  assume  that  the  geographical  boundaries  of  the 
old  and  new  states,  as  settled  at  Paris,  will  be  maintained  for 
any  great  length  of  time;  that  the  penalties  exacted  and  the 
injuries  inflicted  will  be  accepted  as  binding  forever;  that  the 
hindrances  imposed  will  be  submitted  to  without  protest,  as 
soon  as  protest  can  be  made  with  confidence?  On  the  contrary, 
the  world  and  the  League  of  Nations  must  be  prepared  for  all 
of  this!  The  consciousness  of  these  uncertainties  of  the  peace 
settlement  was  one'  of  the  secret  reasons  which  commended  the 
idea  .of  the  League  to  the  Entente  governments  as  an  instru- 
ment with  which  to  enforce  the  peace  of  duress  upon  the  over- 
powered peoples  and  discourage  dissatisfaction  among  the  new 
nationalities !  That  the  League — which  is  themselves — -would 
also  prove  an  effective  instrument  to  prevent  war  among  them- 
selves is  a  paradox;  for,  who  should  decide  and  enforce?  The 
perception  of  these  points,  together  with  the  growing  impres- 
sion that  the  peace  of  Versailles  is  a  wrongful  and  stupid  set- 
tlement (although  this  impression  is  as  yet  admitted  only 
tacitly) ,  all  added  to  our  general  distrust  of  European  di- 
plomacy as  the  result  of  our  war  experiences,  were  no  doubt  an 
important  part  of  the  reasons  why  the  United  States  Senate 
refused  to  sanction  the  League  pact  without  important  modifi- 

227 


cations  being  made.  It  must  be  apparent  to  all  who  have 
succeeded  to  grasp  the  great  breadth  and  depth  of  this  subject 
that  the  present  constitution  of  the  League  is  too  impei-fect 
in  foundation  and  scope,  and  too  indefinite  in  its  mannei-  of 
action  to  lead  successfully  to  the  contemplated  object.  To 
become  a  real  power  for  good  the  League  must  rest  upon 
three  propositions,  now  disregarded:  1.  The  free  acknowledg- 
ment that  the  responsibility  for  the  war  must  be  borne  jointly 
by  all  the  six  nations  originally  involved;  2.  Upon  such  a  revi- 
sion of  the  peace  terms  to  the  Triple  Alliance  nations  as  will 
be  in  accordance  with  the  acceptance  of  the  first  proposition; 
3.  It  must  include  the  defeated  nations  as  full  and  free  mem- 
bers. In  addition,  the  League  must  have  a  more  definite  organi- 
zation of  its  police  power  than  at  present  proposed,  and  the 
manner  of  participation  therein  must  be  made  fully  acceptable 
to  the  member  nations.  Without  such  a  constitution  of  the 
League,  Europe  cannot  reduce  its  armaments!  This  entire 
question,  in  its  American  and  European  aspect,  has  received 
more  attention  than  any  other  part  of  the  peace  terms,  both 
by  the  Senate  debates  and  President  Wilson's  speeches.  As  it 
has  since  become  the  main  subject  of  a  great  Presidential 
election  and  of  discussion  without  limit,  the  author  will  reserve 
further  explanations  and  criticisms  on  this  topic  for  later 
articles. 


/^  F  THE  peace  terms  of  Germany,  the  proposition  that  she 
^^  be  compelled  not  only  to  reduce  her  army  to  the  size  of 
a  mere  police  force  (100,000  men),  but  also  to  abandon  the  na- 
tional and  compulsory  ''manhood  conscription"  system  and, 
instead,  maintain  a  paid  professional  volunteer  army  is  of  great 
importance  to  all  the  nations  as  it  might  prove  the  means,  in 
a  short  time,  of  compelling  all  of  them  (through  popular  de- 
mand) to  adopt  the  same  plan.  The  proposition  indicates, 
however,  that  the  statesmen  of  Europe  still  believe.  League  or 
no  League — that  wars  will  occur  again  and  that  the  nations 
should  be  armed,  at  least  on  a  moderate  scale — and  we  in 
America  seem  to  share  this  opinion  by  our  war  preparations. 
The   propaganda  for  practical  disarmament  recently  launched 

228 


in  this  country  has  made  but  little  headway  either  in  Congress 
or  among  the  people  because  of  the  very  uncertain  interna- 
tional situation  still  prevailing.  Indeed,  there  can  be  no  "ques- 
tion that  future  wars  are  not  only  a  possibility  but  a  certainty 
— and  even  a  necessity,  especially  in  Europe !  Organized  mili- 
tary force  is  primarily  the  necessary  agent  of  the  State  to 
enforce  law  and  order  internally — in  labor  disturbances,  polit- 
ical riots,  etc. — and  to  insure  its  security  externally  in  case  of 
attack  or  in  satisfaction  of  well-founded  grievances.  It  would 
be  ideal  if  the  use  of  military  force  could  be  confined  to  these 
legitimate  purposes;  but  this  will  be  as  difficult  a  task  in  the 
future  as  it  has  been  in  the  past,  because  those  human-nature 
traits  which  are  at  the  bottom  of  great  political  eruptions — 
ambition  to  rise  and  expand,  covetousness  of  advantages  pos- 
sessed by  others,  vanity  of  race,  economic  necessity,  etc. — have 
not  changed  in  the  ages!  They  appear,  at  times,  to  be  well 
under  control  (particularly  while  the  horror  and  effects  of  a 
a  war  still  linger  with  a  people),  but  soon  revive  to  con- 
centrate upon  even  larger  aggressive  enterprises.  (A  more 
extended  treatment  of  the  ethical  aspect  of  war  will  be  found 
in  Section  "B"  of  this  article.)  The  more  the  nations  advance 
in  population  and  power,  the  fiercer  becomes  the  violence  and 
the  greater  the  extent  of  war  when  it  does  break  out!  From 
this  point  of  view,  the  size  of  the  army  to  be  allowed  each 
state  and  the  manner  of  their  organization  become  important 
points.  Such  regulation  would  be  particularly  the  province 
of  a  League  of  Nations  or  of  any  similar  World  Tribunal,  to- 
gether with  all  the  related  details  of  warfare ;  but  whether  the 
present  League  is  strong  enough  to  take  and  enforce  any  steps 
in  this  direction  is  very  doubtful.  In  fact,  the  question  imme- 
diately arises:  Can  regulations  of  this  kind  be  enforced  by  the 
strongest  kind  of  a  League  or  Tribunal,  and  will  they  stand  the 
strain  of  actual  war? 

We  have  on  a  previous  occasion  made  the  observation  that 
"modern  armies  are  the  people"  and  "the  people  are  the 
armies,"  and  the  author  believes  that  this  must  continue  so  in 
the  future;  it  is  a  product  of  the  times.  It  is  not  at  all  con- 
ceivable that  another  war  among  the  nations  of  Europe  could 
be   confined  to   such  limited   armies  as   have  been   tentatively 

229 


proposed  to  be  sanctioned  under  the  League-of-Nations  powers. 
Any  future  conflicts  will  immediately  develop  with  great  inten- 
sity to  "wars  of  the  nations,"  the  whole  nation  on  each  side, 
and  the  actual  fact  of  war  will  automatically  suspend  all  artifi- 
cial agreements  and  limitations  as  to  size  and  manner  of  the 
forces  to  be  employed — each  side  will  proceed  to  put  forth  its 
utmost  effort.  It  is  the  writer's  opinion,  therefore,  that  a  con- 
scripted "cit'zen  soldiery"  of  short-term  enlistment  is  far  pref- 
■erable  to  a  long-term  professional  army.  Not  only  is  such  an 
army,  drawn  from  all  ranks  of  the  people  as  an  obligation  of 
patriotism,  more  national  in  character,  but  its  plan  conveys 
upon  the  entire  manhood  of  a  people  the  very  desirable  benefits 
of  strict  discipline  and  physical  and  moral  training  associated 
with  the  military  service.  Under  this  scheme,  in  case  of  war, 
the  entire  nation  is  prepared  and  ready  to  meet  the  enemy. 
The  size  of  these  "people's  armies"  could  be  regulated  in  some 
proportion  to  the  total  population  of  each  country,  and  the 
drafting  done  in  such  relays  as  to  furnish  this  training  to  the 
entire  able-bodied  manhood  population,  while  maintaining  the 
actual  numbers  in  the  graduating  year,  at  any  time,  at  the 
agreed  total  of  effective  forces. 

Much  mi'^information  and  bad  logic  have  frequently  been 
expressed,  particularly  in  socialistic  literature,  as  to  the  "crush- 
ing cost,"  the  "awful  burden  upon  the  people"  of  such  large 
national  conscription  armies.  The  figures  of  expenditure  for 
them,  certainly,  appear  enormous — but  they  are  deceptive; 
the  cost  is  not  all  outgo;  the  hardship  of  taking  men  away  from 
their  regular  occupations  for  a  few  years  can  be  reduced  by 
running  government  trade  shops  to  do  government  work  (at 
regular  pay  under  contractors)  for  certain  definite  hours  per 
day,  or  days  per  week.  This  plan  would  not  interfere  with 
outside  labor  and  would  keep  the  men  in  trim  at  their  trades 
and  also  furnish  them  with  extra  income  in  addition  to  their 
pay  as  soldiers.  The  fact  that  neither  Germany  nor  France, 
nor  any  other  of  the  nations  who  had  maintained  universal 
military  service  before  the  late  war  had  suffered  economically 
from  this  institution  in  any  manner — quite  the  contrary,  they 
had  all  prospered  greatly — is  the  best  proof  that  the  "crushing- 
cost"  argument  against  it  is  not  borne  out  by  actual  experience. 

230 


T  OOKING  back  over  the  great  war  from  the  position  taken 
^^  in  this  book,  both  the  war  and  the  victory  must  be  adjudged 
a  tremendous  fiasco.  None  of  the  objects  sought  have  been 
attained,  at  least  not  in  the  way  and  to  the  extent  hoped  for. 
Russia  is  not  in  Constantinople,  and  her  southern-seacoast 
dreams  are  further  removed  than  ever.  Serbia  has  helped  to 
crush  Austria  and  has  escaped  the  latter's  dictation  over  her, 
but  at  what  cost!  France — if  she  could  but  undo  the  war — 
would  gladly  leave  Germany  in  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
and  forget  her  desire  for  revenge!  England  has,  temporarily, 
destroyed  her  rival,  and  no  Berlin-Bagdad  scheme  will  now  be 
carried  out  by  Germany,  and  the  latter's  commercial  and  naval 
competition  is  at  an  end  for  the  present;  but  for  how  long  a 
time  and  at  what  a  price  has  England  accomplished  this?  Italy's 
"Irredenta  war"  will  turn  out  such  a  meagre  practical  success 
as  to  be  almost  a  defeat,  in  view  of  the  enormous  cost  to  her 
in  men  and  treasure.  The  once  proud  enpire  of  Austria  is  dis- 
membered forever,  and  the  newly-formed  states  appear  like 
old  castle  ruins  looking  down  upon  a  vanished  past  of  a  thou- 
sand years  of  stirring  history!  Poland  is  grinning  a  ghastly 
ironical  smile  and  rattling  the  skeleton  of  her  "national  inde- 
pendence" at  the  scene  of  ruin  alt  about  her  and  at  her  own 
helplessness.  Germany  is  beaten  down  and  disorganized, 
crippled  for  decades  to  come;  her  case  is  that  of  a  courageous 
man  who  meets  six  powerful  bandits  in  the  street  who  demand 
his  money,  but  who  resists,  trusting  to  his  strength  and  good 
right  as  a  free  man,  but  is  promptly  clubbed  to  death  and 
robbed.  America,  who  nervously  hid  her  share  of  materialistic 
aims  and  pitiable  jealousies  behind  the  bold  and  disinterested 
face  of  democarcy,  liberty  and  justice  for  all  mankind — what 
has  she  achieved  in  the  war?  She  has  helped  to  bring  about 
the  fall  of  the  German  and  Austrian  empires,  true;  but  has 
anything  better  taken  their  place,  or  is  anything  better  than 
that  which  had  been  likely  to  come  out  of  these  ai'bitrary  and 
violent  transformations?  Is  it  any  benefit  or  "progress"  to 
throw  a  string  of  half-cocked  "nationalities"  and  "republics" 
into  the  world  to  live  or  die  as  best  they  may? 

And  what  about  Russia  whom  we  abandoned  at  the  moment 
when  she  needed  our  encouragement,  recognition  and  support 

231 


in  her  struggle  for  democracy  to  prevent  her  falling  a  victim 
to  the  tei-ror  of  radicalism?  Have  we  cleared  up  Europe  and 
the  rest  of  the  world  of  autocracies,  kings  and  kingdoms? 
There  are  still  the  following  left  requiring  our  attention — as  we 
declared  ourselves  to  be  the  elected  authority  for  dictating  gov- 
ernments: The  kings  and  kingdoms  of  Gi'eat  Britain,  Holland, 
Belgium,  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  Spain,  Italy,  Serbia, 
Roumania;  also  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  the  Shah  of  Persia,  the 
empire  and  Emperor  of  Japan,  the  British  Indian  empire,  and 
sundry  smaller  principalities  and  princes  of  various  degrees 
scattered  over  the  world!  We  yet  have  a  right  goodly  task 
before  us!  And  how  about  justice?  Has  justice  been  done  at 
Paris  under  the  vaunted  inspiration  of  our  President?  This 
answer  we  believe  is  given  in  this  book,  decidedly  in  the  nega- 
tive, a  verdict  moi^e  and  moi'e  supported  by  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world ! 


T  N  CONTRAST  with  the  artificial  and  almost  "imposed" 
■'■  aspirations  to  freedom  and  national  independence  of  the  new 
countries  named  above  there  stands  the  case  of  Ireland,  to  which 
we  have  already  briefly  referred,  of  Ireland  denied  and  defied, 
of  Ireland  so  indubitably  a  people  and  a  nation!  She  possesses 
the  absolute  and  unquestioned  boundaries  of  an  island  in  the 
ocean,  and  an  absolute  racial  solidarity  and  unity,  except  for 
the  small  minority  of  the  Scotch-Irish  in  Ulster  province.  And 
this  unfortunate — nay,  disgraceful — internal  division  rests 
three-fourths  on  religious  grounds  and  is  only  one-fourth  polit- 
ical. This  legitimate,  historical  and  irrepressible  aspiration  of 
Ireland  for  freedom  and  independence,  with  which  a  large  ma- 
jority of  civilized  mankind  of  every  race  and  people  is  in  hearty 
sympathy,  has  been  coldly  and  offensively  ignored  by  the  peace 
conference  at  Paris — by  the  unmistakable  order  and  insistence 
of  England!  She  insists  that  the  Irish  agitation  "is  a  domestic 
question";  that  to  encourage  and  sympathize  with  Ireland  in 
her  struggle  "is  to  interfere  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  Great 
Britain"  and  to  commit  an  unfriendly  act  towards  her;  that 
Ireland  should  be  left  to  herself  to  settle  the  question  with 
England,  unsupported,  unaided!     The  equal  of  this  cold-blooded 

232 


hypocrisy  and  ranting  assurance  of  the  British  is  not  to  be 
found  on  the  face  of  the  earth!  And  even  we  Americans, 
twenty  per  cent  Irish  in  race,  acquiesce  in  humble  submission 
to  the  dictates  of  the  British  lion  and  convulsively  but  obe- 
diently gulp  down  our  grandiloquent  declarations  about  "the 
rights  of  small  nations  to  liberty  and  independence."  The 
author  declares  this  to  be  a  shameful  attitude  of  dishonor, 
cowardice,  injustice,  self-condemnation  that  makes  a  pitiable 
parody  of  all  our  "war  professions"  and  steeps  our  people  in 
deep  mortification! 

But  Ireland's  freedom  must  come  as  surely  as  the  rising 
sun  of  to-morrow  if  there  is  to  be  any  honor  and  honesty  about 
this  idea  of  assisting  small  nations  to  independence;  if  it  is  to 
be  "a  real  principle"  and  not  merely  a  political  pretense  in- 
vented to  meet  temporary  exigencies.  In  that  case  the  entire 
Entente  world,  including  America,  would  stand  convicted  of 
hypocrisy  and  moral  fraud  beyond  all  measure!  But  we  have 
stated  the  real  crux  of  the  Irish  question  in  our  previous  refer- 
ence to  it:  "What  was  done,  and  done  justly  and  to  some  ex- 
tent from  noble  motives,  in  the  case  of  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia, 
Hungary  and  Jugo-Slavia  was  feared  to  be  done  in  the  case  of 
Ireland  because  of  England's  opposition!  It  is  not  that  there 
is  any  doubt  of  Ireland's  title  to  her  independence;  it  is  recog- 
nized that  her  title  is  greater  than  that  of  any  one  of  the  other 
peoples  named,  but  the  Entente  allies  and  ourselves  are  en- 
tangled with  England  in  the  peace  settlement  and  financially 
to  such  an  extent,  and  are  otherwise  so  thoroughly  cast  down 
with  the  fiasco  and  the  burdens  of  the  war,  that  action  even  by 
those  whose  sympathies  are  unequivocally  with  Ireland  seems 
impossible  at  this  time.  May  Ireland  take  courage — and  gather 
patience  and  self-restraint — from  these  statements,  and  con- 
tinue her  struggle  in  full  confidence  that  but  a  short  time  more 
w^ill  see  her  hope  and  dream  fulfilled,  her  faith  rewarded,  her 
glorious  independence  a  reality! 

A  T  HOME,  in  America,  the  illusions  of  the  war  are  .still 
'^^^  largely  prevalent,  but  a  reaction  and  slow  awakening  to 
"its  realities"  has  begun.  We  are  beginning  to  see  that  we  were 
deceived,  our  ignorance  of  Europe  imposed  upon  and  our  gen- 
erous impulses  exploited,  but  we  have  the  good  conscience  that 

233 


we  acted  in  good  faith!  Great,  therefore,  and  well  justified 
was  the  exultation  of  this  country  in  the  part  it  played  in  the 
war  and  in  our  military  achievements!  The  victory  celebra- 
tions and  joyous  troop  receptions  were  an  inspiring  expression 
of  our  gratitude  ^nd  satisfaction  at  the  outcome.  Too  much 
honor  and  praise  could  scarcely  be  offered  to  our  valiant 
troops!  But,  alas!  for  the  dismal  day  not  far  distant  when  we 
shall  fully  come  to  realize  that  these  brave  boys — our  crusader 
boys — fought  for  a  chimera  only,  for  an  illusion  revealed  to 
have  been  a  delusion!  Fired  with  a  noble  but  artificial  ideal — 
as  the  whole  nation  was — our  soldier  boys  were  unknowingly 
deceived  and  sacrificed!  What  an  awakening  for  us  when  we 
look  upon  the  faces  of  "THOSE  WHO  HAVE  PAID  IN  FULL," 
the  faces  of  this  fine  young  American  manhood,  to  realize  at 
the  end  the  terrible  truth  that  they  have  really  died  in  vain! 
How  maddening  to  think — and  how  pitiable — that  all  our  fine 
patriotic  effort,  devotion,  self-sacrifice,  energy  and  skill  of 
organization  should  have  been  wasted  upon  a  false  issue  with 
a  barren  result!  The  "Huns"  indeed! — but  not  the  Huns  in 
Germany,  but  the  war-maker  and  profiteer  Huns  in  Washington. 
Empty-handed  we  are! — we  have  achieved  nothing!  Nothing 
is  better,  no  one  is  happier  for  our  interfex-ence  in  the  war; 
chagrin  at  the  outcome,  alarm  for  our  future,  a  huge  debt, 
personal  sorrows  and  sacrifices  are  our  reward ! 

Are  the  couple  of  millions  of  German  shipping  tonnage 
we  took  over  as  helpless  war  prizes  and  those  seven  or  eight 
hundred  millions'  worth  of  German-owned  industries  estab- 
lished here,  which  we  seized,  an  adequate  compensation  for 
us?  We  should  think  not;  not  even  if  the  entire  German  ship- 
ping and  commercial  competition  against  us  were  destroyed 
forever. 

How  diff"erent  our  exultation  and  pride  would  have  been  if 
we  had  gone  to  war  in  a  real  cause,  against  a  real  enemy  who 
had  tried  to  trample  upon  us,  to  interfere  with  our  liberty 
and  independence;  how  different  if  Germany  or  Austria  had 
conspired  against  us  politically  and  committed  wilfull  acts  of 
enmity  against  us!  But  there  was  nothing  of  this  kind  going  on 
against  us  in  1914  or  at  any  time  later,  not  till  after  we  had 
declared  war!  The  acts  of  "espionage"  by  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria before  our  entry  into  the  war  were  acts  of  legitimate  self- 

234 


protection  only,  mostly  provoked  by  our  own  conspicuous  un- 
neutrality.  Those  acts  of  oflfense  and  enmity  which  happened 
later — and  which  we  greatly  exaggerated  to  make  out  a  good 
"casus  belli"  for  our  conscience,  were  mostly  unavoidable  re- 
sults of  the  existing  state  of  war  and  its  pitiless  necessities. 
Had  we  had  a  real  enemy  before  us,  then,  indeed,  would  Wil- 
liam Jennings  Bryan's  "million  men  have  sprung  up  armed 
overnight"  to  guard  the  country's  safety  and  honor!  No  need, 
then,  to  enact  compulsory  conscription,  to  suppress  freedom  of 
speech,  publication  and  assembly,  to  hound  innocent  aliens, 
to  insult  and  persecute  loyal  foreign-born  citizens,  to  muffle 
and  browbeat  the  Congress  and  to  turn  the  country  into  a 
madhouse! 


After-War  Anti-German  Demonstrations.  The  continuance 
of  strong  anti-German  feeling  in  many  quarters  in  this  coun- 
try need  surprise  no  one  who  has  observed  the  scarcely  abated 
activity  of  the  British  and  American  propagandas  since  the 
closing  of  the  war.  Adding  to  this  the  repeated  inflaming 
speeches  of  President  Wilson  and  other  leaders  and  the  un- 
changed hostility  of  a  large  part  of  the  press,  it  is  but  natural 
that  the  "perverted  view  of  the  war"  and  its  feelings  of  hate 
should  still  be  with  us.  The  fight  against  ignorance  and  deep- 
seated  prejudice  is  ever  a  hard  fight!  Conspicuous  in  this  per- 
sistent attitude  are  the  American  Loyal  Legion,  a  national  asso- 
ciation of  ex-soldiers  of  the  war;  also  the  American  Defense 
Society  and  the  National  Security  League;  also  sundry  organi- 
zations of  women-patriots  who  seem  to  think  it  necessary  to 
demonstrate  their  new  political  status  by  the  extra  zeal  which 
everywhere  characterizes  the  neovite.  That  our  young  soldiers, 
only  a  short  time  home  from  the  war,  their  ears  filled  with  the 
popular  praises  of  "our  heroes,"  should  have  an  elated  con- 
ception about  the  great  importance  of  their  services  to  the 
country  is  perfectly  natural  and  fully  justified.  At  this  vei'y 
writing,  renewed  affirmation  is  being  made  throughout  the 
country — from  Secretary  of  State  Hughes  down — of  "the  high 
idealism  which  inspired  this  people  and  our  troops  in  the  war," 
all  in  answer  to  Ambassador  Harvey's  common-sense  speech  of 
qualification  made  at  the  London  Pilgrim  Society  dinner.  While 
the  administration  evidently  thinks  the  same  or  nearly  the 
same  as  this  foolhardy  ambassador — for  otherwise  he  would 
have  been  promptly  disavowed  and  recalled — it  is  clear  now 
that  the  sober  view  of  the  war  is  not  yet  deemed  "good  and 
safe  knowledge"  for  the  American  people.  Now,  without  wish- 
ing to  utter  one  word  or  tjiought  in  disparagement  of  the  splen- 
did showing  which  our  troops  and  navy  made  on  land  and  by 

235 


sea,  the  authoi-  submits  that  this  extravagant  language  about 
their  "idealism"  is  out  of  place  and  in  bad  taste,  now  that  the 
war  excitement  should  subside,  because  it  is  not  in  accordance 
with   the   facts. 

We  all  know  that  the  call  for  volunteers  was  not  a  success 
and  that  the  government  was  quickly  obliged  to  institute  com- 
pulsory national  conscription  to  obtain  the  forces  required. 
While  it  is  quite  beyond  question  that  among  these  drafted 
troops  there  were  many  individuals  who  would  have  offered 
themselves  as  volunteers  and  who  were  animated  by  a  deep 
interest  in  the  war,  high-minded  patriotic  devotion  and  "the 
humanitarian  ideals"  of  the  hour,  it  is  not  likely  that  these 
were  more  than  probably  10  per  cent  to  15  per  cent  of  the 
total  numbers  and  that  85  per  cent  to  90  per  cent  of  the  men 
were  in  the  war  because  of  no  particular  enthusiasm  and  merely 
because  they  had  been  drafted  and  had  to  go!  Resistance 
meant  imprisonment;  evasion  and  desertion  meant  death.  This 
statement  of  the  plain  facts  can  scarcely  be  questioned;  hence, 
the  continuance  of  the  exaggerated,  fulsome  talk  about  our  sol- 
diers' "unselfish  and  voluntary  sacrifice  in  the  service  of  ideal 
objects,"  etc.,  stultifies  both  the  men  and  those  who  indulge  in 
it  from  a  mistaken  sense  of  patriotic  zeal. 

A  desirable  sobering-up  on  this  subject  is  gradually  taking 
place  among  the  more  informed  and  thoughtful  sections  of  the 
people  and  has  found  expression  in  the  press  and  in  Congress. 
Let  us  hope  that  it  may  soon  spread  among  the  general  public 
so  that  we  may  regain  our  former  international  reputation  of 
being  a  serious  and  sensible  people! 

As  to  the  "excesses  of  patriotism"  of  the  Loyal  Legion  and 
other  offenders,  we  repeat  that  they  are  chargeable  to  a  super- 
ebulition  of  animal  spirits,  national  sentiment  and  war  glory, 
perfectly  natural  and  excusable  but  which  should  now  be  al- 
lowed to.  re  tire  to  the  normal  proportions  and  sober  view  in 
harmony  with  the  facts.  This  applies  to  all  that  has  happened 
in  New  York  in  this  direction,  from  the  blockading  of  the 
German  opera  to  the  "Rhine  Horror"  scenes  and  the  following 
All-American  demonstration  and  speeches  in  Madison  Square 
Garden;  equally  to  all  similar  occurrences  in  other  cities. 


B.     WAR  AND  CIVILIZATION.     MISLEADING  ILLUSIONS. 

A    "NATURAL"    VIEW    OF    LIFE    AS    THE    REMEDY. 

THE  TRUE  HISTORICAL  AND  ETHICAL  VIEW 

OF  WAR. 

The  most  absorbing  questions  above  all  others  within  the 
awful  war  turmoil  are  these:  "What  about  civilization;  has 
it  been  lost?  if  lost,  what  was  it  and  where  is  it  gone? — or  is 


236 


.  it  still  with  us?"  What  is  its  character  and  position  in  rela- 
tion to  the  world  tragedy  just  closed?  There  are  thousands, 
millions  who  ask  these  questions,  who  have  been  deeply  stirred  " 
by  the  occurrence  of  the  war,  who  have  lost  all  moral  faith 
and  self-confidence,  who  feel  that  we — mankind — have  been 
deceived  by  our  teachers,  that  we  have  wilfully  deceived  our- 
selves about  ourselves  and  this  pretense  of  civilization.  In 
view  of  what  has  passed  over  us,  the  specific  question  knocks 
loudly  at  the  door:  "Is  man  really  something  more,  something 
better  than  merely  an  educated  and  dressed-up  animal?"  How 
can  we  reconcile  the  terrible  brutality  of  war  with  our  pre- 
tensions of  religion,  education,  refinement,  humanitarianism — 
of  superiority  over  the  animal  world?  How  can  we  recon- 
cile it  with  all  else  that  we  comprise  in  the  terms  "civilization", 
"civilized  life",  with  our  pretensions  of  being  "higher  beings" 
made  in  the  image  of  an  all-perfect  creator, — embodiment  of 
wisdom  justice  and  all  the  virtues — God? 

The  answer  to  these  harassing  contradictions  which  tor- 
ment so  many  of  us  and  which  outrage  so  poignantly  our  self- 
esteem  and  so-called  "higher  consciousness"  is  simple  enough 
if  we  will  but  be  honest  with  ourselves,  strip  off  all  accumu- 
lated artificiality,  and  contemplate  the  real  natural  Adam.  But 
to  perform  this  feat  is  not  as  easy  as  to  state  it;  the  great 
part  of  educated  mankind  are  brought  up  to  regard  civilization 
and  man  from  the  exalted  standpoint  (above  indicated)  which 
supernatural  religion  or  equivalent  systems  of  egotistical  phi- 
losophy have  implanted  in  us  and  which,  in  spite  of  our  doubts 
and  disillusions,  are  firmly  grown  into  the  flesh  and  blood  of 
the  great  majority  of  men.  These  make  us  regard  ourselves 
as  beings  of  a  "spiritual  nature",  as  standing  apart  from  the 
remainder  of  created  life,  in  fact  as  the  very  objects  for  which 
the  world  was  created  or,  rather,  exists.  In  practical  applica- 
tion, however,  "the  world"  shrinks  quickly  to  the  size  of  our 
little  home-sphere,  the  earth;  the  suns  and  stars  are  but  a  set- 
ting and  decoration  for  it;  everything  upon  the  earth  is  here 
for  man  alone;  we  are  beings  of. a  supernatural  destiny  of 
resurrection  after  death;  we  have  an  immortal  soul,  something 
which  is  distinct  from  the  body  and  lives  forever;  animals  die, 
and  that  is  the  end  of  them,  but  we  die — and  yet  live  again! 

237 


Such  is  the  "monument  of  conceit"  which  man  has  made  of 
himself  and  his  terrestrial  abode!  Can  there  possibly  be  a 
more  narrow  view  of  "the  world"  and  a  more  sophisticated 
one  of  the  earth  and  its  little  insect-product  man — when  we 
think  of  the  boundless  extent  of  the  universe,  the  millions  of 
stars  and  other  "worlds"  which  circle  around,  of  the  great 
forces  which  worii  all  through  this  wonderful  maze  of  cosmic 
activity  and  which,  even  at  this  "advanced"  day,  we  but  im- 
perfectly understand ! 

Those  who  hold  to  this  supernatural-life  conception  sur- 
round the. real  man  with  a  glass  house,  a  kind  of  showcase  of 
self-admiration  and  exultation  at  our  supposed  select  position 
in  nature, — a  showcase  which  for  particular  circumstances 
has  its  practical  uses,  but  whose  artificiality  is  incontestable. 
Inside  of  it  is  "the  artificial  man,"  man  not  "as  and  what  he  is" 
but  as  and  what  we,  or  they,  the  believers,  would  wish  him  to 
be,  an  ideal  man,  the  goal-man,  the  god-man,  the  higher  ego. 
With  those  who  hold  to  this  conception  (with  most  of  them 
merely  a  matter  of  acquired  mental  habit,  not  of  self-evolved 
convictions)  "civilization"  in  all  its  manifestations  partakes  of 
this  same  artificial  character  and  point  of  view;  hence,  war 
is  to  them  an  atrocious,  revolting,  accusing,  debasing,  incom- 
prehensible contradiction.  The  terrible  reality  of  its  occur- 
rence makes  their  artificial  creation  tremble,  and,  for  the 
moment,  shakes  their  faith!  And  one  should,  indeed,  think 
that  this  orgie  of  blood — war — with  its  thousands  and  thou- 
sands of  the  slain  and  maimed,  its  boundless  suffering  and 
sorrow  spread  throughout  the  world  without  a  sign  having  come 
from  this  God  in  this  Heaven  would  knock  the  last  prop  from 
under  the  belief  in  a  personal,  responsible  and  "benign"  power 
as  the  creator  and  ruler  of  the  world,  and  destroy  all  faith  in 
the  higher  nature  and  destiny  of  man.  But  the  oblivion 
brought  by  time  restores  the  tottering  confidence  of  "the  be- 
lievers" and  they  soon  return  to  their  flattering  weave  of  self- 
deception.  History  might  teach  them  their  error,  but  they 
close  their  ears;  nature  all  about  them  could  do  so  still  better 
by  her  denials  and  conti'adictions:  The  living  in  filth  and 
degradation  of  millions  of  these  exalted  humans;  the  starving 
to  death  of  other  millions  annually  iProm  want,   while  "their 

238 


brothers"  have  super-abundance;  the  character  of  other  mil- 
lions who  are  in  sense  and  sensibilities  below  the  stage  of 
many  animals;  the  hopeless  depravity  of  other  millions  living 
in  the  very  centers  of  progress  and  refinement;  the  shocking 
spectacle  of  the  unpitying  killings  of  millions  of  heads  of  cattle, 
sheep,  hogs,  beasts  of  the  woods,  birds,  fowls  and  fishes  for 
human  food  that  this  special  creature — man — may  gratify  his 
Lucullian  appetite  when,  yet,  there  is  abundant  palatable  and 
more  wholesome  food  in  the  world  which  is  not  of  the  blood 
of  life  of  other  creatures!  All  this  evidence  there  is  and 
more,  but  they,  the  believers,  close  their  eyes  and  ears  for 
fear  of  disturbing  their  vainglorious  dream! 

We  also  have  the  evidence  of  our  general  helplessness  and 
of  the  absence  of  any^  "specially  favored  destiny  or  protection" 
when  a  Vesuvius  or  an  Aetna,  a  tidal  wave  or  a  monsoon,  an 
earthquake  or  a  great  epidemic  breaks  loose  and  sweeps  man 
and  his  works  away  like  leaves  before  a  wind!  And,  further, 
there  is  the  death  and  suffering  wrought  by  the  lesser  "acci- 
dents" of  life  due  to  the  imperfection  of  man's  own  work 
or  to  his  fallibility — railroad  accidents,  ship  disasters,  ex- 
plosions, conflagrations,  inundations,  machinery  accidents,  elec- 
tric shocks,  cuts,  falls,  etc.  With  all  these,  and  with  "moral" 
pains  and  disappointments,  we  are  "but  a  bit  of  chaff",  helpless 
at  the  caprice  of  the  unfeeling,  unreasoning  and  irrespon- 
sible forces  of  nature. 

Or,  would  anyone  be  bold  enough  to  say  that  in  these  visi- 
tations and  accidents  "the  victims"  are  a  specially  selected 
congregation  of  humans  or  specially  wicked  individuals,  in  each 
•  case,  oi'dained  by  the  assumed  agent  of  eternal  justice  residing 
in  an  assumed  "heavenly"  abode  to  be  thus  specially  punished 
for  wrongs  each  and  every  one  so  visited  had, committed?  The 
proposition  is  too  absurd  to  be  entertained;  but  what,  then, 
must  be  our  conclusion?  How  can  we  reconcile  these  facts 
with  our  vain  assumption  that  we  are  the  objects  of  a  "divine 
solicitude  and  providence"  and  of  a  pre-designed  destiny  for 
eternal,  imperishable  conscious  life?  No  reliable  sign  and  evi- 
dence of  such  conscious  existence  of  man  after  death  on  earth 
has  ever  come!  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  of  any  intelligent 
destiny  and  direction  to  a  steadily  progressive  purpose  in  the 

239 


history  of  the  human  race;  there  is  no  continuous  advance 
from  a  lower  level  to  a  higher  one,  each  individual,  each  people 
and  period  of  civilization  handing  on  to  the  next,  unabridged, 
what  they  had  inherited  and  what  they  had  themselves  won  in 
order  for  them — their  successors — to  build  further  and  higher. 
Such  continuous  progress  appears  only  over  periods  of  limited 
duration — a  few  thousand  years  at  best — which  are  insignifi- 
cant in  the  arena  of  cosmic  cycles  of  time.  On  the  contrary, 
we  climb — and  slide  back  a  little ;  we  climb  some  more — and 
slide  back  some  more ;  we  climb  again — then  slide  back  the 
whole  length  of  the  ladder  to  the  bottom!  Such  is  the  history 
of  the  coming  and  going  civilizations  in  respect  of  the  various 
races  and  peoples  of  recorded  time;  but  in  a  later  article  the 
author  will  attempt  to  give  even  a  larger  perspective  of  this 
subject,  from  which  it  will  appear  that  man's  entire  known 
period  of  existence  is  but  one  of  many  similar  predecessors 
which  all  rose  to  their  height — then  fell  to  extinction,  separated 
by   ages   of   stagnation. 

Quite  different  from  the  supernatural  is  the  "natural  view" 
of  life,  the  view  in  calm  harmony  with  the  facts  of  nature  and 
with  man's  physical  character,  capacities,  disposition,  neces- 
sities and  opportunities.  It  sees  man  as  a  product  of  this 
earth,  similar  in  origin  and  makeup  to  all  other  animal  life, 
merely  of  a  higher  order  and  development  of  facilities  (erect 
stature,  freedom  of  hands,  articulation,  etc.)  bringing  increased 
opportunities  to  learn  and  develop  and  with  them  the  growth 
of  "reflective  intelligence."  We  perceive  the  structure  and 
functions  of  our  thinking  and  feeling  apparatus  to  be  similar 
to  those  of  the  higher  animals,  only  so  much  more  developed  . 
by  constant  practice  and  the  ability  of  free  movement  over 
the  earth  and  the  sea,  and  by  readier  climatic  accommodation. 
The  sensations  of  heat  and  cold,  hunger  and  thirst,  pain  and 
wellbeing,  joy  and  grief,  sexual  desire,  love  of  life  and  pressure 
of  self-preservation  link  us  to  the  animal  world  and  to  nature 
at  large  inseparably  with  unbreakable  chains  and  in  every 
way  so  categorically  that  it  makes  the  opposite  conception 
appear  a  mere  childish  freak  of  ignorance  and  foolish  vanity. 
All  this  is  demonstrated  very  prosaically  (and  in  some  respects 
very  offensively  to  that  refinement  of  sensibilities  which  is  the 

240 


accompaniment  of  civilization)  by  the  identical  physical  func- 
tioning of  our  bodies  with  those  of  the  lower  "animals" — the 
processes  of  breathing,  nutrition,  excretion,  growth,  reproduc- 
tion, disease,  decline — death  and  dissolution.  These  truths  are 
pitilessly  destructive  of  our  assumed  pretense  of  importance 
and  dignity  as  "special  and  immortal  beings";  if  we  were  such, 
why  are  we  not  made  different?  Why  has  this  immortal 
soul  of  man  not  yet  been  identified  and  proven  different  from 
the  soul  of  the  animal,  the  flower  or  the  apple  tree,  that  soul 
which  is  individualized  in  the  myriad  exhibits  of  nature — which 
is  nature  itself?  While  the  gulf  which  separates  the  most 
advanced  animals  from  man  is  immense,  it  is  a  difference  of 
degree  only  and  not  of  fundamental  kind.  Why  have  not  all 
the  countless  ages  of  man's  development  succeeded  to  eliminate 
one  dot  of  his  animal  physique  and  necessities,  of  his  mental 
and  emotional  character,  of  the  limitation  of  his  understand- 
ing? We  have  the  right  to  ask  these  questions  of  supernatural 
religion  with  its  claims  and  confident  assurances — but  receive 
no  intelligible  answer. 

In  this  natural  and  truthful  conception  of  life  which  the 
author  attempts  to  convey  "civilization"  is  not  anything  so 
very  remarkably  advanced,  wonderful  or  exalted  as  we  are 
wont  to  proudly  believe ;  it  only  appears  to  us  to  be  so  rela- 
tively; the  foundation,  nature,  and  the  material,  man,  are  and 
remain  ever  the  same ;  it  is  astonishing  and  instructive  to  see 
how  thin  is  this  artificial  product,  how  easily  it  is  stripped 
off,  how  near  man  is  at  all  times  to  his  "natural"  state.  The 
war  has,  once  again,  pointed  this  lesson  with  a  terrifying 
eloquence!  That  civilization  is  not  regular,  continuous  and 
permanent  we  have  already  pointed  out,  nor  is  it  at  any  time 
of  very  great  absolute  perfection.  It  should  be  regarded  as 
merely  a  logical  result  of  man's  momentary  state  of  develop- 
ment at  any  given  epoch,  the  result  of  the  challenge  thrown 
out  by  nature  to  the  forces  within  him  to  make  their  utmost 
demonstration  under  the  many  varried  conditions  of  existence. 
It  measures  the  degree  of  man's  conquest  over  nature  at  any 
given  time,  over  the  many  obstacles  and  uncertainties,  the 
arbitrariness  and  unbending  dictation  which  he  encounters  in 
the   path   of   his   struggle   for   self-preservation,   for   a   living, 

241 


comforts,  enjoyments,  position  and  power  over  others,  individu- 
ally and  collectively,  in  various  directions. 

In  proportion  as  civilization  advances,  it  is,  in  a  measure, 
a  getting-away  from  nature;  and  it  is  a  nice  question  as  to 
how  far  man  may  proceed  upon  this  road,  individually  and 
in  a  mass,  with  impunity,  i.  e.,  with  immunity  from  harmful 
consequences.  Evidently,  being  nature's  children  (altogether 
so  in  our  view)  the  artificial  life  of  civilization  must  reach 
a.  limit  at  some  time  at  the  point  where  we  begin  to  suffer 
and  deteriorate  physically,  and  where  life,  as  such,  becomes 
unenjoyable,  where  a  state  of  weariness  at  the  oppressive  sur- 
feit of  the  artificial  sets  in.  At  that  point  we  are  compelled 
to  stop  and  turn  back.  Individual  men,  peoples  and  entire 
periods  of  civilization  reach  that  condition  from  time  to  time. 
As  to  attaining  perfection  of  development,  history  shows  civi- 
lization in  its  various  periods  among  different  peoples  to  have 
been  one-sided  and  imperfect  in  each,  now  excelling  more  in 
this  direction  and  now  in  that,  here  showing  deficiencies  of  one 
class  and  there  of  another;  also  it  shows  it  to  have  been  irregu- 
lar and  flitting  in  its  coming  and  going  from  one  people  or 
part  of  the  earth  to  another.  Each  period  seems  to  have  left 
some  things  attempted  unattained,  notable  achievements  of 
former  times  lost  and  forgotten,  those  of  later  periods  not  even 
dreamt  of.  However  it  be,  it  rises  like  a  wave  to  its  crest, 
then  recedes  to  a  calm,  to  exhaustion,  to  recuperation  and  a 
new  rise  and  swell  to  eminence  at  some  other  place;  it  is 
the  picture  of  ever-continuous  life  within  transformation  and 
death,  the  reflection  of  nature  itself  in  her  round  of  summer 
and  winter,  resurrection  and  burial. 

It  follows  that  in  the  view  of  life  and  man's  character 
here  presented,  war  is  not  anything  unnatural.  All  nature  is 
the  scene  of  perpetual  war  of  contending  forces;  self-preserva- 
tion is  a  battle  from  the  smallest  creatures  up  to  man ;  every 
living  thing  seems  to  have  its  "natural"  enemy  (by  instinct) 
whom  it  wants  to  destroy,  and  many  "live  upon  each  other" 
for  food ;  peace  within  this  unceasing  struggle  is  only  re- 
cuperation for  new  effort  of  demonstration,  acquisition,  dom- 
ination ;  absolute  peace  means  stagnation  and  decay.  Man's 
nature  is  animal — imperative  physical  necessities  to   be  satis- 

242 


fied,  the  passions  of  the  flesh  to  be  appeased,  the  emotions  of 
love  and  hate,  jealousy  and  vengeance,  desire  for  possessions 
and  of  power  over  others  to  be  asserted — and  leads  inevitably 
to  contention  and  strife  with  his  fellowman  and  equally  among 
entire  peoples.  Nor  is  man,  the  animal,  when  aroused  in  his 
fundamental  physical  character,  a  gentle  animal  like  a  cow, 
a  fish,  a  fowl  or  the  little  things  which  creep  in  the  ground; 
on  the  contrary  he  is  fierce,  bloodthirsty  and  terrible  like  the 
wolf  of  the  steppes  and  the  tiger  of  the  jungles.  Thus  the 
essence  of  war  is  ever  present  and  ever  the  same  whether  man 
meets  man  with  a  spiked  club,  a  flint-lock  gun  or  a  modern 
repeating  rifle,  with  a  Roman  catapult  or  a  fifteen-inch  breech- 
loading  gun!  And  while  mechanical  and  scientific  progress 
have,  on  the  one  hand,  produced  the  awful  agencies  of  destruc- 
tion, death  and  mutilation  which  this  war  has  shown,  they  have 
happily,  on  the  other  hand,  produced  the  amelioration  of 
suffering  by  modern  surgery,  medicine  and  hospital  nursing, 
and  the  vastly  improved  care  for  the  soldier  from  every  point 
of  view.  Hence,  there  is  for  those  who  subscribe  to  a  rational 
and  normal  view  of  life,  including  war,  no  conflict,  incom- 
patibility or  accusation  between  war  and  civilization,  no  dis- 
illusionment and  no  remorse;  these  sentimental  agonies  belong 
alone  to  those  who  are  morbidly  illusioned  and  oppressed  by 
an  artificial  conception  of  the  character  of  man,  his  life  on  the 
earth  and  assumed  destiny  after  death. 

But  an  important  differentiation  must  be  asserted.  While 
war,  in  the  view  stated,  is  inevitable  from  time  to  time  as  a 
condition  "natural  to  man"  and  as  the  final  appeal  and  only 
definite  conclusion  in  serious  enmities  between  nations,  there 
is,  nevertheless,  a  great  distinction  to  be  drawn  as  to  the 
character  of  wars;  as  to  quality  of  motives  and  any  real  un- 
avoidable necessity.  Those  of  the  past  which  have  been  pure 
wars  of  aggression  and  conquest  of  the  stronger  upon  the 
weaker  for  political  and  material  gain,  or  those  of  injury  and 
subjugation  from  mere  envy,  greed  and  racial  jealousy,  or 
those  of  mere  monarchical  or  imperial  self-perpetuation,  or 
those— most  execrable  of  all — of  religious  contention  and  per- 
secution are  to  be  entirely  condemned  and  should  be  made 
impossible  in  the  future  by  every  means  which  can  be  devised. 

243 


But  there  are  other  wars  of  the  past — such  as  will  also  be  justi- 
fied in  the  future — which  have  been  as  the  beacon  lights  in 
man's  general  advance,  intellectual,  moral,  material.  Such 
were  the  wars  in  revolt  of  oppression  by  tyrannical,  arbitrary 
governments,  whether  they  were  those  of  monarchical  or 
popular  tyranny;  those  for  national  consolidation  and  inde- 
pendence when  conditions  for  such  were  ripe,  above  all  those 
for  man's  intellectual  and  moral  emancipation  and  for  free 
popular  government  in  agreement  with  modern  thought  and 
feeling. 

History  is  replete  with  these  commendable,  constructive 
wars:  The  wars  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  republics  of  old;  of 
Spain,  Holland  and  Switzerland,  and  others  more,  for  national 
independence ;  the  wars  of  the  "reformation"  for  religious 
freedom  and  tolerance;  that  of  America  for  freedom  from 
England  and  establishment  of  our  republic ;  the  civil  war  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  American  Union;  the  wars  of  the 
French  revolution  for  the  intellectual  and  political  emancipa- 
tion of  mankind;  the  smaller  modern  revolutionary  wars;  those 
of  Germany's  and  Italy's  consolidation  to  nationality;  finally, 
the  struggles  for  fi-ee  institutions  in  Russia  and  Germany  as 
the  result  of  the  great  war  just  closed.  But  of  the  condemn- 
able  wars  of  olden  and  modern  times  none  approaches  in  ab- 
sence of  justification,  in  low  grade  of  motives  and  falsehood  of 
every  species  the  war  of  1914-1919  on  the  part  of  five  original 
war  powers  of  1914,  but  overwhelmingly  of  the  three  Entente 
powers!  Its  cupidity  was  surpassed  only  by  its  stupidity;  it 
was  in  fact,  the  unintentional  result  of  a  fatal  diplomatic  mis- 
calculation, as  fully  explained  by  the  author  in  Article  VIII. 
It  forced  Germany  and  her  allies  to  challenge  the  world  to  a 
war  in  self-defense  of  their  honor  and  independence,  the  grand- 
est in  scale,  courage  and  devotion  which  the  world  has  seen. 
This  will  be  the  universal  verdict  on  this  war  in  less  than  ten 
years  from  now,  when  complete  calm  will  have  replaced  the 
present  mental  and   emotional   disturbance. 

In  the  largest  view,  however,  the  direct  motives  and  in- 
cidents which  led  to  the  outbreak  of  the  great  war  were  not  in 
themselves  the  primary  cause,  but,  rather,  an  effect,  a  con- 
sequence of  our  decadent  and  barren  system  of  morals  which 

244 


is  incapable  of  exercising  effective  control  over  men's  minds 
and  emotions  and  serves  only  as  a  cloak  for  the  inherent  evil 
impulses  of  a  race  unchecked  by  genuine  ideals.  To  this  must 
be  added  the  accompanying  state  of  "Spiritual  Inertia,"  previ- 
ously discussed  in  Article  VII,  mainly  produced  by  our  preoccu- 
pation with  material  subjects  and  achievements.  But  had  there 
been  in  practice  a  sound  system  of  personal  and  political  ethics 
founded  on  natural  facts  and  unprejudiced  reason,  one  the 
truth  and  power  of  which  men  would  have  felt  in  their  inmost 
hearts  as  a  true  guide  to  right  action,  this  spiritual  inertia 
could  not  have  been  influential!  Now  that  the  war  is  past 
and  we  realize  its  monstrosity  and  are  cast  down  with  chagrin 
and  remorse,  we  make  a  concerted  but  imbecile  effort  to 
prevent  a  similar  disaster  by  a  purely  political  and  one-sided 
scheme  of  a  League  of  Nations.  The  more  credulous  pretend 
to  believe  that  this  means  will  be  efl'ective ;  but  how  should  this 
be  possible  if  the  fundamental  ethical  errors  and  deficiencies, 
which  we  have  named  as  the  real  underlying  causes  of  our 
condition,  are  left  untouched?  We  must  go  deeper — to  the 
very  bottom ;  we  must  tear  off  our  old  dress  of  hypocritical 
and  worn-out  ideas  and  plunge  into  the  fountain  of  real  truth, 
naturalness  and  genuine  human  brotherhood-sympathy  for  our 
regeneration.  A  radical  remedy  is  needed!  While  there  is 
no  harm  in  supernatural  religious  assumptions  as  a  specula- 
tion merely  of  the  imagination,  as  a  subject  for  mythical  poetry 
and  art,  as  a  pretty  fancy  for  primitive  peoples,  children  and 
the  mentally  simple,  these  fancies  must  not  be  transformed 
into  beliefs  in  their  actuality  and  made  the  foundation  of  our 
practical  life  conceptions  and  rules  of  moral  action.  Herein 
lies  the  danger  and  harmfully  misleading  influence  of  religion; 
it  furnishes  a  false  environment  and  perspective  to  our  exist- 
ence, fills  the  mind  of  man  with  impossible  illusions  and  puts 
him  in  constant  contradiction  with  the  hard  facts  of  daily 
life  experiences  and  the  whole  history  of  the  race.  This  con- 
dition leads  to  a  perversion  of  the  judgment  and  the  impulses 
until  our  whole  position  is  become  unnatural,  diseased  and 
theoretical — and  we  have,  in  short,  the  glass  house  and  its 
inmate ! 

245 


It  is  an  interesting  question  whether  the  periodical  stag- 
nation and  collapse  of  civilizations,  this  puzzling  fact  of 
climbing  and  backsliding  and  losing  of  achievement,  this  ab- 
sence of  a  steady  continuity  in  man's  advance  may  not  be 
due  to  the  influence  of  these  unsound  life  views,  these  hallu- 
cinations about  ourselves  which  from  time  to  time  are  bound 
to  end  up  in  a  climax  of  reaction,  of  revelation  of  their  un- 
soundness, and  in  a  consequent  moral  and  spiritual  debacle. 
In  the  rational  view  and  practice  of  life,  as  suggested  in  this 
book,  it  is,  on  the  conti'ary,  possible  to  encompass  the  attain- 
ment of  this  continuity  and  the  advent  of  a  steady  progress 
of' man  of  unbounded  scope  and  splendor! 


Excrescences  of  Religion.  Apart  from  the  many  "sects"  of 
the  Christian  and  other  religions  which  have,  at  least,  some 
theological  dogma  or  interpretation  of  the  Bible  for  their  foun- 
dation, there  are  all  those  strange  modern  vagaries — Spiritual- 
ism, New-Thought,  Christian  Science,  Theosophy,  Occultism, 
etc.,  which  are  neither  religion,  dogma,  schools  of  ethics,  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  nor  anything  else  definite  and  classifiable. 
These  negative  "cults"  are,  however,  very  important  for  the 
author's  argument  by  proving — from  their  great  number  and 
very  large  following — the  utter  dissatisfaction  with  orthodox 
supernatural  religions  by  a  growing  section  of  the  public,  and 
its  yearning  for  something  more  satisfying  and  convincing. 
With  all  that,  these  "cults"  are  not  atheistc  nor  even  strictly 
agnostic,  and  hold  fast  to  the  fundamental  ideas  of  super- 
natural religions,  as  set  forth  in  the  preceding  text.  Regarding 
spiritualism,  spiritism,  re-incarnation,  occultism,  and  all  other 
forms  which  believe  in  "spirits",  "messages",  "manifestations", 
"materialization  of  the  departed",  etc.,  these  strange  vagaries 
have  the  ardent  object  of  proving  the  theory  of  supernatural 
existence  by  finding  and  producing  evidence  of  its  actuality. 
(The  evidence  is  "found"  in  various  ways  and  very  often 
"produced"  in  the  literal  sense).  This  object  and  its  methods 
cannot  be  regarded  as' anything  else  but  a  species  of  pitiable 
self-deceit  proceeding  from,  and  appealing  to,  minds  naturally 
weak  or  pathologically  aff"ected,  in  other  woixls  "unsound"  in  the 
sense  of  being  super-credulous,  morbidly  impressionable,  un- 
clear, and  unable  to  bring  logical  reasoning  powers  to  bear 
on  the  physical  processes  by  which  the  various  forms  of  "super- 
natural evidence"  are  manifested.  The  physical  processes  are 
the  well-established  facts  and  methods  of  mesmerism,  trance, 
somnambulism,  thought-influence  or  telepathy,  hypnotism  and 
every  other  form  of  "super-excited  psychological  manifesta- 
tions."   Their  names  are  many  and  impressive  but  their  nature  is 

246 


identical,  and  rests  upon  the  general  principles,  facts  and  power 
of  psychology  and  metaphysics.  In  the  hands  of  the  trained 
scientist,  physician  and  minister  of  religion  these  facts  and 
powers  are  of  the  greatest  value — whether  applied  to  spiritual, 
moral,  medical  or  merely  material  problems — but  in  the  hands 
of  the  half-trained  professional  "teachers"  in  these  lines  and 
the  many  unprincipled  charlatans  who  thrive  upon  them  and 
the  public's  credulity,  they  are  mostly  a  deception  and  merely 
a  means  of  financial  exploitation; 


XV.     THE    SUMMIT 

The  Nineteenth  Century.      Progress  or  Decay?      The  Philosophy 

of  "Rationalism"  vs.  Supernatural  Religions.      Its 

Practical    Application. 

When  at  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  in  1815,  the  great  Napoleon 
was  defeated  and  European  peace  established  soon  thereafter, 
a  new  era  began  to  dawn  upon  the  world.  The  European 
nations — the  flower  of  the  earth — were  at  last  permitted  to 
turn  from  the  horrors  and  distractions  of  war  to  the  hopes  and 
beneficent  employments  of  peace.  A  great  mental  reforma- 
tion, a  resurrection  or  intellectual  renaissance  had  been  wrought 
by  the  French  Revolution  and  the  years  of  political,  military 
and  philosophical  strife  which  followed  in  its  wake.  The  new 
theories  of  individual  rights  and  increased  personal  liberty — 
the  new  intellectual  and  moral  freedom — had  gone  into  the  flesh 
and  blood  of  men  and  become  a  living  faith.  Now  that  peace 
had  come  again  with  a  fair  promise  of  permanence,  after  a 
period  of  twenty-six  years  of  turbulence,  this  new  philosophy 
imperatively  called  for  demonstration  in  all  the  fields  of  human 
endeavor — and  the  territory  and  all  attendant  conditions  were 
ripe  for  this  demonstration.  It  was,  moreover,  a  case  of  urgent 
material  necessity.  The  world  had  been  impoverished,  fam- 
ished, disjointed!  Destruction  in  town  and  city,  of  farm  build- 
ings and  country  estates,  and  devastation  of  fields  and  forests 
had  been  going  on  for  two  decades  in  France,  Central  Europe- 
and  Italy.  The  scale  of  living  had  been  reduced  to  the  mini- 
mum  required   for  bare   existence,   except  for  the   very  rich, 

247 


and  many  of  that  class  also  had  suffered  severe  privations 
through  political  persecution  and  exile.  No  wonder,  then,  that 
the  world  now  began  to  draw  a  new  breath.  The  problem  for 
it  was  "to  get  on  its  feet  again",  to  work  and  plan  with  dili- 
gence to  replace  the  waste,  to  accumulate  new  resources  for  a 
new  era  of  material  progress.  In  this  new  era,  pursuant  to 
the  new  ideas,  a  greater  number  of  all  the  people  should  share 
in  the  material  wellbeing  hoped  for,  than  had  formerly  been 
possible. 

At  this  period  the  world  was  a  different  one  from  that  of 
to-day.  It  was  a  great  world  of  new  ideas  in  politics,  philos- 
ophy, literature,  art  and  music,  in  theoretical  science  and 
mathematics,  but  in  applied  sciences  it  was  a  world  in  its  in- 
fancy compared  to  our  day.  Although  only  a  hundred  years 
behind  us  in  point  of  time,  it  stood  nearer  to  Greece  and  Rome 
and  the  Middle  Ages  than  to  us.  There  were  no  power  engines 
of  any  kind  except  simple  hydraulic  and  other  mechanical  de- 
vices; no  railroads  or  steamboats,  no  telegraph,  telephone,  gas- 
light and  powei",  or  electric-light  and  power;  no  automobile, 
aeroplane,  submarine  or  wireless  telegraph.  Mechanical  science, 
electricity,  chemistry,  photography,  sanitation,  medicine,  hy- 
giene and  surgery  were  still  in  their  early  stages  of  tentative 
development,  pregnant  of  great  things  to  come,  but  practically 
just  emerging  from  the  darkness  of  the  Middle  Ages.  In  the 
finest  residences  and  hotels  of  those  days  there  were  no  water- 
supply  and  heating  systems,  no  sanitary  plumbing  apparatus 
and  sewage  disposal,  nothing  but  candle  light  and  primitive  oil 
lamps,  and  the  cooking  apparatus  and  other  domestic  appoint- 
ments were  of  the  simplest  kind.  Scientific  ventilation  was 
entirely  unknown.  Cities  had  no  public  water  and  sewer  sys- 
tems. No  long-distance  communication  of  any  kind  existed ; 
the  post-chaise-and-four  was  the  means  of  traveling  and  mail 
service;  everything  in  all  these  respects  was  of  the  simplest  kind 
compared  with  the  conveniences,  comforts  and  advantages  of 
our  time.  It  is  not  easy  for  us  to  form  a  correct  mental  pic- 
ture of  the  living  and  working  conditions  of  those  days,  so 
great  is  the  difference! 

But  the  awakening  of  the  world  to  a  new  life  was  on  its 
way.     James  Watts  had  seen  the  kettle-lid  moving;  Volta  and 

248 


J^ranklin  were  experimenting  in  electricity  and  galvanism ; 
chemists  and  physicists  were  delving  and  brewing;  later  the 
great  Faraday  came  with  his  startling  discoveries.  Fulton  had 
made  the  first  tentative  i-uns  with  his  steamboat  on  the  Hud- 
son, and  the  mechanism  of  the  steam  engine — that  greatest 
single  achievement  of  modern  history — was  being  perfected. 
Soon  .that  "wonder  engine"  set  the  wheels  a-rolling,  we  might 
say  all  the  wheels  of  the  modern  era,  of  the  greatest  of  the 
centuries.  In  a  short  time  there  were  railroads,  steamboats, 
steam  engines  of  every  sort  to  drive  mechanical-power  plants, 
and  manufacturing  establishments  arose  of  every  variety. 
The  loom,  the  lathe,  the  scientific  pump,  many  kinds  of  power 
tools  and  wonderful  hand  tools  were  being  invented ;  the  sew- 
ing machine  and  knitting  machine  came  in  due  order.  Mean- 
time, in  the  scientific  world  discoveries  of  a  marvelous  kind 
were  being  made  which  soon  gave  us  artificial  gas  light  and 
domestic  water  service,  the  telegraph,  the  telephone,  the  great 
printing  press  that  works  like  a  thing  of  life,  the  dynamo  for 
producing  electric  light  and  the  motor  for  power,  the  typewrit- 
ing machine,  the  phonograph,  cinematograph  and  dictagraph, 
gas  and  oil  and  compressed-air  engines,  the  gasoline  engine  and 
the  automobile,  the  electric  power  battery  and  storage  battery, 
the  submarine  boat,  airship  and  flying  machine,  wireless  tele- 
graphy and  aerial  telephony,  and  countless  wonderful  appli- 
cations of  these  forces  and  devices.  Chemistry  kept  apace  w'ith 
its  valuable  discoveries  in  the  field  of  the  hydro-carbons  and 
coal-tar  products,  in  finding  new  substances  and  processes — 
liquification  of  air,  many  new  gases,  Roentgen  rays  and  radium, 
refrigeration  and  food  preservation  processes,  etc.,  while  phys- 
ical and  mechanical  sciences  hastened  to  apply  these  new 
means  in  the  thousand-and-one  ways  and  uses  with  which  we 
are  familiar.  It  was  a  stupendous  century  of  research,  study, 
invention,  progress  in  knowledge  and  revolution  in  methods 
and  scale  of  living,  working  and  enjoyments! 

In  all  this  there  was  the  stimulus  of  a  goal,  the  ambition 
to  advance  from  that  which  had  been  attained,  stepwise,  to  that 
which  loomed  up  ahead  as  something  still  newer,  promising,  fas- 
cinating; and  between  pure  experimental  science  and  necessity 
— between   rhc   insistent   demands   for   new   conveniences   and 

249 


facilities,  new  life  benefits  and  attractions  and  the  power  of 
discovery  and  invention — there  ensued  the  restless  chase  of  the 
galloping  nineteenth  century  for  more  and  more  of  new  thrills 
of  achievement.  We  have  been  to  the  North  Pole  and  the  South 
Pole;  we  travel  upon  the  water,  under  the  water  and  in  the 
air  with  the  certainty  of  land  locomotion;  we  have  delved  into 
analytical  chemistry  and  biology  to  a  point  which  brings  us 
close  to  solving  the  riddle  of  life.  The  general  advance  in 
theoretical  and  mathematical  astronomy  has  been  so  wonderful 
that  with  the  aid  of  the  modern  monster  telescope  we  can 
almost  walk  around  on  Luna  and  Mars  as  if  they  were  the 
earth  itself,  and  the  progress  in  photography  has  fixed  their 
pictures  with  astonishing  accuracy.  Utilitarian  physics  and 
chemistry  have  taught  us  how  to  turn  the  very  dust  and  debris 
of  the  earth  and  the  life  processes  into  useful  material!  We 
fly  across  three-thousand  miles  of  ocean  in  a  few  hours,  and 
with  the  aerial  and  land  telephone  can  talk  around  the  earth; 
the  engineering  marvels  of  the  railroads,  with  their  tunnels  and 
bridges,  have  been  supplemented  by  the  great  canals  of  Suez, 
Kiel,  Corinth  and  Panama.  In  our  cities  magnificent  buildings 
for  hotels  ancf  oftices,  of  thirty  to  forty  stories  in  height,  have 
been  erected  and  in  their  internal  equipments  are  compendiums 
of  everything  that  science  and  art  have  developed  for  the 
service  and  gratification  of  this  luxurious  modern  man,  while 
the  ingenious  subways  and  sub-river-tunnel  railroads  furnish 
rapid  city  travel  free  from  interference  from  street  traffic. 
Our  transatlantic,  lake  and  river  steamers  are  floating  hotels, 
wonders  of  strength,  size,  speed,  ingenuity  of  arrangement  and 
elegance  of  installation.  It  would  seem  that  our  every  thirst 
and  ambition  for  knowledge  of  the  earth  and  of  the  heavens, 
of  man  and  his  life  purpose,  of  physical  satisfaction  and  plea- 
sures are  now  satisfied  and  that  we  are  apparently  arrived  at  a 
summit  in  all  of  these  respects.  The  state  of  "continuous  ex- 
pectancy" of  the  last  seventy-five  years  is  abating,  the  book  of 
wonders  is  closing,  the  summit  of  our  powers  and  dreams  seems 
attained ! 

In  truth,  what  is  there  left  for  man  to  achieve  of  additional 
marvels  to  minister  to  his  service  or  progress  unless  he  develop 
some    new   intellectual    sense,   like   the    comprehension    of   the 

250 


1 


fourth  dimension,  or  turn  to  a  new  philosophical  idea  and  life 
perspective,  as  he  might,  by  abandoning  the  cult  of  the  super- 
natural? There  will,  no  doubt,  be  perfectioning  of  detail  and 
increasing  variety  of  all  that  we  now  possess,  and  extensions 
into  related  fields.  The  imagination  can  see  a  thousand  things 
to  which  the  powers  which  we  now  control  may  yet  be  applied. 
But,  what  essentially  new  great  problems  and  ambitions  in  the 
lines  of  discovery  and  invention"  are  there  really  and  visibly  left 
to  us — objects  of  our  ardent  desires — links  to  our  knowledge, 
necessities  to  the  enlargement  and  improvement  of  our  exist- 
ence? 

Only  a  few  years  back  there  was  still  the  North-pole  lure 
and  the  South-pole  lure,  the  submarine  boat,  the  navigation 
of  the  air,  wireless  telegraphy  and  telephony.  Today  we  have 
left  only  two  or  three  major  problems  of  burning  interest  to 
excite  our  energies.  One  is  the  penetration  into  the  bowels  of 
the  earth  to  such  depth,  and  at  sufficiently  numerous  points,  as 
to  enable  us  to  solve  the  question  of  the  structure  of  the  earth's 
crust  (if  it  be  a  crust)  or  of  its  interior  formation — whether 
it  be  a  mass  of  molten  stone  and  metal  or  a  cold  solid  of  sili- 
cious  and  metallic  nature — or,  perhaps,  a  hollow  space  filled 
with  hot  gases.  Modern  engineering  should  be  able  to  sink 
open  steel-tube  shafts  to  such  depth — twenty-five  miles  or 
more — that  a  safe  surmise,  at  least,  might  be  made  as  to  the 
earth's  'interior  structure.  Another  problem  left  is  the  pene- 
tration into  the  air  region  around  the  earth  to  the  limits  of  this 
gaseous  envelope  to  ascertain  its  nature  and,  perhaps,  beyond 
into  the  ether  of  light  and  electricity,  even  far  enough  to  es- 
tablish communication  with,  or  at  least  gain  precise  informa- 
tion about,  the  nearest  heavenly  bodies  to  our  earth — our  sate- 
lite  Moon  and  the  planet  Mars  and  its  moons.  With  the  dis- 
covery of  explosive  agents  of  unbelievable  power,  and  our 
ability  to  construct  titanic  guns  of  cori-esponding  strength,  the 
vision  rises  of  our  ultimately  reaching  these  bodies!  These 
two  quests  into  the  unknown  are  no  more  chimerical  than 
many  of  those  which  we  have  solved  would  have  appeared  to 
the  people  of  a  hundred  years  ago.  The  third  visible  problem 
is  the  continuation  of  advanced  biological  research  to  discover 

251 


the    process    of    the    spontaneous    generation    of    organized    self- 
conscious  animal  life — of  our  life.     THIS  IS  THE  GREATEST. 

These  three  major  tasks  still  before  us  are,  undoubtedly, 
of  absorbing  interest  and  scientific  value;  yet,  if  we  reflect, 
it  may  be  seen  that  they  are  of  much  less  direct  human-life 
usefulness  than  those  which  were  the  effort  and  grand  success 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  Thus  the  immediate  future  before 
mankind  lacks,  in  comparison,  the  stimulus  of  similar  power- 
fully incentive  subjects  of  science  and  life  problems  as  those 
were  which  gave  such  a  zest  of  endeavor  to  the  immediate  past. 
Even  the  wonderful  new  cosmic  theory  of  "relativity"  as  ex- 
pounded by  Professor  Albert  Einstein — relativity  of  the  values 
of  time,  space,  motion,  gravitation  and  all  other  cosmic  forces — 
holding  the  prospect  of  completely  changing  our  conception  of 
the  universe  and  all  its  processes,  does  not  affect  or  interest 
Us  deeply  in  regard  to  our  mundane  life-existence.  For  a  con- 
siderable period,  no  doubt,  we  shall  remain  at  our  summit  to 
perfect,  enlarge,  exploit  and  enjoy  our  accomplishment.  Then, 
if  no  new  conditions  shall  arise  to  give  a  fresh  aspect  to  life, 
with  practical  tasks  of  immediate  necessity  or  great  desirability, 
different  in  kind  from  the  three  stated  above,  and  now  hidden 
from  our  view,  there  must  inevitably  follow  a  period  of  in- 
difference, stagnation  and  decay  similar  to  those  of  past  ages. 


C"  0  much  for  the  outward  demonstration  and  effect  of  things. 
But  everything  in  life,  every  fact  and  exhibition,  is  founded 
on  ideas  and  is  guided  by  ideas.  Behind  the  act  there  stands 
the  thought,  behind  the  intention  and  method  the  philosophical 
basis.  That  day  when  primitive  man  fii-st  stopped  to  act  and 
desire  fi'om  mere  unreasoning  animal  impulse  and  began  to 
think  and  reflect  about  things,  including  his  own  acts  and  feel- 
ings, and  to  develop  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  was  the 
greatest  day  in  the  history  of  this  earth  and  its  animated  in- 
habitants. Mind  and  moral  principles  together — with  neces- 
sity as  the  mainspring — detei'mine  quality  and  scope  of  action  ; 
and  as,  from  time  to  time,  new  levels  of  station  are  reached, 
new  adjustments  must  be  made,  new  perceptions  and  convic- 
tions translated  into  practice  if  action   is  not  to  deteriorate  to 

252 


mechanical  repetition.  Thus  in  the  world  of  pure  thought  and 
emotion — religion,  morals,  philosophy,  political  and  social  sys- 
tems— identical  astonishing  development  has  taken  place  in  this 
remarkable  nineteenth  century,  and  we  seem  to  have  similarly 
arrived  at  a  summit  of  outlook,  scope  and  means  where  either 
new  standards  must  be  found  or  stagnation  and  decay  result 
from  the  insufficiency  of  the  old  ideas  to  provide  a  satisfactory 
working  guide  and  stimulating  goal  for  the  new  future.  The 
following  reflections  have  been  expressed  in  connection  with 
the  topics  of  preceding  articles:  "A  new,  vigorous,  clear  and 
bold  philosophy  is  imperatively  needed  for  the  freely-thinking, 
emancipated  sections  of  mankind,  lest  we  be  willing  to  see  this 
civilization  die  of  the  poison  of  impotent  resignation  to  the 
contradictions  which  confront  supernatural  religions  and  which 
other  systems  of  thought  are  likewise  unable  to  meet  to  our 
satisfaction. 

In  the  article  on  the  ethical  transformation  of  large  numbers 
of  the  working  and  business  population  of  the  most  advanced 
countries — Article  XIII,  Part  B — we  spoke  of  the  inability  of 
the  new  views  of  mere  religious  negation,  of  indefinite  ethical 
theories  and  of  unnatural  human-rights  doctrines  to  furnish  a 
firm  moral  basis  to  the  individual,  especially  when  associated 
with  an  insufficient  educational  foundation.  The  state  of  con- 
fusion and  exasperation  produced  by  this  mental  condition  is 
directly  accountable  for  the  unfortunate  prevalent  misconcep- 
tion of  the  ideas  and  aims  of  socialism  and  of  popular  political 
institutions  by  those  so  affected.  Religious  and  other  reliable 
guides  are  wholly  or  partly  discarded  in  these  cases  without  a 
firm  level  of  new  views  having  been  gained.  As  We  said,  only 
few,  in  proportion,  have  in  this  struggle  "attained  the  confi- 
dence and  serenity  of  full  new  convictions,"  of  a  new  rational 
moral  outlook  and  conception  of  life.  But  these  difficulties 
and  errors  and  discouragements  do  not  remove  the  causes  of 
the  existing  doubt  and  distraction ;  the  life-problems  and  the 
mental  conditions,  as  we  described  them,  cannot  be  removed  by 
merely  ignoring  them;  they  are  the  stern  reality  with  which  we 
must  deal — and  the  remedy  and  new  rejuvenated  confidence 
must  be  brought  to  all!  What  is  lost  entirely  or  become  un- 
reliable   by   having   proven   itself   insufficient   cannot   be   rein- 

253 


stated,  nor  can  the  new  positions  and  visions  gained,  even  if 
yet  imperfect,  be  dissipated  by  denial.  These  new  ideas  and 
feelings  have  come  to  stay  and  they  demand  an  answer,  a 
satisfactory  answer  which  will  appeal  to  reason:  It  is  our 
problem — the  greatest  problem  before  mankind — to  give  this 
answer,  to  furnish  to  all  men  and  women  that  new  and  truer 
conception  of  mankind  and  life  upon  which  a  new  era  of  civili- 
zation, of  increased  and  more  equal  happiness  may  firmly  be 
built  and  the  fatal  inertia  and  decay  which  face  us  be  averted! 
It  is  this  new  idea  of  life,  this  new  moral  basis  which  must  re- 
generate man's  imagination,  disclose  new  paths  and  objects  of 
work  and  living  and  thus  prevent  the  surfeit  of  material 
achievement  and  the  oppression  of  dead  religious  conceptions 
overwhelming   him. 

What  the  character  of  this  new  faith  and  guide  must  be, 
and  the  reasons  for  its  being  and  its  acceptance,  have  now  been 
outlined :  It  is  to  be  the  naturally-ethical  view  of  man  and 
life,  free  from  all  supernatural  attributes  and  destiny.  Reason 
and  physical  probability  must  be  the  test;  our  attitude  in  all 
questions  must  be  "rationally  critical";  consequently  we  must 
repel  the  hypnotic  thraldom  of  supernatural  conceits  and  come 
down  out  of  our  artificial  heaven  upon  this  earth  altogether, 
to  the  bosom  of  our  mother,  our  alpha  and  omega,  and  make 
this  life  here  our  heaven,  and  our  character  and  works  our 
only  possible,  desirable  and  comprehensible  immortality.  This 
philosophy  sets  us  in  complete  harmony  with  nature  upon  a 
basis  of  facts  instead  of  illusions;  it  removes  those  doubts  and 
fears  which  confront  us  the  moment  we  shut  ourselves  up  in 
that  glass  house,  and,  instead,  gives  clearness  to  our  view  and 
firmness  to  our  purpose.  It  centers  our  moral  responsibility 
directly  in  the  individual,  or  in  the  community,  and  confines 
it  upon  this  earth  alone,  free  from  any  artificial  reservations 
of  "accounting"  in  a  future  state  of  life.  Being  of  and  through 
nature,  this  mode  of  thought  must  rest  upon  the  study  of  her 
laws  and  works  and  upon  the  study  and  discipline  of  our  own 
"human  nature,"  making  them  jointly  the  source  and  guides 
for  our  code  of  practical  morals  and  life  ideals.  In  this  way 
shall  we  acquire  that  clearness  of  thought,  faith  and  aim  which 
will  permit  us  to  bring  the  new  socialistic  and  free  political 

254 


ideas  which  are  active  everywhere  into  a  successful  combination 
with  which  to  overcome  our  dangers  and  build  a  new  period 
of  progressive  civilization.  This  system  of  life  philosophy  we 
will  name  "The  true  Rationalism." 

How  is  this  revolutionary  transformation  in  life-view,  ethics, 
in  social  and  political  institutions  to  be  promulgated  and  guided 
along?  We  are  not  only  speaking  of  the  correction  and  broad- 
ening needed  in  those  already  inculcated  with  the  new  thought, 
but  particularly  of  the  conversion  of  the  yet  unaffected  or 
only  partly  touched  sections  of  the  people.  On  the  practical 
side  of  this  program  there  will  not  be  much  difficulty — it  is  even 
now  almost  conquered  territory;  the  only  real  opposition  will 
be  from  the  rich  and  privileged  who  will  have  to  surrender 
a  portion  of  their  favored  positions  and  advantages  for  the 
common  good.  But  on  the  ethical  side  the  transformation  will 
not  be  so  easy  or  so  rapid.  The  average  man  is  quick  enough 
to  see  the  practical  points  in  a  new  movement,  but  slow  to 
assimilate  the  theory,  the  idea  which  is  behind  it,  and  to  feel 
the  close  connection  between  the  two.  But  this  theoretical 
side,  the  philosophy  of  the  new  conviction  and  aspiration,  is 
the  most  important  part  because  it  is  the  foundation  of  the 
practical  embodiment.  We  know  how  deeply  rooted  with  many 
is  the  fascination  of  the  supernatural,  the  thought  of  our  supe- 
rior quality  and  destiny,  the  hope  of  a  blissful  state  in  a  here- 
after! 

And  yet  it  is  the  truth  that  these  beliefs  are  today-  in  over- 
whelming preponderance  more  a  matter  of  early  teaching,  of 
mental  habit,  of  force  of  association,  of  practical  "business" 
value,  even,  than  of  true  conviction!  They  flatter  our  vanities, 
lull  our  apprehensions,  reassure  superficially  our  natural  timid- 
ity as  to  death  being  the  ultimate  and  definite  end  of  us — but 
they  do  not  satisfy  the  critical  reasoning  faculties  of  very  large 
numbers.  The  progress  in  breadth  and  boldness  of  intelligence 
of  the  educated  man  of  our  time  over  the  same  man  of  even 
sixty  years  ago  is  immense  (excepting  the  small  army  of  the 
pioneers),  and  the  similar  progress  of  the  ordinary  man  of 
today  is  even  greater!  The  effect  of  the  wonderful  one-hun- 
dred years  past  has  been  to  sharpen  the  reasoning  faculties,  to 
eradicate  timidity  and  bugaboo  fears  of  the  supernatural  and 
to  make  man  self-reliant  of  opinion.     The  lure  of  "a  heaven" 

255 


and  feai-  of  "a  hell"  are  broken  with  millions  and  have  become 
a  matter  of  doubt  with  even  greater  numbers;  in  truth,  if  the 
mental  inertia  in  matters  of  abstract  thought,  'which  holds  so 
many  captive,  and  all  the  social  and  utilitarian  influences  were 
removed  from  the  practice  of  religion,  the  proportion  of  "seri- 
ous and  convinced  worshippers"  in  our  churches  would  shrink 
to  a  surprisingly  low   figure. 

It  is  this  indifference  to,  this  disappointment  with  superna- 
tural religion  because  of  its  delusive  teachings  and  impotent 
results,  which  has,  in  the  absence  of  a  clear  and  strong  new 
philosophy  to  take  its  place,  produced  the  moral  bankruptcy  of 
the  masses  and  laid  them  open  to  every  revolutionary  theoi-y 
in  ethics  and  social  and  political  reform.  But  it  is  the  fact  of 
the  great  war — the  possibility  of  its  occurrence — which  has 
brought  all  this  unbelief  and  dissatisfaction  to  a  focus  and 
added  millions  more  of  disillusioned  and  mortified  humans  to 
the  others  already  in  that  condition;  it  has  given  the  knock-out 
blow  to  the  pious  belief  in  a  kind  and  just  heavenly  father,  a 
reigning  providence  and  future  eternal  life  of  higher  destiny! 
The  conspicuous  fact  is  demonstrated  on  all  sides  that  there 
are  great  multitudes  of  men  of  all  classes  of  society,  and  be- 
longing to  the  most  advanced  peoples  of  the  world,  who  are 
ready  for  a  new  philosophy  of  life  based  on  natural  facts  and 
reason  which  will  remove  their  perplexities  and  bring  firmness 
and  a  new  hope  to  their  thought;  they  are  ready  to  receive  a 
plain,  simple  and  convincing  view  of  man  and  his  relation  to 
his  surroundings;  they  are  eagerly  waiting  for  the  system  and 
the  teacher!  With  many  of  the  highly  educated  and  specially 
intelligent  this  hope  and  wish  is  an  accomplished  fact;  for  the 
others  the  advance  must  be  secured  through  transforming  our 
system  of  teaching  the  moral  perceptions,  the  rights  and  duties 
of  the  individual  to  himself,  the  family,  the  community;  the  real 
relation  of  man  to  his  fellow-man,  to  the  animal  world,  the 
mother-earth  and  the  universe.  It  has  long  been  a  conviction 
among  thinkers  and  social  students — and  is  a  growing  suspi- 
cion among  the  masses — that  as  long  as  man  remains  possessed 
by  the  idea  of  his  special  destiny  and  a  life  after  death  in  which 
the  inequalities  and  wrongs  of  the  life  on  earth  will  be  rectified, 
he  will  not  attain  to  the  exercise  of  his  free  untrammelled 
moral   nature   and   will   not   extend   to  his   brother-man   that   full 

256 


sympathy,  helpfulness  and  justice  of  treatment  which  is  his 
natural  right — the  right  of  each  other — but  will  continue  to 
deploy  his  one-sided  selfishness  and — with  a  grin — leave  the 
wrong  he  does,  and  in  turn  suffers,  to  the  after-death  adjust- 
ment, both  for  his  victim  and  for  himself.  The  moral  threat 
of  religion  has  lost  its  strength  as  against  that  of  the  passions, 
and  creates  unconsciously  in  the  individual  an  unfavorable 
attitude  for  the  exercise  of  the  highest  conscience  and  sense  of 
justice  and  of  a  genuine  interest  in  our  fellow-man — the  very 
opposite  result  of  what  religion  claims  to  do  and  to  achieve. 
It  is  the  author's  firm  belief  that  the  view  of  life  he  advocates 
will  make  man  clearer  and  truer  to  himself,  more  honest  and 
truthful,  more  just  and  kind  to  his  fellows. 

Therefore,  additional  to  the  teaching  of  the  general  thought 
of  the  new  rationalism,  it  is  education — on  the  right  lines — 
which  must  assist  to  break  down  this  unfavorable  influence  of 
religion  which  centuries  of  habit  have  made  a  very  part  of  our- 
selves! Compared  with  any  faith  of  after-death  religion,  the 
new  philosophy  advocated  will  automatically  produce  the  oppo- 
site mental  attitude  on  all  questions  of  earth-relations  and  con- 
duct by  enabling  us  to  realize  the  identity  and  equality  of  limi- 
tations of  the  destiny  of  all  of  us  on  earth.  It  must  thus  lead 
in  a  natural  way  requiring  no  arguments  to  the  true  brother- 
hood of  man! 

The  system  of  teaching  which  the  author  believes  to  be  re- 
quired will  not  be  one  of  fixed  tenets  and  precepts  but  rather 
of  instilling  and  generating  ideas  and  impressions  which  will 
lead  to  processes  of  thinking  and  feeling — in  other  words,  the 
creation  of  an  attitude  and  the  building  of  character — to  be 
won  from  the  interested  and  attentive  study  of  nature's  laws 
and  wonderful  works,  revealing  lessons  of  order,  system,  grad- 
ation, submission  of  the  lower  in  position  and  value  to  the 
higher,  advancing  in  varied  combinations  to  the  highest  devel- 
opment of  variety  within  unity,  of  freedom  within  authority. 
With  such  perceptions  solidly  attained,  and  as  much  as  possible 
in  nature's  workshop  itself — by  work  on  farms,  in  gardens,  in 
woods,  by  breeding  of  animals,  hunting  and  fishing,  etc. — and 
supplemented  by  general  education,  the  reading  of  history  and 
good  literature,  the  study  of  art  and  music,  the  result  could 
not  fail  to  be   the  intimate  conviction  of  our  wholly  "natural" 

257 


origin  and  destiny  and  would  become  a  living  faith  and  stimu- 
lating life  foundation.  Once  this  position  were  attained,  all 
that  which  is  unsound  in  reason  in  present  socialistic  and  polit- 
ical doctrines,  opposed  to  our  nature  and  impossible  of  attain- 
ment would  be  abandoned  and  the  way  opened  for  a  new  human 
society  of  true  internal  strength  and  boundless  external  possi- 
bilities! 

To  resume  and  condense:  The  essential  thought  of  the 
author  is  this  that  man's  social  nature,  sense  of  responsibility 
and  the  ethical  precepts  for  the  conduct  of  intercourse  between 
man  and  man,  the  social  fabric  as  a  whole — including  also  the 
political  State — must  rest  upon  a  purely  mundane  foundation 
(excluding  the  whole  airay  of  "supernatural"  assumptions) 
and  must  be  evolved  from  nature's  facts  and  laws  and  from  her 
teaching.  That  which  we  know  as  "morals" — and  which  is' 
ethics  resting  upon  the  ideas  of  supernatural  religions,  assump- 
tion of  special  origin,  kind  and  destiny  for  man — must  be  trans- 
formed into  "pure  ethics"  evolved  entirely  from  our  position 
on  the  earth,  our  relation  to  and  complete  dependence  from 
unreasoning  nature  and  our  intercourse  with  each  other,  and 
with  the  animal  world  of  which  we  are  a  part  and  the  leading 
exponent.  The  teaching  of  ethics,  as  distinguished  from  re- 
ligious morality,  has  achieved  a  position  of  increasing  impor- 
tance in  modern  educational  work — as  illustrated  in  America 
by  the  notable  work  done  by  the  "Society  for  Ethical  Culture" 
(New  York)  under  the  leadership  and  inspiration  of  its  gifted 
founder  and  president.  Dr.  Felix  Adler,  and  his  able  and  eai'nest 
assistant  teachers.  Yet,  all  this  work,  wherever  done,  has  not 
reached  the  full  usefulness  and  effect  which  it  should  have  had 
and  has  not  found  the  extended  following  by  the  public  which 
should  have  been  its  share,  because  its  teaching  has  not  repre- 
sented a  clean-cut  departure  from  supernatural  religions.  It 
has  attempted  to  rest  its  "system"  upon  both  the  fundamental 
assumptions  of  "religion"  and  the  conclusions  of  natural  human 
"reason,"  two  irreconcilable  ideas  the  union  of  which  cannot 
produce  that  clearness  of  conviction  which  is  necessary  for  a 
true  and  vigorous  philosophy  of  life.  In  the  propaganda  for  the 
"rationalistic"  system  of  thought,  and  in  its  methods  of  teaching, 
every  form  and  manner  of  compulsion,  not  to  mention  persecu- 
tion and  violence,  must  be  rigidly  shunned.  The  primary  requisite 

258 


from  the  public  must  be  the  concession  of  the  equal  right  of 
existence  and  the  full  tolerance  of  this  new  life-view  with  all 
other  forms  of  natural  and  supernatural  religion  or  philosophy. 
As  long  as  the  purpose  is  pure  and  earnest,  every  road  of  in- 
quiry into  man's  character  and  life  questions  should  have  equal 
opportunity;  there  must  be  no  weapon  of  attack  or  defense  used 
except  that  of  persuasive  argument  resting  on  indisputable  facts 
and  man's  ability  to  think  and  reason.  Conquest  in  the  kingdom 
of  ideas  must  be   won  by  argument  and   convincement  only! 

We  have  on  a  previous  occasion  expressed  the  thought  that 
the  true  democratic  state  is  in  its  idea  antagonistic  to  theism, 
and  vice-versa,  and  that  the  perfected  republic  of  the  future 
will  require  the  naturalistic  system  of  ethics,  as  here  presented, 
for  its  full  success  and  assured  permanence.  As  between  mod- 
erate socialism  and  the  fully  developed  form  of  communism 
now  known  as  "bolshevism",  the  latter  demands  positively  both 
political  democracy  and  the  ethical  freedom  of  "rationalism"; 
it  is,  with  all  its  present  faults  of  theory  and  application,  a 
complete  doctrine  of  morals,  society  and  political  form  com- 
bined in  one  system,  and  thus  covers  the  three  fundamentals 
which  we  have  previously  designated  as  the  essentials  of  civil- 
ized life.  This  broad  and  definite  position  of  bolshevism  gives 
it  a  distinct  advance  over  merely  utilitarian  socialism;  it  is  more 
complete  as  a  political  theory  and  is  also  a  creed  of  life.  Bol- 
shevism believes,  with  incontrovertible  logic,  that  SO  long  as 
socialistic  projects  and  democratic  political  theories  remain 
associated  with  a  supernatural  philosophy  in  contradiction  w^ith 
life-truth,  and  also  with  the  idea  of  classes — be  they  of  birth 
or  wealth  or  pre-advantages  of  any  kind — the  combination  can 
produce  but  an  incomplete  and  contradictory  scheme  upon 
which  no  thorough  remodeling  of  human  society  can  be  built. 
It  believes  in  coming  down  to  "rock  bottom,"  free  from  all  old 
shackles,  and  building  up  anew  from- there.  Our  criticism  of 
bolshevism  is  in  the  main  the  same  as  of  moderate  socialism, 
as  expressed  in  Article  XIII,  Part  B.  It  must  be  brought  in 
better  harmony  with  the  facts  of  nature  and  the  traits  of 
human  nature — in  other  words,  into  full  accord  with  the  ethics 
of  the  true  rationalism.  How  this  can  be  accomplished  by  spe- 
cially directed  education  has  been  argued  in  the  preceding  par- 

259 


agraph  and  is  further  elaborated  below.  The  correct  concep- 
tion of  the  doctrine  must  first  be  thoroughly  implanted  and 
become  fully  appropriated  by  the  masses  before  any  really 
fruitful  progress  upon  this  path  can  be  attained.  When  thus 
worked  out  to  greater  perfection,  bolshevism  may  in  time  be- 
come the  universal  system  of  a  new  society  and  civilization — 
an  international  democratic  communistic  state — socialism. 
(Additional  comments  on  this  topic  will  follow  in  Article  XVI.) 


TjERE,  then,  there  is  a  call  for  a  departure  in  education,  a 
-'■  -'•  new  direction  and  system  to  secure  the  basis  for  a  practical 
new  morality  to  clai^ify,  reinforce  and  enhance  our  civiliza- 
tion to  new  life.  Some  progress  has  already  been  made  in 
recent  years  on  the  road  indicated  as  far  as  nature-study, 
manual  training  and  hygiene  are  concerned.  The  new  idea 
should  begin  with  the  grammar-school  course ;  and  in  order  to 
obtain  more  time  for  the  new  system,  there  should  be  rigidly 
excluded  from  it  all  those  scientific  subjects  which  really  belong 
to  a  college  or  technical  education  and  on  which  much  valuable 
time  is  now  spent  without  corresponding  useful  results.  The 
same  criticism  applies  to  foreign  and  classical  languages;  they 
should  be  studied  in  the  High  school  or  at  home,  or  later  at 
college.  Combined  with  the  nature-studies  and  practical  gar- 
dening work,  etc.,  must  go  the  teaching  of  morals,  or  ethics, 
the  principles  of  just  and  considerate  conduct  in  daily  inter- 
course and  business,  and  also  "the  virtues"  so  necessary  to 
health,  beauty  and  refinement.  All  this  ii",  not  anything  new 
in  itself;  the  newness  I'esides  in  its  new  and  free  basis,  point 
of  view,  or  motive — in  the  thought  behind  it  and  in  its  ultimate 
purpose  which,   both,  are   mundane   instead    of  supernatural. 

The  above  instruction  must  be  given  absolutely  without  the 
aid  of  any  supernatural  beliefs,  fancies,  threats  of  punishment 
or  promises  of  reward,  and  must  proceed  solely  from  the  idea 
and  object  of  the  system — the  training  of  a  human  being  abso- 
lutely natural  and  rational  in  its  manner  of  reasoning,  feeling, 
acting,  views,  tastes  and  ambitions  of  life!  This  same  system 
of  teaching  must,  necessarily,  be  continued  in  the  home-training 
of  the  young  to  make  the  effect  complete.     Wo  will  leave  it 

260 


to  the  professional  educator,  the  student  of  sociology  and  the 
practical  statesman  to  perfect  the  necessary  details  and  devise 
the  ways  and  means  of  setting  the  ideas  here  advanced  in 
motion.  The  author  firmly  believes  that  this  is  the  road  to 
take  to  save  us  from  the  existing  surfeit,  confusion  and  falsity, 
and  which  must  engulf  our  civilization  if  not  checked  by  the 
light  of  a  new  guide  and  the  inspiration  of  a  new  promise! 

Looking  at  this  proposition  of  a  new  philosophy  merely 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  everyday  morality  and  average 
personal  character  of  our  time — from  the  outward  exhibition 
of  the  inner  want — the  need  of  a  change  of  the  underlying 
ideas  is  shown  by  the  shortcomings  exhibited  in  these  respects 
in  all  civilized  countries.  And,  apart  from  morals,  as  such, 
normal  reason  and  feeling  seem  to  be  upset,  and  there  is  urgent 
need  of  producing  a  better-balanced  man,  better  balanced  in 
his  intellectual,  moral  and  emotional  nature  than  is  shown  by 
the  average  man  of  today  almost  everywhere.  The  race  has 
become  one-sided,  super-nervous  and  morbidly  emotional,  in- 
tolerant and  over-sensitive — all  symptoms  of  the  nervous  ex- 
haustion of  the  period,  the  result  of  the  severe  tension  and 
continual  excitements  of  modern  life.  This  lack  of  balance 
and  repose  is  conspicuously  shown  by  the  American  man  and 
woman.  Our  intemperate,  hysterical  conduct  towards  our  en- 
emies in  the  war  is  an  illustration;  another  is  found  in  the 
selfish  and  tyrannical  fanaticism  of  the  compulsory  total- 
abstinence  legislation  (not'to  mention  its  violation  of  personal 
freedom  and  right)  ;  another  by  the  sensational  "religious  re- 
vivals" bordering  on  the  ludicrous  and  offensive;  another  by  the 
morbid  and  literally  "hair-raising"  character  of  the  movie- 
picture  presentations  and  the  exploitation  of  savory  "scandals" 
by  newspapers  and  stage  plays;  another  by  the  ever-abundant 
crop  of  "cranks",  fanatics,  faddists,  reformers  on  every  subject 
under  the  sun;  by  the  "psychology  exploiters"  and  "new- 
thought"  conjurers,  the  "spiritism"  and  "theosophy"  humbugs; 
another  by  the  flagrant  tendency  to  public  indecency  in  the 
flesh-advertising  style  of  women's  costumes  and  in  many  of  the 
entertainments  offered  to  the  public,  even  to  young  boys  and 
girls. 

261 


In  all  lines  the  sensational,  extraordinary,  abnormal,  huge, 
catastrophal,  soul-tearing  seems  to  appeal  to  us  in  preference 
to  the  reposeful,  harmonious,  beautiful!  (Oh!  memories  of 
Greek  art  and  philosophy!)  Our  minds  seem  to  lack  the  sense 
of  proportion,  appropriateness  and  contemplative  reflection, 
rushing  hither  and  thither  in  the  search  for  something  still 
newer  and  more  startling.  Other  nations  have  similar  abnor- 
mal records  of  their  own,  the  whole  indicating  an  age  deficient 
in  mental  balance  and  self-possession.  It  seems  as  if  the  world 
were  losing  its  faculty  of  philosophical  reflection,  the  habit  of 
trying  to  understand  the  ideas  underlying  things!  In  Germany 
and  France,  where  in  former  days  this  faculty  was  conspicu- 
ous, as  evidenced  by  the  rich  literature  relating  to  it,  indiff- 
erence is  growing.  In  England  this  trait  was  always  obscure 
and  held  down  by  the  rule  of  unquestioning  orthodox  religions; 
in  America,  it  is  almost  absent  among  the  general  public. 
Thus  the  world  is  rushing  along  pell  mell  on  the  road  of  prac- 
tical work  for  material  success,  comforts,  enjoyment,  prosperity 
of  the  individual — but  reflection  as  to  elementary  ideas  and 
.causes  and  the  inevitable  results  to  flow  from  the  prevailing 
spirit  and  practice  are  neglected.  We  stride  along  blindly, 
unconsciously  towards  an  unknown  end — it  recalls  in  all  its 
aspects  the  fall  of  ancient  Rome!  Does  it  suggest  itself  to  the 
reader  that  this  condition  must  in  a  large  degree  be  due  to  the 
irritating  contradiction  existing  between  our  plain  "reason  and 
observation"  and  the  irrational  ideas  of  our  "supernatural 
character"  which  are  driven  into  us  when  we  are  young  and 
so  difficult  to  shake  off  when  we  are  older — making  slaves  of  US 
to    a    lifelong   attitude    of    presumption? 

As  to  the  very  cornerstone  of  any  code  of  ethics — truthful- 
ness and  plain  honesty — the  war  has  been  a  shocking  revela- 
tion of  our  unbounded  depravity!  The  author  has  repeatedly 
referred  to  its  shameful  record  of  lies,  slanders,  abuse,  brutal 
selfishness,  prostitution  of  patriotism,  lowness  and  moral  per- 
version of  motives — for  which  ten  millions  of  men  were  slain, 
or  crippled  and  ruined  for  life!  And  the  part  we — America — 
was  compelled  to  play  in  this  awful  record  by  the  actions  of  our 
war  party  was  enacted  under  pretenses  of  high  ideals  and  un- 
selfish  purposes  which   were   put  into   our  hearts  and   mouths 

262 


without  proper  explanation.  What  a  mockery  of  reason  and 
truth!  What  a  mountain  of  callous  hypocrisy!  What  an  ac- 
cusation of  the  impotency  of  supernatural  religion  to  produce 
even  these  simple  virtues  of  truthfulness  and  plain  honesty  in 
men! 

For,  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  awful  record  was  caused  by 
a  sudden  irresponsible  access  of  moral  corruption  due  to  the 
mental  consternation  produced  by  the  war;  it  was,  or  is  the 
plain  reflection  of  our  times.  The  above-stated  cornerstone  of 
all  the  virtues  and  moral  covenants — the  free  exercise  of  truth- 
fulness and  plain  honesty — has  disappeared;  what  there  is  left 
of  them  in  practice  rests  upon  the  existence  of  police  courts 
and  prisons!  Men  and  women  will  lie,  steal,  rob  with  violence, 
repudiate  their  word,  give  and  take  illicit  "graft"  and  criminal 
bribe  money  and  commit  every  other  violation  of  "good  con- 
duct" with  perfect  unconcern  and  total  absence  of  any  sense 
of  wrong  or  shame !  The  spoken  word  today  must  be  received 
with  distrust  and  be  "proven"  before  it  can  be  accepted;  the 
printed  word  in  newspapers,  magazines  and  books  on  matters 
of  international  events,  home  politics,  public  movements,  etc., 
cannot  be  taken  seriously.  These  publications  do  not  exist 
today  to  give  honest  information,  as  in  the  days  of  Horace 
Greeley,  for  the  general  good  but  exclusively  to  advocate  a  cer- 
tain policy  and  defend  its  representatives,  and  to  make  every- 
thing subservient  to  this  one  purpose,  by  withholding  or  mis- 
representing of  news,  by  lies  and  fabrication,  abuse,  slander. 
And,  worst  of  all,  there  is  in  most  cases  behind  all  this  not 
honest  (if  interested)  conviction,  not  mistaken  enthusiasm 
for  a  cause  but  mere  lucre  or  other  material  reward.  In  mer- 
chandising there  is  diminishing  reliability  as  to  material,  purity, 
weight  and  measure,  and  false  statements  are  made  with  the 
boldest  assurance.  All  mankind  seems  to  be  deceiving  and 
defrauding  each  other! 

The  High  Cost  of  Living  prevailing  ever  since  the  war, 
representing  an  advance  of  from  75  per  cent  to  150  per  cent  in 
prices,  has  long  been  proven  by  careful  and  impartial  figures 
of  professional  statisticians,  culled  from  income-tax  reports, 
stock-company  statements,  etc.,  to  have  been  caused  to  its 
largest  extent  by  direct  "profiteering"   (artificial  and  arbitrary 

263 


raising  of  prices  for  extra  profit)  and  only  to  the  extent  of 
about  25  per  cent  to  reflex  increase  of  wages,  rents  and  other 
factors  due  to  the  war  cost.  It  is  thus  proven  to  be  over- 
whelmingly nothing  less  than  wholesale  and  retail  stealing, 
looting  of  the  pockets  of  the  helpless  public  in  a  Veritable  orgic 
of  money  making.  When  these  "patriots"  bought  their  "libei-ty 
bonds",  did  they  make  up  their  minds  "to  get  their  money 
back,"  even  if  they  would  have  to  rob  the  public  to  do  it?  Is 
it,  perhaps,  all  a  game  on  their  part  of  "passing  the  buck"  (to 
use  an  expressive  curb  phrase)  through  the  people  back  to  the 
door  of  the  government?  This  seems  to  be  the  true  explana- 
tion. And  the  government,  being  the  people  itself,  returns 
"the  buck"  to  them  through  increased  taxation,  and  the  people 
pass  it  back  to  the  originators  through  increases  in  wages  and 
retail  prices  of  merchandise. 

Here  we  have  the  "endless  chain",  but  with  this  important 
distinction,  that  those  who  have  power  and  means  can  play  this 
game  to  the  limit,  while  the  great  mass  of  men  who  are  de- 
pendent and  not  free  can  retaliate  only  partially.  The  high 
cost  of  living  is  thus  exposed  to  be,  fundamentally,  an  attempt 
by  those  who  possess  control  of  the  necessaries  of  life  and  the 
staple  materials  of  production  to  get  back  their  compulsory 
liberty-loan  investments  in  a  few  years  by  excess  profits  on 
these  commodities,  instead  of  considering  them  as  bona-fide 
time  loans  to  the  government!  And,  as  the  limited  retaliation 
which  the  people  are  making  is,  in  the  main,  a  matter  of  sheer 
necessity  and  self-defense,  the  crime  of  the  high  cost  of  living 
is  directly  chargeable  to  the  rich  and  powerful! — and  We  have 
one  more  illustration  of  the  moral  laxity,  the  ease  of  con- 
science, the  abeyance  of  the  sense  of  fairness  and  plain  honesty, 
the  coarse  greed  for  money  which  characterizes  our  times! 
To  the  author  nothing  appears  more  contemptible  than  this 
high-cost-of-living  exhibition  and  nothing  more  pitiable  than  the 
inability  of  our  government  to  arrest  it! 

But  face  to  face  with  the  preceding  "pictures",  are  we  not 
entitled  to  ask  this  question :  "Wherein  is  the  merit  of  this 
supernatural  religion  on  which  our  "morality"  is  based  if  this 
is  its  fruit,  if  it  is  thus  proven  powerless  to  restrain  man's  im- 
pulses and,  instead,  gives   full   reign   to  the   lowest  and   meanest 

264 


passions  of  greed,  covetousness,  hate,  revenge,  lust,  violence?" 

Think  of  the  war!  its  horrors  and  sacrifices  and  sufferings; 
think  of  the  indescribable  fiendishness  by  these  "sons  of  God" ; 
of  the  murder  of  Mayor  MacCurtain  of  Cork  and  of  Magistrate 
Alan  Bell  of  Dublin;  of  the  hanging  of  six  young  Irishmen  in 
Mountjoy  jail,  March  14th,  1921,  and  of  ten  others  at  a  later 
date,  for  no  greater  crime  than  the  wish  to  see  their  own  coun- 
tree  free;  think  of  the  lawlessness  in  Germany,  of  the  many 
brutal  murders  and  great  bank  robberies  in  New  York,  of  the 
era  of  extravagant  and  licentious  life  which  seems  to  prevail 
all  over  the  war-stricken  world — in  the  very  midst  of  the  great- 
est misery  and  helplessness — all  the  result  of  a  complete  state 
of  literal  demoralization — the  church  doors  gaping  wide  open 
all  the  time,  but  no  live  response,  no  message,  no  convincing 
explanation  coming  from  within ! 

Are  we  not  also  entitled  to  ask  this  other  question :  "How 
is  it  that  under  this  popular-government  form  of  the  United 
States  and  other  republics  nothing  can  be  done  about  these 
conditions?  Why  is  this  government  of  the  people  incapable 
of  acting  for  the  people's  benefit  and  protection  against  those 
who  hold  power  of  position,  money,  influence,  combination? 
Where  is  the  tangible,  practical  demonstration  of  our  much- 
advertised  'liberties'  and  'rights'  as  free  men  governing  them- 
selves?" As  in  the  case  of  the  churches,  the  doors  of  the 
capitol  at  Washington  and  of  our  State  Houses  are  gaping 
wide  open,  but  no  response,  no  explanation  comes  from  within! 
Such  a  combination  of  moral,  social  and  political  disorganiza- 
tion breaks  down  all  confidence  between  man  and  man  and 
begets  a  deep-set  disgust  of  ourselves  and  of  our  civilization; 
it  makes  men  who  have  not  yet  lost  their  "natural  honesty  and 
kindly  instincts"  to  long  for  a  simpler  social  and  political  and 
truer  ethical  existence  in  which  the  dangerous  intricacies,  the 
utter  falsity  and  oppresiveness  of  our  present  civilization  would 
be  impossible — to  a  form  of  sound  communistic  socialism,  in 
short — founded  on  a  system  of  natural  ethics,  and  combined 
with  a  simple  form  of  equitable  and  real  "people's  rule."  Can 
we  pretend  astonishment  at,  or  utter  our  protest  against,  this 
revulsion  of  feeling,  this  radical  departure  from  the  tradition 
of  the  thought  of  2000  years?  No!  the  foundation  for  it  is  all 
too  firmly  laid ! 

265 


-17^  ROM  the  material  of  this  article  the  thought  previously 
^  stressed  rises  again  with  convincing  force  that  the  breakup 
of  civilization  is  more  a  result  of  surfeit  and  disgust  at  general 
conditions,  of  moral  inertia,  of  callous  sentimental  indifference, 
of  coarse  materialism  and  absence  of  real  ideals  and  an  honest 
ethical  basis  than  of  material  and  intellectual  exhaustion.  The 
philosophy  upon  which  all  is  built  becomes  dubious  and  unsatis- 
fying and  is  left  behind  in  the  march  of  mental  and  material 
advance,  leaving  a  void  in  that  which  is  the  most  essential  ele- 
ment of  progressive  development  and  happiness — a  sound  and 
fully  trusted  life-philosophy!  (See  also  Article  VII,  in  con- 
nection.) Something  new  must  be  found  to  take  the  place  of 
that  which  has  become  discredited,  or,  in  a  short  time,  stagna- 
tion and  decay  must  come.  As  to  the  present  times,  we  have 
already  stated  that  the  various  forms  of  supernatural  religions 
have  lost  their  power  of  conviction  and  fail  to  supply  a  rational 
faith  that  appeals  to  the  advanced  intelligence  of  the  modern 
man  and  is  capable  of  furnishing  him  with  a  trustworthy  basis 
for   the   moral   covenants   of   daily   life. 

Also,  in  the  preceding  article,  we  drew  a  sketch  of  the  in- 
completeness of  past  pei'iods  of  civilization,  of  their  erratic 
course  and  character.  They  all  rose  to  a  summit,  remained 
stationary  at  the  pinnacle  for  a  time,  then  swayed  and  fell! 
Such  periods  have  been  those  of  Egypt,  China,  India,  Assyria, 
Greece  and  Rome  and  the  Middle-Age  European  empires.  Why 
did  these  civilizations  not  continue  on  their  road  of  progress? 
Why  did  they  not,  after  a  period  of  stagnation,  revive  and 
roll  on?  In  answer  we  speak  cleverly  of  "natural  exhaustion", 
of  "having  run  their  course",  etc.,  but  the  true  explanation  is 
that  such  decay  was  caused  by  the  fact  that  a  summit  of  effort 
had  been  reached  with  no  more  of  great  and  inspiring  aims  in 
sight  (such  as  might  have  been  within  the  mental  and  physical 
range  of  these  respective  periods)  and  that  interest  and  incen- 
tive to  work  and  strive  had  been  deadened  because  of  the  in- 
sufficiency of  their  religious  or  philosophical  systems!  The 
sterility  of  their  daily  ethical  code,  resulting  from  such  condi- 
tions, and  the  absence  of  spiritual  imagination  prevented  the 
birth  of  stimulating  new  visions  in  harmony  with  the  intel- 
lectual and  material  level  which  had  been  attained! 

266 


Not  one  of  these  past  civilizations  has  been  proven  to  have 
fallen  because  of  unavoidable  material  or  political  necessity; 
in  each  case  the  foreign  conqueror  only  came  after  decay  had 
well  begun.  They  died  from  moral  and  spiritual  inanition!* 
Doubt  and  contradiction  between  the  new  and  the  old  caused 
vacillation  and  decay!  Each  such  case  needed  a  Messiah,  a 
teacher  to  point  a  new  way,  but  who  failed  to  come ; — and  thus 
they  left  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  their  civilization  and 
returned  to  the  simple  life — to  the  bosom  of  nature  for  re- 
cuperation. Have  we  arrived  at  a  similar  stage  and  prospect? 
Are  we,  also,  to  fall  to  the  ground  with  our  civilization  in  the 
conflict  between  the  categorical  but  unsatisfying  Old,  become 
a  structure  of  tyrannical  doubts,  and  the — as  yet — unclear,  but 
promising  New,  full  of  beckoning  assurance  of  a  larger,  truer 
and  better  life?  Will  for  us  the  Messiah  come  in  the  rise  of  the 
philosophy  of  "true  rationalism",  of  the  acceptance  of  physical 
truth  and  naturalness,  in  the  clear  recognition  by  us  of  our 
real  character,  position  on  earth  and  opportunity  for  happiness? 
If  so,  as  we  may  well  wish  and  hope,  our  present  summit  of 
material  surfeit,  intellectual  unrest  and  moral  distraction  may 
prove  but  a  short  resting  period  of  recuperation  for  the  upward 
flight  to  yet  greater  heights  of  the  twentieth-century  phoenix! 


XVI.     AFTER-PEACE  CONCLUSIONS. 

The    League    of    Nations    and    America. — Modification    of    the 

Treaty. — Revelations      from      Paris. — President      Wilson's 

Position. — German      and      other      War      Publications. 

Present      Situation      in      Europe. — England      and 

France    Show    Their    Hand    at    Last. — Final 

Summary   of    the    Moral    Aspect    of    the 

War. — The  Russian  Drama. 

The  manuscript  of  this  book  was  completed  soon  after  the 
signing  of  the  peace  treaty  with  Germany  at  Versailles,  June 
28th,  1919,  but  publication  had  to  be  deferred  for  various 
reasons.  More  than  two  years  having  elapsed  since,  during 
which  time  important  developments  have  taken  place  and  much 

267 


new  information  come  to  light,  the  author  found  it  necessary 
to  add  this  article  to  bring  the  book  up  to  the  date  of  its  publi- 
cation. Some  of  this  new  material  has  been  incorporated  in 
the  body  of  the  original  text  at  appropriate  places  or  put  in 
the  form  of  special  explanatory  notes,  and  the  balance  and  final 
resume  appear  in  this  special  article. 

The  opinion  heretofore  expressed  by  the  author  that  the 
peace  pacts  concluded  with  Germany,  Austria,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  are  settlements  of  bad  faith,  vengeance  and  duress, 
and  of  bad  judgment  even  from  the  position  of  the  victors, 
has  since  been  abundantly  verified  by  the  present  political  and 
economic  condition  of  Europe.  All  this  being  matter  of  the 
daily  records  of  the  past  two  years,  we  can  confine  our  re- 
marks to  the  principal  features.  The  League  of  Nations,  to 
which  so  many  had  been  led  to  look  with  great  hopes,  is  al- 
ready proving  its  cumbersome  inefficiency  to  deal  with  the 
problems  of  the  Ruhr  Valley  and  of  Upper  Silesia,  and  their 
solution  is  left  in  the  hands  of  France,  England,  Italy  and 
Japan,  exclusively. 

The  United  States  has  not  yet  ratified  the  treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles because  of  determined  opposition  to  the  idea  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  which  was  made  an  integral  part  of  the 
treaty.  After  months  of  discussion  over  various  proposed  "re- 
servations" to  the  League  by  the  United  States  Senate,  as 
affecting  specially  the  interests  of  this  country,  some  of  these 
reservations  were  adopted  and  others  defeated  and  the  treaty 
as  a  whole  finally  rejected  by  a  decisive  majority  and  returned 
to  President  Wilson  for  his  further  action,  March  20th,  1920. 
This  outcome  furnished  the  world  with  a  strange  spectacle. 
In  this  country  alone  of  the  five  Entente  nations  (Russia  being 
out  of  the  count),  where  the  idea  of  the  League  had  been 
eloquently  advocated  by  the  President  and  largely  approved  by 
the  people,  a  determined  opposition  had  arisen  in  the  course 
of  time  to  the  idea  of  the  League  in  general  but  especially  to 
Article  X  which  was  interpreted  as  obligating:  this  country  to 
further  participation  in  the  contentions  of  the  European  States 
and  to  furnishing  military  forces  in  pursuance  thereof.  There 
was  the  additional  objection  to  the  proposed  details  of  the 
voting  in  the   League  deliberations,  which,  by  putting  a  con- 

268 


siderable  preponderance  of  power  into  the  hands  of  the  Eu- 
ropean nations,  particularly  England,  limited  the  influence  of 
this  country  in  matters  which  we  might  deem  incompatible 
with  our  judgment  and  interest. 

The  above  opposition  took  shape  in  the  Senate,  led  by  the 
Republican  majority,  but  was  also  supported  by  a  considerable 
number  of  Democratic  Senators  and  backed  by  a  large  section 
of  the  people.  President  Wilson's  position  was  clear  and  firm 
in  this  controversy  (from  his  point  of  view)  ;  he  vetoed  the 
proposed  reservations  to  the  treaty  and  also  the  rejection  of  the 
treaty  as  a  whole,  and  likewise  the  Senator  Knox  resolution  for 
a  seperate  peace  with  Germany.  The  object  of  the  "Knox" 
resolution  was  not  only  a  final  attempt  to  dispose  of  the  treaty 
and  the  league  but  also  to  prevent  the  entire  tangle  becoming 
an  issue  in  the  Presidential  election  of  1920.  That  the  oppo- 
sition to  the  League  was  well  justified  is  proven  by  the  fact 
that  gradually  many  of  the  ablest  political  men  of  the  country 
who  had  at  first  been  in  its  favor  changed  their  opinion,  also 
by  the  attitude  of  the  Press  and  the  overwhelming  verdict  given 
in  the  said  election.  The  entire  matter  was  thus  passed  on  to 
the  new  administration  and  Congress.  The  new  Senate  has 
recently  passed  a  revised  "Knox"  resolution  for  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany.  This  has  now  been  consummated,  all  but 
final  ratification. 

This  tortuous,  involved  and-to-them-inexplicable  action  by 
the  American  government  and  people  produced  a  distinctly 
"disconcerting"  impression  in  Europe  and  has  led  to  a  weaken- 
ing of  the  confidence  and  cordiality  formerly  existent  between 
us  and  our  war  allies.  The  League-of-Nations  idea  has  re- 
ceived a  serious  check  through  our  opposition ;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  disposition  of  the  leading  members  of  the  League  to 
grant  to  America  certain  reservations  rather  than  lose  her  as  a 
member  altogether  opens  the  door  to  other  nations  also  to 
demand  special  privileges  in  the  League,  all  of  which  would 
tend  to  paralyze  its  essential  idea.  The  elements  of  doubt 
thrown  upon  the  peace  of  Versailles  by  this  prospect,  joined 
to  its  general  inertia,  has  gradually  produced  a  disposition  for 
its  revision,  at  least  in  respect  to  some  of  its  most  exacting 
and  degrading  terms.     The  foolish  proposal  to  prosecute  the 

269 


Kaiser  as  the  "responsible  author  of  the  war"  has  been  dropped, 
and  Germany  has  been  conceded  her  plea  for  the  light  herself 
to  prosecute  the  so-called  "war  criminals"  for  alleged  atrocities 
committed  by  them.  The  knotty  problems  of  the  war  indem- 
nities due  by  Germany,  of  her  "deliveries"  required  under  the 
armistice,  of  her  disarmament  and  of  other  lesser  demands 
have,  at  last,  been  settled  by  the  Supreme  Council  confer- 
ence of  April-May  of  this  year  on  a  basis  somewhat  more  rea- 
sonable and  practical  than  that  originally  intended.  These 
terms  have  now  been  accepted  by  Germarny — reluctantly  and 
in  the  same  spirit  of  helplessness  in  which  the  armistice  and 
peace  terms  were  accepted — but  they  constitute  at  least  a 
definite  program  for  both  sides  and  for  ^oine  time  to  come. 
(See  the  special  explanatory  Note  "The  Reparations  Settle- 
ment.") The  most  important  concession — the  omission  of  the 
demand  for  her  "war  guilt  acknowledgment"  by  Gei'many  and 
its  relation  to  the  general  spirit  of  the  Versailles  peace  has  been 
illuminated  in  detail  in  the  above  Note.  As  there  stated,  these 
revised,  or  rather  adjusted  terms,  require  tho  early  additional 
elimination  of  the  remaining  unjust,  impractical  and  dangerous 
provisions  of  this  treaty  which  are  today  condemned  by  the 
most  enlightened  section  of  public  opinion  all  over  the  world. 
The  conscience  of  mankind,  enslaved  by  the  passions  of  the 
war,  is  regaining  its  normal  balance  and  demanding  a  more 
reasonable  final  settlement  of  the  great  conflict  than  that  ef- 
fected  by   the  Treaty   of   Versailles. 

For,  in  addition  to  those  terms  which  have  now  been  slightly 
reduced,  there  still  remain  the  crimes  of  awarding  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France  without  the  authority  of  a  popular  plebis- 
cite; of  giving  Posen  to  Poland  without  compensation  for  the 
public  improvements  made  by  Germany;  of  seizing  a  strip  of 
purely  German  territory — with  the  old  German  seaport  of 
Danzig — to  annex  to  Poland  to  form  "a  corridor"  of  access  to 
the  Baltic  sea;  of  pi'actically  robbing  Germany  of  the  Saar 
valley  and  of  Upper  Silesia;  finally,  of  confiscating  every  one 
of  her  foreign  colonies  in  Africa,  China  and  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
All  this  is  exaction  in  addition  to  the  financial  penalties  of  the 
"reparations"  terms,  the  surrender  of  all  war  material,  sub- 
marines,  aeroplanes'  and   Zeppelins;  of   thousands   of   locomo- 

270 


I 


tives  and  freight  cars;  of  horses,  pigs  and  cattle,  sheep  and 
barn  fowls  in  great  numbers — all  these  physical  exactions  were 
made  under  the  armistice  terms — and  in  addition  to  the  enor- 
mous cost  of  a  minimum  fifteen-years'  occupation  of  the  left 
bank  Rhine  zones  and  the  right-bank  bridgeheads!  These 
terms  would  deliver  the  German  people  into  complete  economic 
bondage — slavery — to  the  victorious  Entente  nations,  mainly 
France,  Belgium,  England  and  Italy  for  three  generations  to 
come — 60  years — and  into  political  extinction  at  the  same  time. 
Without  an  army,  Germany  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  every 
large  or  small  "armed"  country  adjoining  her;  without  a  navy, 
her  merchantmen  would  be  subject  to  the  caprice  of  any  hostile 
port  official  in  a  distant  land. 

Does  the  public  of  the  United  States  comprehend  and  re- 
alize all  this;  does  the  world  at  large  realize  what  the  peace 
of  Versailles  means  to  all  the  peoples,  not  only  to  Germany 
herself?  This  peace  must  be  rewritten  in  all  its  terms,  not 
merely  ameliorated  in  a  few  of  its  hardest  conditions.  And,  as 
repeatedly  stated  in  these  articles,  the  basis  of  this  revision 
must  be  the  full  acknowledgment  by  the  other  nations  of  their 
share  in  the  war  guilt!  In  the  above  review  we  have  spoken 
only  of  Germany,  but  there  are  also  unhappy  Austria,  wronged 
Hungary,  pillaged  and  crumpled  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  all  vic- 
tims of  this  peace  of  political  rape.  The  world  can  never  be 
right  again  until  all  this  is  settled  right!  America  must  and 
will  be  the  nation  whose  innate  sense  of  justice  and  'fair  play 
will   ultimately   induce   this   revision! 

There  are  many  who  maintain  that  below  the  crushing  terms 
of  the  peace  treaty  there  are  hidden  blacker  designs  than  those 
of  mere  political  revenge  and  victor's  lust;  that  it  is  the  covert 
design  of  England  and  France  to  ruin  Germany  as  an  indepen- 
dent and  self-asserting  country  forever  and  to  convert  her  into 
a  dependent  helpless  slave  sweatshop  for  the  benefit  of  the 
victor  powers;  that,  as  to  France,  the  outspoken  design  is  to 
acquire  at  least  the  now  occupied  territories  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine  for  permanent  annexation  and  to  have  the  whole 
of  Upper  Silesia,  in  spite  of  the  plebiscite,  turned  over  to 
Poland.  The  author  hesitates  to  accept  these  fears  in  full, 
although  in  regard  to  imperialistic  France  the  signs  are  omin- 

271 


ous;  but  he  believes  absolutely  that  America — as  an  enacting 
if  not  ratifying  member  of  the  Versailles  peace  powers — will, 
in  spite  of  her  present  strong  friendship  for  France,  never 
tolerate  an  international  wrong  of  such  magnitude  to  be  per- 
petrated! 

The  Reparations  Settlement.    The  first  "Reparations"  meet- 
ing in  London,  which  followed  the  "Paris  agreement"  of  Jan- 
uary, 1921,  on  a  226,000,000,000  gold  marks  indemnity,  and 
which  was  called  to  receive  Germany's  acceptance  of  this  de- 
mand  or  equally  satisfactory  counter-proposals,  adjourned   on 
March  7th,  1921,  having  failed  of  an  agreement.     The  author 
of  this  book  was  at  that  time  engaged  on  the  final  revision  of 
his  text.      This  afforded  him  an  opportunity  to  introduce  here 
some  comment  upon  the  speech  of  declination  of  Premier  Lloyd 
George  in  rejecting  the  German  counter-propositions.     The  de- 
tails are  too  recent  to  require  detailed  statement.      In  summing 
up,   Mr.   Lloyd   George   made   an   emphatic  declai-ation  on  the 
English  and   Allied   position  on   Reparation  and  the  Versailles 
peace  terms  in  general.    He  said:  "He  (Dr.  Simons,  Germany's 
spokesman  at  the   meetings)    refused  to  accept,   on  behalf   of 
Germany,  responsibility  for  the  war,  which  is  the  very  basis  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles.     Not  only  did  he  refuse  to  accept  that 
basis  but  appealed  to  history  for  revision  of  the  sentence  im- 
posed.     The   Allies  cannot  possibly  enter  into   any  discussion 
on   that  basis.      The   responsibility   of   Germany   for   the   war   is 
with    them    fundamental.      The    whole    treaty    of    Versailles    de- 
pends upon  it."      Here,  then,  we  have  the  issue  squarely  put! 
Of  course  the  responsibility  of  Germany  is  fundamental  with 
the  Allies;  of  course,  the  whole  treaty  of  Versailles  depends 
upon  it.    •  It  is  precisely  because  this  responsibility  is  assumed, 
not  proven,  a  mere  assertion  of  the  Allies,  a  colossal  deceit  per- 
petrated upon  the  entire  world  by  the  infamous   British  propa- 
ganda, that  this  false  treaty  with  its  revolting  terms,  fabulous 
reparation   demands,  robbery  of  territories  and  colonies  must 
be   uprooted   and   a   new   treaty  written   with   terms   based    on 
facts,  judicially  ascertained  from  documents  and  personal  tes- 
timony  now    available,    if    Germany   and    France    are    not    once 
more   to  be  drenched  in   blood! 

The  second  reparations  meeting,  held  in  London  in  the 
first  days  of  May,  has  at  last  brought  a  result  and  settlement, 
even  though  it  can  only  be  a  temporary  one.  Germany  has  ac- 
cepted the  terms  under  protest,  helplessly,  unable  to  resist 
further  and  compelled  by  her  economic  and  political  conditions 
to  settle  down  to  a  definite  program  of  peace — and  to  go  to 
work.  This  decision  was  largely  influenced  by  an  important 
change  which  accompanied  the  terms:  The  demand  for  admis- 
sion   of    the    sole    war    guilt    had    been    waived,    at    least    tacitly! 

272 


This  demand  which  had  figured  so  prominently  in  the  negotia- 
tions which  ended  on  March  7th,  (see  the  above  quotations 
from  the  Lloyd  George  speech)  had  raised  a  storm  of  renewed 
indignation  and  protest  in  Germany  and  indicated  to  the  Allies 
very  plainly  that  if  they  really  desired  to  arrive  at  a  settle- 
ment without  recourse  to  force,  this  demand  would  have  to  be 
excluded.  Under  the  final  terms,  accepted  by  Germany  with- 
out reservations  and  counter-proposals,  on  May  10th,  1921,  the 
total  reparations  indemnity  is  to  be  about  133,000,000,000 
(133  billions)  gold  Marks,  equivalent  to  about  $34,500,000,000. 
But  to  this  must  be  added  5  per  cent  interest.  Germany  is  to 
pay  annually  about  2,100,000,000  gold  Marks,  plus  a  25  per 
cent  tax  on  her  exports,  to  provide  a  fund  for  this  interest 
charge,  against  which  sum  bonds  will  be  issued  periodically,  or 
annually,  in  proportion.  This  arrangement  restricts  the  in- 
terest charge  to  the  amount  of  bonds  actually  outstanding — 
or,  rather,  vice-versa.  Also,  Germany  is  to  fulfill  the  Ver- 
sailles treaty  in  all  other  respects — disarmament,  punishment 
of  war  criminals,  etc. 

But  the  mere  omission  from  the  final  reparations  settle- 
ment of  the  demand  for  Germany's  admission  of  her  sole  guilt 
and  responsibility  for  the  war — done  in  a  laudible  effort  to 
present  the  second  settlement  proposals  becoming  a  fiasco 
like  the  first— is  not  sufficient  in  the  way  of  admission  and 
correction  of  a  great  wrong.  As  the  claims  of  this  sole  guilt 
of  Germany  was  the  very  principle  of  the  sweeping  armistice 
and  peace  terms,  these  terms  must  not  merely  be  amel- 
iorated a  little,  but  must  be  fundamentally  remodeled  on  the 
basis  of  the  fully  admitted  joint  guilt  of  the  five  original  war 
nations.  No  other  settlement  will  ever  bring  a  true  and  lasting 
peace ! 

Additional  Remarks  on  the  Reparations  Settlement.  Now 
that  this  whole  matter  of  Germany's  war  indemnity  is  settled 
for  the  time  being,  it  is  very  useful  to  remind  the  reader  of  the 
utterances  and  incidents  which  occured  in  connection  with  the 
Paris  conference  of  January  and  the  first  London  reparations 
meeting  of  the  end  of  February,  1921.  At  Paris,  where  the 
reparations  amount  was  determined  at  226,000,000,000  gold 
marks  by  the  Supreme  Council  (without  waiting  for  the  official 
computations  of  the  Reparations  Commission)  it  was  a  signi- 
ficant accompaniment  that  during  and  after  this  meeting  the 
French  press  and  statesmen  were  prolific  in  announcements 
about  the  "enormous  amounts  of  gold  and  other  liquid  wealth 
still  owned  and  hidden  in  Germany"  and  about  "how  well  able 
Germany  was  to  pay"  the  amounts  demanded  by  the  Allies. 
All  this  was  pure  imagination,  if  not  wicked  fabrication.  It 
is  true  that  Germany  was  very  wealthy  in  1914,  when  the  war 
broke  out,  but  these  French  visionaries  forget  conveniently 
that  she  had  fought  a  four-years'  war  during  which  gigantic 

273 


national  loans  had  to  be  issued  which  gradually  absorbed  the 
floating  wealth  of  the  country.  The  clash  between  these  col- 
ored assertions  about  "the  hidden  wealth  of  Germany"  and 
the  daily  press  reports  describing  the  financial  and  economic 
collapse  of  that  country,  the  starvation  and  general  misery 
prevailing,  was  positively  ludicrous. 

But  the  Supreme  Council  had  its  theory  all  worked  out: 
"Germany  can  pay  if  she  will  but  go  to  work;  if  she  will  but 
economize  as  the  Allies  have  done;  if  the  German  people  be 
but  made  to  pay  heavy  taxes  the  same  as  the  people  of  the 
Entente  countries  do."  (Extract  from  Lloyd  George's  speech 
of  January  28th,  1921.)  This  is  surely  amusing,  especially 
when  the  Premier  remarks  that  "the  revival  of  German  industry 
and  trade  was  to  be  hindered  by  all  kinds  of  restrictions  and 
by  the  imposition  of  oppressive  export  duties";  for,  said  he,  at 
the  first  London  reparations  conference  at  the  end  of  February 
of  this  year:  "Germany  can  only  pay  by  being  put  on  her 
feet  again  so  as  to  be  able  to  manufacture  and  export,  but 
great  care  must  be  taken  that  she  may  not  quickly  manufac- 
ture and  export  too  much  and  thus  damage  our  own  prosperity." 

In  other  words,  Germany  is  to  be  given  a  chance  to  work 
and  produce  but  no  more  than  just  enough  to  pay  the  repara- 
tions debt;  she  is  to  slave  for  the  Entente  allies  for  sixty  years 
or  more  and  remain  poor,  helpless  and  dependent  as  to  herself. 
Here  is  where  we  can  see  the  grand  human  ideals  for  which  the 
war  was  fought!  Mr.  Briand,  the  French  Premier,  was  like- 
wise very  amiable  in  his  utterance  of  January  28th,  1921,  at 
Paris,  when  he  said:  "Germany  must  pay  to  the  limit,  and 
no  sum  must  be  fixed  without  thorough  investigation  (those 
cellars  in  Germany  full  of  gold)  lest  it  may  quickly  prove  too 
small  (only  the  modest  sum  of  226  billions  of  gold  marks 
were  being  asked,  equivalent  to  about  55  billions  of  dollars) 
and  the  Germans  "jeer"  at  us  for  our  ignorance  and  timidity." 
Mr.  Briand,  also,  was  in  a  very  great  hurry  about  collecting 
this  little  bill,  and  added:  "A  settlement  of  this  difficult  ques- 
tion must  positively  be  reached  before  the  end  of  to-morrow," 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  Germans  that,  on  their  part,  they 
were  not  in  such  a  hurry  to  be  intimidated.  The  Reparations 
Commission  was,  meanwhile,  completing  its  figuring  and 
brought  in  a  final  verdict  for  132^2  billions  of  gold  marks — 
a  reduction  of  nearly  one-hundred  billions.  Mr.  Keynes  is 
right:  The  war  was  largely  an  economic  war,  but  diplomatists 
wei'e  allowed  to  camouflage  its  chai'acter  into  one  of  false 
pretenses,  and  were  also  allowed  to  settle  the  peace  on  these 
same  false  pretenses  and,  in  other  respects,  on  purely  political 
lines.  Can  we  be  surprised  that  we  have  economic  depres- 
sion and  confusion  and  financial  instability — two  years  after 
the   war — of  a  worse  kind  than   during  the  war  itself? 

274 


In  connection  with  the  London  reparations  meeting  of  end 
of  April,  1921,  the  incident  of  the  German  government  appeal- 
ing to  the  government  of  this  country  for  its  good  will  and 
offices  to  endorse  and  submit  its  latest  reparations  offers  to  the 
Supreme  Council  is  noteworthy  for  what  it  revealed.  The  in- 
cident disclosed,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  Germans  had  not 
yet  learned  their  lesson,  did  not  understand  the  depth  of  feel- 
ing engendered  here  against  them  by  the  war;  on  the  other 
hand,  as  to  ourselves,  it  disclosed  the  strange,  distracted  atti- 
tude of  this  country,  torn  between  pride,  resentment  and  an 
uneasy  conscience  and  unable,  as  yet,  to  come  to  an  honest  and 
candid  opinion  on  the  war!  (As  we  know,  America  declined  to 
endorse  and  sponsor  forward  the  German  propositions,  after 
having  ascertained  their  unacceptability  by  the  European  allies, 
and  advised  Germany  to  negotiate  directly  with  the  Supreme 
Council  in  London.) 


T  N  corroboration  of  the  author's  position  on  the  war,  the 
■'■  revelations  made  on  the  course  of  the  Paris  Peace  Confer- 
ence are  of  first  importance.  These  negotiations  are  now  very 
fully  disclosed  through  the  book  by  Maynard  Keynes,  that  by 
ex-Secretary  of  State  Lansing,  that  by  Charles  T.  Thompson  on 
"The  Peace  Conference  Day  by  Day",  that  by  Col.  E.  M.  House 
on  "What  Really  Happened  at  Paris",  that  by  Andre  Tardieu, 
"The  Truth  About  the  Treaty"  and  through  the  articles  by 
Lincoln  Colcord  in  "The  Nation"  and  by  many  other  books  and 
contributions  by  "intimates."  (Additional  reference  to  these 
books  will  follow  later.)  They  have  set  free  the  fact  that  the 
Allies  at  first  only  accepted  the  League  idea  to  please  President 
Wilson  and  the  American  people,  in  order  to  win  the  continu- 
ance of  our  sacrifices  for  them.  Later,  when  they  supported 
the  League  more  decisively,  it  was  because  of  the  discovery 
that  it  would  offer  a  useful  means  of  deception  under  which 
to  continue,  at  the  Paris  peace  table,  the  pretense  of  the  false 
war  motives  of  the  propagandas.  This  revelation  should  show 
us  how  weak  the  sentiment  for  a  League  of  Justice  really  was 
among  the  European  governments.  The  politics  of  Europe  are 
too  intricate  for  an  idea  so  simple  and  general;  they  must  in- 
evitably gravitate  towards  secret  diplomacy  and  secret  treaties 
between  the  nations,  in  pairs  or  in  groups  of  related  interests; 
and   this   method   has   even   now   been   resumed    although   the 

275 


League  is  fully  organized  in  its  formal  existence  in  pursuance 
of  the  Ti-eaty  requirement.  Under  the  prevailing  sentiment 
and  relationships  in  Europe,  the  League  will  prove  to  be  no 
more  than  an  association  of  the  leading  powers  for  the  regu- 
lation of  the  smaller  States  who  are  members  thereof. 

By  comparison,  the  former  "Hague  Tribunal"  was  a  judi- 
cial body  instead  of  a  political  one;  its  deliberations  and  judg- 
ments were  to  rest  on  general  fundamental  laws,  accepted  pro- 
positions and  covenants  as  to  international  rights,  regula- 
tions of  warfare  on  sea  and  on  land,  use  of  special  weapons, 
treatment  of  non-combatants  and  prisoners  of  war,  etc.  Its 
decisions  were  to  be  "judicial",  based  on  evidence  by  plaintiff 
and  defendants  and  were  to  be  free  from  political,  racial  or 
personal  bias — in  short,  were  to  be  based  on  "law"  as  ex- 
pressed in  codes  and  rulings  and  rendered  impartially  by 
"jurists"  instead  of  by  Prime  Ministers,  ambassadors,  diplo- 
matists and  ai'my  chiefs.  Such  was  the  conception  of  the 
Hague  International  Tribunal  held  by  Mr.  Evarts,  Mr.  Choate, 
Elihu  Root  and  other  leading  American  and  European  jurists. 
It  may  be  confidently  hoped  that  the  prospective  failure  of  the 
purely  "political"  League  of  Nations  created  by  the  Versailles 
Treaty  will  ultimately  be  transformed  into  such  a  "legally  ad- 
vising and  judicially  deciding"  league.  Such  a  one  is  the 
vision  of  the  best  thought  in  this  country — and  probably  the 
aim  of  the  present  administration — and  could  be  whole-heart- 
edly supported  by  the  American  people.  Its  motto  must  be: 
Peace  and  international  justice  by  law  and  understanding,  but 
including  the  recognition  of  force  and  war  as  necessary  and 
useful  agencies  of  political  and  general  progress.  Arbitrary 
aggression  from  low  motives  and  a  false,  maudlin  sentimen- 
tality about  war  must  be  equally  excluded   from  its  program. 

In  the  United  States,  the  opposition  to  the  League  is  based 
not  only  on  its  political  grounds,  as  examined  above,  but  not 
a  little  on  a  feeling  of  resentment  against  our  associates  in 
the  war,  as  before  stated.  This  country  has  gradually  found 
out  a  great  deal  about  its  former  friends — England,  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  Russia — and  their  political  aims  and  methods 
which  it  did  not  know  when  it  entered  the  war  and  the  sum  of 
v.iiich  is  a  growing  conviction   that  we  were  deceived  by  them 

276 


about  the  origin  and  issues  of  the  war  and  their  charges  against 
Germany  and  Austria,  also  in  regard  to  their  faculty  of  mak- 
ing secret  treaties  among  themselves — Pact  of  London  on 
Trieste-Fiume  agreement  with  Italy,  pledges  to  Greece,  Rou- 
mania  and  Poland,  and  the  Shantung  convention  with  Japan — 
while  all  the  time  acclaiming  the  American  revived  plan  of  a 
League  of  Nations  and  its  cardinal  principle  of  "open  co- 
venants openly  arrived  at"  ■  and  open  diplomacy  generally 
among  nations!  The  secret  agreements  referred  to  were  made 
before  this  country  entered  the  war,  but  were  purposely  hid- 
den from  us  in  order  not  to  jeopardize  our  expected  war 
decision;  they  were  in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  visit  here 
of  ex-Prime  Minister  Viviani  and  Marshal  Joffre,  of  France, 
and  of  ex-Prime  Minister  Balfour,  of  England,  and  of  the 
Italian  statesmen,  all  of  whom  came  here  in  the  early  summer 
of  1917  to  stir  our  war  fever  into  maximum  action — and  to 
obtain  loans — but  never  did  they  breathe  a  word  about  these 
secret  understandings  for  fear  that  our  eyes  might  be  opened 
to  the  abyss  of  hate,  greed,  bad  faith  and  chicanery  of  Eu- 
ropean politics!  Our  sensibilities,  prejudices  and  national  vani- 
ties were  exploited  by  these  allies  by  every  means  in  the  reper- 
tory of  suptle  British  diplomacy — by  the  most  insistent  pres- 
sure upon  existing  social  and  racial  ties,  the  ostentatious  praise 
of  our  President's  "ideaHsm"  and  our  national  "humanitarian- 
ism",  by  the  foulest  misrepresentation  of  Germany's  and  Aus- 
ti-ia's  position,  motives  and  actions  in  the  war. 

Now  we  know  all  these  things  and  know  that  we  were  de- 
ceived and  victimized!  Not  until  February,  1919,  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference,  during  the  debate  on  the  Japanese  claims  to 
the  German  Pacific  islands,  were  these  nefarious  secret  rela- 
tions disclosed  and  President  Wilson  publicly  and  officially  ap- 
prised of  their  existence,  both  in  regard  to  Japan  and  Italy. 
(See  the  article  by  Lincoln  Colcord  in  "Th^  Nation",  of  May 
17th,  1919.)  Publication  of  these  agreements  had  been  made 
in  November,  1917,  by  the  Russia  Revolutionary  Government, 
which  had  found  records  of  them  in  the  Imperial  archives;  but 
being  unofficial,  and  coming  from  that  source,  the  reports  were 
at  first  discredited.  But  even  after  their  authenticity  had, 
been   established,   no   action   was   taken   by  President   Wilson   in 

277 


regard  to  them  towards  the  Entente  powers,  no  explanation 
demanded,  no  change  of  policy  proposed!  The  detailed  accur- 
acy of  the  above-related  incident  at  Paris  was  attested  by  ex- 
Secretary  of  State  Lansint>'  before  the  Senate  Investigating 
Committee.  It  was  a  pleasant  discovery  for  the  American 
people,  after  it  had  brought  its  sacrifices  and  saved  the  Entente 
nations  from  defeat,  to  realize  the  kind  of  treatment  it  had 
received  from  them  and — inferentially — to  realize  that  all  this 
chagrin  was  due  to  our  own  super-sentimental  war  enthusiasm. 

There  is  authentic  report  of  a  similar  "acute"  scene,  early 
in  November,  1918,  at  the  Foreign  Office  in  Paris,  in  regard  to 
the  repudiation  of  the  binding  power  of  the  President's  "four- 
teen points,"  which  had  been  made  the  basis  of  the  armistice 
negotiations  by  German*'^,  and  which  had  previously  been  ac- 
cepted by  the  Allies,  in  jrinciple  at  least,  as  the  basis  for  the 
ultimate  peace  to  be  concluded.  At  this  meeting  of  the  Eu- 
ropean Premiers,  the  fourteen  points  were — one  by  one- 
brushed  aside  as  having  no  definite  meaning  or  binding  power, 
some  being  repudiated  altogether.  When  Col.  House,  who 
represented  our  President,  then  in  America,  was  bluntly  asked 
by  Clemenceau  "whether  the  President  would  terminate  the  arm- 
istice negotiations  (then  proceeding  between  himself  and  Ger- 
many) if  the"  Council  of  Ministers  should  repudiate  these  four- 
teen points,"  he  was  momentarily  put  in  a  quandry,  not  being 
in  possession  of  definite  instructions  from  the  President  on  such 
an  abrupt  challenge, — and  gave  an  equivocal  reply.  This  was 
immediately  seized  upon  by  the  astute  Clemenceau  and  con- 
strued to  mean  that  the  President  would  not  abandon  the 
peace  solicitations,  although  they  would,  in  that  case,  be  car- 
ried on  under  a  condition  of  "false  pretenses"  towards  Ger- 
many. With  that  interpretation — Col.  House  sitting  silent — 
he  closed  the  argument.  Premier  Lloyd  George,  of  England, 
at  the  same  sitting  emphatically  "excepted"  the  point  which 
aimed  to  establish  "the  freedom  of  the  seas" — one  of  the  most 
important  of  the  fourteen  peace  planks — as  having  any  binding 
force  upon  England.  These  two  far-reaching  repudiations 
were  not  challenged,  qualified  or  amended  subsequently  by 
President    Wilson    although    they    were    in    complete    opposition 

278 


to    everything    he    had    uttered    on    the    war    and    the    peace    to 
follow! 

The  foregoing  exposition  sliows  the  spirit  of  the  European 
powers  in  regard  to  the  binding  validity  upon  them  of  these 
"fourteen  points"  so  grandly  formulated  by  our  President  and 
so  ignobly  abandoned  by  him.  They  were  entirely  disregarded 
in  the  armistice  terms  and  equally  so  in  the  later  peace  terms 
— with  never  a  protest  from  our  President.  And  as  regards 
the  League-of-Nations'  fate  in  the  earlier  months  of  the  Con- 
ference, the  real  spirit  of  these  powers  was  shown  by  the 
fact  that  only  the  determined  insistence  by  the  President,  and 
his  threat  to  break  off  his  further  participation  in  the  peace 
conference  and  to  return  to  America  forthwith,  succeeded  to 
put  the  covenant  into  the  peace  treaty  as  a  leading  and"  in- 
tegral part  thereof.  This  League  and  its  inclusion  in  the 
Treaty  was  the  one  thing  above  all  others  upon  which  the 
President  had  set  his  heart  and  on  which  he  would  accept  no 
compromise— and  the  Premiers  yielded  for  the  reasons  before 
stated.  But  it  may  have  been  "a  deal"  after  all,  as  all  the 
inside  facts  are  not  yet  fully  clear.  The  President  may  have 
made  concessions  to  the  Allies  for  the  acceptance  and  inclusion 
of  his  league — and  some  day  the  revelation  of  the  actual  facts 
may  be  made  by  Col.  House  or  by  President  Wilson  himself. 
Colonel  E.  M.  House,  of  Texas,  has  played  a  secret  and  some- 
what mysterious  part  in  the  inception  of  the  war  (on  our  side) 
and  in  the  later  peace  negotiations  in  his  capacity  of  confiden- 
tial adviser  of  the  President.  So  far,  in  the  books  on  the  con- 
ference which  he  has  written  or  edited,  he  is  discreetly  silent  on 
every  point  of  "real  enlightenment"  on  the  war  itself.  But  that 
is  the  great  point.  The  details  of  the  fight  for  "the  spoils"  are 
interesting  and  valuable,  yet  secondary.  These  two  men  are 
separated  now,  to  all  appearances;  and  before  long  we  shall 
receive  more  intimate  and  constructive  information  on  this  and 
many  other  matters  of  war  policy  and  peace  negotation.  The 
main  truth  for  us,  however,  has  become  perfectly  clear:  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  honored,  feted,  petted,  "decorated"  and  pre- 
sented with  beautiful  gifts;  he  was  publicly  lauded  and  ac- 
claimed as  few  men  have  been,  in  every  Europeaii  country  he 
visited,  but  at  the  peace  table,  in  the  practical  work  of  diplom- 

279 


acy,  he  met  his  match — and  was  checkmated!  Our  armies  won 
victories,  but  our  liigh  published  aims  for  mankind  were  lost 
in  the  selfish  and  brutal  scrimmage  of  the  Paris  peace  con- 
ference ! 

The  real  interest  of  the  Entente  in  the  League  has  been 
given  as  one  of  false  pretense  for  the  purpose  of  pi-eserving 
their  "war  motive"  myths  at  the  Paris  conference  for  their  own 
selfish  purposes,  and  for  their  ruling  power  over  the  smaller 
'i^ations.  As  to  their  pi-etended  great  concern  over  the  non- 
ratification  of  the  peace  treaty  by  the  United  States,  let  no  one 
believe  that  they  are  greatly  worried  over  the  possible  failure 
of  the  humanitarian  objects  of  the  League  but  very  much  so 
over  the  carrying  of  the  material  burdens  arising  from  the 
suicidal  peace  settlement,  and  of  which  they  had  counted  upon 
this  country  (through  its  participation  in  the  League)  to  as- 
sume a  large  share.  In  the  proposed  "pooling  scheme  of  war 
costs",  which  was  incorporated  in  the  Treaty,  we  would  lose 
fully  one-half  of  our  war  loans  to  the  Allies,  an  item  of  oyer 
4y2  billions  of  dollars,  not  a  small  figure  even  for  this  rich 
country.  Of  other  burdens  there  was  the  proposition  of  having 
us  assume  the  "mandate"  over  Turkey  entirely,  or  at  least 
over  Armenia,  and  other  similar  honorary  tasks  involving  ex- 
tensive organization  and  heavy  financial  outlay  for  many  years 
to  come,  and  holding  the  constant  risk  of  involving  us  in  dis- 
putes and,  perhaps,  hostilities.  All  this  is  our  allies'  very  prac- 
tical interpretation  of  our  grand  war  ideals  of  "fighting  for 
human  rights  and  freedom,  universal  justice,  independence  of 
small  nations,  making  the  world  safe  for  democracy!  They 
have  taken  us  at  our  word — or  at  the  word  of  our  President — 
which  they  mistakenly  thought  was  that  of  the  American  people. 
But  can  we  blame  them  for  their  error  in  the  circumstances? 
Beyond  these  material  considerations,  however,  including  fin- 
ancing of  the  enemy  countries  to  start  them  on  the  road  to 
recovery,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  our  late  allies 
view  our  rejection  of  the  League  plan  and  retirement  from 
European  politics  with  remarkable  equanimity!  This  country, 
having  done  the  share  of  war-work  which  the  European  Allies 
had  planned  for  it  to  do,  may  soon  be  dispensed  with; — thank 
you,  sir!     In  pursuance  of  the  general  situation  of  disillusion- 

280 


ment  on  our  part  with  the  final  results  of  the  war — and  es- 
pecially if  no  eai-ly  revision  of  the  present  Treaty  can  be 
brought  about — we  should  try  to  forget  our  "splendid  mistake" 
as  speedily  as  possible,  ignore  the  treaty  of  Versailles  and  es- 
cape its  burdens  and  ignominities  and  make  separate  settle- 
ments with  our  enemies  of  the  war.  In  this  way  should  we 
wash  our  hands  of  the  evil  which  has  been  and  of  that  which  is 
yet  to  come! 

The  cornerstone  of  our  changing  opinion  on  the  war  is  the 
realization  of  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  original  six  powers 
for  the  war.  And  had  we,  at  all  times,  understood  that  Ger- 
many was  really  waging  a  defensive  war  and  that  the  Entente 
Allies  were  the  real  aggressors,  our  attitude  in  regard  to  the 
sea  zones  and  the  American  Shipping  question  would  have  been 
different,  more  like  that  of  the  European  neutrals,  and  we 
would  have  followed  a  policy  of  stricter  neutrality  in  regard  to 
shipping  of  arms  and  supplies  to  the  Allies.  Our  whole  atti- 
tude would  have  been  dift'erent;  that  which  under  a  state  of 
fancied  hostile  provocation  led  us  into  embitterment  and, 
finally,  into  war,  would  have  become  amenable  to  diplomatic 
adjustment,  as,  in  similar  relations,  was  the  case  with  Holland, 
the  Scandinavian  countries  and  Spain.  We  see  it  now  all  very 
plainly  that  the  Paris  Peace  was  erected  upon  an  error  of  fun- 
damental fact  as  to  the  war  causes  and  the  war  guilt  and  that 
the  monstrous  terms  of  punishment  and  humiliation  inflicted 
upon  the  Central  powers  were  the  direct  outcome  of  this  arti- 
ficial and  maliciously  assumed  position  of  the  Entente  allies. 
It  reveals  the  treaty  of  Versailles  as  a  shocking  piece  of  polit- 
ical fraud  which  not  only  dealt  out  destruction  to  the  enemy 
but  also  besmirched  his  honor  by  mean  slanders.  These  ad- 
vanced views  have  been  hastened  not  a  little  by  the  publication 
of  the  books  on  the  war  by  the  leading  military  and  diplomatic 
figures  of  Germany  and  Austria,  in  correct  translations  free 
from  the  intentionally  garbled  versions  of  the  first  American 
newspaper  notices,  and  unfolding  the  war  story  in*  measured 
and  dignified  statements  of  fact.  The  American  people  cannot 
be  a  party  to  a  treaty  of  peace  of  such  injustice  and  infamy; 
they  must  not  be!  The  League-of-Nations  proposals,  while 
dishonestly  made  and  specially  objectionable  to  us,  are  really 

281 


of    secondary    importance;    it   is   the    Treaty   as   a   whole    which 
must  go! 

All  this  means  for  us  somewhat  of  a  disagreeable  admis- 
sion, but  America,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  world,  must  come 
to  it!  The  way  is  not  easy — and  it  takes  time.  It  was  ex- 
pected by  many  that  in  the  heat  of  the  campaign  of  last  fall 
some  open  repudiation,  some  candid  avowals  of  error  would 
be  made,  but  the  open  secret  was  kept  well  by  both  parties — 
the  people  were  not  yet  considered  ripe  for  hearing  the  truth — 
their  enthusiasm  and  sacrifices  were  yet  too  recent!  Instead, 
there  was  extra  vociferous  and  violent  denunciation,  on  the 
one  side,  of  the  League  and  the  terrible  things  it  would  do  to 
us,  and,  on  the  other  side,  equally  strenuous  denial  and  defense. 
It  all  looked  as  if  we  tried  by  our  vehemence  to  hide  our  real 
thoughts  and  feelings  on  the  subject!  Neither  side  really  be- 
lieved one-half  of  what  was  said.  That  the  League  and  Treaty 
deserved  to  be  beaten  is  surely  this  writer's  view,  and  must 
have  been  the  view  of  the  overwhelming  election  majority; 
but  below  the  great  outward  contention  there  lay  hidden  those 
other  things  which  we  were  afraid,  as  yet,  to  stir  up  and 
name — our  hurt  feelings,  on  account  of  our  allies,  our  wounded 
pride  and  sense  of  stultification,  our  uneasy  conscience!  But 
time  will  bring  truth  and  the  courage  to  face  it — as  with  Colom- 
bia. This  people  is  honest  enough  at  heai't  to  insist  that  right 
shall  prevail  once  error  has  been  recognized! 


I 


N  this  progress  towards  a  juster  view  of  the  war.  President 
Wilson  has  taken  no  part.  The  total  failure  of  his  League- 
of-Nations  western  campaign  tour,  in  the  early  fall  of  1919, 
and  the  popularity  of  the  Senate  attitude  left  him  untouched. 
Considering  the  great  part  he  had  played,  it  was,  perhaps, 
beyond  the  power  of  human  nature  for  him  to  admit  any  errors 
of  judgment,  and  even  partially  the  failure  of  his  high  en- 
deavors. "He  could  not  bring  himself  to  give  this  country  a 
chance  to  withdraw  from  the  dangerous  position  into  which  he 
had  led  it.  to  settle  down  and  forget  the  war,  but  continued, 
instead,  to  pour  out  his  invectives  against  Germany  and  to  re- 
iterate his   idealistic  war  declarations.       Like  an   evil  genius  this 

282 


man  has  sat  upon  the  soul  of  this  country — and,  in  fact,  of  the 
world — with  his  inflaming  fanaticism  and  the  seductive  per- 
suasiveness of  his  pronouncements!  The  fire  of  his  argument 
was  almost  uncanny  in  its  sweeping  self-confidence  and  grand 
disregard  of  the  axioms  of  human  knowledge,  experience  and 
of  the  voice  of  history.  His  sincerity  and  honesty  of  con- 
viction are  beyond  question ;  but  he  believes  himself,  even  to- 
day, not  only  right,  but  infallible  in  his  position  on  the  war; 
he  combines  in  his  character  the  merits  of  great  energy,  un- 
bounded enthusiasm,  and  the  lack  of  practical  good  sense  of  the 
confirmed  visionary.  In  his  speeches  in  the  aforesaid  tour  he 
boldly  assumed  that  the  American  people  had  not  learned  any- 
thing about  the  war  since  that  great  peace  had  been  made  at 
Paris,  and  repeated  his  pre-war  arguments  unchanged,  and 
displayed  his  intense  personal  bias  against  Germany  unsoftened. 
But,  in  addition,  he  descended  to  a  political  cunning  and  un- 
scrupulousness  in  his  arguments  which  astonished  the  country 
and  provoked  strong  disapproval. 

He  began  his  war  argument  regularly  with  the  murder  of 
the  Archduke  in  Serajevo,  and  from  that  basis  developed  an 
exasperating  picture  of  the  dark  pui'poses  of  Austria  and  Ger- 
many in  regard  to  their  vengeance  upon  that  poor,  innocent 
country  of  Serbia,  but  remained  entirely  silent  on  the  histori- 
cal background  of  the  war  and  the  motives  behind  the  murder 
of  Francis  Ferdinand,  silent  on  the  sordid  purposes  of  France 
and  England!  This  mode  of  presenting  the  war  issue  left  one 
part  of  his  hearers  as  much  in  the  dark  as  they  had  ever  been, 
while  that  section  which  "had  learned  something'"  was  both 
irritated  and  ofi'ended  by  his  lack  of  courage  to  tell  the  truth-  — 
that  truth  which  they  felt  he  must  surely  know.  Herein  lies, 
in  the  writer's  opinion,  the  crucial  mistake  which  has  cost  the 
President  his  reputation!  He  failed  on  his  return  from  Paris, 
himself  disillusioned  about  the  Allies  and  the  whole  war — a 
wiser  and  sadder  man — to  take  this  people  into  his  confidence 
and  to  state  the  facts — gently  and  dicreetly  but  yet  the  facts — 
and  to  admit  his  error  of  judgment  and  our  error  of  exhub- 
erant  patriotism!  He  remained  silent,  and  is  silent  and  ob- 
durate today;  but  the  facts  have  not  remained  silent;  and  the 

283 


moral  strain  upon  the  President  of  this  irritating  and  depressing 
situation  has  boken  his  body  and  mind! 

The  general  tone  of  the  President's  tirades  against  Ger- 
many in  these  L.  of  N.  campaign  speeches,  and  his  evident 
intent  of  inflaming  anew  the  feeling  against  German-Americana 
by  his  taunting  charges,  entirely  unproven,  of  "their  lifting 
their  heads  again  in  propaganda"  were  exhibitions  extremely 
demagogic  and  regrettable  in  a  man  of  his  intellectuality 
and  position.  His  general  characterization  of  the  Senate  op- 
position to  the  peace  treaty  and  the  aspersion  cast  upon  the 
personal  motives  of  the  Senators  w^ere  most  lamentable  utter- 
ances! It  seems  incomprehensible  that  President  Wilson  should 
have  stooped  to  such  raw  political  methods!  Was  this  loss 
of  poise  and  mental  integrity  an  indication  of  the  unfortunate 
physical  collapse  which  was  to  overtake  him?  Was  his  soul 
not  "torn  to  shreds"  as  between  the  merciless  jabs  of  his 
assailants,  his  own  remorseful  conscience  and  his  obstinate 
refusal  to  acknowledge  any  error?  Is  it  not  his  moral  nature 
which  is  sick  and  wounded  much  more  than  his  physical  body? 
The  President  must  realize  today  that  he  was  possessed  by  a 
mistaken  conception  of  things — carried  away  by  ideas  which 
resided  in  his  imagination  and  not  in  the  real  war  situation  in 
Europe ;  that  he  has  failed  at  the  Paris  peace  conference ;  that 
the  League  of  Nations  is  an  illusory  plan  and  its  indorsement 
by  the  European  governments  perfunctory  or,  at  most,  politic- 
ally selfish;  that  the  most  intelligent  section  of  the  American 
people  have  had  their  eyes  opened  and  cannot  be  deceived  any 
longer  about  the  war  and,  therefore,  do  not  approve  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  What  a  realization  for  him!  Can  we 
wonder  at  the  result?  Even  the  strongest  man  has  his  limita- 
tions. His  breakdown  is  a  national  calamity,  a  great  national 
loss!  What  a  sad  difference  between  this  broken,  disappointed 
and  discredited  leader  of  today  and  the  Woodrow  Wilson  who 
marched  down  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York,  at  the  head  of  the  war 
parade,  defying  the  whole  world  to  say  him  nay! 

But  scarcely  had  this  indomitable  spirit  recovered  some- 
what from  his  attack  of  collapse  but  that  he  rushed  forth  anew, 
carried  away  by  his  obsession.  In  his  letter  to  Senator  Hitch- 
cock, of  March  9th,  1920,  stating  his  views  and  probable  action 

284 


on  the  proposed  Senate  reservations  to  Article  X,  we  read  again 
the  same  extravagant  declarations  about  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  "having  saved  the  world  from  dire  calamities  which  were 
iminent  from  the  aggression  and  pretensions  of  Germany"! 
Just  what  these  aggressions  and  pretensions  of  Germany  were, 
the  President  did  not  say;  and  no  one  else  has,  as  yet,  set  them 
forth  even  in  general  outline,  not  to  mention  in  such  detail  as 
would,  in  honor,  be  required  in  a  matter  of  such  terrible  pos- 
sibilities! It  is  one  of  the  greatest  puzzles  of  the  American 
war  delusions  that  this  people  should  have  taken  these  wild- 
goose  accusations  against  Germany  without  ever  demanding 
facts  or  documentary  evidence  of  these  plots  -of  aggression 
by  Germany!  Nothing  of  the  kind  ever  appeared  in  print  in 
any  part  of  the  world!  The  said  letter  to  Senator  Hitchcock 
was,  in  part,  a  deplorable  attempt  to  galvanize  the  dying  war 
feeling  of  the  country  to  new  life  and  to  reaffirm  the  arti- 
ficial illusions  of  the  war — one  purpose  as  reprehensible  as  the 
other.  In  line  with  his  letter  was  his  indorsement  of  the  Vir- 
ginia State  Platform  as  the  model  for  the  Democratic  platform 
in  the  1920  election,  which  stated  that  we  went  into  the  war 
"to  crush  a  colossal  scheme  of  conquest" — by  Germany,  of 
course.  This  country,  certainly,  had  worked  itself  into  a  state 
of  near  insanity  on  this  subject!  Further,  the  President  at- 
tempted to  make  a  "point"  in  the  above  letter  to  Senator  Hitch- 
cock by  representing  the  apprehensions  of  "reservation" ,  Sen- 
ators as  being  unfounded,  saying,  in  effect,  "that  it  was  a 
matter-of-course  that  the  recommendations  of  the  League  of 
Nations  Council  were  subject  to  being  passed  upon, — accepted 
or  rejected — by  the  Constitutional  powers  of  each  respective 
country."  But,  if  the  President's  assertion  was  correct  and 
sincere,  and  the  League  of  Nations  will  merely  "advise  and 
recommend"  subject  to  approval — individually — by  the  powers 
which  compose  the  League,  what  great  good  may  be  expected 
from  it  in  the  hot  contentions  of  self-interest  and  ambition 
which  have  ever  characterized  European  politics?  Many  other 
similar  impassioned  and  hallucinatious  pronouncements  on  the 
war  and  against  Germany  have  been  issued  by  President  Wil- 
son, notably  his  veto  messages  on  the  reservations  and  the 
"separate  peace"  resolution.     He  is  possessed  by  a  strong  racial 

285 


bias  against  Germany  and  is  full  of  resentment  against  her  for 
spoiling  his  world-savior  ambitions;  also  he  holds  a  set  of  politi- 
cal theories  and  assumptions  of  his  own  with  which  he  plays  to 
the  world  as  upon  a  musical  instrument,  in  disregard  of  actual 
facts  and  reasonable  possibilities.  We  are  afraid  that  no  such 
ai'bitrary  political  dictums  and  altruistic  visions  will  ever  fit  the 
case  of  Europe! 

Judging  Pi'esident  Wilson  calmly  in  his  gravitation  from 
ostensible  neutrality  to  open  hostility  towards  Germany,  it  is 
generally  accepted  in  the  country  today,  even  by  his  admirers, 
that  he  was  strongly  pro-British  from  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
in  1914.  His  ancestry  and  mental  cast  attest  this;  while  he 
tried,  at  times,  to  be  high-minded,  just  and  impartial,  he  was 
unable  to  overcome  his  natural  bias.  The  German  Government 
slighted  him  twice — very  imprudently;  the  first  time  by  its 
utter  silence  in  answer  to  his  address  to  the  Congress  and  the 
following  declaration  of  war  against  Germany  on  April  6,  1917; 
the  second  time  by  its  independent  peace  initiative,  in  Novem- 
ber, 1916,  after  having  waited  for  seven  months  for  the  Presi- 
dent to  take  his  own  promised  reciprocity  and  peace  steps 
(which  he  finally  did  on  December  18,  1916).  In  both  in- 
stances the  President's  pride  and  egotism  were  deeply  wounded! 
and  after  the  complete  fiasco  of  his  peace  endeavors  of  Decem- 
ber 18,  1916,  to  January  25,  1917,  he  threw  himself  into  the 
arms  of  England  without  fui'ther  resei^ve.  Thenceforth  he  was 
the  implacable  enemy  of  Germany,  as  convincingly  stated  in 
von  Bernstoi-ff' s  book,  and  his  utterances  increased  in  vehe- 
mence with  every  speech  he  made.  Colonel  House  had  suc- 
ceeded completely  in  his  work;  while,  on  the  one  hand,  duping 
Ambassador  Bernstorff'  to  believe  in  the  President's  peace  pro- 
fessions, he  led  the  latter  into  a  fanatical  frdme  of  mind  about 
"fighting  for  liberty,  democracy,  and  saving  civilization"  from 
those  savage  Germans.  All  this  was  agitation  for  a  definite 
purpose — the  purpose,  first,  to  prevent  Germany  continuing 
her  U-boat  warfare  at  a  time  when  it  had  the  best  chance  for 
complete  success,  and,  secondly,  to  deliver  this  nation  as  quickly 
as  possible  as  a  belligerent  ally  into  the  lap  of  England  and 
France!  We  will  conclude  this  subject  with  the  following  in- 
structive American  estimate  published  in  the  New  York  papers 
of  April  23,  1919: 

SEES  DESPAIR  OF  PEACE. 

Europeans,    Says    C.    S.    Davison,    Have   Turned   Against   Wilson 

Ideals. 

"Charles  Slewart  Davison,  chairman  of  the  Board  of  Trus- 
tees of  the  American  Defense  Society,  who  arrived  from  Europe 
on  Monday,  .said  yesterday  that  both  in  England  and  France  he 
found  among  persons  representing  all  social  classes  and  occu- 

286 


pations  the  opinion  that  the  situation  in  relation  to  the  Peace 
Conference  was  unsatisfactory. 

"Some  characterized  it  as  a  failure,"  he  said,  "some  as  a 
farce;  all  denounced  the  failure  to  make  peace  while  discussing 
theories  of  the  future  relations  of  the  nations.  The  existing 
situation  was  attributed  to  the  personal  idiosyncrasies  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson.  » 

"Among  Americans,  the  opinion  was  freely  expressed  that 
the  President  ought  to  return  home  and  let  Europe  settle  its 
own  questions.  All  nationalities  seemed  to  agree  that  the  situ- 
ation was  growing  steadily  worse  throughout  the  world  and 
would  soon  be  intolerable. 

"All  agreed  that,  on  the  President's  first  arrival  in  France, 
he  was  generally  received  as  the  embodiment  of  the  salvation 
of  civilizatioi?,  and  that  now  Europe  was  divided  into  three 
categories  in  her  estimate  of  him — those  who  were  puzzled, 
those  who  were  angry,  and  those  who  despaired. 

"I  did  not  hear  the  President's  course  of  action  approved 
by  a  single  person.  The  people  who  seemed  to  be  the  most 
bitter  about  the  situation  were  American  army  officers.  Mean- 
while the  general  impression  throughout  Europe  appears  to  be 
that,  owing 'to  the  situation  which  has  been  created,  the  war 
will  have  to  be  fought  again  in  twenty  years. 

"The  opinion  appears  to  prevail  that  President  Wilson  and 
his  policies  will  come  to  be  execrated  throughout  the  world. 
Whoever  may  be  at  fault  it  is  a  sad  ending  as  it  stands  today 
to  high  aspirations." 


America's  Unbridled  Language.  Additional  to  what  has 
been  stated  on  this  subject  in  the  supplementary  note  "The 
Reign  of  Blind  Hate,"  Article  XI,  and  elsewhere  in  this  book, 
and  in  the  references  to  President  Wilson's  speeches  in  this 
Article  XVI,  we  feel  it  necessary,  as  a  matter  of  justice  to  the 
history  of  the  war,  to  give  a  few  more  of  the  "pithy"  pronounce- 
ments of  Mr.  Wilson. 

In  his  message  to  Congress,  early  in  December  of  1917, 
when  he  was  apprised  that  th^  German  Government  was  pre- 
paring to  take  the  initiative  for  a  peace  move  without  waiting 
any  longer  upon  his  own  dilatory  tactics,  he  vented  his  ire  by 
denouncing  the  German  Government  as  one  "without  honor, 
conscience  or  qualities  for  entering  into  a  peace  by  treaty," 
adding  that  "this  power  must  be  broken  to  the  ground  if  not 
literally  exterminated."  He  made  an  appeal  to  the  German 
people  "to  get  rid  of  their  horrible  masters,"  then  would  it  be 
"possible  to  conclude  a  peace  of  "justice  for  all  peoples."  (Prob- 
ably something  like  the  peace  of  Versailles.)  "This  message 
of  the  President  was  followed  by  an  almost  equally  violent 
speech  by  Lloyd  George,  English  Premier,  in  which  he  called 
the  Prussians  "criminals  and  bandits";  he  had  previously  called 

287 


them  "savages,  barbarians  and  huns."  On  January  18,  1918, 
President  Wilson  made  his  speech  of  "the  fourteen  points," 
in  which  he  again  urged  the  German  people"  to  get  rid  of  their 
masters"  and  erect  a  power  of  popular  authority  "with  which 
the  Entente  could  deal."  (All  this  was  merely  political  har- 
rangue  to  exasperate  and  divide  the  German  people  still  more.) 

Following  the  desperate  appeal  of  Lloyd  George  to  America 
for  quick  help,  in  March,  1918,  Mr.  Wrlfeon  replied  again: 
"Germany — without  conscience,  honor  or  understanding — 
must  be  crushed;"  and  on  April  6,  1918,  at  Baltimore,  came  the 
famous:  "Force,  force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  measure 
and  limit,  triumphant  force,  to  restore  respect  for  laws  and 
treaties"  and  to  "crush  every  form  of  selfish  autocracy  into 
the  dust."  To  these  quotations  of  what  was  uttered  by  the 
leader  of  this  nation  must  be  joined  the  unbridled  abuse  of 
Germany  politically  and  of  Germans  as  a  race  and  people  by 
the  daily  papers  and  periodicals  of  America  and  the  innumer- 
able "addresses"  made  by  public  men  and  women  throughout 
the  country. 

Today,  only  two  years  after  the  signing  of  peace,  this  atti- 
tude and  language  appear  to  all  rational  men  as  incomprehen- 
sible and  absolutely  inexcusable!  The  "blind  fanaticism  of 
war"  is  patent  to  us  now  by  the  mere  reading  of  these  expres- 
sions of  opinion  and  feeling.  What  right  did  these  men  have 
to  use  such  language  towards  a  country,  its  executive  heads 
and  people  with  whom  we  were  at  complete  peace  only  two 
years  previously  and  for  whom  we  had  professed  great  respect 
and  even  admiration?  The  "state  of  war"  cannot  excuse  such 
presumptuous,  dictatory  and  villifying  language  against  an- 
other people!  Excepting  a  few  abusive  outbursts  by  the  Eng- 
lish Premier,  the  foreign  statesmen,  press  and  peoples  showed 
much  more  self-restraint  in  their  utterances  than  obtained  here, 
although  the  war  concerned  them  to  a  much  more  acute  degree! 


'TpHE  author's  views  on  the  war  have  been  unaffected  by  the 
-*■  Peace  Conference  books,  nor  have  they  been  qualified  by 
the  new  information  brought  by  the  important  war  books  which 
have  been  published  in  Germany  and  Austria  during  the  past 
two  years — the  books  by  General  LudendorfF,  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Karl  Helfferich,  ex-Premier 
Czernin  of  Austria,  ex-Ambassador  von  Bernstorff  and  others. 
We  may  add  to  these  the  authoritative  English  book  by  Keynes 
on  the  economic  side  of  the  peace  treaty,  the  Memoires  of 
Lord  Haldane  and  many  other  political  books  and  magazine 
articles  aiming  to  explain  the  war.     They  make  it  clear  beyond 

288 


question  that  an  understanding,  later  extended  to  a  complete 
convention,  existed  between  France  and  England  from  the 
beginning  of  the  Morocco  difficulty,  1898-1904,  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  Algeciras  conference  through  Germany's  protest 
at  being  ignored  by  France  and  England  in  the  African  colon- 
ization questions.  And  these  books  make  it  equally  clear  that 
this  approachment  between  France  and  England  was  not  pro- 
voked by  any  unwarranted  assumption  of  rights  in  the  above 
questions  by  Germany,  nor  by  any  fears  of  designs  of  foreign 
conquest  or  continental  domination  on  her  part,  but  were  solely 
inspired  by  jealousy  of  her  economic  rise,  military  power, 
growth  of  commercial  shipping  and  naval  strength.  On  the 
part  of  France,  this  feeling  was  augmented  by  the  agitations 
of  the  irrepressible  Delcasse  faction  for  "revenge"  for  1871. 

And  when,  as  related  in  the  respective  Articles  of  the  book, 
Russia  began  to  realize  that  the  Triple  Alliance  would  compel 
Germany,  through  her  union  with  Austria,  to  work  against 
Russia's  designs  and  hopes  in  her  southeastern  policy,  she  lent 
a  ready  ear  to  the  advances  of  France  to  join  with  her  and 
England  in  a  general  combine — the  Triple  Entente — against 
Germany  and  her  associates.  The  entire  background  of  the 
war  as  given  by  the  writer  is  thus  confirmed :  The  strengthening 
of  the  Triple  Entente  to  crush  their  rival  when  Germany's 
near-Oriental  extension  policy  should  become  fully  developed; 
the  diplomatic  moves  to  alienate  Italy  from  the  "Dreibund" 
and  to  weaken  the  ties  between  Greece  and  Germany;  the 
checking  of  Germany  in  her  endeavor  to  make  other  alliances; 
ultimately,  the  creation  of,  or  seizure,  of  an  opportune  occasion 
to  bring  about  her  humiliation  and  retreat  under  the  threat 
of  an  overwhelming  military  combination  against  her.  All  this 
design  was  directed  by  the  superior  diplomatic  skill  of  the  Brit- 
ish against  which  the  open  and  blunt,  not  to  say  clumsy,  meth- 
ods of  the  Germans  did  not  avail.  It  is  also  made  clear  that 
Germany's  political  form  or  the  personality  of  the  Kaiser  had 
absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  these  political  and  economic  rival- 
ries. There  is  nothing  "new"  in  these  views;  they  are  the  views 
of  the  well-educated  European  of  every  nationality.  They  were 
"ignored"  only  in  America;  and  it  is  upon  this  ignorance  that 
the  Entente  built  to  draw  us  into  the  war — on  their  side! 

289 


The  book  by  General  Ludendorff  is  very  valuable  in  that 
it  sheds  much  light  upon  the  military  phases  of  the  war  and 
also  upon  the  political  developments  towards  the  end  of  the 
year  1918.  And  here,  again,  the  author's  conception  of  the 
events,  as  set  forth  in  Article  XIII,  is  fully  sustained  by  addi- 
tional proofs  from  Ludendorff' s  statements.  The  genei'al  had 
been  violently  attacked  i-n  Germany  *f  or  his  apparently  con- 
tradictory course,  to  wit:  First,  as  early  as  August  11,  1918, 
soon  after  the  first  German  reverses  which  followed  the  suc- 
cessful Germain  di'ive  towards  Amiens  and  Ypres,  he  suddenly 
pressed  for  immediate  peace  with  all  his  influence  on  the  plea 
of  the  rapid  deterioration  of  the  army  and  its  inability  to  win 
victory  against  the  increasing  favorable  situation  of  the  enemy; 
second,  he  issued  an  emphatic  call  for  the  resumption  of  the 
struggle  and  for  a  decision  on  the  battlefield  in  answer  to 
President  Wilson's  surrender  of  the  armistice  negotiations  into 
the  hands  of  France  and  England  by  his  tacit  consent  to  -the 
excision  of  the  "fourteen  points"  as  the  basis  of  the  nego- 
tiations. What  is  the  explanation  of  this  apparent  contradic- 
tion in  Ludendorff's  course?  The  General  does  not  openly 
state  it,  but  his  cautious  silence  is  "revealing"  just  the  same, 
and  is  no  reproach  to  him.  The  motive  is  too  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  change  of  government  in  Germany,  still  in  the 
formative  process,  to  have  permitted  him  to  speak  frankly; 
but  it  is  not  difficult  to  put  the  matter  together. 

The  doubt  entertained  in  Germany,  and  by  the  enemy  also, 
as  to  the  fact  of  the  precarious  position  of  the  German  army 
when  Ludendorff  first  sounded  his  alarm,  has  since  been  proven 
to  have  been  well  founded.  There  were  at  the  time  still  some 
four  millions  of  well  organized  soldiers  in  the  German  armies 
in  France,  with  ample  military  supplies,  before  the  final  battles 
of  the  fall  of  1918  began.  Under  united  military  and  political 
leadership  they  might  still  have  won  the  war!  These  armies 
subsequently  went  through  the  windup  campaigns  in  the  West, 
center  and  North  of  the  great  French  fighting  ground ;  and 
they  still  fought  well,  yet  were  steadily  driven  back  because 
they  were  morally  discouraged  and  disgruntled,  and  were',  of 
course,  greatly  weakened  in  numbers  by  this  retreat.  Yet  it 
was  after  these  losses,  which  no  one  knew  better  than  Luden- 

290 


dorff  himself,  that  he  flung  out  his  bugle  call  and  demanded 
resistance  to  the  utmost,  and  pretended  to  believe  in  the  possi- 
bility of  its  success!  The  motives  ai-e  very  clear  now; 
thew  were  entirely  political  and  such  as  we  have  partly 
given  them  in  Article  XIII :  Ludendorff  plainly  saw  the 
coming  of  the  great  political  storm  in  Germany  and  the  threat 
it  held  to  the  dynasty,  the  empire  and  the  German  people.  It 
was  to  avert  this  danger,  from  patriotic  motives  and  fealty  to 
his  sovereign  and  the  German  Constitution,  that  he  worked  for 
peace  in  the  early  fall  of  1918,  but  for  peace  to  be  secured  by 
the  Kaiser  and  his  government,  by  Germany  as  an  empire, 
while  these  were  still  existent,  and  before  they  should  be  en- 
gulfed by  the  gathering  forces  of  the  revolution! 

In  his  estimation,  an  acceptable  peace  was  at  that  time 
still  procurable  from  the  enemy,  though  it  might  have  had  to 
fall  much  below  what  had  once  been  hoped,  but  would  certainly 
have  been  greatly  preferable  to  the  debacle  he  saw  coming.  Had 
his  view  been  able  to  prevail,  had  it  been  backed  up  by  the  re- 
quired diplomatic  ability  and  the  necessary  spirit  to  sacrifice  na- 
tional pride  and  political  party  ambitions  for  the  sake  of  the 
rescue  of  the  Fatherland  by  the  offer  of  "sufficiently  humble 
terms,"  then  Germany,  the  empire  and  the  dynasty  might  have 
been  saved,  and  the  revolutionary  eruption,  the  humiliating 
armistice,  the  shameful  peace,  the  like  fate  of  Austria,  Bul- 
garia and  Turkey  averted  and  the  entire  European  and  ivorld 
chaos  of  today  made  impossible!  But  it  was  not  to  be.  The 
political  coalition  which  pressed  for  surrender,  largely  to  attain 
its  own  victory  and  elevation — a  design  which  received  strength 
and  co'untenance  from  the  allied,  and  particularly  from  the 
"Wilsonian"  demand  for  a  "new  government  emanating  from 
the  people"  in  place  of  that  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty — did 
not  want  a  peace  that  would  have  saved  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment! As  between  that  course  and  risking  the  abject  sur- 
render of  the  country — but  under  their  political  victory — they 
chose  the  latter!  This  combination  of  incapacity  and  perfidy 
has  seldom  been  equalled.  When  Ludendorff  became  convinced 
of  this  design,  he  quickly  reversed  his  position  and  called  for 
a  renewal  of  the  struggle  to  save  the  burning  ship  by  a  last 
determined  effort!     But  his  call  came  too   late;  the  ship  was 

291 


already  sinking;  the  Imperial  authority  was  already  gone — and 
Germany  went  down  in  the  turbulent  waves  of  military  defeat 
and  political  revolution!  It  is  the  greatest  tragedy  the  world 
has  ever  seen! 

The  book  by  von  Tirpitz  gives  us  much  valuable  information 
on  pre-war  events  and  important  junctures  during  the  conflict, 
but  is  historically  less  valuable  from  its  pronounced  gossipy 
and  vehement  "personal"  character.  The  ex-Admiral  is  in- 
tensely aggrieved  against  the  Kaiser  and  his  government 
because  the  policies  which  he  recommended  were  not  adopted; 
and  he  is  convinced  that  if  unrelenting  U-boat  warfare  had 
been  continued  through  1916,  instead  of  being  arrested  in 
deference  to  the  protests  of  the  United  States,  Germany  would 
have  won  the  war — and  there  is  much  evidence  to  sustain  his 
opinion.  Being  an  intensely  patriotic  man,  and  believing  his 
estimate  of  the  situation  absolutely  correct,  the  bitterness  of  his 
mind  is  easily  understood  and  his  offensive  method,  in  some 
measure,  excusable.  The  inroads  that  had  been  made  upon 
English  shipping  by  the  U-boats  up  to  April,  1916,  were  con- 
siderable and,  had  this  continued,  England  would  have  had  no 
chance  whatever  to  prepare  herself  with  protective  measures 
against  them ;  she  would  have  been  starved  out  by  the  spring  or 
summer  of  1917  and  compelled  to  sue  for  peace.  This  almost 
certain  outcome  would  have  made  America's  entry  into  the  war 
highly   improbable! 

How  must  the  Germans  feel  today,  in  their  terrible  plight, 
on  reading  the  Adntiral's  emphatic  statements,  on  realizing 
"how  near  they  were  to  victory"  at  that  time,  had  they  but  - 
possessed  the  insight  and  courage  of  one  great  statesman  at 
home,  supported  by  an  ambassador  at  Washington  strong  enough 
to  withstand  the  beguiling  promises  of  Col.  House  about  the 
President's  "early  steps"  at  London  for  "reciprocity"!  This 
much  is  certain,  that  if  Germany  had  even  remotely  believed 
at  that  time  that  America  would,  at  the  end,  be  drawn  into  the 
war,  nothing  in  the  world  could  have  prevented  the  advice 
of  von  Tripitz  being  followed  and  prosecuted  to  a  victorious 
finish!  The  whole  history  of  the  U-boat  warfare,  as  given  by 
the  ex-Admiral,  is  also  interesting  as  revealing — from  the  vacil- 

292 


lation  and  irregularity  in  its  employment — that  the  heart  of  the 
German  government  and  people  was  never  fully  in  this  measure 
as  applied  to  merchantmen  and  passenger  vessels;  it  was  coun- 
tenanced only  as  "a  warfare  of  desperation"  against  the  English 
food  blockade  which  was  relentlessly  squeezing  the  life  out  of 
the  country,  civil  and  military. 

The  books  by  the  German  and  Austrian  statesmen,  which 
we  have  mentioned,  occupy  themselves  chiefly  vnth  the  his- 
torical background  and  the  political  situation  just  prior  to 
the  war,  and  with  the  diplomatic  "note  exchanges"  from  the 
day  of  the  Serajevo  tragedy  to  the  actual  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities. Very  valuable  is  the  light  thrown  upon  the  relations 
between  Germany  and  Austria  and  upon  the  "peace  moves," 
the  substance  of  which  endeavors  is  embodied  in  preceding  text 
notes.  The  gist  of  the  contents  of  these  books  corroborates 
the  author's  conception  of  the  war  and  establishes  the  follow- 
ing main  facts  beyond  question :  First,  that  the  knowledge  by 
Austria  and  Germany  of  "the  real  inner  meaning"  of  the  Sera- 
jevo murder,  of  the  attitude  of  Russia  and  the  obstinacy  of 
Serbia  had,  from  the  first,  not  only  an  exasperating  effect  upon 
them  but  a  depressing  one  also  as  to  the  possibility  of  pre- 
serving the  peace;  the  whole  of  the  events  were  to  them  a  clear 
manoeuvre,  pre-concocted,  to  "force  the  situation"  which  had 
been  long  preparing  to  bring  on  a  tryout  between  the  rival 
power  combinations,  and  the  real  objects  of  which  were  well 
known  to  them;  second,  that  in  spite  of  this  conviction  the 
German  Government,  and  the  Kaiser  personally,  did  all  that 
could  be  done  to  induce  Russia  and  Serbia  to  recede,  to  urge 
England  and  France  to  do  the  same,  to  let  these  powers  know 
that  Germany  was  in  honor  bound  to  stand  by  Austria  and 
would  not  shrink  from  war  even  if  forced  to  it;  third,  that  it 
was  equally  clear  to  Germany  and  Austria  that  the  failure  of 
England  to  exert  pressure  upon  Russia,  together  with  her  am- 
biguous attitude — holding  herself  threateningly  in  the  back- 
ground while  pretending  to  be  working  for  peace — had  no 
other  meaning  than  that  a  united  attempt  was  being  made  by 
the  Triple  Entente  to  coerce  the  Triple  Alliance  to  a  diplomatic 
backdown  under  the  threat  of  war,  involving  a  consequent  re- 
traction of  its  political  and  economic  aims,  position  and  power. 

293 


As  there  was  nothing  unwan-anted  about  the  latter,  this  pur- 
pose of  the  Entente  was  bound  to  be  indignantly  rejected! 

From  the  woi'k  by  Karl  Helfferich,  former  German  vice- 
Chancellor,  we  obtain  unimpeachable  and  intimate  testimony 
of  the  Kaiser's  absolutely  peaceable  intentions  and  of  the  great 
mental  agony  the  prospect  of  war  caused  him ;  likewise  of  the 
total  absence  of  any  schemes  of  conquest  by  Germany.  How 
the  policy  of  the  Entente  was  wrecked  by  Germany's  ener- 
getic repulse  of  its  implied  insinuation  has  been  described  in 
Article  VIII  of  this  book.  It  is  now  equally  clear  from  these 
German  and  Austrian  books  that  Austria's  exacting  terms  to 
Serbia  and  Germany's  pledge  of  support  were  not  addressed 
so  much  to  Serbia  as  to  Russia  and  the  other  Entente  powers 
to  coerce  them — on  the  part  of  the  Triple  Alliance — to  back 
down  and  relinquish  their  selfish  designs.  Had  the  Entente 
yielded  and  Russia  arrested  her  mobilization,  Austria  would 
then,  no  doubt,  have  agreed  to  suspend  her  terms  to  Serbia 
(another  term  for  Russia,  only).  An  attempt  at  a  real  con- 
ference of  the  powers  might  then  have  been  made  to  prevent 
the  extremity  of  war.  Whether  success  would  have  been  at- 
tained is  very  problem.atical,  but  the  attempt  would  have  been 
worth  the  making. 

The  Kaiser  himself  has  also  written  a  book  on  the  war — 
a  book  giving  his  personal  views  and  aims — and  intended  only 
for  limited  private  circulation.  As  the  author  has  not  been 
able  to  see  a  "copy"  and  is  confined  to  "newspaper  reports" 
as  to  the  Kaiser's  statements,  he  cannot  speak  about  it  with  any 
real  knowledge.  It  appears,  however,  that  on  the  basis  of  the 
"review  in  the  N.  Y.  "  World,"  the  Kaiser's  explanations  of  the 
long-time  political  war  causes  and  the  course  of  diplomatic 
events  in  the  month  between  Serajevo  and  August  4th,  1914, 
as  well  as  in  regard  to  Germany's  readiness  for  peace  at  any 
time  on  reasonable  and  just  terms  to  all,  ai'e  identical  in  all 
principal  features  with  those  given  by  the  author  in  this  book. 

The  "Diplomatic  Memoirs  of  Lord  Haldane",  to  which  we 
have  given  some  attention  in  a  previous  article,  treat  mainly 
of  the  "Berlin-Bagdad"  negotiations  with  Germany  and  reveal 
the  subtle  English  methods  of  diplomacy  in  furthering  grasp- 
ing and    dominating   designs   upon    other   nations   by   outward 

294 


candor  and  affability.  The  presentation  of  the  same  subject 
in  the  Vol.  I  of  Karl  Helfferich's  "The  World  War,"  in  which 
the  negotiations  are  given  in  detail,  step  for  step,  effectually 
disposes  of  Lord  Haldane's  position  and  explanations. 

In  addition  to  the  deductions  we  have  previously  drawn 
from  the  various  "books  of  revelation"  on  the  Paris  Peace  Con- 
ference, they  are  all  open  to  the  charge  of  being  written  strictly 
from  the  position  of  the  Allies,  which  is  assumed  to  be  infallibly 
correct;  they  do  not  contain  one  illuminating  ray  of  truth  on 
the  main  issue — the  political  and  ethical  causes  of  the  war — 
and  are,  therefore,  worthless  historically  except  in  so  far 
as  they  record  the  detail  incidents  of  the  conference  and  re- 
flect its  atmosphere  and  the  relative  positions  and  aims  of  its 
leading  figures.  The  "conference"  followed  too  soon  upon  the 
war  itself  to  allow  those  who  attended  it — from  Prime  Ministers 
down  to  newspaper  correspondents — to  disembarrass  them- 
selves of  its  sinister  influence  and  obtain  the  judicial  and  his- 
historical  viewpoint.  The  atmosphere  of  concealment  and  false 
accusation,  which  we  have  fully  analyzed  in  a  previous  article, 
gave  the  keynote  to  everything  that  was  said  and  done! 

But  on  one  subject  these  several  books  are  not  only  valu- 
able but  also  unanimous,  either  by  direct  statement  or  permis- 
sible inference.  From  all  of  them  the  extraordinary  fact  ap- 
pears that,  with  all  his  lofty  declarations  of  idealistic  world 
policies,  the  President  seems  to  have  had  no  definite  and  prac- 
tical plans  as  to  how  to  attain  these  objects  by  political  enact- 
ments. His  energies  were  mainly  bent  upon  the  adoption  of 
his  League-of -Nations  plan  and  its  inclusion  in  the  treaty;  be- 
yond that  object  he  seems  to  have  allowed  Messrs.  Clemenceau, 
Lloyd  George  and  Orlando  to  do  much  as  they  pleased  with  his 
ideals,  the  enemy  and  woiid  peace!  For  instance,  the  terri- 
torial assignments  made,  on  the  President's  plea  for  the  "self- 
determination  of  nationalities,"  were  so  unjustly  and  ignorantly 
made  in  regard  to  Germany  and  Austria  that  it  is  impossible  for 
them  to  stand.  The  crime  committed  against  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary particularly  under  this  impractical  Wilsonian  dictum  is  a 
frightful  one!  Hate,  greed  for  political  power,  and  a  spii-it 
of  unparalleled  victor's  vengeance  reigned  at  Paris — not  hu- 
manitarian ideals  and  a  genuine  and  intelligent  desire  to  secure 

295 


a  just  and  lasting  world  peace.  Yet,  President  Wilson  was 
present  all  the  time  and  agreed  to  the  monstrous  settlement 
made ! 

The  book  by  ex-Ambassador  von  Bernstorff  is  very  inter- 
esting to  America  in  showing  that  through  the  absence  of  fre- 
quent and  ample  communication  with  the  German  government, 
he  became,  in  a  measure,  isolated  and  out  of  contact  with  the 
true  state  and  relation  of  events  at  home,  and  perhaps  through 
that  fell  a  victim  to  the  persuasiveness  of  Colonel  House  and 
the  President's  promises  on  the  subject  of  America's  peace 
endeavors.  He  gauged  the  American  trend  for  war  correctly, 
and  so  informed  his  government,  but  failed  to  see  the  game  of 
procrastination  being  played  in  Washington  to  frustrate  Ger- 
many's U-boat  warfare  and  thus  gain  time  for  Allied  counter- 
preparations.  He  is  frequently  in  flat  contradiction  with  Karl 
Helfferich,  but  the  latter's  explanations  of  events  have  the 
weight  of  full  knowledge  and  official  evidence  on  their  side. 
The  ambassador  make.s  an  emphatic  denial  of  his  connection, 
officially  or  private,  with  the  German  propaganda  in  this 
country. 

On  the  economic  and  financial  side  of  the  Versailles  peace 
we  must  speak  again  of  the  English  book  by  Mr.  Maynard 
Keynes  because  of  the  thoroughness  and  lucidity  of  his  state- 
ments and  the  irresistible  logic  of  his  facts  and  figures,  com- 
piled by  an  expert  in  statistics.  His  book  is  a  scathing  arraign- 
ment of  the  work  of  the  Paris  conference,  of  the  incredible  ig- 
norance and  shortsightedness  on  all  practical  matters  of  pro- 
duction, commerce  and  finance  on  the  part  of  the  men  into 
whose  hands  the  fate  of  the  world  was  committed!  The  tes- 
timony of  this  cool-headed  author  on  the  "pitiable  littleness 
and  arrogant  hypocrisy"  of  the  spirit  of  the  Paris  conference — 
its  total  lack  of  broad  outlook  and  loftiness  of  conception  of 
its  great  task — throws  a  vivid  light  upon  the  mockery  of  rea- 
son, pledges,  justice  and  ordinary  foresight  which  produced 
the  abortive  peace  of  Versailles. 

All  the  above  books,  and  many  others,  leave  a  common  void 
— to  the  great  disappointment  of  the  deluded  public  of  the 
world^ — -the  void  of  failing  to  disclose  the  slightest  evidence  of 
the    existence    of    a    set    design    by    Germany,    or    Germany    and 

296 


Austria,  to  precipitate  a  war  of  conquest  and  domination,  as  has 
been   represented   by   the  war  propagandas.      The   policy   of  the 
two  empires  is  clearly  revealed  to  have  been  nothing  more  than 
the   legitimate   protection   of  their  political   integrity  and   the 
making  of  such  extensions  of  influence  and  economic  connec- 
tions by  treaties  and  commercial  enterprises  as  were  entirely 
justified  and  to  the  injury  of  no  other  countries.     On  all  this, 
the  war  and  Paris  conference  books  coming  from   the   Allies 
are  silent;   no  acknowledgements,  no  admissions  of  error,  no 
explanations  on  the  basis  of  well-established  facts;  nothing  but 
a  stubborn  adherence  to  their  fabricated  war  story!     And  this 
void  has  been  greatly  deepened  by  the  absolutely  barren  results 
of  the  much-heralded  "disclosures"  to  come  from  the  examina- 
tion of  the  "secret  archives"  of  the  Berlin  and  Vienna  Foreign 
Offices.     The    expectations   of   the    extreme    socialists   particu- 
larly, who  had  worked  themselves  into  a  fury  of  hate  against 
the  old  order,  were  sadly  discomfited  by  the  emptiness  of  said 
archives,  which  held  no  "secrets"  of  any  importance  and  fur- 
nished  no  additional  information   of  moment  upon   the   diplo- 
macy of  the  war.     Nor  did  the  new  democratic  German  govern- 
ment's official  investigation  by  a  special  committee  of  the  Reichs- 
tag into  the  "causes  of  the  war",  with  the  aid  of  these  papers 
from  the  archives  and  the  personal  depositions,  under  oath,  of 
ex-Chancellor   von    Bethmann-Hollweg,    Karl    Helfferich,     Von 
Jagow,  Zimmermann,  General  Ludendorff  and  others  who  had 
held  important  posts  in  the  army  and  navy  and  Imperial  For- 
eign   Office,    bring    out    any    evidence    of    nefarious    designs    or 
world  plots,  of  secret  terrible  conspiracies  against  other  nations 
or  interests!     Alas!  it  was  all  the  other  way;  the  plotting  for 
suppression,  conquest,  gain  and   revenge  was   on   the   part  of 
Gei"many's   enemies;  and   German  diplomacy  was  all   too  blunt 
and   candid   and   lacking   in   finesse   to   be  able   to   checkmate  or 
dispel  these  machinations! 


npHE  political  plight  of  the  four  new  states  carved  out  of  the 

old  Austrian  empire  carries  less  danger  to  peace   (they  all 

being  too  helpless  and  distracted)    than  the  situation   on   the 

Rhine  and   in  Upper  Silesia,  but  it  is  for  that  so  much  more 

297 


pathetic  and  dramatic.  The  ti'eatment  of  Hungary  by  the  Paris 
peace,  in  having  some  of  her  choicest  districts,  overwhelmingly 
Hungarian  in  history  and  feeling,  wrenched  away  from  her 
without  even  a  plebiscite,  and  arbitrarily  assigned  to  Serbia 
and  Roumania  as  "political  rewards"  is  an  act  almost  unbeliev- 
able in  its  brazen  unscrupulousness.  As  to  German-Austria — 
the  heart  of  the  former  empire — she  has  not  only  been  crippled 
economically  beyond  the  power  of  existence,  her  agricultural 
mainstay  divided  among  the  adjoining  States,  but  her  "natural" 
and  ardent  desire  for  economic  union  and  political  association 
with  the  German  Republic  has  been  denied  at  Paris  from  mo- 
tives of  arrant  political  jealousy  and  in  open  defiance  of  the 
dictum  of  "self-determination."  To  let  her  join  Germany 
would  have  added  to  the  strength  of  both — and  that  would  be 
entirely  opposed  to  France's  imperialistic  policy!  In  the  South, 
the  contest  between  Jugo-Slavia  and  Italy  over  the  possession 
of  Fiume,  etc.,  and  the  control  of  the  Adriatic  has  at  last  been 
settled,  but  it  is  a  temporary  settlement,  dictated  by  the  stern 
necessity  for  peace  and  recuperation,  and  the  issue  will  be  re- 
opened before  many  years  will  have  passed.  In  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia  (formerly  Bohemia,  Moravia  and  the  eastern  part  of 
Galicia  of  the  Austrian  empii"e)  there  is  a  reign  of  close  rivalry 
and  bitter  feeling  between  the  Slavs  and  the  Germans,  who  in 
many  cities  and  districts  are  almost  equally  matched  in  num- 
bers and  influence,  preventing  the  cotintry  settling  down  to 
peace  and   work. 

We  are,  therefore,  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be 
no  surprise  of  history  if  these  four  States  of  former  Austria 
should,  after  a  few  years,  draw  together  again  to  a  new  "con- 
federation" to  act  as  a  unit  in  regard  to  economic  necessities 
and  external  policies.  There  are  indications  even  now  that  such 
currents  are  at  work.  This  prospect  arises  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  former  Austria.  The  old  monarchy,  or  rather  confed- 
erate empire,  was  not,  properly  speaking,  the  result  of  con- 
quests but  of  a  natural  association  of  States  or  peoples  which, 
individually,  lacked  the  necessary  physical  and  political  quali- 
fications for  independent  life  and  were  thus  combined  to  a  unit 
able  to  hold  its  own  in  the  broilpot  of  European  politics.  Thus 
may   history   repeat   itself!     Adding  to   all    the   foregoing   the 

298 


chaos  in  Russia  and  Turkey,  the  Shantung  dispute,  the  total 
collapse  and  intense  suffering  of  all  these  peoples,  we  have  be- 
fore us  the  complete  failure  of  the  Versailles  treaty:  Nothing 
definitely  settled  anywhere  and  resolved  in  a  statesmanlike 
manner  and  frankly  accepted;  no  one  satisfied,  not  even  those 
who  w^ere  assumed  to  have  been  benefitted;  everywhere  gaps 
and  fractures  and  open  wounds  left  to  breed  new  complica- 
tions, thoughts  of  retaliation,  resolve  to  force  necessary  cor- 
rections! The  author  ventures  to  predict  that  if  this  monu- 
ment of  incapacity  and  cupidity — the  Versailles  Treaty — is  not 
speedily  revised  by  man,  by  man  recollecting  his  proclaimed 
principles  and  promises,  it  will  be  revised  by  irresistible  fate 
itself — the  cold  logic  of  facts  and  events — in  a  manner  too 
awful  to  contemplate! 


'T^  HE  most  illuminating  political  denouement  of  the  war  is  now 
•*■  taking  place  in  the  Turkish  dominions  and  Persia  by  the 
gradual  unfolding  of  England's  Oriental  policy.  Daily  her  scheme 
of  converting  Asia  Minor,  Mesopotamia,  Persia,  Palestine, 
Egypt  and  Arabia  into  "a  political  and  economic  dependency" 
of  Great  Bx'itain  becomes  more  clearly  apparent.  This  need 
not  necessarily  mean  conquest  or  literal  annexation  but  merely 
such  political  control  as  will  insure  the  desird  economic  advan- 
tages for  England,  including  the  incidental  protection  to  her 
Indian  interests.  It  includes  a  continuous  land-route  of  com- 
munication with  India  in  addition  to  present  and  future  sea 
routes  from  ports  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Arabian  Seas. 
How  familiarly  all  this  sounds!  Did  we  not  have  occasion  to 
say  something  at  several  places  in  this  book  of  a  certain  Berlin- 
Bagdad  railroad  and  eastern-extension  policy  by  that  black- 
souled  country — Germany — for  the  purpose  of  securing  addi- 
tional supply  sources  of  raw  materials  and  new  markets,  and  a 
land-route  and  sea  connection  to  the  Orient,  independent  of  the 
unreliable  sea-route  through  the  English  channel?  And  did  we 
not  say  that  this  foolhardy  plan  on  the  part  of  upstart  Germany 
was  not  much  to  the  liking  of  England  because  of  its  threat  of 
interference  with  the  latter's  own  plans  and  interests  and  be- 

299 


cause  of  the  challenge  it  offered  to  her  "undisputed  supremacy" 
in  European  affaii's?  Again,  has  it  not  seemed  strange  to 
large  numbers  of  the  credulous  of  the  world  that  England,  who 
was  very  hard-pressed  in  Europe  in  the  war  up  to  the  last  six 
months  thereof,  should,  instead  of  concentrating  all  her  forces 
in  Europe,  have  maintained  from  the  beginning  large  forces 
to  challenge  the  Turk  in  Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  Syria,  Arabia, 

Egj-pt? 

The  reason  of  this  is  now  made  plain  to  all:  England 
wished  from  the  very  start  to  secure  her  victory  in  the  Orient 
above  all  else,  because  it  was  there  where  her  real  interest  in 
the  world  war  lay!  Is  there  anyone  left,  after  these  revela- 
tions, to  believe  that  anything  else  but  commercial  and  political 
antagonism  was  England's  motive  in  the  war?  Does  anyone 
doubt  that  France  shared  these  motives  of  jealousy  and,  in  ad- 
dition, had  for  years  nursed  her  ambition  to  repay  her  defeat 
of  1870  and  reconquer  Alsace-Loi'raine  and  inaugurate  a 
policy  of  imperialistic  annexations  against  Germany?  Can 
there  be  any  question  that  Russia's  sole  purpose  in  the  war  was 
to  bring  her  rivalry  with  Austria  and  Turkey  for  domination 
in  the  Balkan  States  to  an  issue  to  realize  her  Constantinople- 
Mediterranean  dream  by  any  means,  at  any  cost?  There 
were  other  contributory  but  secondary  causes  of  the  war,  but 
the  above  were  and  remain  the  principal  ones!  There  were  im- 
portant incidents — the  defection  of  Italy,  Greece  and  Rou- 
mania — all  accidental,  political  and  not  elementary.  The  entry 
of  America,  important  as  it  was  in  its  results,  was  also  merely 
an  incident,  in  no  wise  connected  with  the  "beginning-causes" 
of  the  war.  We  can  thus  say  with  full  conviction  that  the  men- 
dacious and  malicious  war  motives  advanced  by  the  Eui'opean 
and  American  propagandas  against  Germany  are  now  disproven 
and  have  collapsed!  And  we  can  also  say  that  these  false  war 
motives  of  England  and  the  other  Entente  powers — advanced 
to  hide  their  real  designs — were,  unfortunately,  believed  by 
the  majority  of  the  American  people  to  be  the  genuine  ones — 
a  delusion  which  has  cost  us  a  hundred  thousand  lives  and  a 
twenty-billion  war  debt! 

There  will  be  many  readers  who  will  find  it  difficult  to 
harmonize  the  emphatic  condemnation  of  the  spirit  of  England's 

300 


1 


war  politics  contained  in  this  book  with  her  evident  disposition 
to  be  much  more  reasonable  towards  the  Germans  and  other 
former  enemies  than  the  French  and  other   Entente  allies,  and 

willing  that  they  be  given  a  revision  of  the  peace  terms — by 
enactment  or  interpretation — and  every  help  and  opportunity 
of  rebuilding  their  shattered  countries.  To  those  who  are  de- 
ceived by  these  manifestations  of  kindliness  as  to  their  real 
nature  we  will  say  that  the  British  character  and  position 
towards  other  nations  have  ever  been  this:  Admit  our  mental 
and  physical  superiority  as  a  race,  and  our  consequent  natural 
right  to  the  dominating  position  we  occupy  aS  the  first  political, 
commercial  and  sea-power — and  we  will  be  quite  glad  to  let 
you  live  alongside  of  us — as  our  contributing  friends!  But 
regarding  France,  it  is  quite  clear  that  her  unflinching  ferocity 
towards  Germany,  exacting  the  ultra  maximum  possible  of 
"punishment"  and  "restitution"  at  the  same  time,  including 
annexation  or  control  of  her  most  valuable  natural  resources 
in  her  desire  to  crush  her  enemy  to  the  ground  forever,  is  born 
of  the  fear  of  Germany's  inherent  strength  to  rise  again  in  spite 
of  all  and  strike  back!  Does  she  realize  the  awful  wrong  she 
is  committing  in  thus  planting  the  seeds  of  a  new  war  of  re- 
venge more  terrible  than  the  last?  England,  equally  guilty  of 
the  war,  and  even  more  so  than  France,  has  a  different  tem- 
perament: She  knows  neither  fear  nor  pangs  of  conscience, 
and  is  ready  to  assuage  the  consequences  of  the  war — now  that 
she  has  won — no  matter  how — and  wants  to  enjoy  the  fruits — 
by  her  conspicuous  suavity  and  apparent  fairness,  no  less  agree- 
able and  effective  because  thoroughly  hypoci'itical! 


LEAVING  the  political  side  and  turning  to  the  moral 
and  material  situation  of  the  people  of  Europe,  we  find 
them  in  a  state  of  sentimental  disorganization  and  physical  suf- 
fei-ing  which  defies  description.  In  Germany,  Austria  and 
Hungary  the  extreme  socialistic  and  democratic  sections  are 
possessed  by  a  frenzy  of  violent  hatred  of  the  former  Imperial 
governments  and  their  rulers,  and  all  and  everything  connected 
with  them,  and  of  the  idea  of  the  monarchy  in  general.  All  this 
has  found  expression  in  most  shocking  and  humiliating  exhibi- 

301 


tions    of    revolution    and    indescribable    acts    of    brutality.       We 

have  referred  to  this  before.  From  the  manifestos  issued  by 
these  "parties,"  it  is  seen  that  nothing  could  exceed  their 
fantastic  conceptions  of  the  "idea"  and  the  merits  of  "people's 
rule."  Not  even  the  unreasoning  opposition  to  "capitalism"  by 
the  socialists  in  general  equals  the  blind  hatred  of  these  polit- 
ical extremists  for  the  empires  which  have  been  destroyed — 
only  yesterday  wonderful  aggregations  of  organization,  pros- 
perity and  power,  and  the  admiration  of  the  world! 

This  new  "democratic"  element  calls  upon  the  German 
people  particularly  for  "confession  of  their  guilt,"  for  repu- 
diation of  their  former  political  spirit  of  achievement  and  great- 
ness, for  "repentance"  and  humble  petition  for  reception  into 
the  haven  of  the  League  of  Nations  of  their  enemies!  No  con- 
duct more  craven,  abject,  demoralized  has  ever  been  shown 
before  the  world  and  exposed  a  great  and  deserving  people  to 
its  contempt  and  ridicule!  It  is  the  work  of  men  who  have  cast 
aside  all  self-respect,  racial  pride  and  patriotism,  of  men  led 
astray  by  alluring  political  doctrines  and  distracted  by  unset- 
tling social  and  ethical  theories — left  devoid  of  old  ideals  and 
new  guides  alike.  ALL  our  reasoning  on  these  subjects,  as 
given  in  Articles  XIII,  XIV  and  XV,  has  thus  received  a  terrible 
confirmation  beyond  the  author's  woi'st  apprehensions!  One 
should  have  to  despair  utterly  of  Germany's  right  and  ability 
to  revive  if  this  spirit  were  prevalent  to  a  decisive  extent. 
But  the  quiet  people  of  Germany — those  who  "suffer  and  hide 
their  faces" — are  yet  as  stunned  by  their  experiences;  the 
whole  situation  is  still  unreal  to  them;  daily  they  a^  them- 
selves the  question:  "How  did  it  happen,  how  could  it  ever 
happen?"  Their  thoughts  and  emotions  are  turned  into  morbid 
channels,  their  mental  balance  is  upset;  their  sad  condition 
raises  the  threat  of  psychological  disorders  on  a  national  scale 
which  it  may  take  decades  of  normal,  quiet  existence  to  over- 
come. Similar  conditions  prevail  in  Austria  and  Hungary — 
complete  political,  social  and  ethical  disruption  and  material 
collapse! 

To  these  mental  and  moral  sufferings  must  be  added  the 
physical  ones  of  hunger,  cold,  want  of  every  kind — intense  and 
widespread  as  described  in  a  previous  chapter.     The  evidence 

302 


of  the  many  committees  of  investigation  and  relief  and  the 
report  made  by  Mr.  Henry  P.  Davison,  Chairman  of  the  Board 
of  Governors  of  the  League  of  Red  Cross  Societies,  about  a 
year  ago,  and  other  similar  reports  show  that  the  conditions 
were  not  overdrawn  in  the  daily  press.  They  are  only  slowly 
improving  now.  Scarcely  a  family  can  be  found  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe  that  has  not  suffered  the  loss  of  one  or  more 
sons,  or  of  the  father  or  both,  in  the  war,  the  destruction  of 
business,  income  and  capital.  The  harvest  of  death  from 
sickness  and  malnutrition  in  Germany  and  Austria  has  been 
frightful!  The  American  people  has  generously  opened  its 
heart  and  purse-strings  to  the  appeal  for  help,  but  more  and 
continued  assistance  is  needed  to  prevent  these  abnormal  con- 
ditions reacting  upon  our  own  welfare,  in  the  opinion  of  Mr. 
Davison,  Mr.  Hoover  and  other  observers. 

Yet,  all  this  harrowing  picture  has  not  brought  the  under- 
standing in  America,  to  any  great  extent,  that  these  conditions 
are  not  so  much  the  result  of  the  war  itself  as  of  the  infamous 
life-crushing  Versailles  peace  treaty  which  has  paralyzed  all 
material  agencies  of  existence  and  killed  all  ambition  and  hope 
in  the  former  enemy  countries.  Nor  is  it,  as  yet,  fully  under- 
stood that  the  same  cause  is  at  the  bottom  of  our  own  after- 
war  conditions  of  inflation,  profiteering,  economic  and  finan- 
cial disorganization.  The  burdens  laid  upon  the  enemy  are  in- 
human and  cry  out  for  quick  relief  before  it  is  too  late!  Let 
us  hasten!  Let  us  also  speak  the  word  of  regret,  of  acknowl- 
edgement of  error  and  of  injustice  done  in  the  heat  of  war 
passion,  and  therewith  rekindle  in  the  hearts  of  these  stricken 
people  of  Europe  their  faith  in  mankind,  their  hope,  self-con- 
fidence and  energy  to  live  and  work!  This  WOuld  be  worth 
more  to  them  than  all  the  millions  of  money  we  could  send; 
it  would  include  all  else  from  us  and  from  themselves!  The 
American  Senate — and  people — should  not  only  protest  the 
League-of-Nations  plan  on  account  of  its  un-American  condi- 
tions but  should  insist  on  a  rational  and  just  revision  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty  on  the  basis  argued  in  this  book  as  the 
sine  qua  non  requisite  of  the  United  States  of  America  becom- 
ing a  party  to  this  peace  settlement  and  assuming  any  of  its 
burdens ! 

303 


But  the  pi'eceding  is  not  the  whole  after-wai*  picture;  there 
is  another  side  to  it  even  more  alarming-.  There  is  the  evidence 
that  the  war  has  been  an  orgie  of  legitimate  and  even  more 
of  illegitimate  money-making,  of  heartless  exploitation  of  in- 
exorable conditions  of  necessity,  of  fortunes  lost  by  thousands 
and  won  by  lucky  or  unscrupulous  other  thousands,  involving 
a  widespread  shifting  of  social  relations  and  scale.  This  hap- 
pened not  only  in  the  defeated  countries,  but  also  in  those  of  the 
victors.  And  turning  to  these,  we  find  that  the  war  has  left  psy- 
chological scars  upon  them  no  less  deep  and  far-reaching  than 
upon  the  others.  Due  partly  to  this  sudden  acquisition  of  wealth 
by  many,  also  to  the  general  rise  of  earnings  by  labor  and  of 
profits  by  merchants  but  even  more  to  the  disgruntlement  at  the 
disappointing  final  results  of  the  war,  we  have  the  reigning  era 
of  extravagance,  gambling  and  fast  living  now  running  in  Eng- 
land, France  and  America  and  even  in  the  large  cities  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria!  One  should  think  that  the  colossal  catas- 
trophe of  the  war  upon  victor  and  vanquished  alike  would  have 
cast  a  deep  gloom  upon  all,  even  the  fortunate,  and  have 
directed  their  minds  into  serious  channels.  This  is  no  doubt 
the  case  with  the  majority  in  the  defeated  countries.  But  even 
there,  to  some  extent,  and  generally  in  the  other  countries,  the 
public  seems  to  be  in  a  veritable  riot  of  frivolity  as  if  possessed 
by  a  sub-conscious  impulse  to  stifle  by  the  din  and  excitement 
of  purely  physical  extravagances  the  recollection  of  the  awful 
tragedy  of  the  war  and  the  reproach  of  the  tormenting  after- 
math; silence  the  unrelenting  "knocking  at  the  door  of  con- 
sciousness and-  conscience"  of  all  those  disillusions  and  revul- 
sions of  feeling  which  we  have  endeavored  to  analyze  in  the 
preceding  articles; 

No  published  books  or  magazines,  as  far  as  the  writer  is 
aware,  have  made  a  serious  and  adequate  attempt  to  describe 
and  sum  up  this  psychological  affliction.  Superficial  explana- 
tions, lame  excuses,  vain  boastings,  artificial  reinforcing  of  our 
shattered  self-confidence  are  filling  the  air  aplenty,  but  of  fear- 
less critical  examination  there  is  little.  But  the  world  is  too 
deeply  torn  and  stirred  and  too  seriously  sick  to  be  thus  easily 
pacified  and  cured!  It  needs  the  surgeon's  scalpel  to  cut  out 
all  the  dead  ideas  of  the  past,  the  accumulated  errors  of  concep- 

304 


tion  and  practice  which  the  war  has  brought  to  the  full  con- 
sciousness of  startled  and  trembling  mankind!  The  feeling  of 
doubt  and  anxiety  which  permeates  all  men,  from  the  statesman 
to  the  laborer,  from  the  preacher  to  the  business  man,  must  be 
met  with  something  tangible,  something  positive.  Not  opiates 
and  plasters  are  wanted  to  ease  the  symptoms  but  a  real  elixir 
of  new  faith,  hope,  life!  This  author  claims  no  patent  in  the 
premises;  there  are  many  minds  of  authority,  learning  and  in- 
fluence who  know  the  cause  to  be  as  he  has  stated  it — but  only 
a  few  seem  to  have  come  forward  to  speak  out  and  shake  the 
fabric  of  our  inherited  delusions  and  their  tyrannical  embodi- 
ment. The  war  has  unmistakably  brought  the  growing  skepti- 
cism of  a  century  and  a  half  of  "free  thought"  to  a  focus;  it 
has  struck  a  stunning  blow  in  the  face  of  our  high-flown  pre- 
tensions and  has  exposed  our  littleness,  wickedness,  silliness, 
arrant  conceit  and  skin-deep  civilization  to  our  own  contempt! 
The  amazing  revelation  should  make  us  sick  at  heart  and  thor- 
oughly ashamed  of  ourselves! 

The  author  has  in  preceding  articles  set  forth  in  main  out- 
line a  "philosophy  of  regeneration"  for  these  conditions.  It  is 
a  radical  plan,  a  complete  reversal  of  life  conception  and  out- 
look; but  he  is  convinced  that  the  current  propositions  of  "prac- 
tical" betterments,  of  concessions  to  this  class  and  that,  of  the 
whole  line  of  the  present  groping  socialistic  and  political  en- 
deavors will  bring  but  superficial  and  temporary  results,  if  not 
accompanied  by  a  new  system  of  ethics.  Men  and  women 
everywhere  are  yearning  and  crying  for  the  truth  about  them- 
selves, for  a  new,  natural  and  appealing  life  philosophy  founded 
on  that  truth  and  free  from  the  buncomb,  cant  and  imposition 
of  past  teaching!  A  new  point  of  view  is  needed,  a  radical 
change  of  feeling  and  reasoning,  a  vital  ideal  in  which  we  can 
truly  believe!  May  the  light  of  this  new  view  of  the  world  and 
of  our  existence  here  rise  aggressively  from  this  war  and  purge 
our  effete  civilization  of  all  its  ailings!  Then  shall  we  perhaps 
be  able  to  say  that  the  great  war  was  not  fought  ift  vain! 


305 


I 


N  view  of  the  position  this  author  has  taken  in  regard  to  "Bol- 
shevism," it  seems  desirable  to  add  a  short  word  on  the 
present  situation  in  Russia.  We  have  credited  bolshevism  with 
a  promising  framework  of  political  and  social  reform,  far  in 
advance  of  merely  utilitarian  socialism  in  lucidity  and  com- 
prehensiveness. It  represents  a  "fundamental"  reform  of  so- 
ciety in  all  its  aspects,  not  merely  a  plan  of  change  and  adapta- 
tion within  the  existing  ideas.  It  addresses  itself  to  a  radical 
reform  of  those  material  causes  of  discontent,  surfeit,  in- 
equality, injustice — and  those  of  ethical  perversion  and  false 
pretense — which  we  have  pointed  out.  We  have  criticized  the 
movement  on  the  general  lines  of  the  "rationalistic  life  phi- 
losophy" as  to  its  detail  aims  and  methods.  These,  however, 
may  in  time  be  corrected  to  a  more  perfect  and  practically 
workable  system  of  great  merit. 

Has  bolshevism,  with  its  radical  departure  from  the  old 
ideas  of  government  and  society  accomplished  anything  real, 
akin  to  success  in  Russia  so  far?  As  yet  the  answer  must  be 
uncertain;  and  the  reasons  for  this  are  many  and  varied. 
While  the  other  countries  of  Europe  are  today  deep  in  the  strug- 
gle with  the  disastrous  after-war  results,  Russia  has  had  even  a 
harder  road  to  travel.  Emerging,  after  her  important  efforts 
in  the  war,  from  the  blood  and  fire  of  one  of  the  most  violent 
political  revolutions  the  world  has  seen,  she  gravitated,  after 
the  second  stage  of  her  revolt,  in  Novembei-,  1917,  to  her 
present  form  of  a  communistic  republic,  organized  in  "com- 
munities of  common  interest" — geographical  and  occupational 
— and  based  on  advanced  political  and  sociological  views  long 
advocated  by  the  best  thinkers  of  all  nations  on  these  absorb- 
ing topics.  Thus  Russia  has,  in  addition  to  the  effects  of  mili- 
tary defeat  and  revolution,  gone  through  the  upheaval  and 
severities  of  a  complete  political,  social  and  ethical  transfor- 
mation such  as  has  never  before  been  undertaken  in  any 
country. 

The  transformation  is  eveii  greater  than  that  attempted 
by  the  French  revolution.  It  has  brought  a  radical  change 
in  the  Russian  people's  life  relations,  mode  of  work,  civil  ad- 
ministration, public  and  private  ethics,  property  standards,  etc. 
And  at  the  same  time  that  this  tremendous  work  of  reorganiza- 

306 


tion  was  proceeding,  the  new  government  had  to  face  and 
combat  internal  opposition  by  masses  and  classes,  counter-revo- 
lutions and  the  attacks  of  the  external  enemies,  sent  or  sup- 
ported by  Russia's  former  allies  in  the  great  war,  to  destroy 
this  viper  of  Russian  freedom  and  independence — bolshevism — 
because  its  principles  are  considered  a  threat  to  "the  estab- 
lished social  and  moral  order" — that  order  which  produced  the 
brutal  war  and  the  brutal  peace — and  which  we  have  analyzed 
in  this  book  in  all  its  disappointing  aspects!  The  bolshevist 
government  has  performed  the  marvelous  feat  of  beating  down 
most  of  its  military  enemies,  native  and  foreign,  and  of  over- 
coming much  of  the  internal  opposition  to  the  new  idea — but 
there  is  a  force  which  it  has  not  been  able  to  overcome  and 
which  is  working  to  bring  about  the  failure  of  the  whole 
program  of  bolshevist  reform.  That  force  is  the  ignorant 
ilwill  of  a  prejudiced  world  clinging  to  its  old  social  and  ethical 
ideas  although  the  failure  of  these  ideas  has  been  demonstrated 
for  a  half-a-century  and  been  made  glaringly  apparent  to  all 
by  the  occurrence  of  the  war  and  its  revelation  of  our  cup- 
idity and  littleness.  This  force  of  ignorance,  prejudice  and 
blind  hate  is  not  content  with  throwing  every  vile  epithet  at 
this  movement  and  stamping  it  as  the  work  of  the  devil  him- 
self, but  has  left — and  continues  to  leave — Russia  isolated, 
shunned,  abandoned  to  herself  to  sink  or  swim  as  best  she  may, 
refusing  all  commercial  intercourse,  all  supplies  of  materials 
for  industry,  all  financial  aid  or  credits!  ' 

It  was  but  natural  that  the  great  reformation  of  society 
attempte.d  in  Russia  should,  at  the  beginning,  have  interfered 
with  normal  activities  and  that,  in  consequence,  production  was 
curtailed  and  want  and  suffering  brought  on  in  many  directions. 
It  was,  also,  unavoidable  that  in  the  working-out  of  the  details 
of  this  system  many  mistakes  would  be  made.  This  circum- 
stance had  gradually  somewhat  reacted  on  the  general  situa- 
tion in  Russia,  producing  a  degree  of  disappointment  with,  and 
accusations  against,  bolshevism  as  having  failed  to  real'ze  its 
expectations  and  promises.  In  combination  with  the  external 
pressure,  the  total  result  today  is  a  situation  of  want,  suffering, 
business  collapse  and  general  disorganization  even  greater  than 
that  in  the  defeated  countries.     In  consequence  we  have  this 

307 


disgraceful  position  which  the  world  today  occupies  towards 
Russia:  To  push  her,  by  refusal  of  all  material  help,  by  re- 
fusal to  fully  lift  the  blockade  of  her  ports,  by  refusal  to  rec- 
ognize the  bolshevist  government  to  her  utter  ruin — and 
then  to  point  to  "bolshevism"  as  the  cause  of  it  all  and  thus 
strike  it  down  by  indirection!  It  is  not  fought  squarely  on 
the  value  of  its  socialistic  theories  or  political  aims;  brute  force 
is  the  agency  used  in  the  place  of  argument!  It  is  to  be  denied 
a  chance  even  to  demonstrate  its  alleged  "errors"  by  its  fail- 
ure in  practical  application,  and  is  to  be  killed  by  imposing 
upon  the  Russian  people  hunger,  despair,  collapse,  desperation! 
Daily  the  papers  print  these  exulting  reports:  "Bolshevism 
cannot  last  six  months;  bolshevism  is  doomed;  the  industrial 
standstill  of  Russia  is  complete;  bolshevism  succumbs  to  the 
blockade,"  etc.  And  all  of  this  shameful,  cruel,  cowardly  dem- 
onstration is  made  while  mankind  is  fully  aware  of  the  anomaly 
of  its  old  ideas  of  society,  morals  and  political  form,  aware  of 
the  fermentation  among  the  masses,  the  friction  among  the 
classes,  the  sham  of  our  "democracy",  the  arrogant  triumph  rf 
"money"  over  everything  else,  the  breakdown  of  the  old  codes 
of  conduct  and  the  demand  for  new  standards,  views,  methods, 
ideals!  Now  that  this  dark  design  of  driving  Russia — because 
of  bolshevism — to  economic  collapse  and  starvation  has  suc- 
ceeded and  famine  has  actually  overtaken  large  sections  of  the 
country,  these  same  external  enemies  rush  in  with  "relief 
trains"  to  ameliorate  the  misery  and  failure  to  which  they  have 
so  largely  and  designedly  contributed!! 

The  great  difficulty  in  Russia  with  bringing  the  communistic 
republic  to  an  immediate  success  lies  largely  in  the  fact  that 
the  leaders  of  the  movement  had  no  concrete  example  of  a 
successful  similar  form  of  society  and  political  State  before 
them  from  ancient  or  modern  times  from  whose  record  they 
might  have  profited  and  whose  "constitutions"  they  might  have 
adapted  to  their  requirements.  It  is  also  particularly  unfortu- 
nate that  this  form  of  socialism  should  have  been  first  brought 
to  a  practical  test  in  so  vast  and  populous  a  country  as  Russia, 
with  such  liriiited  means  of  communication,  and  under  the  hin- 
dering material  conditions  which  followed  the  war.  Reason 
and  former  experiments  of  similar  character  demonstrate  that 
any  highly  advanced  form  of  popular  government,  combined 
with  socialistic  ideas    (which  exact  the   best  grade  of  popular 

308 


education,  intelligence  and  personal  devotion  from  the  indi- 
vidual citizen)  should  first  be  "worked  out"  in  a  smaller  coun- 
try of  the  size  of  Holland  or  Belgium  or  Bavaria  and  not 
exceeding  twenty  millions  in  population.  Within  such  a  modest 
compass  the  problems  of  principle  and  practical  application  of 
such  a  new  system  can  be  more  readily  tested  and  perfected 
and  made  ready  for  adoption  in  lai'ger  countries.  (See  the 
fuller  elaboration  of  this  thought  in  "National  Evolution"  by 
this  author.) 

But  Bolshevism — a  simple  form  of  democratic  communistic 
society — whether  the  present  experiment  in  Russia  survive  or 
go  down — has  at  least  successfully  revealed  a  "new  idea,"  a 
step  forward  towards  freedom  and  salvation  from  present  dis- 
appointments, because  even  its  worst  enemies  could  not  deny — 
if  it  should  succumb — that  its  fall  came  from  outside  opposi- 
tion more  than  from  internal  weakness!  The  compound  com- 
bination of  foi'ces  against  it  never  allowed  the  system  a  fair, 
full  and  peaceable  chance  of  demonstration.  The  expei-iment 
may  yet  succeed;  at  all  events  the  idea  will  survive  and  return 
soon,  purged  of  its  present  shortcomings,  as  the  new  star  out 
of  the  East  to  show  the  world  a  new  and  better  way  to  live! 


"i  /  V  ;it 


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